
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HISTORY OF USS DACE (SS 247)

The Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut, laid the keel of hull number SS 247 in their new Victory Yard on July 22, 1942.

April 25, 1943, Mrs. O. Pomeroy Robinson christened this hull the DACE and sent her sliding into the waters of the Thames River -- the first submarine to be launched at the Victory Yard.

Three officers and about ten members of the crew of the DACE were present for the launching. Her prospective commanding officer was Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, Naval Academy class of 1933. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander W.G. Holman, Class of 1936. Other officers assigned to the ship were: Lieutenant C.R. Clark, Jr., USN, Engineering Officer; Lieutenant H.D. Thorton, USNR, gunnery officer; Lieutenant (junior grade) F.P. Thomas, USN, Commissary Officer; Ensign E.T. Jones, USN, Assistant Engineering Officer; and Ensign C.C. Erhard, USNR, Communications Officer.

On July 23, 1943, Captain W.W. Foster, of the Electric Boat Company, got the DACE underway and brought her alongside the pier at the U.S. Submarine Base, New London. The officers and crew, dressed in blues waited silently on the dock for their ship. At 1700, that afternoon, they marched aboard. After a brief ceremony the ship was formally handed over to the crew.

The next two weeks were spent in the New London area.

Over fifty per cent of the crew were green hands, fresh from Submarine School. Only seventeen men had ever been on a war patrol before. Full advantage had to be taken of this period to organize this outfit into coordinated submarine crew.

On August 9, 1943, the USS DACE went to sea for the first time on a short trip to Newport, Rhode Island. She spent a few days there test firing torpedoes then returned to New London. Prior to her arrival she made her first deep dive, without incident.

On September 6, 1943, the DACE got underway for Pearl Harbor. She stopped for a few days at the Submarine Base, Colon, Canal Zone, then completed her trip.

On October 3, the USS DACE arrived at Pearl Harbor. For two and a half weeks she went through the tests, drills, and exercises prescribed by Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, to prepare her for war. Finally, on October 20, heavily laden with torpedoes, fuel, ammunition and food, the DACE set sail on War Patrol Number One.

WAR PATROL NUMBER ONE

The USS DACE stopped at Midway from October 24-27 in order to repair one engine. On October 27, she crossed the 180th meridian for the first time. On the 31st, the barometer started dropping. On November 2, it dropped 18 points in seven hours and the DACE encountered her first heavy weather.

On the 4th, she entered her patrol area which was off the coast of the southern-most Japanese island. For several days she patrolled the area submerged in the daytime and surfaced at night.

First contact was made the night of November 7, while on the surface. There seemed to be two large ships and two small ones. The target fired at was similar to the KYAKKO MARU of 6,783 tons. One hit was felt and lots of black smoke poured out of the targets stack.

The DACE returned for a second attack but this time a large oiler with two escorts loomed up ahead. One ofthe escorts challenged her. She ignored the challenge and fired more torpedoes -- no results. The Japs flashed search-lights and dropped depth charges but the DACE had clearod the area on the surface.

The patrol continued off the coast of MIKI SAKI. Numerous planes and a few small picket boats were sighted but nothing worth-while.

On November 11, the USS DACE surfaced early in the evening in the bright moonlight. At 2130, a patrol boat was sighted. The DACE turned away and tried to open the range. The patrol boat now was revealed as a destroyer which commenced chasing. When the destroyer had closed the DACE to 6,000 yards, the submarine fired a spread of torpedoes. The Japs did not make the expectd final dive so the DACE submerged -- and fast. The Jap rushed over the top and dropped four depth charges -- not close, then continued away at high speed.

Days of routine patrolling went by. Planes were sighted and evaded by diving. Small picket boats were always present, but no worth while targets were sighted.

On November 14, she shifted to the southern part of the area and about midnight sighted HACHIJO JIMA about 40 miles away.

At the break of dawn on the 15th, an aircraft carrier of the SHOKAKU-class, and at least three destroyers passed just outside of torpedo range. It was impossible to get closer to them while the boat was submerged.

On the 19th, at about 1800, while theship was submerged a tanker and an escort were sighted. Everything looked good for a submerged attack but the Japs became suspicious and the tanker turned away. The escort located the DACE and attacked. The first depth charge was close, light bulbs broke,cork flew off the bulkheads, and few cables were pushed further into the ship.

Within an hour three more patrol boats joined the fun and tried to relocate the DACE. Fourteen more depth charges were dropped -- none very close. About 2100, the patrol boats gave up and left the vicinity. The DACE surfaced at 2315, found herself alone so she cleared the area.

The DACE remained in her area but out of sight of land on a shipping lane for the next few days. One small ship, possibly a "Q" ship and one CHIDORI were sighted at a distance but no worth -while contacts appeared.

Finally on December 4, the DACE was ordered back to Midway for rest and refit.

The combat insignia was not authorized for this patrol at this time. The Patrol lasted for 53 days.

The refit for the second patrol was started on December 11th while the crew rested on Midway.

On December 28, Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, USN, was relieved as Commanding officerby Lieutenant Commander B.D. Claggett, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1935. From December 29 through January 4,1944, the new Commanding Officer trained his crew in and around Midway. During this time Vice Admiral C.A. Lockwood, Jr., USN., spent a day on the DACE observing the training exercises. January 7, the ship was completely loaded and sent out on her second war patrol.

From January 7 to 18, daily drills and dives were held for training purposes. A few plane. contacts were made but the submarine was evidently undetected. On the 15th, the DACE was transferred to the operational command of Task Force 72. On the 18th the DACE entered her assigned area located between the Bismarck Archipelago and the Caroline Islands.

From the 18th to the 26th, the ship patrolled her area on the surface. Once a lot of wreckage and a lifeboat were sighted, and once six Jap planes were seen. On the 23rd, Pulosuk Island was sighted about 30 miles away. On the 24th, the area off Manila Reef was patrolled on the Palau-Truk shipping route.

Contact was established the night of the 26th on a large tanker with two escorts. For three hours the group was tracked in order to determine their course and speed. The DACE turned in to attack. Unfortunately, one of the escorts complicated the attack by interposing itself between the sub and themain target. The sub passes successfully behind the escort and fired torpedoes at the tanker. A couple of minutes later two violent explosions shook the sub but no flashes were seen because of rain squall. The target fired two red rockets. Three more explosions were then heard. The DACE turned away with one escort, which appeared to be a destroyer, chasing her. For a long time the destroyer stayed about a mile and a half dead astern then it seemed to give up the chase and left.

The DACE then went back after the target which was still on the surface and making about 16 knots. The sub was unable to catch up with her before daylight, so the chase was abandoned and normal patrol routine resumed.

On the 28th, the sub started working her way slowly to Tulagi for fuel. A couple of friendly subs were encountered and several aircraft were detected. On February 2, the DACE arrived in Tulagi and commenced fueling and minor voyage repairs. On the third, she got underway again for patrol south of the Caroline Islands near Truk. Three or four of the usual plane contacts were made but none noticed the DAVE bec use she dived out of sight.

From February 6, to 11, the submarine patrolled her area on the surface and dived two or three times a day to avoid the numerous aircraft in that particular area.

On the 11th, a convoy of five ship were contacted but because it was impossible to close them the DACE lost contact and tried to intercept them further along their possible track. Two hours later they were contacted again but closer investigation showed that they were small and not worthy of torpedo fire. Tracking was discontinued.

From the 12th to 17th, she conducted her patrol off of Helene Shoals.

On the 17th, the DACE moved to a patrol area west of Truk near Pulusuk Island. Several plane contacts were made.

On February 22nd, she exchanged signals with the USS PERMIT. At midnight, that same day, the DACE received orders to return to Milne Bay, New Guinea.

Enroute to Milne Bay, she met the USS DARTER and the two subs proceeded in company the rest of the way.

This patrol also was not successful and the combat insignia was not authorized. The patrol lasted 49 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER THREE

After a two week rest period spent at Camp Beeman, Milne Bay the officers and crew returned to the DACE on March 11th much refreshed. The DACE was ready for sea on March 16. She got underway on her third war patrol in company with the USS FLOUNDER and escorted by the USS BACHE. On March 18, she arrived at Langemak Bay to pick up passengers for special missions. She then departed for her area late the same afternoon.

After reconnoitering the coast near Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea, at close range for two days and a night, the DACE closed in on the surface, after dark, March 23rd. During this perbd the DACE had taken many photographs and made sketches of the coast and surrounding terrain. At 2315, she put off five commandos in a rubber boat -- distance to the beach one mile. At 0213 March 24th, she put of off two more boats with six commandos.

For the next two days the DACE took pictures of the coast, sighting nothing but a hospital ship and an occasional patrol boat.

Upon completing these missions the ship returned to Seeadler Harbor, Admiralty Islands for fuel arriving midday the 27th. The next day she headed out once more bound for the patrol area. On March 31, she received a two-bomb straddle from a Jap bomber which dived out of the clouds. On April 4th, the DACE sighted an aircraft carrier leaving Davao Gulf but could not close to attack. At 0012 April 6th, the DACE contacted a task force of three Jap cruisers and four destroyers. Two torpedoes weere fired at each cruiser at 0042. There were no hits. At 0130 the next morning, the DACE contacted an escorted freighter, but after a prolonged chase, the sub was detected an received three depth charges. She was unable to attack.

The DACE received orders April 10th to meet the dadly damaged USS SCAMP, and escort her home. That evening contact was established and the DACE and the SCAMP commenced their long trek back to the base, arriving at Seeadler Harbor April 16th. On April 19th, the DACE got underway for patrol once again.

During this time the DACE had a very interesting experience. The ship made a routine dive to evade a Jap plane. Due to the excitement of the moment and temporary loss of power the boat nosed gently over to an angle of 52 degrees. Everyone was forced down to the forward bulkhead. The Chief Radioman, J.H. Jemison, USN, slid out of the radio shack, inadvertently grabbed the knocker valve on the high pressure air manifold and blew the main ballast tanks. The Captain ordered all back full. Control was regained just before the boat broached so that she stayed out of sight under the surface.

That same day another emergency dive ended up with a 37 degree down angle. It seemed to be the day for steep dives. Everything stayed under control from then on, and the ship regained her normal stability. There was no further excitement until the 26th when a p periscope was sighted. This was avoided.

The evening of the 27th, several destroyers were contacted but they got away. On May 2nd, the DACE chased for several hours a large tanker escorted by two destroyers. Hampered by reduced speed due to a generator casualty, and impending dawn, the DACE fired five torpedoes at the tanker from long range. Unfortunately there were no hits, and close gun fire from the escorts drove the DACE off.One fairly close depth charge was dropped."

That afternoon, after a long and nerve-racking patrol, the DACE headed for home, and arrived at Brisbane, Australia, May 13, 1944.

This patrol was considered successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The patrol lasted 59 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FOUR

After a 30-day refit, including two weeks leave in Brisbane, Sydney, and environs, the DACE was ready for sea. She headed north June 13th with a new Executive Office, Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN. Various training exercises were conducted under Commander C.C. Burlingame, USN. She arrived at Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralties June 20th. The next day, the DACE departed for her area and on the way opened the "ACEY DACE" Movie Theater with a showing of "No Time For Love." June 26th, she entered the area and commenced hunting Japs in earnest.

The DACE patrolled submerged close to the Mindanao Coast during the day and on the surface at night. Many contacts were made, all of which either got away or were too small to be worth-while targets. The great number of planes contacted indicated considerable activity in Davao Gulf. Finally on July 9th, the DACE made a submerged attack on a large transport with two escorts. She scored at least three hits. Various countermeasures made observation of final results impossible. A total of 43 depth charges were dropped, too close for comfort, but not close enough for severe damage.

On July 16th, the DACE penetrated Sarangani Bay and took periscope photographs. At dawn, July 20 off Port Lebak, she contacted a well escorted tanker which passed just out of range. Surfacing later that morning the DACE started a long and hazardous chase in full view of the shore. The target was not seen again and the disappointment was intense.

Just after dawn July 26 smoke was seen on the horizon. This contact was chased all day, the DACE being forced to submerge eight times to avoid detection by planes. That night after dark contact was re-established and at 0049, the next morning, the DACE attacked on the surface. Ten torpedoes were fired into a convoy of three ships and six escotts -- one ship was sunk. The DACE was forced to submerge to avoid being rammed. Twenty-six depth charges were dropped.

The afternoon of July 31st, a submerged attack was made on a small unescorted freighter. One hit sank it at once but another torpedo exploded prematurely just outside the ship. It shook the boat and shattered light bulbs and gauge faces. The next morning the last four torpedoes were fired at a medium-sized freighter with four escorts. The freighter nimbly dodged all torpedoes while the escorts climbed on the DACE to the tune of 10 close depth charges. Later that morning the DACE, having expended all torpedoes, headed for the "barn." She arrived at Seeadler Harbor, August 6th, and left for Brisbane the next day. The DACE ran through very heavy weather in the Coral Sea, but arrived safely in Brisbane, Australia, on August 12th.

This patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of the patrol was 60 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FIVE

Two hectic weeks of renewing acquaintance and visiting in Sydney, Toowoomba, Southport, Coolangatta, Redcliffe and to other areas along the east coast of Australia finally terminated with the announcement that the DACE had received an excellent refit and was ready for her fifth war patrol.

On September 1st, under the command of Commander B.D. Claggett, in company with the USS DARTER and escorts, the DACE departed from Brisbane. That same evening, while making a trim dive, a submerged object jarred the boat. Next morning an investigation with shallow-water diving apparatus revealed that the sonar head would be inoperative for the rest of the trip. Commander R.H. Crane, USN, training officer came aboard September 4th, and observed all battle and emergency drills for two days. Finally on the 10th, the DACE moored alongside the USS COUCAL at Darwin to replenish food and fuel. After an uneventful transit of Banka Passage the patrol area was reached and the DACE commenced mine sweeping operations. With 20-millimeter gun fire she sank six drifting type mines and exploded one moored type (parts of which became firmly imbedded in the desk, and narrowly missed the Officer of the Deck). Reconnaissance and mine-sweeping assignments terminated on the 27th, when we moored alongside the USS ORION in Mios Qoendi Lagoon, Schouten Islands.

An untimely caualty to the master gyro compass forced the DACE into the "Reluctant Dragon Club" and departure was delayed until October 3. She then proceeded via Sibutu and East Ape Pass and reached the assigned area of Palawan Passage and Balabac Strait on October 10. The 13th proved a lucky day when a seven ship convoy of tankers and freighters with two destroyers escorting was sighted. Shortly after midnight on the 14th (after the navigator labored over charts, bearings, soundings, and ranges) the DACE had firmly established her position inside a treacherous area of reefs, shoals and islands and proceeded to attack. While firing (on the surface) one torpedo ran erratic and only expert maneuvering allowed the boat to continue the attack and avoid her own torpedo which porpoised and circled and threatened the DACE's existence. Torpedo explosions in the targets alerted the destroyers and their tracers streaked through the air but no splashes of falling enemy shells were noticed. The DACE cleared the area at full speed to reload. Results of this attack were one 10,000-ton tanker sunk and one 7,500 ton transport sunk. Approaching daylight forced the ship to leave the hazardous area. On the 19th, two nosey, alert, Jap anti-submarine destroyers avoided our torpedoes and promptly retaliated with depth charges. Again shortly after midnight on the 22nd, while exchanging information with the USS DARTER, the radar contacted high speed enemy ships -- definite indication of men-of-war. In conjunction with the DARTER the DACE, making maxinum speed on the surface, set a course to intercept these desirable targets. But the enemy's radical change of course plus the advantage of greater speed permitted him to escape untouched and unseen.

Our orders were to return to the base. However the Skipper had that "funny-feeling in his bones" and requested that the DACE be given permission to extend her time in the "hot spot." The next night (and again minutes after midnight) while talking to the DARTER, a long range radar contact put us in pursuit of the enemy. In this instance a failure in our most vital piece of equipment caused us to lose touch with our future targets. Teamwork on the part of the DARTER and our communication set-up permitted us to continue our chase. Meanwhile the expertly trained technicians worked "like mad" and in a short time had our equipment back in shape. At about 0200, an enemy task force of 12 big and important men-of-war surrounded by fast, cautious "tin-cans" was being plotted and recorded. So the Old-Man's hunch had materialized and the DACE and DARTER were making preparations for the big event to take place at dawn.

The DARTER made the first run and did a beautiful job of destroying Jap men-of-war. Shortly thereafter the DACE expertly executed attack at dawn which cost the Japs their biggest heavy-cruiser--the MAYA. Of course a destroyer counter attack followed and the noise of torpedoes , the cruiser's magazines exploding, the depth charging, and the sinking ships' breaking up noises were terrific. The same night a crippled heavy cruiser with two torpedoes was trying to seek the safety of a nearby port, but the two subs had otherthoughts for that choice target so plans were made accordingly. Around midnight the DARTER went aground on Bombay Shoal. At 0140 on the 24th, with the DARTER still aground, the attack was brfoken off so that the DACE could stand by to render any services possible.

When it was recognized that the DARTER couldn't be saved only one alternative was left -- rescue the personnel. Hurriedly the DARTER crew was transferred in small rubber boats through surf and breakers to the DACE. On the last trip the Commanding Officer of the DARTER came aboard and the final destruction of the unfortunate DARTER was planned. While this job was being accomplished using torpedoes and guns and enemy plane appeared and dropped a couple of bombs. Luckily she selected the DARTER as his target. This interruption forced a stop to her destruction, So, with two full submarine crews aboard an already over-crowded sub, she proceeded to Freemantle, Western Australia. These two crews were together in one submarine for two weeks.

This patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 67 days.

At Freemantle, Western Australia , an excellent refit of normal duration, conducted by the USS EURYALE, was completed and the DACE was ready for her sixth war patrol. On November 21st, Commander B.D. Claggett (after four patrols as Commanding Officer) was relieved by Commander O.R. Cole, Jr., USN.

December second the DACE in company with the USS BERGALL starting her run which took her to Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, and through Lombok Straits. DACE and BERGALL parted company while DACE doubled back to investigate a radar contact. Then the DACE proceeded along the Singapore -- Hong-Kong trade route with the hopes of intercepting some enemy traffic. This hope wasn't realized so the DACE continued on to Pulau Gambir. The channel between Pulau Gambir and the mainland was an excellent night refuge for shipping so the DACE was assigned the task of making that spot less desirable. After the many hours the navigator spent in determining currents, depths, reefs, the task of mining this channel was started at 0330 on December 16th, and was completed one hour and fifteen minutes later. Later that afternoon loud explosions were heard but the heavy seas prevented any visual verification of what the DACE thought to be the results of an effectively mined area.

The next assignment was the area off Camranh Bay. Heavy seas and strong wind made for a miserable existence. Submerged patrolling proved difficult because of the sea conditions. On the 19th, a convoy of five large ships with three escorts was sighted and the attack started. Bad weather was certainly in the enemy's favor. At times the targets could not be seen and again the periscopes would be exposed too much. Depth control was difficult but expertly handled. Just as the first torpedo was to be sent on its way, a series of four depth charges or bombs went off which shook the boat violently, and cork and paint chips filtered down from the overhead. More depth charges followed the initial pattern, starting some oil leaks, causing light bulbs to break , and more paint and cork to fall. The DACE decided to break off the attack and evade. She hit bottom, and while resting there anxiously waiting for the escorts to go away, the strong current took charge, and carried the DACE bumping, turning, scraping and clanking along the bottom. How the boat avoided being detected will never be known. She surfaced, after making some repairs and proceeded to an area farther north. At 0459, on the 21st, another contact put us in hot pursuit of the enemy, but after closing the range she decided the target was too small and an unsuccessful attack would only divulge her position, so the sub abandoned the chase. The enemy had another idea and promptly proceeded to launch his own attack. The DACE outdistanced the chaser without being recognized or seen and dove to definitely lose him. On that dive a main engine was flooded so she surfaced at 0750 and located the trouble. At 0100 on the 22nd, while heading into the seas at slow speed, the topside damage was repaired and the engine was put back in commission. During the next few days numerous contacts were made which were either impossible to attack or too small to sdo anything about. Christmas Day was just another day of patrol except that the cook and baker did an excellent job of preparing a delicious and unforgetable dinner.

While running on the surface many floating mines were detected so the lookouts were doubly cautious. On the 28th, another opportunity presents itself --this one resulting in sinking one medium freighter of 4,000 tons and damaging one medium freighter of 4,000 tons. In the days that followed, planes and small ships were contacted but not targets of any size worthy of torpedoes were sighted so our presence remained a secret.

December 31st, a worth,-while periscope contact of two columns of ships was made at 1000. The Captain's plan was to avoid the ever-closing escorts which were shielding the group and to locate himself between the two columns. While trying to keep in close touch with all the ships and still keep our presence unknown the Captain sighted planes -- which served to increase to our already numerous interferences. Intense anti-submarine measures were being employed by the protectors of the Japanese ships so the Skipper had to be extremely careful. Fortunately for the Japs and unfortunately for the DACE, an escort carrier (which was the target singled out for her attack) was at an excessive range for our torpedoes -- or else sighted and avoided our torpedoes, and consequently got away untouched. A plane dropped a depth bomb but his aim was off, so no damage was done. At 1233, while making preparations for surfacing another bomb was dropped -- this one also not too close. After surfacing at 1433, we set out to run down the evasive targets but a plane, forced us to dive two minutes later and again a depth charge was felt -- but wasn't close either. In the next hour or so more depth charges were dropped -- but fortunately none did any damage.

The next few days were spent in normal patrol and on January 7th, the DACE made preparations for the trip to Saipan. On the 8th, two suspicious vessels which were investigated, proved to be Chinese junks. They were left untouched. On January 17th, the DACE reached Saipan and moored alongside the USS SKIPJACK alongside the USS FULTON. On the 18th, the DACE departed Saipan enroute Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the twenty-eighth.

The patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 58 days.

On January 28th, 1945, the DACE arrived in Pearl Harbor where she received voyage repairs. She then proceeded to the San Francisco Bay Area for her first Navy Yard overhaul.

From February 8th, until April 25th, the ship underwent a complete and satisfactory overhaul at the Submarine Repair Basin, Bethlehem Steel Company. During this period all personnel and offices were given 30 days leave and were transferred and new men reported aboard. Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN, was relieved as Executive Officer and Navigator by Lieutenant F.J. Ruder, USN, on March 12, 1945.

April 26th, the DACE departed San Francisco enroute Pearl Harbor in company with the USS WHALE.

The two subs arrived Pearl Harbor on May fifth. For six days they under-went a voyage refit then started the training period with Captain C.C. Burlingame, USN, as training officer.

The seventh war patrol started May 25th. Two subs, the DACE and the USS CABEZON, left for the cold waters of the Kuriles Islands.

On the 29th, they laid over at Midway for fuel and supplies

From April 30th, till June 7th, the two ships, enroute to station, conducted training exercises and drills individually and together. The evening of the 7th, they separated and headed in for their patrol stations. The DACE closed the coast that night and dived in Kunashiro (Channel) between the islands of Shikotan and Kunashiri.

Early that morning two sailing vessels were sighted through the periscope. The DACE tracked them with difficulty in the ever thickening fog. Finally preparations were made and at 0945, she surfaced in smooth water in a fog with Japanese islands only a few miles on either side of them. At a range of only 1600 yards she opened fire with her five-inch gun and automatic weapons.

The first shot from the forward gun hit the largest sailing vessel in the bow. In a couple of minutes, a five-inch shell which hit amidships started a roaring fire. Jap flags painted on the side made perfect targets for the gun crews. The DACE closed in to 500 yards and made certain the destruction was complete. She then turned her attention to the other sailing vessel.

A small rowboat with one or maybe two survivors was being rowed furiously into the fog towards the nearest beach. The second vessel was completely deserted. In a few minutes it too was reduced to a smouldering wreck.

By this time, the fog had cleared enough so that the nearby shores were visible. The DACE moved away from the scene of the wreckage, then dived.

This was the first time the DACE had ever surfaced and fired her guns at an enemy ship.

The DACE finally left the area on the ninth of June and headed into the Sea of Okhotsk.

The early morning of June 10th, a large freighter and a small tanker were sighted about eight miles ahead. The DACE went ahead full speed in order to run around the ships and get ahead of them. At one time the fog cleared up enough to show a large destroyer escort only six miles away. For a couple of minutes the personnel on the bridge watched this Japanese warship, then the fog obscured her again.

An hour later another escort was seen for a few minutes, then disappeared. The convoy now consisted of two rather potent escorts, one freighter, and a small tanker.

At about noon all hands had lunch, then the sub waited dead ahead of the convoy. In a half hour the first escort came into sight and the DACE submerged.

Silently the DACE slipped unseen under the water between the two escorts. The freighter was dead ahead and coming towards her bows on. The DACE maneuvered out of the way, and with the freighter only 380 yards away, she fired. Almost instantly the first torpedo hit the freighter with a tremendous explosion amidships. Quickly more torpedoes were fired at the smaller tanker but none hit. The Captain took a quick look at the escorts through the periscope and discovered one of them coming straight for the submarine. Quickly another torpedo was fired at this escort, then the DACE dived deep. Just before the periscope was lowered a quick glance at the freighter proved that the first torpedo had done its job well. As she dived to deeper depths the noise of the freighter breaking up on her way towards the bottom was clearly audible through the hull.

A couple of minutes of silence passed, then four depth charges shook the boat. Someone remarked: "If you think that was loud wait until you hear the next ones." The breaking up noises from the freighter continued. The escort could be heard coming back for another run. A quick set-up was made and another torpedo was fired.

Shortly afterwards and explosion that sounded like a torpedo hit, rumbled through the boat, In quick succession 19 more explosions went off overhead. Five minutes of silence passed. Twelve depth charges exploded close by and shook the ship slightly.

For the next few hours the DACE silently eased away from the searching escorts, one of which was probably badly damaged. Finally late that afternoon after four hours of freezing quiet the DACE came close to the surface for a periscope look -- all clear. The heaters were turned on and everyone restored circulation in their numb limbs by stamping their feet and drinking hot coffee.

After dark, the DACE surfaced in very rough seas. She went back to the scene of the action but could locate no wreckage. She then headed for the area of Kita Uruppu Channel.

June 11-16, the DACE patrolled back and forth in the channel. Some days were exceptionally clear and the snow-capped peaks of Shimishura Take towered high over her. Other days were foggy and bleak.

On the 16th, the DACE joined company with the CABEZON, the USS APOGON and the USS MANTA. The four subs made a wide patrol sweep up the eastern side of the KURILES. During this sweep the first plane for this patrol was contacted -- no bombs.

On the 17th, the pack received orders to search for the crew of a U.S, Army plane which had been forced down near Araido To. Each sub headed for her assigned area and arrived there next day early. The whole day was spent on the surface in a light mist and only five to ten miles away from Araido to. Most of the time the lofty island was clearly visible.

The aviators could not be found. That afternoon a single Jap plane took off from a nearby air field and searched a while on the other side of the island. He never saw the DACE although she was only 15 miles away. An hour later, another plane appeared only 6 miles away so the DACE dived.

That eve after she had surfaced the DACE sighted quite a bit of gunfire about 20 miles away but could not find out what it was all about.

On the 18th, the DACE proceeded down the western side of the Kuriles alon . Later that night she contacted a single ship. For a couple of hours she tracked and ran around the ship in order to get ahead of it. During this time, several distant underwater explosions were heard. The APOGON had located a convoy and was working it over.

Shortly after midnight the DACE was ahead of her target. It was very dark, but the water was constantly illuminated with phosphorescence.. She turned toward her target and waited on the surface in the darkness. Soon the target was close enough and the torpedoes were fired. The water was churned into a brilliant flue flame by force of the expulsion of the torpedoes. Each torpedo left a brilliant streak in the highly phospherescent water. The Jap saw them coming and maneuvered so that they passed down both sides of him.. By this time, the ships were very close and had materialized into a heavily armed anti submarine MIKURA-class frigate. The DACE rapidly turned away and bent on full power. A cloud of exhaust smoke poured out of her engines and momentarily hid her from view. Twin flashes appeared on the bow of the Jap and two explosions resounded through the air. A faint cheer went up from the crew below -- they thought the Jap had been hit by the DACE's torpedoes. Two shells exploded ahead of the DACE. Another salvo came so close that the whistling of the shells could be heard in the conning tower. One exploded close to the ship. The DACE fired more torpedoes -- no luck. She dived rapidly and deep, and fired yet another torpedo. This was not a case of hitting the target -- it was a case of saving the DACE for V-J Day. The next three minutes were spent hanging on as the sub rocked and was shaken by 18 large and loud depth charges.

The DACE maneuvered and evaded far below the surface while the Jap attempted to reloacate her. He dropped 18 more charges which were not too close. A couple of hours later he had wandered so far away from the DACE that she secured from battle stations and allowed everyone not on watch to turn in for a well-earned rest. Some slight damage from the depth charging was noticed, but nothing serious -- only the usual broken light bulbs, scattered cork insulations, some small leads broken and some small valves backed off of their seats.

June 20-26, the DACE patrolled in the Sea of Okhotsk.

One day during a heavy overcast, the bridge watch were startled to hear the whine of an approaching airplane. As the sub dived, the last man down the hatch saw the Japs plane roar about 100 feet overhead. A half-minute later the sub was under and bullets were dropping on to the hull as the plane tried to strafe. One small depth bomb went off, but it missed by a wide margin.

Once during this time the DACE dropped a few shells into a sulphur refinery close to the beach at Moyoro Wan, but it was so hazy that no results were observed.

On the 26th, the DACE joined the other members of the wold pack and continued a sweep through the Okhotsk Sea, and along the lower channels of the Kuriles Island chain.

On the 27th, she closed in one morning on a contact and finally recognized her as a Russian Merchant ship -- a lend-lease Liberty type ship.

On the second of July, the subs operated independently and the DACE went to Kita Uruppu channel for patrol.

No contacts were made, so on July 6th, the DACE and CABEZON again joined company and left the area.

The patrol was deemed successful for the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 47 days.

POST - WAR PERIOD

The DACE and CABEZON arrived at Midway on July 25, 1945. For two weeks the relief crew overhauled the ship while the officers and crew enjoyed themselves sunning, fishing and engaging in competitive sports. The DACE and CABEZON engaged in an athletic competion for a plaque to be presented to the winning ship. The DACE now has the plaque as a trophy in her forward battery passageway.

On August 4th, the two subs got underway for another war patrol. they arrived at Saipan on August 13th for voyage repairs.

The ship was all ready to leave on August 15th, 1945, at 1400. At ten in the morning, Japan agreed to surrender terms, and the patrol was delayed indefinitely.

For two weeks the DACE remained in Saipan. A quarter of the crew and officers were assigned to man any Jap subs which might appear for surrender. They returned to the DACE ten days later without seeing a Jap submarine.

On September 1, 1945, the DACE set sail for Pearl Harbor in company with the USS ORION, USS RAY, USS CREVALIE and USS ICEFISH.

After an uneventful trip they all arrived in Pearl Harbor on September 10,1945, and waited for the orders which would take them all home for good.

On September 13, 1945, the DACE, MUSKALLUNGE, CREVALLE, and GATO departed for Panama and home. The DACE was scheduled to return to New London on October 5th. She had made seven war patrols in two years and two months active duty, and sunk or damaged over 73,000 tons of enemy ships.

By Directive dated January 1947, USS DACE (SS 247) was later placed out of commission, in reserve, attached to the U. S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

SUMMARY OF PATROL RESULTS

No. of Patrols	Number and Type of Ships Sunk	Tonnage of Ships Sunk	Number and Type of Ships Damaged	Tonnage of Ships Sunk
1	0	0	Freighter (EC) KYOKKO MARU type	6,783
2	0	0	Tanker (EU)	10,000
3	0	0	0	0
4	1-AK (EU) 1-SMC (EU)	2,000 1,200	1 AP (EU)	10,000
5	1-AO (EU) 1-AP (EU) 1-CA (ATAGO class)	10,000 7,500 12,500	0	0
6	1-AK	4,000	1 AK	4,000
7	1-AK EIHUKU class (EU)	4,000	1 PF (MIKURA) (EC)	1,500

No. of Patrols	Number and Type of Ships Sunk	Tonnage of Ships Sunk	Number and Type of Ships Damaged	Tonnage of Ships Sunk
	1-MIS Sea-truck (EC)	300		
	1-MIS Lugger (EC)	100		
TOTAL FOR WAR	9	41,600	5	32,283

USS DACE earned seven Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal for participating in the following operations:

1 Star/Asiatic-Pacific Raids - 1944
Truk Attack -- 16 to 17 February 1944

1 Star/Western New Guniea Operation
Cape Sansapor Operation -- 30 July to 31 August 1944

1 Star/Leyte Operation
Battle of Surigao Strait -- 24 to 26 October 1944

1 Star/Luzon Operation -- 12 December 1944 to 1 April 1945

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 20 October to 11 December 1943

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 16 March to 13 May 1944

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 25 May to 10 July 1945

She also earned the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION on 22 to 23 October 1944 while on her fifth war patrol in the Pacific.

*****

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH	312 feet
BEAM	27 feet
SPEED	20 knots
DISPLACEMENT	1,468 tons

*****

1st Copy.

SS247/A12-2

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
December 11, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 141.
(2) The Commander Submarines Pacific, Subordinate Command.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track chart of patrol in area assigned for Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the First War Patrol of this vessel, conducted along the southeast coast of HONSHU and the approaches to Nagoya, during the period October 20, 1943 and December 11, 1943, is forwarded herewith.

/s/ J.F. ENRIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-0909c DATE 5/25/72

DECLASSIFIED

63096

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

PROLOGUE

Arrived at Pearl Harbor from the East coast on October 3, 1943. On October 4, 1943 went alongside the U.S.S. BUSHNELL for voyage repairs. Installed additional 20MM gun aft. Installed brackets for (2) 50 cal. guns on deck. Shifted positions of periscopes due to interference between officer at forward periscope and radar operator during night attacks. October 9, 1943 fired (6) Mark 18 torpedoes forward in satisfactory test. Was depermed and conducted sound test. Independent operations in area on 10th, and started training period. 6 days with target including 2 nights.

(B) NARRATIVE

Oct. 20th

1300 (VW) Departed Pearl with PC 586 as escort.
1600 (VW) Trim dive.
1915 (VW) Released escort.

Oct. 21st

Training dive.
0810 (VW) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with PBY.
0910 (VW) Sighted B24 Liberator. We challenged and he used current reply. He continued to close up, and at 1 mile we fired flare. He approached close aboard, then on his way.
1450 (VW) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with PBY.
1500 (VW) Changed time to plus 10.
1850 (W) Secured #2 main engine. Connecting rod bearing wiped, badly scoring the journal. No apparent cause for casualty. Sent message to Midway concerning required repairs.

Oct. 22nd

Training dive and fire control drill.

Oct. 23rd

Training dive and fire control drill. The ship is 3 months old. 152 dives - 10,350 miles.

Oct. 24th

0800 (W) Met Midway plane escort.
0930 (Y) Moored alongside U.S.S. SPERRY. Started work on #2 main engine.
1015 (Y) Received CTF 17 message 241823.

Oct. 25th and 26th

SPERRY continued work on #2 main engine.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

Nov. 6th
0630 (All times are King)
Dived. Patrolling on course 240 on deep water route between Iro Saki and Shiono Misaki - sea calm - ran at periscope depth until sky became overcast with low hanging clouds. Then ran at 90 feet with observation every 20 minutes.

1835 Surfaced. Patrolled in moon streak, then set course 040 to close coast in vicinity Ota Kawa.

Nov. 7th
0336 First contact. Radar range 13,700 yards bearing North. Stopped and tracked. Found his course to be 215, speed 8.5. Paralleled his course, then closed in when data checked. Target sighted from bridge at 5500 yard range. He appeared to be similar to the KYOKKO MARU, 6783 tons. No other ships in sight but radar reported 2 big pips and 2 smaller, all about the same bearing. Fired 4 torpedoes - 2 to hit, and the others spread 2°. Swung left, expected target to blow up. No results. Fired 2 stern tubes with depth set at 10 feet. One hit is claimed as an explosion was heard on time for the first shot, and a large amount of black smoke came out of the stack. He changed course toward the beach. We started to chase the target again when another ship was sighted dead ahead, range 3500 yards. This was probably an AO as his stack was aft. Assumed that this ship was not in the original target group as he had not been sighted previously and was about 5000 yards from the other ship. This one was escorted by two PC's about 300 yards on either beam. The nearest PC started blinking a light at us, (Did not read challenge). Put a snap set up on TDC and fired 3 bow shots at 10 feet. No results. The torpedoes exploded at end of run, and about 15 minutes later the escort vessels swept the horizon with searchlights and dropped 5 or 6 depth charges.

The misses on the first salvo at the AK can be accounted for as a control error. The TDC selective switch was on "Position Keeper" only and not "Position Keeper and Angle Solver". The operator inadvertantly placed it in this position in the dark and didn't use a flashlight to check. Luminous paint has now been added. The gyro angles were in error 13°.

The misses on the second target can be accounted for as an error in the course estimate. The range was large, but not excessive. The escort sighted us shortly after we sighted the target and it was too late to dive. It was necessary to get the shots off without further checking before the escorts starting shooting and the target maneuvered.

Oct. 27th

0900 (Y) Work completed and engine tested. Underway with plane escort. Zig-zagging at 3 engine speed.

1215 (Y) Escort departed.

1700 (Y) Trim dive.

2330 (Y) Crossed 180th meridan. Advanced calendar 1 day.

Oct. 29th

0540 (M) Trim dive.

Oct. 30th

0155 (M) Radar contact on starboard beam, 4700 yards. Turned away at full speed to avoid as the TARPON and LAPON were both expected. Lost contact immediately.

0555 (M) Trim dive and fire control problem.

Oct. 31st

Barometer dropped 15 points in 7 hours. Wind and sea increased to force 4. Totally overcast. Rain squalls.

0615 (M) Trim dive. Fire control drill. Wind and sea quieted down during day.

Nov. 1st

0830 (L) Trim dive.

Nov. 2nd

Barometer dropped 18 points in 7 hours. High seas.

Nov. 3rd

Training dive. So far have sighted only 4 empty oil drums and 2 glass net balls.

Nov. 4th

Training dive.

0930 (K) Increased to 80-90 on 3 main engines and changed course from 263° to 270°.

2330 (K) Passed 15 miles north Hachijo Shima using occasional SD ranges and fathometer soundings.

Nov. 5th

0305 (K) Sighted lights of plane dead ahead about 2 miles, Northly course. Dove in SE corner of area. Planned to surface again but decided to make repairs as the trim pump wouldn't pump, the drain pump couldn't get a suction, and #2 sanitary tank sea and stop valves were both leaking badly. Made repairs in about 2 hours.

Periscope patrol on westerly course during day bucking 1½ knot current.

1814 (K) Surfaced and headed toward center of area.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

Nov. 6th (All times are King)

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Nov. 7th

The sea condition was such, force 4, that radar depth was not feasible. Therefore the surface attack was made and it was planned that accurate data would give us hits even at the range necessary to keep from being sighted.

Conducted submerged patrol in heavy seas.

Nov. 8th

Submerged patrol. During night navigated by hourly fathometer soundings and unidentified radar pips. No sights in 48 hours and land obscured by haze and clouds.

Nov. 9th

Submerged patrol. Rain and fog. Visibility in morning 1-1½ miles, sea force 4-5. Barometer dropped 27 points during dive.

Nov. 10th

Weather cleared and moderated. Navigator got sights at 0100. Closed coast and picked up Kashino Saki light. Normal brillancy, but characteristics changed to 5 seconds on and 2 seconds off. When about 10 miles from the light, the characteristics changed to steady white, and apparent jamming on the SD was noted for 20 minutes.

Conducted periscope patrol along the coast.

1738 Sighted masts of patrol boat bearing 240, distance 3 miles.

1835 Surfaced. Immediately after surfacing, 4 bright steady lights came on in vicinity of Miki Saki and stayed on for about 2 minutes--then off.

1838 2 lookouts sighted red and green lights of a plane. Dove.

1900 Surfaced.

Nov. 11th

0239 Sighted small lighted boat bearing 310°T., distance 4 miles.
Closing coast in vicinity of Miki Saki.

0635 Dived.

0847 Sighted (6) fighter planes in formation, elevation 500 feet, westerly course.

0923 Sighted DAVE type float plane patrolling coast in vicinity of Kantori Saki and about 10 miles north. This plane was in sight almost continuously until 1200 and was patrolling the same section, but no shipping sighted.

1200-1230 Sighted (2) sail boats and (3) picket boats with a high lookout platform on mast.

1225 Heard persistent pinging, could not sight any shipping except sail boats and picket boats. A single fathometer ping was taken about 1215 to check position due to using various hard-to-identify peaks and projections for bearings.

- -

Nov. 11th

1230 Pinging much stronger and apparently on us. He was getting an echo. Went deep and rigged for silent running.

1500 Pinging died out. No screws were heard at anytime. There was a fairly good negative gradient at 230 feet which probably effected his echo ranging, but it was very clear on our sound gear.

1540 Secured from silent running and resumed periscope patrol.

1843 Surfaced. Moon very bright. Patrolling in moon streak.

2129 Sighted what we thought to be a patrol boat bearing 330° T., distange 11,000 yards, angle on bow 20° starboard. Turned stern toward him and commenced tracking with radar. First radar range 10,300 yards. When it became evident that he had sighted us and headed directly for us we put all engines on and made full power on 150°T. The patrol boat materialized into a destroyer. For the next twenty-two minutes he continued to close us at the rate of 200 yards per minute, angle on the bow zero, bearing 180° relative. When the range had closed to 6000 yards made ready three tubes aft, set depth on 6 feet, fired one half degree spread, relative speed of target and torpedo 60.5 knots, torpedo run 3 minutes. Expected to see him make a thirty second dive and when he didn't, we did. Turned off track, and before we were leveled off he dropped 4 depth charges on the track, not close. He never slowed down and was shortly lost on the sound gear. He apparently did not see the wakes as he did not change course.

Nov. 12th

0142 Surfaced and set course back to the center of the area.

It was disconcerting to know we are visible 11,000 yards in this moonlight in spite of being trimmed down.

It is realized that the torpedoes did not have a particularly good chance of hitting, but that chance was taken in hopes we could get rid of our first CHIDORI.

0617 Dived.

Nov. 12th

1833 Surfaced.

2034 SD contact 14 miles.

2045 Contact closed to 5 miles. Dived.

2106 Surfaced.

2345 Sighted single patrol boat or CHIDORI bearing 215° T., distance 6 miles.

Nov. 13th

0405 Sighted small boat--not identified.

0600 Heard and felt heavy object hit port side. Possibly an oil drum in the seaway.

0622 Dived.

Nov. 13th

0755 Sighted light bomber, KATE, 055°T., 8 miles course 210.
1030 Sighted 6 bombers on southerly course bearing 340°T.
1836 Surfaced.
2106 SD contact 15 miles.
2108 SD contact 16 miles.
2305 SD contact 5 miles. Dived.
2355 Surfaced.

Nov. 14th

0010 SD contact 6 miles.
0042 SD contact 9 miles.
0044 SD contact 5 miles. Dived.
0155 Surfaced.
0156 SD contact 6 miles. Dived as it continued to close.
0311 Surfaced.
0316 SD contact 4 miles. Dived and stayed down.
The following conclusions were reached concerning the SD and the night flying planes without lights. The Japs have a means of determining when the SD is on in the vicinity but cannot accurately DF it when on 5 seconds each minute. The plane patrols in the area until the SD goes off, indicating that the sub dove. Then the plane continues patrolling in that vicinity hoping to sight the sub in the moonlight on surfacing. After we were once located fairly closely with the bright moon, it was necessary to either continue to use the SD for indicating the planes presence, or remain down. However on the following nights in the area the SD was not used. No other night flying planes were sighted, and it is not known if they were there or not.
1830 Surfaced. After battery charge used 4 engine heading for southern part of the area to east.
2034 Secured port shaft and removed lube oil in reduction gear. Water entered gear box around pump shaft from bilges.
2113 Increased speed on both shafts.

Nov. 15th

0006 Sighted Hachijo Jima at 40 miles.
0519 Slowed and changed course to 128°T.
0555 Sight contact of 1 CV or SHOKAKU class and 3 or more destroyers. Bearing 180°T., radar range 18000 yards. Angle on bow about 90 starboard. It was starting to get light and we were silhouetted.
0557 Dived. Attempted to close but it was out of the question. The nearest screen was sighted in the periscope about 2 minutes after diving. Range 6000 yards.
0710 Set course 255 back to area.
1815 Surfaced.

Nov. 16th

0510 Reentered area. Set course 310°T.
0629 Dived.
1812 Surfaced.
2132 SJ land contact 10,400 yards.

Nov. 17th

0505 Got fix with DAIO SAKI and ANORI SAKI lights. Normal brilliancy but altered characteristics.
0616 Dived south of Daio Saki. Periscope patrol 6-10 miles south Daio Saki.
1352 Sighted 4 engine land bomber, course 310, elevation 1000 feet.

Nov. 18th

0216 Sighted small darkened boat 4 miles bearing 330° T.
0647 Dived. Conducted periscope patrol in East and West courses in Enshu Nada. Overcast. Land obscured by haze.
1820 Surfaced.
2215 Sighted hospital ship at 20,000 yards properly illuminated on course for Iro Saki.

Nov. 19th

0632 Dived 10 miles Southwest Daio Saki and closed coast.
0909 Sighted (2) DAVE type planes, 1500 feet, on course south.
0925 Sighted Ida type plane 300 feet, westerly course.
0945 Sighted small patrol boat smiliar to our Coast Guard 83 foot cutters. Angle on bow zero, range 2000 yards. Changed course to avoid and went to hand operation on bow and stern planes.
1055 Sighted bomber, BETTY, bearing 060, course 290, elevation 1000 feet.
1146 Sighted sailing ship of approximately 200 tons. Bearing north on westerly course. Distance 6000 yards.
1530 Sighted (2) small sail boats 6000 yards bearing northwest.
1627 Sighted (2) unescorted ships. One bearing 258°T., and the other 336°T.--range to each about 9,000 yards. Started approach on the one bearing 258° as his stack was aft and probably a tanker.

The angle on the bow was 30° starboard when sighted. Then it changed to 3° port as he changed course for Daio Saki light. When the range decreased to 5000 yards the ship reversed course and the angle on the bow was 177 starboard. The range continued to open until he went out of sight. The other ship was also out of sight now. Sound could not pick up heavy screws on either target but did have light fast screws in vicinity of the AO.

1755 Sighted patrol boat coming from the position the AO disappeared. Angle on bow zero, range 6000 yards. Changed course to 150° to get off his track. He started to echo range about this time, but we did not believe he

Nov. 19th

1755 was getting an echo from us. It was just sunset. When about 4000 yards from the track and one half hour after sunset, he was observed directly astern and had stopped echo ranging. The angle on the bowwas large and apparently we had avoided him. His screws were never heard.

1850 Practically dark and patrol boat not in sight.

1853 Started for radar depth for check.

1855 Sighted same patrol boat bearing 200° relative, 300 yards. Started for deep submergence.

1900 His screws were heard through the hull and he dropped his first depth charge when we were at 110 feet. It was close, breaking light bulbs in the After Torpedo Room, knocking off cork, and pushing a few cables in.

This patrol was soon joined by another, and about an hour later by a 3rd ship with screws sounding like a destroyer. At one time 4 ships were pinging.

The depth charges, a total of 14, were dropped from 1900 until 2041. The first was a single and the rest in patterns of 3 or 4. They used both echo ranging and listening and apparently had little trouble keeping on us as no charges were thrown away. We were in a good density layer which helped the depth control without pumping, but did not keep the echoes from bouncing off the hull.

The patrol boat screws and pinging were definitely astern about 2100 and died out about 2200. A high noise level developed on our port side and extended from 250° relative to 10° relative. This undoubtedly aided us.

2315 Started for periscope depth.

2325 Surfaced after periscope and radar sweep showed nothing, cleared vicinity.

Now it appears that the patrol listening gear was able to pick up our screws when we increased to standard speed during the approach. The target was obviously warned. No patrol or escort, either surface or air, was seen during the approach. Sound conditions were good. During our approach both JP and JK heard light screws in the vicinity of the target. This was apparently the patrol boat, but he was not in sight.

Nov. 20th

0630 Dived in center of area.

1834 Surfaced. No land in sight. Overcast. Greased topside fittings.

Nov. 21st

0630 Dived.

1830 Surfaced.

Nov. 22nd

0625 Dived.

0735 Sighted masts and smoke bearing 310°T. Battle stations and started approach.

0830 Discontinued approach at 4000 yards when target was determined to be a small 1500 ton coastal tramp with probably a shallow draft. It is possible that this was a Q boat as his appearance with a high bow and quiet screws in addition to his size make him very similar to Q ships as previously reported.

0925 Sighted 4 engine bomber.

1429 Sighted another CHIDORI. Range 7000 yards, course 230°, speed 18. He passed 3500 yards astern. Sound picked him up at 7000 yards after sighting and followed him out to about 10,000.

1835 Surfaced. Patrolled during night on the CHIDORI track for Omai Saki to Shinono Misaki in case he was going after a suitable target.

Missed serial lettered "HOW". Haiku schedule not as dependable as NPM.

Nov. 23rd

0640 Dived.

1430 Sighted 4 engine bomber, MAVIS, 6 miles, 3000 feet, course 310°T.

1845 Surfaced.

Nov. 24th.

0637 Dived.

1825 Surfaced.

Nov. 25th

0635 Dived.

1836 Surfaced.

Nov. 26th

0633 Dived.

1833 Surfaced.

Nov. 27th

0300 Dive for trim and BT card.

0340 Surfaced.

0640 Dived.

1845 Surfaced. Set course back to area.

Nov. 28th

0645 Dived.

1830 Surfaced.

Nov. 29th

Reentered area.
0647 Dived.
1830 Surfaced.

Nov. 30th

0639 Dived.
1828 Surfaced.

Dec. 1st

0650 Dived.
0949 Sighted black smoke. Bearing changed to south. Went to normal approach course.
1020 Smoke disappeared. Nothing else sighted.
1023 Sighted small sail boat, 344°T., 6000 yards.
1718 Sighted patrol boat apparently lying to. 235°T., 3000 yards. Changed course putting him astern.
1737 Patrol boat out of sight. No sound contact at any time.
1832 Surfaced.
1834 Sighted signal lights of two boats in vicinity of previously sighted patrol.

Dec. 2nd

0646 Dived.
1828 Surfaced.

Dec. 3rd

0659 Dived.
1826 Surfaced.

Dec. 4th

0032 Sighted lights of small boat, apparently fishing.
0654 Dived. Seas too rough for periscope observations, even at stardard speed. Rolling 15° at 120 feet.
1620 Sound picked up light fast (230 r.p.m.) screws of either a CHIDORI or PC boat. As the screws were definitely of a patrol or escort vessel, and no other around, did notrisk broaching to see him.
1652 Sound clear.
1821 Surfaced. Cleared area on return trip.

Dec. 5th

0100	Hachija Shima abeam to starboard, distance 20 miles.
0645	Dived.
0730	Surfaced--started zig-zagging at 3 engine speed.
1745	Slowed to 2 engine speed and secured zig-zagging.

Dec. 6th

0620	Dived.
0641	Surfaced.
1225	Sighted 4 engine bomber on westerly course. Dived.
1311	Surfaced.
2000-2300	Unable to get our message Ø61Ø45 through because of jamming.

Dec. 7th

Uneventful.

Dec. 8th

Barometer dropped 21 points between 1000 and 1400.
Wind and sea from southwest increased to force 6.
Rain and poor visibility.

Sent message ØSØ92Ø to Midway.

Dec. 9th

Wind, rain, and overcast weather with poor visibility continued.

Dec. 10th

Weather cleared but wind and heavy sea from west continues.

Dec. 11th

Uneventful.

2400	Set calendar back 1 day.

Dec. 11th

0605	Met Midway escort planes.

(C) WEATHER

(Enroute to Station)

The wind and sea were generally of force 3 or 4 and the sky was totally overcast approximately half the time. At no time was the weather really bad in spite of a rapidly falling barometer on 2 occasions.

(On Station)

The weather was variable. The wind was frequently of force 4, and then in a matter of minutes die down completely. The direction of the wind was also variable but more than fifty per cent of the time from the North or West. Swells were present constantly, and in some cases were large.

The sky was completely overcast a great deal of time, but would clear and cloud up again in a matter of minutes. There was little rain. The land was generally covered by haze and low lying clouds.

The air temperature averaged approximately 50°F.

While the moon is out, ever a quarter, the night is very bright.

(Enroute from station)

The first part of the trip back the weather was good. Then the barometer dropped rapidly, seas and winds increased and visibility became poor with frequent rain. The wind and sea were from the west, force 6. After the barometer rose two days later, the visibility became excellent, the wind decreased, but large swells continued.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

The Japanese current is the strongest in this vicinity and averaged about 1½ knots. However, at times it was entirely lacking, and at another time reach 4.3 knots during a 12 hour period. The axis of the current shifts south during a north wind. The injection temperature is a good indication as to whether or not you are in the current. In the absence of the wind, the set was not observed north of a line 070-250 drawn through 34°N 138°E. The set was generally observed to be south of east, instead of north of east as shown on the chart.

In Kumano Nada during a east wind a current of 2 knots was experienced to the west.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

Kashino Saki Light - Normal brillancy. Characteristic changed to white, on 5 seconds and off 2 seconds; when our "SD" was apparently detected as being in the vicinity the light remained steady white.

Miki Saki Light - Visible 30 miles - 3 white flashes every 45 seconds.

Daio Saki Light - Normal brillancy. White, 1 second flash every 15 seconds.

Anori Saki Light - Normal brillancy. White, 5 second flash every 50 seconds.

These lights were not used every night, but seemed to be used only when the visibility was not excellent.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

NO.	DATE	TIME (K)	LAT. & LONG:	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE	SPEED	HOW CONTACT.	REMARKS
1	Nov.7	0336	34-21N 137-21E	1AK 1AO 2PC	13,700	215	8.5K	R	AK damaged 1 Hit
2	Nov.10	1738	33-19N 136-39E	Patrol	6,000	-	-	P	
3	Nov.11	0239	33-45N 136-26E	Small Boat	8,000	-	-	SN	Lighted.
4	Nov.11	1200	33-37N 136-07E	2 sail boats 2 picket boats	3-7,000	Var.	-	P	A boat with echo ranging present but not identified.
5	Nov.11	2129	33-40N 136-36E	DD or Chidori	11,000	150	23.5	SN	
6	Nov.12	2345	34-05N 137-44E	PC or Chidori	12,000	-	-	SN	
7	Nov.15	0555	33-55N 140-32E	CV & 3-5 DD	18,000	305	22	SN	
8	Nov.18	2215	33-50N 136-50E	Hospital Ship	20,000	060	14	SN	Illuminated.
9	Nov.19	0945	34-08N 136-40E	Patrol	2,000	270	6	P	
10	Nov.19	1146	34-11N 136-37E	Sailing Ship	6,000	250	10	P	200 tons
11	Nov.19	1530	34-12N 136-40E	2 Sail boats	6,000	270	-	P	
12	Nov.19	1627	34-13N 136-33E	1AK	9,000	240	12	P	
13	Nov.19	1627	34-07N 136-25E	1AO	14,000	030	10	P	
14	Nov.19	1755	34-08N 136-25E	Patrol	6,000	090	6	P	
15	Nov.22	0735	34-29N 137-52E	Coastal Freighter	10,000	080	7	P	1500 tons
16	Nov.22	1429	34-28N 137-45E	Torpedo Boat	7,000	230	18	P	
17	Dec.1	1023	33-41N 136-37E	Sail Boat	6,000	090	-	P	
18	Dec.1	1718	33-42N 137-51E	Patrol	3,000	-	-	P	

Abbreviations under "HOW CONTACTED" - P - Periscope
R - Radar
SN - Surface night

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Not including friendly)

NO.	DATE	TIME	NO.	LAT.	LONG.	TYPE	COURSE	HOW CONTACT.	ELEV.
1	Nov.5	0305	1	33-07N	138-20E	- -	000	SN	500
2	Nov.10	1838	1	33-18N	136-50E	- -	090	SN	500
3	Nov.11	0847	6	33-40N	136-15E	Fighters	270	P	500
4	Nov.11	0923-1200	1	33-45N	136-06E	DAVE	Var.	P.	2000
5	Nov.12	2045	1	34-11N	137-53E	- -	- -	R	- -
6	Nov.13	0755	1	34-04N	137-50E	KATE	210	P	1000
7	Nov.13	1030	6	34-09N	137-50E	Bombers	210	P	1200
8	Nov.13	2305	1	34-02N	137-14E	- -	- -	R	- -
9	Nov.14	0044	2	34-00N	137-16E	- -	- -	R	- -
10	Nov.14	0156	1	34-00N	137-18E	- -	- -	R	- -
11	Nov.14	0316	1	34-02N	137-22E	- -	- -	R	- -
12	Nov.17	1352	1	34-04N	137-03E	Bomber	310	P	1000
13	Nov.19	0909	2	34-10N	136-49E	DAVE	180	P	1500
14	Nov.19	0925	1	34-10N	136-50E	IDA	270	P	300
15	Nov.19	1055	1	34-10N	135-52E	BETTY	290	P	1000
16	Nov.21	0925	1	33-36N	136-53E	MAVIS	180	P	1500
17	Nov.23	1430	1	33-25N	136-16E	MAVIS	310	P	3000
18	Dec. 6	1225	1	34-10N	149-10E	4-engine bomber	270	SD	2000

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. ONE, Patrol No. ONE.

Time: 0429(K) Date: Nov. 7th. Lat. 34°14'N Long. 137°15'E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One AK and One AO in convoy. Two PC boat escorts. Contact made by radar at 13,700 yards. Visibility clear.

Ships Sunk: None.

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Target Draft 20' Course 215 Speed 8.5 Range 3150

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 10 Course 315 Depth: Surface Angle (zero)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Radar contact at night at 13,700 yards. Gained position for a night surface radar attack, or sea force (4) was such as to preclude a successful radar depth attack. After target was sighted at 5500 yards, TBT bearings, and radar ranges were used. Fired 4 torpedoes at first ship, depth set at 15 feet. Gyro angles were error due to control error as T.D.C. was set on "Position Keeper" instead of "Position Keeper and Angle Solver."

Attack #1

Tubes Fired	#1	#2	#3	#4
Track Angle	69P	72P	76P	77P
Gyro Angle	11	8	4	3
Depth Set	15	15	15	15
Power	- -	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	53618	53580	53390	53596
Mark Exploder	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2
Serial No.	- -	- -	- -	- -
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	- -	- -	- -	- -
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	
Type Spread	0	2 degree divergent		
Sea conditions	4	4	4	4
Overhaul Activity	- BUSHNELL -			

Remarks: Misses were due to a control error. The Torpedo Data Computor was set on "Position Keeper" instead of "Position Keeper and Angle Solver", with the results that the gyro angles were in error. Actual gyro angles should have been 14.5, 14.3, 16 and 11.7.

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. TWO, Patrol No. ONE.

Time: 0437(K) Date: Nov. 7th. Lat. 34°14'N Long. 137°15'E.

Description; Same target group as attack number one.

Ships Sunk: None.

Ships Damaged:

One, similar to the KYOKKO MARU of 6783 tons.

Damaged Determined by:

An explosion was heard on time for the first shot, and a large amount of black smoke came out of the stack. Very doubtful that he could see the torpedo wake and he changed course to head for beach.

Target Draft 20' Course 215 Speed 8.5 Range 3400

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 2 Course 160 Depth: Surface Angle (zero)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

After firing forward, swung left for a stern shot. After it was determined that the bow shots had missed, fired 2 stern tubes. T.D.C. was still set on "Position Keeper", but gyros were only in error by one degree.

Attack #2

	#9	#10
Tubes Fired		
Track Angle	70 Port	74 Port
Gyro Angle	166°	165°30"
Depth Set	10 feet	10 feet
Power	High	High
Hit or Miss	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No
Mark Torpedo	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2
Serial No.	39822	25578
Mark Exploder	6-Mod 1	6-Mod 1
Serial No.	12555	11008
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	Contact	- -
Mark Warhead	16	16
Serial No.	1117	11234
Explosive	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	10 sec.	
Type Spread	None	None
Sea Conditions	4	4
Overhaul Activity	BUSHNELL	BUSHNELL

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. THREE, Patrol No. ONE.

Time: 0505(K) Date: Nov. 7th(LCT) Lat. 34°12.5'N Long.137°14'E.

Description: One AO with two PC type escorts. Contact by sighting from the bridge at 3500 yards.

Ships Sunk: None.

Ships Damaged:

None.

Target Draft 20' Course 165 Speed 9.5 Range 2400

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 12 Course 280 Depth: Surface Angle (zero)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: This target was aft of first target group and was sighted from the bridge. Used a snap set-up on T.D.C. and fired three torpedoes from the bow tubes set at 10 feet. T.D.C. was set on "Position Keeper and Angle Solver", control error having been found shortly after the first firing.

Attack #3

Tubes Fired	#1	#5	#6
Track Angle	81P	81P	81P
Gyro Angle	344	343	342
Depth Set	10	10	10
Power	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18
Serial No.	53459	53565	53491
Mark Exploder	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2	4-Mod 2
Serial No.	- -	- -	- -
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	18	18	18
Serial No.	- -	- -	- -
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	10 sec.	15 sec.	
Type Spread	1°	Longitudinal	
Sea Conditions	4	4	4
Overhaul Activity		- BUSHNELL -	

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. FOUR, Patrol No. ONE.

Time: 2158(K) Date: Nov. 11th. Lat. 33°29.5'N Long. 136°43.5'E.

Description:
One DD.
Contact made by sighting at 11,000 yards.

Ships Sunk:
None.

Ships Damaged:

None.

Target Draft 6' Course 155 Speed 23.5 Range 5600

OUR SHIP DATA

Speed 19 Course 155 Depth: Surface Angle (zero)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Target sighted in brilliant moonlight by officer of the deck. Turned stern toward target and started tracking by radar. Target sighted us and target speed started increasing rapidly. With target bearing 180°, angle on bow ZERO, fired three torpedoes, low power, depth set on 6 feet, one to hit and the other two one half degree divergent spread right and left.

Attack #4

	#7	#9	#10
Tubes Fired			
Track Angle	2S	2S	0
Gyro Angle	183.5	184.5	179
Depth Set	6	6	6
Power	Low	Low	Low
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-Mod 3A	14-Mod 3A	14-Mod 3A
Serial No.	39815	39464	39457
Mark Exploder	6-Mod 1	6-Mod 1	6-Mod 1
Serial No.	18036	6954	12119
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	16	16	16
Serial No.	11238	2613	1997
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	15 sec.	10 sec.	
Type Spread	None	1/2° Divergent	
Sea Conditions	2	2	2
Overhaul Activity		- BUSHNELL -	

(I) MINES

None.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

The principal anti-submarine measure seems to be to keep the shipping very close to the beach protected by a screen of patrol boats equipped with sensitive sound gear. The boats lie-to and detect a submarine's presence by either sonic or super sonic listening gear or both. The boats are numerous and as the sound conditions encountered were good, we were detected whenever trying to close the beach.

Only one suitable contact was made more than 10 miles off the beach while in the area.

While we were using the SD radar during bright moonlight nights we were kept down most of one night by planes being attracted. The equipment was used for 5 seconds and off for 43 seconds.

The evasion tactics used were to try to avoid the patrols, and for depth charging to go to 275-300 feet and run silently. The bow and stern planes in power are by far the noiseiest equipment which is normally running.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE. (Engineering and Electrical)

1. Upon surfacing after a period of deep submergence the port reduction gear sump was found to be contaminated with salt water. This entered the sump through loose flanged joints in the piping and through the packing gland of the attached pump. This oil was removed, the system flushed out with clean oil and new oil used. No further contamination was experienced.

2. The auxiliary engine overheated under heavy loads due to poor exhaust valve timing. This was remedied by replacing the shims (N9779-15 and 26) which had been removed by the Winton representative prior to commissioning. New type valve caps were not installed.

3. The Briggs lubricating oil clarifier elements showed marked deterioration after 300 hours of use. The filter from the elements clogged the puralator strainers.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE. (Engineering and Electrical) Cont'd.

4. Wiped the crankpin bearing of #9 unit, #2 main engine which caused severe scoring of the journal. The journal was ground by the SPERRY and a 5/32" undersize bearing fitted. The engine has run satisfactorily at all loads since the repair. The reason for the casualty cannot be determined.

5. The wrist pin roller bearing of #8 unit, #3 main engine failed causing the following: (1) cracked liner; (2) wiped connecting rod bearing; (3) scoring of the piston. All parts were renewed and the engine performed satisfactorily.

6. The reverse current relay contactor lever (Culter Hammer Stock No. 624-263) in the stern plan control panel has broken several times. In the manufacture of this piece the punch which bends it apparently cuts too deeply and weakens it.

7. The bow plane tilting circuit grounded several times and blew fuses about six times. It was finally found that in the original installation the wiring did not follow the plan. The jumper which should have been from terminal #10 to terminal #100 was from #10 to the blank. This is the bow-tilting and rigging master control E.B. Plan #2061-97. This was corrected and it has since been satisfactory.

(L) RADIO

Prior to November 10th, reception on HAIKU FOX was unreliable due to weak signal and interference. FLEET FOX was used to copy skeds.

Since November 10th, KAIKU FOX reception was as follows:

FREQ.	TIME (GCT)	SIG. STRENGTH	COMMENTS
16.68	0830-1600	0-1	Heavy interference, high noise level.
16.68	1600-2000	1-2	Reception poor.
4525	0830-2000	2-3	Rising and falling signal - Local interference from Jap stations.
9090	0830-1100	3-4	Good signal, slight interference.

(L) RADIO (Cont'd)

FREQ.	TIME (GCT)	SIG. STRENGTH	COMMENTS
9090	1100-1230	2-3	Marked increase in interference from Jap stations, appears to be deliberate blocking, starting at beginning of 1100 sked and decreases at end of sked.
9090	1230-2000	3-5	Good signal, minimum of interference.
14390	2000-	5	Perferect signal.

December 6th: At 1045 GCT, we gave NPM a preliminary call on 8470 Kcs. and received a signal to go ahead, his signal strength was S-2. We transmitted our message (Reference NR. Ø61Ø45) and he replied the interference was strength 5. At 1130 GCT, we shifted to 4235 Kcs. Received NPM's signal to go ahead and again transmitted the message and he again replied that the interference was strength 5.

At time of transmission, we were 500--700 miles from the Empire.

Message "HOW" sent on 21st or 22nd November missed.

(M) RADAR

No trouble with either radar was experienced. One tube, No. 813, was replaced in the SJ.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

The JP sound gear was used frequently to check the quietness of this vessel and was valuable in correcting small vibrations and air bubbles.

The sound conditions throughout the area were about the same and were very good to excellent. Propellors were heard consistently at approximately 10,000 yards.

Neither the JP or the JK showed a marked superiority over the other. The JP was effected more than the JK by the local boat noises.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

The density layers experienced were about the same.throughout the area and not limited to any particular sector.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS (Cont'd)

Frequently a negative gradient of 2° to 4° in 30 or 40 feet was experienced between 230 and 300 feet. The frequency of these gradients decreased as the air temperature during this time of the year cooled the surface water. A negative gradient was not observed above 300 feet after any prolonged force 4 sea with swells.

A BT card to 300 feet was taken daily while in the area.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

The health, food, and habitability were very good. No disease other than mainor colds was experienced.

The food was well prepared and the variety was satisfactory. A Thanksgiving dinner of all usual items was served.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The personnel, both officer and enlisted, performed in an excellent manner. Nothing more could be asked of them. The outstanding ability, energy, and loyalty to duty, of the Executive Officer, Lieut.Comdr. W.G. HOLMAN, USN., is appreciated and worthy of mention.

(R) MILES STEAMED - Fuel Used

Pearl to Midway		1245 miles	14,170 gals.
Midway to Area		2438 miles	26,696 gals.
In area	(Surface)	3104 miles	27,429 gals.
In area	(Submerged)	871 miles	
Area to Midway		2668 miles	27,101 gals.

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area	9
Days in area	30
Days enroute to Midway	8
Days submerged	30

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes	Fuel	Provisions	Personnel Factor
12	9,396 gals.	10 days	10 days

The provisions of the operation order was the limiting factor of this patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

(U) REMARKS

The courses steered during the nights while the moon was up were practically dictated by the moon streak. We were trimmed down the night the destroyer sighted us at 11,000 yards. Gray camouflage would probably be an aid.

The bow and stern planes frequently failed electrically and will be throughly checked during refit.

FB5-141/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION 141

Serial 0180

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
12 December, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
DACE report of First
War Patrol, file SS247/
A12-2 dated 11 Dec.,1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Division 141.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Force, Subordinate Command,
Submarine Base, Navy Number 1504.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. Forwarded. The first patrol of DACE was of fifty-three (53) days duration, including three (3) days in MIDWAY, making engine repairs.

2. ATTACKS

The first attack resulted in misses due to a control error.

The second attack resulted in one hit in an AK. Damage inflicted was not observed.

The third attack, using a "snap set-up" on the T.D.C. resulted in misses.

The fourth attack, using 6 foot depth setting, "down the throat" of a DD, failed to produce a hit.

3. DACE encountered determined opposition from patrol vessels and aircraft. The enemy seems to have been protecting his shipping in this area in a very energetic and successful manner.

4. The ship returned in good material condition and refit will be conducted by BUSHNELL in the normal period.

LEO L. PACE.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET,
SUBORDINATE COMMAND, NAVY NO. 1504.

A16-3

Serial 0177.

c/o Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, Calif.,
13 December 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE Conf. Ltr.
SS247/A12-2 of 11 Dec. 1943.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division 141.

2. This first patrol, while not particularly productive, gave the DACE some valuable training and her future patrols should be more effective from the experience gained.

3. The Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the DACE are congratulated upon the damage inflicted on the enemy.

J. B. LONGSTAFF.

Copy to:
Comsubdiv 141
CO, USS DACE

Reg. No. 24642
Ltr. No. mr
1 0856

FF12-10/A16-3(8)/(16) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
21 December 1943.

Serial 01950

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DACE Report of
First War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 332
U.S.S. DACE - FIRST WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS332) - Report of First War Patrol.
(20 October to 11 December 1943).

1. The DACE's first war patrol was conducted in one of the Empire areas.

2. Although the area coverage was good the DACE had but five contacts worthy of torpedoes. Four attacks were made but only one resulted in damage to the enemy. Excessive ranges undoubtedly caused some of the misses. The experience gained on this patrol will undoubtedly prove valuable on the DACE's next war patrol.

3. This patrol is not considered successful for Combat Insignia Award.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for inflicting the following damage upon the enemy:

D A M A G E D

1 - Freighter (KYOKKO MARU class) - 6,783 tons.

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Acting.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)

Cominch	(5)	Comsowespac	(1)
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E. L. HYNES, II,
Flag Secretary.

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SS247/A16-3

Serial 02

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer, USS DACE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 181.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 18.
(3) The Commander Task Force 72.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Second War Patrol.

Enclosure: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Charts of Patrol in Area. (CTF-72 only)
(C) Statical Summary.(CTF-72 only)

1. Enclosures (A),(B), and (C), covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area between the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the CAROLINE ISLANDS between 157° to 1400 East during the period January 7, 1944 to 25 FEB 1944 are forwarded herewith.

B.D. CLAGGETT.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-009C DATE 5/25/72

DECLASSIFIED

67803 FILMED

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Second War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Midway from First War Patrol December 11, 1943. Submarine Division 141 in the U.S.S. BUSHNELL commenced refit. Conducted normal refit and accomplished the following: installed new type high power radar transmitter with P.P.I. screen; modified stateroom #2 by adding two bunks. Refit completed by Submarine Base, Midway due to the departure of the BUSHNELL.

December 28, 1943: Lt.Comdr. J.F. ENRIGHT, USN, relieved as Commanding Officer by Lt.Comdr. B.D. CLAGGETT, USN. Held six days training--December 29th through January 4, 1944. No torpedoes were fired as no recovery vessel was available. Completed loading January 5th and 6th. Ready for sea January 7th.

(B) NARRATIVE:

January 7

1600 Y — Underway from Submarine Base, Midway enroute to patrol area in accordance with SubPac Operation Order #316-43. Furnished air escort until sunset.

January 7 - 15

Enroute area at two engine speed conducting daily training dives and fire control drills.

January 9

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 27°-26' N Long. 178°-41' E
MILES: 320 FUEL: 4602 gal.

January 10

0925 M — Sighted two motored seaplane bearing 280°T, distance five miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

1037 M — Surfaced.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 25°-25' N Long. 176°-05' E
MILES: 293 FUEL: 3869 gal.

January 11

1600 M — Sighted single motor land plane bearing 260°T., distance six miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

1703 M — Surfaced.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 23°-33' N Long. 171°-10' E
MILES: 285 FUEL: 3323 gal.

January 12

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 21°-26' N Long. 166°-28' E
MILES: 306 FUEL: 3695 gal.

January 13

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 18°-00' N Long. 162°-52' E
MILES: 299 FUEL: 4027 gal.

January 14

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 14°-07' N Long. 159°-55' E
MILES: 311 FUEL: 3342 gal.

January 15

0000 — Commenced operating under command of ComTaskFor 72.

0730 L — Changed course to 065°

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 10°-07' N Long. 157°-05' E
MILES: 257 FUEL: 3614 gal.

January 16

0400 L — Changed course to 245°T.

Decided to resume course and proceed to area as we are already behind schedule.

January 16 (Cont'd)

0921 L — Plane on S.D. distance 16 miles--closed to 13 miles so submerged to avoid detection. Did not sight plane. Took time submerged to replace torpedo in #2 tube with one from racks. The one in the tube had a leak in the starting piston.

1117 L — Surfaced.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 09°-41' N Long. 158°-51' E
MILES: 284 FUEL: 3227 gal.

January 17

Proceeding to area.

1530 — Set clocks back one hour. All time now "KING".

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 07°-27' N Long. 156°-35' E
MILES: 327 FUEL: 3959 gal.

January 18

Proceeding to area.

Have secured S.D. on orders of ComTaskFor 72. Am running S.J. continuously.
Note: See remarks for use of S.J. as an aircraft detector.

0817 — Picked up plane on S.J., range 6,500 yards, bearing 280°T. Submerged without sighting planes. Range closed to 5,000 yards as S.J. went under. Do not believe he sighted us as it was overcast.

0918 — Surfaced.

1400 — Entered assigned area. Commenced surface patrol at two engine speed as per instructions of ComTaskFor 72.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 04°-16' N Long. 153°-20' E
MILES: 297 FUEL: 2925 gal.

January 19

Proceeding area.

January 19 (Cont'd)

1045 Proceeding down track of 25 knot target reported by plane and ComTaskFor 72.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-28' N Long. 149°-09' E
MILES: 274 FUEL: 4128 gal.

January 20

Patrolling area at two engine speed.

0614 Submerged for trim.

0704 Surfaced.

1440 Sighted life boat, floating oil drums and wreckage.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-10' N Long. 150°-42' E
MILES: 281 FUEL: 2928 gal.

January 21

Patrolling area.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 05°-13' N Long. 149°-35' E
MILES: 292 FUEL: 3090 gal.

January 22

Patrolling area.

0555 Submerged for trim.

0702 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-31' N Long. 149°-10' E
MILES: 273 FUEL: 3223 gal.

January 23

Patrolling area.

1142 S.J. contact--16,000 yards, bearing 180°T. Sighted six (6) planes flying in formation on a northerly course, altitude 10 to 12 thousand feet. Submerged when range had decreased to 13,000 yards.

January 23 (Cont'd)

1245 Surfaced.

2211 Radar contact on PULOSUK Island, bearing 037°T., range 30,000 yards.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 06°-04' N Long. 150°-38'-30" E
MILES: 288 FUEL: 3096 gal.

January 24

Patrolling area west of MANILA REEF for PALAU-TRUK traffic.

2015 Received ComTaskFor 72 serial changing area and proceeded West.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 06°-47' N Long. 148°-56' E
MILES: 296 FUEL: 3044 gal.

January 25

Proceeding to area.

0605 Submerged for trim.

0700 Surfaced.

2000 Proceeding South

0000 POSIT: Lat. 06°-57'N Long. 147°-53' E
MILES: 297 FUEL: 2909

January 26

1454 S.J. contact--18,000 yards, opened to 20,000 yards. Planes not sighted.

1830 Commenced station patrol across expected track.

January 26 (Cont'd)

2045 S.J. contact bearing 254°T., range 22,000 yards. Changed course to 080°T., and commenced tracking keeping him astern and allowing him to close.

When range closed to 18,000 yards--a second and smaller target appeared about 2,000 yards closer. Continued tracking to determine course and speed. The target is zigging radically and we are tracking to try to determine his zig plan. After two hours tracking it is apparent that he has no set plan, but is zig zagging on various courses from 015°T. to 090°T. with no definite length of zigs that we can determine. We have been tracking him at a range of 16,000 yards, and have gotten a definite speed of 15½ knots. Also have discovered that there is another escort about 2,200 yards astern. Both escorts seem to be patrolling across track.

2350 Have decided that we have as much information as we can get on this fellow so turned right to get out on his starboard bow about 6,000 yards from track, and as soon as he comes back to the easterly leg will proceed in for the attack. The night is dark with scattered rain squalls; it would be convenient if we could get into one of them. We will go in at high speed keeping a small silhouette to the leading escort; will let him pass ahead and fire six torpedoes at the target. On the way out will try to get a shot off at the after escort if he presents a good track and is of sufficient size.

2355 Light rain squall set in--covering us, so started in for the attack; rain is moving toward target's track rapidly, hope it keeps us covered so we will have the advantage of visibility. With range of 8,000 yards can see the target sufficiently for T.B.T. bearings. He looks long and low. Range to target now 5,000 yards; near escort 3,800 yards. Escort unfortunately is 1,200 yards this side of target; they are nearly in line therefore slowed to allow escort to pass ahead. With the escort on this side will have to fire at greater range than planned. When

January 26 (Cont'd)

escort had crossed ahead, range 2,700 yards proceeded to attack and at

0007 .. commenced firing a six torpedo salvo at target. Torpedo run for first torpedo--3200 yards decreasing to 2,700 for the last torpedo. Track 80° starboard, 2° divergent spread, eight foot depth. Commenced swinging left at full speed heading for the nearest rain squall.

0009 - 30 . All hands heard a violent explosion followed by another 10 seconds later. Prior to hearing each explosion the Executive Officer observed the radar screen jump and the pip seemed to expand and then return to normal. No flash was seen on the target which was partially obscured by the rain squall and our exhaust; he is bearing 180° relative and we are retiring at full speed. Soon after this explosion saw two red rockets high above target. Several minutes later three more explosions were heard which could either have been end of run of the torpedoes or explosions on the target.

As we retired, tried to get set up to fire on after escort, but would have had to accept a twenty track so did not fire. The leading escort was observed to be a large destroyer of about 1500 tons. The after escort was not distinct enough to definitely determine, but it appeared to be another large destroyer.

After the explosions the after escort turned toward us, range 3200 yards which held constant for so long that we thought he saw us, but range began to open slowly until it was 5,200 yards when it remained constant again. Range to target at this time--12,000 yards and he seems to be continuing on northerly course. Continued opening until range on escort was 12,000 yards, and then turned north to track target whose range was 26,000 yards. Heard what appeared to be target transmitter on 500 k.c.

Continued tracking target at full speed on four engines--17.5 knots, until 0241 L. Target speed

January 26 (Cont'd)

determined to be 16.5 knots, zig zagging between 020°T. and 045°T. At this time we had only been able to close the range 7,000 yards so abandoned chase Sent contact report.

The decision to abandon the chase was based on the fact that we had only one knot speed advantage, and an end around would have taken all day at full power which would have put us in SCAMP's area and left us dangerously low on fuel.

Target was observed to be a large tanker, about 10,000 tons, with stack and superstructure aft; bridge structure forward. He appeared to be riding high as if empty. He was a beautiful target and it is very disappointing that he didn't sink. It is also disappointing that we didn't have enough speed to catch him. At present our maximum speed in a flat sea is 17.5 knots. The vessel has been out of dock over 6 months. It is hoped she will be docked during the next refit.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 05°-03' N Long. 147°-40' E
MILES: 300 FUEL: 3113 gal.

January 27

0730 Submerged conducting a periscope patrol during forenoon watch to give all hands a rest.

1300 Surfaced and continued surface patrol.

2230 Commenced station patrol

0000 POSIT: Lat.02°-17' N Long. 149°-00' E
MILES: 257 FUEL: 2929 gal.

January 28

January 28 (Cont'd)

0530 Discontinued station patrol
Working to East as fuel is low.

2230 Commenced station patrol

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-06' N Long. 148°-48' E
MILES: 306 FUEL: 3121 gal.

January 29

0553 Secured station patrol. Commenced patrolling along expected track. Leaving area.

0606 Submerged for trim.

0652 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-35' N Long. 151°-10' E
MILES: 311 FUEL: 3138 gal.

January 30

Enroute TULAGI.

1108 Sighted Mavisor P.B.Y. flying boat, altitude 2000 feet, range 6 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

1212 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 00°-28' N Long. 151°-38' E
MILES: 319 FUEL: 3642 gal.

January 31

Enroute TULAGI.

0550 Sighted BLACKFISH.

0608 Picked up BLACKFISH on radar at 15,500 yards. Exchanged signals.

January 31 (Cont'd)

0856 Sighted single engine plane--type unknown. Southerly course, range 6 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

0941 Surfaced.

1250 Sighted ALBACORE. Exchanged signals and information.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-00' S Long. 154°-43' E
MILES: 326 FUEL: 3844 gal.

February 1

Enroute TULAGI.

0714 Sighted aircraft. Course easterly, range 6 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

0810 Surfaced.

1440 Plane contact on S.J., range 14,750 yards, bearing 222°T. Sighted by O.O.D., altitude 5,000 feet, course 070°. Submerged to avoid detection.

1543 Surfaced.

1614 Sighted unidentified plane, range 4 miles, course southerly. Submerged.

1641 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 05°-05' S Long. 156°-33' E
MILES: 279 FUEL: 3367 gal.

February 2

Enroute TULAGI.

0130 Picked up MALAITA Island on S.J. radar--35 miles.

0429 Picked up escort on radar, range 15,000 yards.

0440 Exchanged signals with escort. Proceeding to TULAGI in company with CONSTANT--AM 86.

February 2 (Cont'd)

1201 Moored alongside Y.O. 641, TULAGI Harbor. 3,000 gallons of fuel on board.

1230 Commenced fueling--10,000 gallons per hour. Repairing radar and 2 M.C.

2200 Fueling completed. Received 88,350 gallons of fuel. 1500 gallons of lub. oil from Y.O. 641. Awaiting orders.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 07°-29' S Long. 159°-38' E
MILES: 140 FUEL: 1623 gal.

February 3

0215 Received ComTaskFor 72 message , With best of luck will be 18 hours late reaching position ordered, so have decided to wait in TULAGI until radar work is completed and binoculars received.

0800 Binoculars received on board.

0850 Radar work completed.

0900 Underway escorted by CONSTANT.

1600 Passed point WHITE.

1725 Released escort. Made trim dive.

1755 Surfaced.

At TULAGI MILES: 213 FUEL: 2470 gal.

February 4

Enroute area.

0540 Struck large, submerged log. No apparent damage to tubes or screws.

0654 Possible S.J. contact on flight of planes, bearing 052°T., range 36,000 yards moving fast. Lost contact after seven minutes.

February 4 (Cont'd)

0855 Sighted DAVE-type plane bearing 354°T., course easterly, distance 5 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

0927 Surfaced.

1315 Received ComTaskFor 72 serial

1347 Changed course to proceed to new area.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 09°-03' S Long. 159°-27' E
MILES: 344 FUEL: 4763 gal.

February 5

Proceeding to area.

1237 Sighted "BETTY" bearing 105°T., range 7 miles. Submerged.

1304 Surfaced.

1429 S.J. plane contact--11,000 yards coming in from rain squall ahead. Submerged. Range 6,200 yards when S.J. went under, bearing 015°T.

1455 Surfaced.

2000 Arrived new station. Commenced station patrol.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 03°-00' S Long. 156°-33' E
MILES: 291 FUEL: 3641 gal.

February 6

Patrolling on station.

0450 Unidentified S.J. contact, range 29,500 yards, bearing 257°T. Bearing changing very rapidly--probably large plane. Lost contact at 0454.

1100 Sighted "BETTY"--range 7 miles, course 210°T. Submerged.

1138 Surfaced.

February 6 (Cont'd)

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-12' N Long. 156°-56' E
MILES: 289 FUEL: 3279 gal.

February 7

Patrolling on station.

1141 Sighted two engine plane, bearing 120°T. S.J. range 14,500 yards. Submerged.

1205 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-05' N Long. 156°-49' E
MILES: 286 FUEL: 3305 gal.

February 8

0020 Received ComTaskFor 72 serial Left point proceeding to new area.

1330 Plane contact on S.J.--range 16,300 yards, bearing 049°T. Sighted by lookout at same time--four engine bomber. Submerged.

1405 Surfaced.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-01' N Long. 156°-51' E
MILES: 301 FUEL: 3288 gal.

February 9

Proceeding to area. No planes today.

1700 Arrived in new area.

1750 Received aircraft contact report on north bound convoy. Decided to remain in Eastern part of area in hopes of getting a crack at them.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 03°-31' N Long. 152°-50' E
MILES: 310 FUEL: 3305 gal.

February 10

Patrolling in area.

0700 Received CERO's contact report. Proceeding to southern boundry of area on their track.

0930 Received serial which I interperet to mean I can leave area so I'm proceeding south.

1120 Six (6) "NELLIES" came out of a heavy cloud directly overhead, altitude 5,000 feet, course east. Made very quick dive.

1200 Surfaced.

1815 Received CERO's message describing convoy as too small so reversed course to clear PETO's area and proceeded to HELENA SHOAL.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-47' N Long. 148°-40' E
MILES: 283 FUEL: 3224 gal.

February 11

Proceeding to north of area.

0015 Radar contact--range 18,000 yards, bearing 248°T. Commenced tracking and established mean course as 010°T, zig zagging about 30° each side of base course, speed 8 knots. Convoy was tracked and observed for three hours in bright moonlight. There are five ships in the convoy--all small; two are escorts and the others are similar to ships described by CERO and PETO. After three hours tracking and observing decided that this was same convoy, but it is hard to reconcile the discrepency in positions. The escort is so small that we cannot get him on radar at a range of less than 14,000 yards. Other ships do not appear any larger but have higher masts.

0315 Discontinued tracking. Passed astern of contact and proceeded toward HELENE SHOALS.

February 11 (Cont'd)

0330 — Lost contact, range 23,000 yards, bearing 341°T.

0530 — Radar contact, bearing 032°T., range 25,000 yards. Commenced tracking and closing. Discovered it to be the same convoy. They have apparently changed course to pass west of HELENE SHOALS. Maintained contact with them for over an hour, and observed them through binoculars and high periscope at range of 18,000 yards in full daylight. They all proved to be very small. One of the patrolling escorts was observed broadside to. His lines were similar to a destroyer but was smaller. The other ships appeared to be about the same size.

0637 — Submerged to allow them to open out. At 60 feet with seven feet of periscope exposed could not see any masts.

0738 — Surfaced and resumed course to point north of HELENE SHOALS.

1400 — Arrived position Northwest of HELENE SHOALS and commenced patrolling.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 040-24' N Long. 149°-09' E
MILES: 271 FUEL: 3005 gal.

February 12

Patrolling Northwest of HELENE SHOALS.

0617 — Submerged for trim.

0641 — Surfaced.

1300 — Proceeding to Northeast of HELENE SHOALS.

0000 — POSIT: Lat. 05°-51' N Long. 148°-28' E
MILES: 263 FUEL: 2636 gal.

February 13

Patrolling Northeast of HELENE SHOALS.

0600 Proceeding to new area

1152 Changed course to 290°T. to try to intercept CERO convoy.

1503 Discontinued search in order to reach area on time.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 05°-32' N Long. 149°-54' E
MILES: 294 FUEL: 3670 gal.

February 14

0015 Entered new area and commenced patrol.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-57' N Long. 151°-43' E
MILES: 294 FUEL: 3195 gal.

February 15

Patrolling on station.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 03°-56' N Long. 152°-05' E
MILES: 303 FUEL: 3260 gal.

February 16

Patrolling on station.

0553 Made trim dive,

0629 Surfaced.

0713 Sighted "NELLIES" bearing 120°T., distance 6 miles, elevation 10,000 feet, course 180°T. Submerged to avoid detection.

0757 Surfaced.

February 16 (Cont'd)

2045 Changed course to 320°T. proceeding to new area on three engines

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-01' N Long. 152°-28' E
MILES: 295 FUEL: 3630 gal.

February 17

Proceeding to new station.

0800 Entered new area West of TRUK.

1230 Commenced patrol West of PULUSUK Island on two engines.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 04°-24' N Long. 151°-47' E
MILES: 361 FUEL: 5299 gal.

February 18

Patrolling West of PULUSUK.

0404 S.J. contact on plane bearing 321°T. Maintained contact for 4 minutes at ranges varying from 7,600 to 16,500 yards. Plane not sighted.

Several times while in this area radar interference was noted. The bearings placed the source Northeast of PULUWAT Island. It was timed at 12 r.p.m. Believed to be a SUBPAC submarine.

1123 Sighted four motor plane bearing 140°T., course 320°T., S.J. range 16,000 yards. Submerged.

1200 Surfaced.

1300 During the afternoon watch the entire sky to the East was covered with a dark haze which we hope is coming from TRUK. Hope this isn't wishfull thinking.

February 18 (Cont'd)

1415 Radar interference to Northeast.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 07°-03' N Long. 150°-12' E
MILES: 296 FUEL: 3280 gal.

February 19

0000 Received serial . shifting area. Proceeding South to new area along RABAUL-TRUK lane enroute.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 07°-03' N Long. 150°-12' E
MILES: 317 FUEL: 3335 gal.

February 20

Proceeding to new area.

1200 Entered new area.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 03°-05' N Long. 148°-28' E
MILES: 315 FUEL: 3020 gal.

February 21

Patrolling along PALAU traffic route.

0618 Trim dive.

0720 Surfaced.

1730 Commenced station patrol

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-41' N Long. 144°-52' E
MILES: 302 FUEL: 3468 gal.

February 22

Station patrol

0300 Discontinued station patrol;

February 22 (Cont'd)

0444 Radar interference--260°T.

0540 Radar contact 003°T. Believed to be PERMIT.

Commenced tracking.

0556 Lost contact. Appear to have dived so signaled him on "QC", but got no reply.

0646 Sighted yellow smoke bomb.

Sent challenge on sound, but still no reply.

Two more smoke bombs. We replied with sound and also fired two smoke bombs.

0715 PERMIT surfaced.

Exchanged information with PERMIT
He said he had covered courses to South and was giving up search. We proceeded back along track.

1200 Commenced patrolling

1600 Discontinued station patrol,

2000 Sent message to ComTaskFor 72 giving him dope on fuel.

2200 proceeding to Southeast corner of area in preparation to departing.

2400 Received message directing return to MILNE BAY.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-21' N Long. 146°-18' E
MILES: 360 FUEL: 4992 gal.

February 23

Enroute MILNE BAY.

1128 Sighted HERMIT Island bearing 274°T., distance 35 miles.

2045 Radar interference bearing 210°T. Possible DARTER.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 01°-04' N Long. 145°-35' E
MILES: 355 FUEL: 4245 gal.

February 24

Enroute MILNE BAY.

0056 Radar contact bearing 354°T., range 12,000 yards.

Commenced tracking. He is on a converging course overtaking us. We have radar interference so believe it is DARTER.

0125 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with DARTER.

0715 Radar contact bearing 290°T., range 11,000 yards. Closed to see if it is our escort. We have been searching for him in heavy rain for past hour.

0730 Sighted our escort--the WELLS (DD628) with DARTER.

Jointed formation and commenced passage through VITIAZ STRAIT. Sighted numerous friendly planes.

1400 Sighted friendly convoy of ten ships.

1412 Escort departed. Continuing to MILNE BAY in company with DARTER.

0000 POSIT: Lat. 03°-56' S Long. 146°-36' E
MILES: 387 FUEL: 6750 gal.

February 25

Enroute MILNE BAY.

0910 .. Sighted escort (PG 1124) bearing 180°T., distance 10 miles.

(C) WEATHER:

The weather was generally overcast. Some periods of seventy-two hours were encountered without sights of stars or the sun. Numerous weather fronts were encountered with the attendent heavy rain squalls--on one occassion lightning struck the water very near the starboard bow of the ship; the effect was very similar to a depth charge at about a thousand yards.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:

See table on next page.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

None sighted.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:

Date	Lat.	Long.	Set	Drift	Weather
21 Jan.	5-11-30N	149-34-00E	030°T.	.5 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Cloudy
22 Jan.	5-05-00N	150-16-00E	113°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Detached clouds
23 Jan.	5-57-30N	149-30-00E	080°T.	.4 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Overcast Squalls
24 Jan.	6-39-00N	148-28-00E	115°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Cloudy Squalls
25 Jan.	5-50-00N	147-20-00E	200°T.	.5 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Detached clouds
26 Jan.	3-54-00N	147-57-00E	103°T.	.5 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-2; Detached clouds
26 Jan.	2-12-00N	148-22-00E	270°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-2; Detached clouds
27 Jan.	00-57-30N	148-52-00E	260°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-2; Overcast Squalls
28 Jan.	01-05-00N	148-48-00E	264°T.	.8 kts.	Sea calm; Wind-2; Detached clouds
28 Jan.	01-19-00N	150-29-00E	255°T.	.6 kts.	Sea calm; Wind-2; Detached clouds
29 Jan.	01-33-00N	150-53-00E	255°T.	1.25 kts.	Sea calm; Wind-1; Detached clouds
29 Jan.	01-33-00N	151-07-00E	303°T.	1.0 kts.	Sea calm; Wind-1; Detached clouds
30 Jan.	00-06-00N	152-33-30E	310°T.	.4 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-1; Detached clouds
30 Jan.	00-02-00S	154-00-00E	246°T.	1.3 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-1; Detached clouds
4 Feb.	06-27-00S	158-42-00E	065°T.	.75 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-3; Cloudy Squalls
4 Feb.	04-04-00S	156-23-00E	075°T.	.7 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-3; cloudy Squalls
5 Feb.	01-41-00S	156-50-00E	047°T.	.7 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-3; Cloudy Squalls
5 Feb.	0-41-00N	156-53-30E	270°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-1; Wind-3; Cloudy Squalls
6 Feb.	0-55-00N	156-59-00E	210°T.	.5 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Cloudy Squalls
7 Feb.	1-07-00N	156-51-00E	240°T.	.5 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Detached clouds
7 Feb.	0-55-00N	156-40-00E	255°T.	1.0 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Detached clouds
10 Feb.	4-51-00N	148-57-00E	085°T.	.1 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Overcast, Rain
10 Feb.	4-19-00N	149-12-00E	255°T.	.25 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Overcast, Rain
11 Feb.	5-43-00N	148-31-30E	130°T.	.75 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-2; Overcast
12 Feb.	5-20-00N	148-45-00E	145°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Cloudy
12 Feb.	5-36-30N	149-35-00E	144°T.	.8 kts.	Sea-3; Wind-3; Cloudy
13 Feb.	5-29-30N	149-54-00E	155°T.	.6 kts.	Sea-2; Wind-4; Overcast, Rain

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Second Wat Patrol.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS:

No	Time / Date	Lat. / Long.		Type	Initial Range	Est. Course & Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
	2045 K	02-01 N	(2)	DD's		055°T.		
1	Jan 26	148-36 E	(1)	AO	2,200	15.5 kts.	Sail Jig	Attack #1
			(1)	Trawler				
	0015 K	04-26 N	(2)	Small AK's		010°T.		
2	Feb 11	149-07 E	(2)	Sub Chasers	1,800	8 kts.	Sail Jig	

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Second War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS:

No:	Time : Date	Lat. : Long.	Type	Initial : Range	Est. : Course	Altitude	How : Contacted	Remarks
1	0925 M : Jan 10	24-37 N : 173-54 E	2 Motor Seaplane	5 miles	North-erly	2,000	Sight	
2	1600 M : Jan 11	22-08 N : 172-02 E	Single motor land plane	6 miles	South-erly	2,000	Sight	
3	0921 L : Jan 16	09-33 N : 158-35 E	Unknown	16 to 13 Mls.	Un-known	Unknown	S.D.	
4	0817 K : Jan 18	04-26 N : 151-48 E	Unknown	6,500	Un-known	Unknown	S.J.	Closed to 5,000 yards.
5	1142 K : Jan 23	05-15 N : 150-07.5	(6) planes Unknown	16,000	North-erly	10,000	S.J. & Sight	Closed to 13,000 yards.
6	1454 K : Jan 26	02-35 N : 148-31 E	Unknown	18,000	North-erly	10,000	S.J.	
7	1108 K : Jan 30	00-22 N : 153-21 E	Maris or P.B.Y.	6 miles	280°	2,000	Sight	
8	0856 K : Jan 31	02-35 S : 155-25 E	Single engine	6 miles	South-erly	3,000	Sight	
9	0714 K : Feb 1	05-38 S : 157-41 E	Unidentified	6 miles	East-erly	2,000	Sight	
10	1440 K : Feb 1	06-14 S : 158-33 E	Unidentified	7 miles	070°	5,000	S.J. & Sight	
11	1614 K : Feb. 1	06-20 S : 158-39 E	Unidentified	4 miles	South-erly	2,000	Sight	
12	0855 K : Feb 4	05-57 S : 157-51 E	"DAVE"	5 miles	East-erly	3,000	Sight	
13	1237 K : Feb 5	00-17 S : 157-54 E	"BETTY"	7 miles	185°T.	500	Sight	

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS: (Cont'd)

No	Time / Date	Lat. / Long.	Type	Initial Range	Est. Course	Altitude	How Contacted	Remarks
14	1429 K / Feb 5	00-03 S / 157-01 E	Unknown	11,000	Southerly	Unknown	S.J.	Closed to 6,200 yards.
15	1100 K / Feb 6	01-10 N / 156-57 E	"BETTY"	7 mile	210°	1,000	Sight	
16	1141 K / Feb 7	01-16 N / 157-53 E	Two engine	7 miles	South	3,000	Sight & S.J.	
17	1330 K / Feb 8	02-15 N / 154-38 E	Four engine	16,000	North	3,000	Sight & S.J.	
18	1120 K / Feb 10	04-22 N / 149-30 E	Six (6) "NELLIES"	Overhead	090°	5,000	Sight	
19	0713 K / Feb 16	03-45 N / 152-54 E	"NELLIES"	6 miles	180°	1,000	Sight	
20	0404 K / Feb.18	07-04 N / 150-08 E	Unknown	7,600 to 16,500	Unknown	Unknown	S.J.	
21	1123 K / Feb.18	07-07 N / 150-06 E	Four Motor	16,000	320°T.	2,000	Sight & S.J.	

Enclosure (A).

(H) ATTACK DATA:

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE Torpedo Attack No. ONE. Patrol No. SECOND.

Time: 0007 L Date: January 27 Lat. 02°-17' N Long. 149°-02'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Tanker escorted by two (2) large DD's-- one ahead and one astern.

Ship(s) sunk: None.

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: One (1) 10,000 ton Tanker.

Damage determined by: Two timed explosions and observation on radar.

Target draft: 12 feet Course: 095°T. Speed: 15.5

Range: 3100 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 17 Course: 330°T. Depth: Surface Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Night surface attack. Target was picked up by radar at 23,000 yards and tracked for three hours. The target was making frequent and radical zigs on base course 055°T. The escorts, two large DD's were stationed 2,000 yards ahead and 2,500 yards astern. Fired six torpedoes using a standard spread card, two degrees divergent spread.

(H) ATTACK DATA: (Cont'd)

ATTACK NO. ONE

Tubes Fired	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle	74S	79S	83S	87S	91S	96S
Gyro Angle	14R	23R	37R	45R	55.5R	65R
Depth Set	8	8	8	8	8	8
Power	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	40088	39726	23595	25252	40126	40201
Mark Exploder	6-1	6-1	6-1	6-1	6-1	6-1
Serial No.	4772	7613	7259	17453	11085	4775
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	Contact	Contact	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	16	16	16	16	16	16
Serial No.	10926	10057	2115	10411	10966	3742
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval	10	10	10	10	10	10
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Sea Conditions	1	1	1	1	1	1
Overhaul Activity	BUSHNELL	SUB BASE MIDWAY	SUB BASE MIDWAY	SUB BASE MIDWAY	BUSHNELL	BUSHNELL

Remarks: Hot, straight and normal. One 10,000 ton Tanker damaged.

(I) MILES:

No mining or sweeping activity observed.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS:

The only anti-submarine activities observed were two destroyer escorts with convoy and frequent air patrols over area.

Evasion Tactics: For escorts retired on surface at full speed after attack. Submerged to avoid detection by planes.

Group of small boats with two escort vessels sighted the morning of February 11 had indications of being a come on outfit.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES:

At 1661 engine hours #2 Main Engine started smoking. The exhaust temperatures of units #1, 2, 9 and 10 (all in the blower end) were running high than the other units. Further examination showed the cold compressions of these units to be 360#, the other units in the engine were about 450#, also below standard. These units were disassembled. #2 unit had (3) exhaust valves with erosion pits 1/4 inches deep on the seats. #1 unit had one such pitted valve and the seat was eroded between 1/64 and 1/32 inches at the same spot. #9 had slight pitting on the valves. #10 was the same as #1. All exhaust valves were renewed in these units and #1 and #10 heads were replaced. The rings were in good condition but were worn. The engine was tested and it was fouud that the smoking was eliminated and the temperatures brought down to the average of the engine. The engine was saved after this for emergency use only.

(L) RADIO:

It was possible to copy BELLCONNEN broadcast at all times during the patrol, either on low frequency or high frequency. Difficulty was experienced during the time between 0800 L and 1100 L when a split phoen watch on BELLS and the Aircraft Frequency (7785 kcs) thereby forcing us to make a choice of either BELLS or Aircraft on the high frequency

(L) RADIO: (Cont'd)

receiver (RAL). This condition could be remedied by the installation of another high frequency receiver (RAL). This would permit copying both BELLS and Aircraft during the times when BELLS secure on low Frequency.

All transmissions were satisfactory and no trouble was experienced in raising either BRISBANE or NPM. In transmitting to CTF 72 from the area Japanese interference was experienced only once. During this transmission (my 261745 Feb) the Japanese attempted to use the indefinite call that we were using at that time (NERK) and also attempted to use "Q" Signals that in no way fit the circumstances and finally "ROGERED" for our message before our transmission was complete. No other interference was experienced.

All serial numbered messages originated by HAIKU were successfully copied up until the time of transfer of this vessel from CTF 17 to CTF 72. All serial numbered messages originated by CTF 72 and transmitted through BELLS were successfully copied.

(M) RADAR:

The SD radar was not used after reaching the patrol area. Enroute it picked up one plane at a range of 14 miles but missed several others at shorter ranges.

The overall operation of the SJ-a with PPI and high power transmitter was excellent. The old style range unit however, gave much trouble due to jamming of crystal lead and leakage from the range tank.

Considerable success was experienced using the SJ-a to detect airplanes, and for that reason it was operated continuously. During the training period it was observed that planes could be picked up and tracked in easily at any angles of elevation up to about 40° from ranges of about 10,000 yards. On bombers ranges of 16,000 yards were normal with contacts up to 18,000 yards, and on one occasion 32,000 yards. Approximately one half of the planes encountered were picked up on the SJ-a first.

(M) RADAR: (Cont'd)

A number of radar contacts were made on flocks of birds of 3500 to 7,000 yards. The pips from these contacts were usually so sharp that positive identification was difficult.

While entering and leaving TULAGI, the SJ-a was used to assist in the navigation. Land was picked up at 80,000 yards when entering and followed out to about 112,000 yards when leaving.

Range circles were scribed on a disk of cellulose acetate and placed over the PPI screen. This was of great assistance in estimating ranges over 40,000 yards and in estimating the range of targets when first detected.

The list of radar contacts is as follows:

Date	Maximum Range	Reliable Range	Type of Target
Jan 23	16,800	16,000	2 formations of 3 planes each, 5,000 feet high.
Jan 23	32,000	27,000	Low reef.
Jan 26	33,000	22,000	10,000 ton tanker.
	19,200	18,000	Large destroyer.
	18,600	17,000	Large destroyer.
Jan 27	18,500	18,000	Airplanes.
Jan 31	15,500	14,000	Submarine.
Feb 2	80,000	80,000	Land--two 3,500 foot peaks.
Feb 3	112,000	100,000	Same as above (range by plot).
Feb 4	32,000	32,000	Airplane.
Feb 5	11,000	11,000	Airplane.
Feb 11	28,000	20,000	(3) 500 ton ships
Feb 18	16,500	10,000	Airplane.
Feb 18	16,000	15,000	Airplane.
Feb 22	10,000	9,000	Submarine.

(N) SOUND:

There were no targets for sound during this patrol.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS:

The water in this area is notable for its lack of density layers. In all cases but one, the BT showed isothermal water to a depth of 300 feet (sometimes with a gradual reduction of temperature amounting to not more than 1^{o} over all). On one day a definite break was found at 270 feet in the position Lat. 04^{o}-40' N, Long. 149^{o}-40' E. The water was isothermal to 270 feet, then a sharp 2^{o} change between 270 and 280 feet and a gradual negative gradient from 280 to 310 feet.

A trim was secured at periscope depth with 6,000 lbs. in negative tank and on going deep this was blown to 2,000 lbs. The results were very satisfactory as no further pumping was necessary. The compression rule for this vessel since commissioning has averaged 2,000 lbs. per 100 feet.

BT cards will be forwarded to the Hydrographic Office.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY:

The health of the crew was excellent.

The food was well prepared at all times. The stop in TULAGI enabled us to obtain some fresh vegetables which were not available in Midway.

The habitability was excellent as the patrol was made on the surface.

(Q) PERSONNEL:

The state of training and morale of the crew is good. The lookouts stood both day and night watches as such and consequently got in two patrols looking during one trip. The excellent job turned in is indicated by the number of planes sighted at extreme ranges. The absence of material casualties is indicative of good operation by personnel.

(R) MILES STEAMED:	FUEL USED:
Midway to area	19,760 gal.
In Area	11,388 gal.
Area to Brisbane	15,000 gal.

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Second War Patrol.

(S) DURATION:

Days enroute area	5.3
Days in area	41.
Days enroute Brisbane	3.
Days submerged	None

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING:

Torpedoes	Fuel	Provisions	Personnel
18	2,500	20	10

Limiting factor this patrol:

Expenditure of fuel oil.

(U) REMARKS:

1. Use of the S.J. Radar for aircraft detection.

During the training period prior to this patrol experiments were conducted with the S.J. radar to determine the feasibility of using it as an aircraft detector. T.B.F.'s flew over this vessel from various ranges and at various altitudes from 500 to 2,000 feet. The regular operator was able to pick these planes up at ranges of six to 10,000 yards at angles of elevation up to 10°. The planes were tracked in until the angle of elevation reached about 45° when they disappeared from the screen. When ordered to discontine use of the S.D. radar the S.J. was used continuously. This proved very usefull as shown by the fact that numerous contacts were made and verified at ranges up to 16,000 yards. Contacts were made at greater ranges, but these were not verified by sight.

This should not be taken to mean that the S.J. is a satisfactory answer to the aircraft problem. We still need an improved aircraft radar that cannot be D.F.'d.

2. In operations in area where own planes and own submarines are operating an I.F.F. is a very desirable addition. This equipment is essential if own surface forces are operating in same area. It is realized that we probably submerged numerous times for our own patrol planes. This would be avoided if we had an I.F.F.

3. It is suggested that wolf pack operations would be very usefull along certain established convoy routes. In this way a greater front could be covered, and thus multiply the chances of detecting convoys on the wide variations from the track they use. In this work a high frequency voice radio would be usefull.

4. An additional high frequency receiver is required in order that continuous watch may be stood on both the aircraft frequency and BELLS.

FC5-18/A16-3

Serial: 017

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN,
Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
March 1, 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS DACE Report
of 2nd War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To : The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Second War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The second war patrol of DACE, the first for the present commanding officer, was conducted in the area north of the BISMARCKS along PALAU-RABAUL and TRUK-KAVIENG shipping routes and was of 49 days duration.

2. Two contacts were made with the enemy, only one of which was worthy of expenditure of torpedoes. The other contact was with small AKs escorted by a trawler and subchasers. A complete description of the small AKs is lacking in this report but it must be remembered that every effort should be made to destroy enemy shipping. One attack was made on the surface at night on an unloaded tanker with two escorts. Two hits were obtained resulting in unknown damage to the tanker which did not sink. Due to a speed advantage of only one (1) knot, DACE made no further attacks on this target. The firing range and torpedo run on this attack were large. The 2^{o} divergent spread employed appears to be excessive, giving a total coverage of over 1500 feet. A 1^{o} spread would have given a normal coverage of over 150% of target's length. Track angles were favorable but gyro angles were large. Small gyro angles should be striven for. The two timed explosions heard appear to be evidence of two torpedo hits.

3. DACE returned from patrol in very good material condition and will be given normal refit by FULTON. It is recommended that DACE be drydocked at next available opportunity.

4. It is regretted that more worthwhile targets were not contacted on this patrol.

Eliot H. Bryant.

FF12-15(72)/A16-3/G1

Serial 087

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
3 March 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE - Report of
Second War Patrol.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Second War Patrol - Comments on.

1. DACE departed MIDWAY, 7 January 1944 on Second War Patrol. Passed to operational control Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO, 15 January. Entered assigned area south of TRUK 18 January; patrolling PALAU-TRUK convoy routes. First contact 2045L, 26 January near 02-17 N, 149 E with large northbound tanker with escort of two destroyers. Conducted surface radar approach in squally weather. 0007 fired six bow tubes, registering two timed hits at 3200 yards range. Successfully evaded escorts on surface. After attack target increased speed from 15.5 to 16.5 knots, continued on northeasterly course. Maintained radar contact with target while evading escorts. Chase abandoned at 0241L due to fuel shortage and small favorable speed differential of only one knot. Sent contact report. 29 January left area, arriving TULAGI 2 February. Fueled, accomplished repairs to SJ radar. 3 February departed TULAGI for life guard mission near 01-00 N, 157-00 E. On station 5-8 February during photographic reconnaissance of PONAPE by planes South Pacific Force. 9-13 February patrolled TRUK-KAVIENG convoy routes making contact night 11 February with 3 small marus and 2 escorts, northbound. Ships not suitable torpedo targets. 14-16 February engaged in offensive scouting near 04-00 N, 152-00 E covering operations South Pacific Forces Green Island. 17 February patrolled area 120 miles SW TRUK. 18-19 February patrolled area 100 miles west TRUK. 20-22 February patrolled TINGWON-PALAU convoy routes. Left area 22 February due to low fuel. Arrived MILNE BAY 25 February. Forty-nine (49) days on patrol, thirty-one (31) days in area. Six (6) torpedoes fired, two (2) hits.

2. This is the first war patrol of the present commanding officer as such. It is regretted that more suitable torpedo targets were not contacted.

3. This patrol is not considered a successful patrol for purpose of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia.

FF12-15(72)/A16-3/G1.

Serial 087

TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
3 March , 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Second War Patrol - Comments on.

---

4. The material condition of the DACE is good. Normal refit including docking in ARD-9 will be given the ship by the FULTON at MILNE BAY. Estimated ready for sea 18 March 1944.

5. DACE is credited with inflicting the following damage to the enemy on her Second War Patrol:

DAMAGED

1 Tanker 10,000 tons

James Fife.

JAMES FIFE.

DISTRIBUTION
COMINCH (Advance copies -3)
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COMSUBS. 7th Flt.
CSS-4, 6, 8, 10, 12
14, 16, 18 and 20
CSD-81, 82, 181 and 182
CTF-72 War Patrol Summary
O-in-C, S/M School, N.L. Conn (2)
Flt. Radar Unit, Melbourne.
ALL SS TF-72 (May be taken to sea, but BURN prior to passing 5° South).
CO USS DACE (File)

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Reg. No. 2300 013753
R.S. No.

A16-3(F-3/roj)

Serial: 0678

26 MAR 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE - Report of
Second War Patrol.
SS247/A16-3, serial 02
of January 7 to February 25,
1944.

From: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Second War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

H. W. GRAF,
Chief of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT 18 March 1946

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE BY SUBMARINES

Reference: (a) ComSubPac ltr. FF12-10/L11(1) of 21 February 1946.

USS DACE (SS247) 2nd War Patrol
Date of Attack: 27 January 1944
Position: Vicinity of TRUK

DACE attacked, on 27 January 1944, what was believed to be an AO of 10000 tons (est.) and obtained two hits. Ship continued on course towards TRUK at 16½ knots and chase was abandoned by DACE due to fuel expenditures. Japanese intelligence lists state that the MEIRAI MARU (tonnage unknown) sunk 140 miles toward TRUK from the scene of DACE's attack, on the same day. Since no other submarine attacks took place at that time or in that vicinity it is obvious that the NEIKAU MARU was lost as a result of the above described attack and credit assessment should be changed from DAMAGED to SUNK. Commanding Officer, Comdr. B. D. Claggett, U.S. Navy.

Copy to:
ComSubLant
SubSchool New London
CO SS-247
→ Op-23E
Op-414C3

1ST COPY

SS247/A16-3

Serial 03

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL-I-A-L

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DACE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 181.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 18.
(3) The Commander Task Force 72.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number Three.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track charts (CTF-72 only).
(C) Plot of attacks (CTF-72 only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the third war patrol of this vessel, including two special missions in the HOLLANDIA TANAH MERAH Area, conducted in area south of PALAU, vicinity of DAVAO Gulf in the Philippines, and northwest of HALMEHERA Island, during the period 16 March to 13 May 1944 is forwarded herewith.

B.D. CLAGGETT.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-09B9C DATE 5/25/72

DECLASSIFIED

77545 FILMED

U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number Three.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Milne Bay in company with the DARTER on 25 February. Completed sound test on 26 February and commenced refit alongside the FULTON. Refit completed by FULTON and 181 Relief Crew on 11 March. The following major items were accomplished: four main engines overhauled, docked and painted in A.R.D. 9, 40MM gun installed in lieu of forward 20MM. March 12th devoted to loading. Commenced training 13 March. Completed training 15 March--no torpedoes fired.

(B) NARRATIVE:

16 March

Departed for third war patrol in accordance

2

16 March (Cont'd)

with ComTaskFor-72's Operation Order #S16-44 in company with FLOUNDER. BACHE acting as escort. Commander Submarine Division 82 in FLOUNDER. Fired all guns prior to leaving MILNE Bay. Made trim dives, took pictures through periscope in preparation for special mission.

FUEL: 1837 MILES: 120

17 March

Conducted a daylight end around and attack on escort. Unless otherwise indicated all times LOVE.

1007 Fire in #3 main engine air chamber. Extinguished with CO2. Put engine out of commission and began inspecting for trouble. Found all rings had excessive butt clearances thus pumping oil into air chamber and starting fire. Began renewing rings. This is rather discouraging just after a refit.

Made two night end arounds and attacks, then fell in astern of FLOUNDER.

FUEL: 2858
MILES: 241
POSITION: 08°-08' S
150°-33' E

18 March

Enroute LANGEMAK Bay.

0845 Moored fueling dock LANGEMAK Bay. Topped off on fuel. Made arrangements for shipment of spare piston rings to next stop over.

1200 Received passengers for special missions in accordance with ComTaskFor-72's special orders.

1300 Main engine #4 back in commission--all rings renewed in outboard bank. Well done to the black gang.

18 March (Cont'd)

1710 All the gear for special missions on board. Departed for patrol in company with FLOUNDER escorted by SC743.

FUEL: 1760 POSITION: LANGEMAK Bay
MILES: 248

19 March

Enroute area.

Conducting daily training dives and control problems.

0220 Escort departed, began opening FLOUNDER.

0824 Sighted unidentified plane, contact #1, submerged to avoid detection.

0909 Surfaced.

1015 Sighted two engine bomber, plane contact #2, submerged to avoid detection.

1055 Surfaced.

1240 Exchanged I.F.F. recognition signals with plane. First time it has worked.

1603 Received challenge on I.F.F.--these kept up during remainder of day and evening. I.F.F. seems to be out of commission.

FUEL: 4003 POSITION: 03°-42' S
MILES: 232 146°-19' E

20 March

Enroute area conducting training dives, drills and control problems.

2130 Received information on night bombing restrictions.

FUEL: 3485 POSITION: 00°-34' N
MILES: 375 145°-08' E

21 March

Enroute area conducting training dives.

1538 While surfacing after a training dive sighted an unidentified bomber coming in. Submerged immediately.

Sighted numerous wooden boxes--there must have been a thousand of them of similiar size about two feet square, also numerous large boxes floating in water. Much wreckage and oil. Position: 00°-24' N, 124°-16' E.

1729 Surfaced and recovered one of the small boxes. Inside the wood was a tin container that was opened and revealed small bags of hard tack. Sample was tasted, another saved for intelligence. These boxes are in good condition as if the vessel carrying them has been sunk quite recently. My message file does not show of any recent sinkings in this area. Whoever got this baby deprived a lot of Jap soldiers of a very inferior grade of crackers.

FUEL: 2435 POSITION: 00°-25' N
MILES: 270 140°-31' E

22 March to 27 March

Conducting special missions.

24 March

2356 Sighted Hospital ship on easterly course, speed eight. Closed to 10,000 yards; found her properly marked so opened out to avoid detection. This is quite disappointing as she is the first suitable target sighted since last January. Could not make out much about her due to the glare of all of the lights. From her appearances and also her pip she looked small.

FUEL: 1328 POSITION: 02°-33' S
MILES: 93 140°-57' E

26 March

Searched for convoy reported in serial 13. Covered speeds from 5 to 10 knots, courses East to hugging coast. No success; they must have put in at WAKDE.

1100 Set clocks back one hour to KING time. Got position report off.

FUEL: 5170 POSITION: 00°-31' S
MILES: 283 141°-45' E

27 March

Enroute SEEADLER Harbor.

0230(K) Sighted HERMIT Island bearing 204°T., distance 22 miles.

0914(K) Sighted escort, DD611, bearing 075°T., range 15 miles.

0940(K) Fell in astern of escort proceeding to port.

1215(K) Moored to COUGAL in SEEADLER Harbor. Commenced fueling. Transferred EVANS, C.J. 642 59 31, TM3c, USNR to COUGAL for further transfer to EURYALE for medical treatment.

Delivered report of special missions to COUGAL for delivery to ComTaskFor-72.

Transmitted Australian Radioman to Australian Corvette.

1730(K) Completed fueling.

"Page 6 thru 12 submitted in special report."

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

FF4-11:11:vfg
A16-6
Ser
0839

AUG 15 1952

REGISTERED MAIL CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-29)

Subj: U.S.S. DACE (SS-247), Third War Patrol, pages 6-12; information on

Ref: (a) OPNAV Conf ltr Op-29/pam ser 243P29 of 5 August 1952

1. Pages 6 through 12 of the Third War Patrol Report of the U.S.S. DACE (SS-247) are not contained in the records of this command. No mention is made of operations conducted during this period in either operation orders or dispatches held by Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

2. This patrol was conducted under the direction of Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet and the disposition of these records is unknown to this command.

3. Commander B.D. Claggett, USN, then commanding officer of the DACE, could undoubtedly supply a general synopsis of that vessels activities during the period in question.

J.B. HESS
By direction

034134

034134

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27 March (Cont'd)

1810(K) Underway returning to patrol.

2023(K) Escort departed.

FUEL: 4840
MILES: 404

POSITION: SEEADLER HARBOR

28 March

Enroute area.

0600(K) Picked up SCAMP dead ahead on opposite course, range 6 miles. Exchanged recognition signals and dope.

0602(K) Sighted NINEGO Island abeam to port, range 22 miles.

0620(K) Submerged for trim.

0652(K) Surfaced.

0945(K) Plane sighted on parallel course, range 11 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. No answer to I.F.F. challenge.

1018(K) Surfaced.

1345(K) Sighted two B-24's, course 135°T. Passed overhead at about 10,000 feet. Exchanged recognition signals with I.F.F.

1950(K) Have been challenged for some time on I.F.F. --believe it might be a shore station triggering it off, so secured it.

FUEL: 3837
MILES: 282

POSITION: 00°-45' S
143°-33' E

29 March

Enroute area.

29 March (Cont'd)

0545(K) Hit submerged log. No apparent damage.

0935(K) Plane contact on S.J. bearing 205°T, 30,000 yards.

0936(K) Plane sighted--uhidentified bomber; submerged to avoid detection.

1013(K) Surfaced.

1040(K) Plane sighted bearing 140°T, range 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. Unidentified bomber.

1117(K) Surfaced.

1306(K) Unidentified two-engine bomber sighted--coming in, range of 4 miles. Made very quick dive.

1455(K) Surfaced.

FUEL: 3652 POSITION: 00°-05' S
MILES: 309 138°-46' E

30 March

Enroute Area.

1630(K) Entered area. Proceeding to Western end as this looks like the best spot.

FUEL: 3620 POSITION: 02°-28' N
MILES: 339 134°-40' E

31 March

Patrolling to Western edge of area.

0710(K) Submerged for trim .

0825(K) Surfaced.

1015(K) BETTY-type bomber appeared out of low hanging clouds and dropped two bombs getting a good straddle--one forward about 50 feet from our bow and the other further aft. Plane

31 March (Cont'd)

was not sighted until bombs had been released. It was first heard by all hands on the bridge as it pulled out of its dive at about 1000 feet. When sighted by officer-of-the-deck the bombs were away and the forward one was observed to explode while clearing the bridge. We made what seemed to be the slowest dive on record, and conducted a periscope patrol the remainder of the day as the low hanging clouds and rain squalls never cleared up. He must have either seen us through a break in the clouds or had radar, because from all appearances he was coming in on a planned run at the time we picked him up. Visibility at the time was very poor varying from indefinate to about 3000 yards. He came in from a rain squall and therefore was not picked up sooner. No damage was suffered.

1854(K) Surfaced and continued patrol to Westward.

FUEL: 2093 POSITION: 03°-17' N
MILES: 313 130°-14' E

1 April

Patrolling Western portion of area.

0712(K) Made dawn trim dive.

0854(K) Surfaced.

0917(K) Plane sighted--DAVE-float type seaplane, range about 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

1114(K) Surfaced.

FUEL: 2054 POSITION: 03°-53' N
MILES: 196 128°-55' E

2 April

Patrolling Western end of area.

2 April (Cont'd)

0400(K) Received ComTaskFor-72 serial assigning us to operational control of ComTaskFor-71.

0600(K) Received ComTaskFor-71 serial assigning operational area. Changed course proceeding to area.

0957(K) S.J. radar contact bearing 205°T., range 9,000 yards. Plane sighted coming out of rain squall, range 7,500 yards, angle on bow zero, flying low and coming in fast. Submerged with plane at 5,200 yards as radar went under. Received one depth charge and two aerial bombs as we went deep. No damage. Decided to conduct periscope patrol for remainder of day in order not to give away our destination.

1700(K) Changed time to (-9) ITEM.

1855(I) Surfaced.

FUEL: 1920 POSITION: 04°-28' N
MILES: 280 128°-07' E

3 April

Enroute area.

0030(I) Entered area assigned by ComTaskFor-71. Proceeding to designated point.

0519(I) Plane contact on S.J., range 5,800 yards. Submerged with range 4,500 yards--coming in on a steady bearing. Range 2,800 yards when radar went under. It was still very black--no moon--we could not see plane and do not think he could possibly see me. Probably just happened to pass over us on his dawn patrol. Am 12 miles Northeast of point which is a little further out than I wanted to be, but only have a half hour more of darkness so remained submerged. Proceeding to point.

0650(I) Sighted single engine float plane patrolling, bearing 005°T, distance 6 miles.

0735(I) Sighted same plane bearing 270°T, distance 4 miles.

0750(I) Picked up screws on J.P. After search found small patrol craft bearing 270°T--avoided at periscope depth.

1003(I) Sighted float type plane again bearing 356° T., distance 8 miles.

1235(I) Changed course to North patrolling along coast.

1930(I) Surfaced. Commenced night patrol running down moon streak.

FUEL: 1384
MILES: 184

POSITION: 06°-34' N
126°-28' E

4 April

Patrolling on surface.

0527(I) Encountered radar interference bearing 090° T., probably the BASHAW.

0541(I) Submerged seven miles Northeast of point. Proceeded to patrol on North and South line through point.

0853(I) Sighted "DAVE" type float plane bearing 090°T., course North, distance 8 miles.

1316(I) Sighted smoke bearing 270°T--in haze can not make out anything. Changed course to 270°T to close.

1445(I) Smoke proved to be on beach. Continued to patrol line North and South.

1927(I) Surfaced fifteen miles Southeast of Point AUGUSTIN. Commenced night patrol off cape.

11

4 April (Cont'd)

Running one hour legs in moon streak.

FUEL: 1241 POSITION: 06°-07' N
MILES: 157 126°-01' E

5 April

Patrolling as before.

0539(I) Submerged for day patrol five miles Southeast of patrol point.

1102(I) Heard a distant explosion to the Westward which might be the DARTER working over something coming out. Changed course to the Westward and J.P. picked up screws, nothing in sight. Stuck up about six feet of periscope and sighted the tops and stack of a CHIDORI type torpedo boat on an Easterly course. The next look he was about 12,000 yards away heading to the northward. Assumed we had been sighted by the constant air patrol maintained off Cape SAN AUGUSTIN so put our stern toward him and kept the periscope on him. His speed about 18.

1120(I) Sighted a new type of plane over the destroyer. Possibly it was a KATE, but it looked similar to our GRUMMANS, the landing gear was retracted. Decided that this must be something more than a searching destroyer so came up to 60 feet for a better look and at

1124(I) sighted a converted aircraft carrier, smoke pipes on side, no island, two high masts--bearing 178°T., angle on the bow 20 starboard, range 18,000 yards. Commenced swinging left to 230°T., and started in. Sounded battle stations.

1129(I) Carrier zigged and is now showing a 70 port angle on the bow, started swinging with full rudder when at

5 April (Cont'd)

1131(I) the nearest destroyer or the plane dropped a depth charge fairly close. Went to 100 feet to make turn and lose aircraft screen; on comparing notes decided that it was nuisance bombing as both this and previous one had been on the even half hour so started up and at.

1139(I) Carrier had zigged to course of about 150°T., and was showing us a 120° port angle on the bow, both escorts were on this side at this time. He later zigged back to about 090°T., but we were never closer than about 12,000 yards. Unfortunately we were about 4 miles North of our "point" and were caught off base. The disappointment throughout the ship was very evident.

1200(I) Right on the bell another depth charge was dropped, and another was heard in the distance at 1230. Decided not to send contact report until after surfacing, but later decided it was unnecessary to send one at all.

1959(I) Surfaced fifteen miles southeast of Cape SAN AUGUSTIN.

2158(I) Changed course to 270°T. proceeding the Western boundry of area. Will run up this line in hopes of contact.

2335(I) On Western boundry line, changed course to 340°.

Encountered radar interference bearing 200° T., presumed to be SCAMP or DARTER.

FUEL: 1527
MILES: 161

POSITION: 06°-10' N
126°-20' E

6 April

Patrolling Western edge of area.

0012(I) Radar contact, range 19,000 yards, bearing 312°T. Radar range closing fast so at

0014(I) changed course to 160°T, increased speed to full on three engines. One engine out of commission. Range now 16,000 yards. Have started to track.

Tracking on surface running with target at full power with all we have trying to gain time to get dope before going to radar depth.

0025(I) Submerged to radar depth to avoid detection. Leading destroyer range 13,000 yards--it is a bright night alothough the sky is overcast and the nearly full moon gives lots of light. All ships are clearly visible from bridge without binoculars. Tracking party gives me a course of 160°T., speed 22 knots. We are 5,500 yards off track so come right to 212°T immediately to close track making full speed. I was afraid to give him this large silhouette while on the surface. Continued tracking at radar depth. Have identified targets as follows: leading is large DD patrolling ahead and about 2,000 yards on our side of track; the remainder consists of three large ships, cruisers--class unknown, and three large destroyers or small cruisers in column open order, distance between ships three to four hundred yards. Zigging simultaneously. Have decided to let leading destroyer pass and fire two torpedoes at each of the next three cruisers. Will fire longitudinal spread. Torpedo depth set at ten feet, high speed.

0032(I) Plot shows target has zigged to 120°T., and indicates a slower speed. Am continuing in to get ahead where I will be in position for a zig either way.

6 April (Cont'd)

0035(I) Went to periscope depth with range of 4,800 yards on leading destroyer.

0039-45(I) Destroyer passed ahead, range 800 yards--he filled the entire field of the periscope. Problem is checking nicely, target has zigged to course 190°, visibility is excellent, can get good angles on the bow, speed 20 knots--will have to fire with a torpedo run of 3000 to 2500 yards. Changed course to 260° for 110° port track.

0041-38(I) Commenced firing at leading cruiser bearing 029° relative, gyro 4½° right. Eight seconds later fired second torpedo at same target, gyro angle 3° right, torpedo run 3,000 yards.

0041-52(I) Shifted to second target and fired number three torpedo, periscope bearing 031°, gyro angle 8° right. Nine seconds later fired number four at same target, gyro angle 8°.

0042-10(I) Shifted to third target and fired number five torpedo, periscope bearing 035°, gyro angle 14½° right. Eleven seconds later fired number six, gyro 14° right, torpedo run 2600 yards.

0042-21(I) Right full rudder to bring stern tubes to bear. After swinging 90° saw that targets were going by too fast to get off a stern shot; so steadied up on reverse course to await developments.

After waiting two minutes without any explosion decided that we had missed with all torpedoes. Do not know where our bust was unless it was in speed. We didn't have much time to rack--only 20 minutes, guess we made a mistake shooting the works at three different targets, but what a jack pot if we had collected. The dope looked good so decided to take the chance. Sound heard torpedoes running apparently hot, straight and normal.

0115(I) Surfaced with range to near target 14,000 yards. Commenced chasing at full power on

6 April (Cont'd)

three main engines. Hope one of the other boats gets in, turns them back and gives us another crack at them. Commenced reload forward.

0120(I) Commenced transmitting contact report to ComTaskFor-71. Cleared message in twenty minutes.

0126(I) Radar interference bearing 220°T., believed to be DARTER--hope he gets in.

Have continued tracking target and determined our error. He is making 22 knots, course 180°.

0140(I) Target changed course to 230°T.

0150(I) Lost sight contact.

0205(I) Received rebroadcast of contact report.

0245(I) Sent second contact report; new course and speed.

0258(I) Cleared contact report.

0300(I) Lost radar contact with target, range 37,000 yards.

0305(I) Received rebroadcast of second contact report.

0310(I) Discontinued chase, changed course to 030° proceeding back to patrol station.

0541(I) Submerged for day patrol seven miles Southeast of point.

1925(I) Surfaced 16 miles Southeast of Cape SAN AUGUSTIN. Commenced night surface patrol. Have decided to work North along coast about eight miles off in hopes of getting something coming down from North hugging coast.

6 April (Cont'd)

2100(I) Received ComTaskFor-71's serial 110 detaching us. Will continue patrol Northward to edge of area and then depart. Sure hate to leave this area as there seems to be a lot of activity.

FUEL: 1963 POSITION: 06°-18' N
MILES: 178 126°-25' E

7 April

Patrolling North along coast.

0132(I) Radar contact bearing 342°T, range 17,500 yards. This contact is very close to land and hard to get a good range and bearing on. Commenced tracking; closing to see if we can make it out. Continued closing trying to see target but unable to see it, until at a range of 10,000 yards target became barely visible in moon streak. Cannot make it out because of land background--all that is visible is a dark streak near water line. He is only 1,000 yards from beach and is proceeding on a Southerly course hugging each cove. We have a very bright background so at

0243(I) submerged to make turn, open out and get ahead.

0255(I) Surfaced and opened out from beach. Can not get in for a surface attack with this light, so will get ahead of him and make the attack as he reaches Cape SAINT AUGUSTIN. In this way I will get a look at him when he has passed beyond the land background. I still do not know whether he is a suitable torpedo target. He has one escort that was picked up on radar at 15,000 yards. Escort is about 1,000 yards ahead and pinging.

0300 to 0430(I) Making end around.
Now ahead of target and starting to close point.

7 April (Cont'd)

0448(I) Sighted P.T. boat headed North at high speed, angle on the bow 20° starboard, bearing 040° relative, range 3,500 yards. Changed course to left to allow him to pass. He passed abeam 2800 yards. Resumed course to close target. (Can't immagine why P.T. didn't see us.) When two miles off Cape SAINT AUGUSTIN at

0506(I) with the range of target 8,000 yards submerged to radar depth. The moon is now under a cloud, but visibility is still pretty good judging from looks of the P.T. boat. Have seen target and can now make him out as a small freighter of 2 or 4 thousand tons, escort is a Chidori type torpedo boat or large P.C. and is still ahead.

0511(I) Target has closed to 6,000 yards. Cannot find escort on radar so dropped down to periscope depth to see if I can pick him up in the periscope.

0512(I) Moon is under heavy clouds--cannot see either escort or target through periscope. Hope it comes out in time to put some bearings into T.D.C.. Continued search until at

0514-30 received a close depth charge. Still can't see anything so went deep. Escort must have seen our periscope shears as we were making pretty good speed closing target.

0517(I) Second depth charge, close but above us.

0522(I) Third depth charge not very close.

Escort continued searching area for another hour, but we were under an 11° gradient so he did not find us.

0712(I) Started back to periscope depth.

7 April (Cont'd)

0730(I) At periscope depth--nothing in sight. Commenced periscope patrol departing area in accordance with orders.

1905(I) Surfaced.

2117(I) Received new area assignment form ComTask-For-72.

FUEL: 1759 POSITION: 06°-01' N
MILES: 161 126°-31' E

8 April

Proceeding new area.

0020(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial directing conservation of fuel as ordered to one engine.

0615(I) Made dawn dive. Sky is covered with low clouds so will remain submerged until it clears.

1123(I) Doesn't look as if it will clear so surfaced and proceeded to area on one engine.

FUEL: 1526 POSITION: 04°-49' N
MILES: 173 128°-43' E

9 April

Proceeding to area.

0130(I) Entered new area.

0556(I) Made dawn dive. Numerous low clouds and rain squalls so decided to conduct a submerged patrol until it clears.

0800(I) Commenced renewing piston rings in #3 main engine.

1010(I) Surfaced. There are still numerous clouds.

1135(I) Rain squalls have closed to 8,000 yards so submerged to avoid planes.

1655(I) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol at one engine speed.

1908(I) Changed course to 065°T., to get a radar fix on MERIR Island. Haven't had a decent fix since leaving Cape SAINT AUGUSTINE.

2135(I) Obtained radar fix on MERIR Island, bearing 018°T, range 20,000 yards. Changed course to 120°T to get back to area.

FUEL: 1105 POSITION: 03°-54' N
MILES: 215 131°-37' E

10 April

Patrolling across Northern edge of area at one engine speed.

0355(I) Received message concerning SCAMP. Decided to stay in Eastern part of area in case we can be of any assistance.

0605(I) Made dawn dive.

0835(I) Surfaced. Patrolling Eastern part of area at one engine speed.

1127(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial ; telling us to contact SCAMP. Changed course to West, increased speed to 2-engine speed--should pick him up about 2100.

1843(I) #3 Main Engine back in commission. Commenced renewing piston rings #4 main engine.

1850(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial ; which contained original orders to contact SCAMP. This must have been transmitted during dawn dive.

1955(I) Radar interference. Headed for it.

10 April (Cont'd)

2035(I) Radar contact bearing 186°T., range 13,000 yards.

2045(I) Exchanged recognition signals with SCAMP. Exchanged information and took station ahead at SCAMP's request. Proceeding in company.

FUEL: 2265 POSITION: 03°-38' N
MILES: 191 133°-19' E

11 April

Escorting SCAMP to base.

0100(I) Number One Main Generator burned out. Binding wire appears to have carried away putting generator completely out of commission. Will require new armature. Do not know what caused this as we were cruising at 75/90. There was no indication of the casuality until the overload blew and smoke came out of generator.

0530(I) SCAMP submerged. Stood by to see that everything was all right.

0615(I) Submerged. Conducted periscope patrol.

1818(I) Surfaced.

1822(I) Radar interference from SCAMP. Closed and took station ahead.

FUEL: 1512 POSITION: 03°-00' N
MILES: 256 134°-18' E

12 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0602(I) SCAMP submerged.

0613(I) Received okay by sound from SCAMP so submerged for periscope patrol.

12 April

1753(I) Surfaced.

1816(I) Radar interference, closed SCAMP and took up position for night.

FUEL: 1703 POSITION: 02°-24' N
MILES: 178 137°-12' E

13 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0525(I) SCAMP submerged.

0527(I) Received okay from SCAMP so submerged.

1730(I) Surfaced.

1803(I) Radar interference. Closed SCAMP and took up night cruising position.

2115(I) Radar contact on port bow, range 3,000 yards. Sent information to SCAMP and changed course away. Could not see anything; believed to be wreckage or drift wood.

2130(I) Resumed course.

FUEL: 1427 POSITION: 01°-49' N
MILES: 174 139°-46' E

14 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0507(I) SCAMP submerged.

0512(I) Received okay from SCAMP so submerged.

1728(I) Surfaced.

1755(I) Radar interference. Closed SCAMP and took up night position.

FUEL: 1496 POSITION: 01°-06' N
MILES: 176 143°-19' E

14 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0507(I) SCAMP submerged.

0512(I) Received okay from SCAMP so submerged.

1728(I) Surfaced.

1755(I) Radar interference. Closed SCAMP and took up night position.

FUEL: 1496 POSITION: 01°-06' N
MILES: 176 143°-19' E

15 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0517(I) SCAMP submerged.

0522(I) Received okay so submerged.

1538(I) Surfaced for sun line.

1554(I) Submerged.

1727(I) Surfaced.

1745(I) Radar interference. Closed SCAMP and took position ahead.

FUEL: 1800 POSITION: 00°-24' N
MILES: 184 145°-08' E

16 April

Escorting SCAMP.

0311(I) Radar contact. Changed course to close.

0344(I) Exchanged recognition signals and dope with escort, U.S.S. JENKINS. Fell in astern proceeding to SEEADLER Harbor.

0500(I) Set clocks ahead one hour to zone (-10) KING.

16 April

1004(K) Anchored at SEEADLER Harbor, Admirality Islands.

1500(K) Went alongside U.S.S. MINK for fuel.

FUEL: POSITION: At Anchor
MILES:

17 April

At SEEADLER Harbor.

1200(K) Completed fueling and taking on lub. oil. Ready for sea.

18 April

At SEEADLER Harbor.

19 April

Underway clearing side of JENKINS.

0753(K) Cleared SEEADLER Harbor escorted by USS JENKINS, proceeding to patrol area.

1740(K) Sighted friendly task force of four carriers and eight destroyers.

1758(K) Changed course to East to pass astern of force.

1830(K) Resumed base course.

1845(K) Escort departed.

19 April (Cont'd)

1850(K) Another radar contact, four targets bearing 313°T, range 24,500 yards. Ships not seen but believed to be additional units of other Task Force, as we are receiving radar interference.

1945(K) Radar contact 22,000 yards, bearing 010°T. Changed course to work around astern of force as radar interference indicates they are friendly.

2115(K) Have worked around force; resumed base course.

Challenged each of these contacts with I.F.F. Got no replay at any time.

FUEL: 1851
MILES: 64

POSITION: 01°-18' S
147°-55' E

20 April

Enroute area.

0553(K) Morning trim dive.

0616(K) Surfaced.

0654(K) Sighted plane bearing 345°T, range 12 miles. Exchanged I.F.F. recognition signal.

1021(K) Sighted unidentified plane bearing 150°T, range 10 miles. Submerged. Received I.F.F. challenge as we went under. Came to periscope depth and observed smoke float 1,000 yards ahead. Saw plane--B-25 circling close aboard so fired smoke float.

1058(K) Surfaced, plane not around.

20 April

1500(K) Reached latitude 05° North; headed for area.

FUEL: 4250 POSITION: 04°-08' N
MILES: 377 148°-07' E

21 April

Enroute area.

0818(K) Two-engine bomber sighted bearing 330°T., range 8 miles, coming in at about 1500 feet. Challenged him on I.F.F.--no reply so at

0819(K) with S.F. range 10,000 yards submerged.

0955(K) Surfaced.

1045(K) Challenge on I.F.F., range 32 miles.

FUEL: 4407 POSITION: 05°-03' N
MILES: 356 143°-29' E

22 April

Enroute area.

0810(K) Sighted "BETTY" type bomber coming in, distance 8 miles , bearing 300°T. Submerged. Lost I.C. power and took excessive angle (49°) down. Backed and blew to bring her out of it at 150 feet. Angle was caused by following: planes were believed to be out when I.C. indicator went out. Actually they were on hard dive when we shifted to hand; number 7 vent was not opened and this was not discovered until we go I.C. again and thus indicator lights. Prior to this did not believe it possible to get under with a tank empty.

0927(K) Surfaced.

1055(K) "BETTY" sighted and picked up by S.J. bearing 320°T, range 14 miles. Submerged to avoid detection.

22 April (Cont'd)

1132(K) Surfaced.

1144(K) Another "BETTY" sighted bearing 220°T, range about 10 miles. He closed to 7 miles by S.J. range so at

1145(K) submerged. They either have a lot of planes out here or this fellow is persistant.

1334(K) Surfaced.

FUEL: 3177 POSITION: 05°-00' N
MILES: 324 138°-30' E

23 April

Enroute area.

1507(K) Sighted plane, S.J. range 16,000 yards, elevation 1°, course 020°T., type "BETTY". Submerged to avoid detection.

1612(K) Surfaced.

1835(K) Sighted SONSOROL Island bearing 323°T., distance 20 miles. Closed to 5 miles, no sign of activity.

2050(K) Radar interference bearing 255°T., probably BLUEGILL.

FUEL: 4120 POSITION: 04°-54' N
MILES: 354 133°-21' E

24 April

Enroute area.

0430(K) Radar interference bearing 275°T., probably DARTER.

0922(K) Plane sighted bearing 020°T., S.J. range 16,800 yards. Four-engine bomber (MAVIS), course 125°T.

24 April (Cont'd)

0923(K) Submerged to avoid detection.

1011(K) Surfaced.

1018(K) Sighted (MAVIS) again bearing 090°T., course 270°T., very low. S.J. radar range 10,000 yards. Submerged to avoid detection.

1120(K) Surfaced.

1405(K) Entered Northeast corner of area. Commenced patrolling a Southwest course at two engine speed.

FUEL: 3068
MILES: 325

POSITION: 04°-39' N
129°-22' E

25 April

Patrolling area.

0012(K) Reached Southwest corner of area; reversed course.

0849(K) Submerged to allow weather to clear. Rain squalls all around, ranges from 8,000 to 1500 yards. Cannot pick up planes to avoid detection.

1106(K) Rain squalls have passed so surfaced.

1530(K) Reached Northeast corner of area so reversed course.

1622(K) Sighted unidentified bomber bearing 025°T. Patrolling North and South, range 12 miles.

1626(K) Plane changed course toward us so at

1628(K) submerged.

1705(K) Surfaced.

25 April (Cont'd)

FUEL: 3160 POSITION: 03°-49' N
MILES: 324 128°-57' E

26 April

Patrolling area.

0208(K) Reached Southwest corner of area, reversed course.

1230(K) Reached Northeast limit of area, reversed course.

1839(K) Periscope sighted by O.O.D. and lookout. Bearing 210°T., range 1,000 yards. Headed for it--increased speed to full. Periscope not sighted again, left vicinity at full speed.

1949(K) Reversed course to search area for possible submarine.

2048(K) Have retraced our track to a point four miles beyond contact with no results so continued patrol to Southwest.

FUEL: 3026 POSITION: 04°-07' N
MILES: 327 129°-21' E

27 April

Patrolling area.

0300(K) Reached Southwest corner of area, reversed course.

1230(K) Reached Northeast limit, reversed course.

2045(K) S.J. radar contact 23,000 yards, bearing 200°T. Headed toward and began tracking. Tracked him on course West, twenty knots, zig zagging thirty degrees each side of base course on five minute legs. Continued closing at full power (18 knots) as I believe he will

27 April (Cont'd)

head North to DAVAO when he get West of TALAUD Island. Only hope of catching him is that he slows down when he moon sets at 2230. My maximum speed is 18 knots.

2345(K) Lost radar contact range 24,000 yards. From indications of the radar pip and speed I believe targets were destroyers. Closest range we were able to get was 21,000 yards. Sent contact report to ComTaskFor-72, continued West but with little hope.

FUEL: 2775 POSITION: 04°-06' N
MILES: 321 129°-26' E

28 April

Searching for contact.

0027(K) Gave up search as I see no chance of regaining contact. Returning to area.

0647(K) Submerged for trim. Weather overcast, numerous rain squalls making aircraft detection improbable so decided to remain submerged to see if it would clear.

0956(K) Has cleared some so surfaced. Had numerous rain squalls all day.

1441(K) Reached Northeast limit and reversed course.

FUEL: 2671 POSITION: 03°-58' N
MILES: 291 128°-59' E

29 April

Patrolling area.

0130(K) Reached Southwest limit; reversed course.

0645(K) Made dawn trim dive.

29 April (Cont'd)

0814(K) Surfaced.

1230(K) Reached Northeast limit, reversed course.

1745(K) Sighted MOROTOI Island bearing 190°T., distance 25 miles.

1911(K) Sighted unidentified plane bearing 220°T., range 14 miles, parallel course.

1917(K) Plane passed out of sight.

FUEL: 2827 POSITION: 04°-04' N
MILES: 319 129°-16' E

30 April

Patrolling area.

0046(K) Reversed course patrolling to Northeast.

0128(K) Received serial 96 directing us to depart area.

0645(K) Made dawn dive.

0820(K) Surfaced.

1930(K) Changed course to 270° proceeding to new station.

FUEL: 2178 POSITION: 03°-30' N
MILES: 294 129°-00' E

1 May

Patrolling new area.

1357(K) Commenced station patrol.

1910(K) Submarine sighted bearing 334°T. Closed to investigate.

1 May (Cont'd)

1948(K) Exchanged recognition signals and calls. Submarine is PARGO. Had not been informed that she was in vicinity. PARGO said she would patrol North of track; so I decided to patrol South of same.

2230(K) Radar contact bearing 025°T., range 18,750 yards. Commenced tracking.

The base course is Southwesterly, speed 15 knots. We will track from ahead to solve zig plan. Radar interference from direction of target group lead me to believe the PARGO was tracking from astern therefore I considered it unnecessary to send a contact report.

1050(K) Have sighted two escorts, one on each side of target. Moon is very bright, and we can see target is a large tanker--can not make out escorts, but they look like destroyers.

FUEL: 2950
MILES: 317

POSITION: 04°-13' N
128°-15' E

2 May

Tracking convoy.

0230(K) Have tracked target for four hours and definitely proved that he has no zig plan that repeats. (Apparently uses new plan each hour). His course ranges from 165° to 300°T with base course about 200°. His legs vary from five to twelve minutes. He gets as far as 7 miles off the base course on each side. Radar has been going out intermittently so think it advisable to try for a submerged attack while the moon is still up. I am on his track--he is to the left of it, but should be coming back. Submerged and commenced normal approach at full speed. Can not pick target up on radar so at

0240(K) went to periscope depth and continued approach

1 May (cont'd)

from this depth. Can just make out target through periscope. Looks as if he is still on left hand leg of zig. Tracked him with periscope and sound until he went by at 0300 (K). Estimate we were never closer than 6,000 to 8,000 yards. Remained submerged to repair radar and allow him to gain sufficient range.

0342(K) Radar repaired so surfaced.

0350(K) Radar contact bearing 197°T., range 23,000 yards. Continued tracking chasing at full speed--18 knots. Surely could use that other engine. We are still obtaining radar interference from direction of target. He has same sort of radar gear (see remarks).

0400(K) Escort commenced dropping nuisance depth charges at fifteen minute intervals.

0540(K) Have closed range to 5,500 yards. Torpedo run 7,000 yards, 130° port track. This looks like the best set up I will get as it is starting to get light in East, so fired a salvo of five torpedoes, low power, zero gyro, T.B.T. bearing 28°, one-half degree spread. Escort is in line with target so set depth at six feet.

0541(K) Destroyer appeared on starboard bow and commenced firing. Turned left to avoid, and bring stern tubes to bear. Salvos are well controlled from three gun mounts; can not tell whether they are single or double mounts. Looks like either director or buzzer control as they fire in good salvos. Splashes from third salvo were observed about 500 yards on starboard bow. Decided it was too close for comfort as radar range is now 4,500 yards. Submerged as fourth salvo went off. Not enough light to see through periscope, and do not have accurate enough dope to fire so went deep and rigged for depth charge.

2 May (Cont'd)

0545(K) Destroyer dropped one depth charge fairly close. Nuisance depth charges continued at fifteen minute intervals until 0700(K).

Decided it is useless to try to close him through island group on surface during daylight so will conduct periscope patrol during morning and give all hands a rest.

1508(K) Surfaced. Proceeding to base.

FUEL: 2450 POSITION: 03°-28' N
MILES: 267 128°-12' E

3 May

Enroute base.

0726(K) Sighted MERIR Island bearing 135°T., distance 12 miles.

FUEL: 4384 POSITION: 04°-37' N
MILES: 339 133°-15' E

4 May

Enroute base.

1156(K) Sighted B-24 bearing 242°T., S.J. range 4,200 yards. Sent challenge on I.F.F. and submerged.

1221(K) Surfaced.

FUEL: 5096 POSITION: 05°-00' N
MILES: 374 138°-50' E

5 May

Enroute base.

1108(K) Plane sighted bearing 180°T., range 7 miles, type "MAVIS". Submerged to avoid detection.

1203(K) Surfaced.

5 May (Cont'd)

1223(K) Unidentified plane sighted bearing 120°T, distance 7 miles. Sent challenge on I.F.F. --no reply so submerged.

1253(K) Surfaced.

FUEL: 3878 POSITION: 05°-06' N
MILES: 319 143°-33' E

6 May

Enroute base.

0800(K) Entered Safety lane.

FUEL: 5111 POSITION: 03°-04' N
MILES: 376 148°-11' E

7 May

Enroute base.

0537(K) Sighted FLOUNDER bearing 195°T.

0538(K) Exchanged recognition signals with escort, P.F. 139. Formed column astern FLOUNDER proceeding in company.

0630(K) Sighted PBY bearing 220°T., range 10 miles.

FUEL: 4449 POSITION: 02°-47' S
MILES: 391 148°-17' E

8 May

Enroute through VITIAZ Straits in company with ODGEN and FLOUNDER.

Encountered numerous friendly ships in passage.

0525(K) ODGEN departed.

1145(K) S.J. contact at 12,000 yards, later seen and identified as a PBY. Exchanged recognition signals.

8 May (Cont'd)

FUEL: 3878 POSITION: 07°-12' S
MILES: 319 149°-23' E

9 May

Enroute base in company with FLOUNDER.

0550(K) Sighted escort, H.M.S. CASTLEMAINE, bearing 220°T. Joined up and proceeded to MILNE Bay.

1207(K) Departed CHINA Straits enroute Brisbane.

1521(K) Escort departed.

Sighted numerous friendly ships that were avoided.

FUEL: 2624 POSITION: 10°-47' S
MILES: 344 150°-32' E

10 May

Enroute Brisbane.

0700(K) Sighted friendly merchantman. Changed course to pass well clear.

FUEL: 3216 POSITION: 14°-23' S
MILES: 322 151°-53' E

11 May

Enroute Brisbane.

2300(K) Radar interference. Closed and exchanged signals with BREEM.

FUEL: 3221 POSITION: 18°-45' S
MILES 325 153°-35' E

12 May

Enroute Brisbane.

1028(K) Made dive to 300 feet to check for leaks.

12 May (Cont'd)

1111(K) Surfaced.

1630(K) Fired all guns for test and training.

FUEL: 3230 POSITION: 24°-09' S
MILES: 331 154°-38' E

13 May

Enroute Brisbane

0615(K) Picked up pilot.

0800(K) Entered MORETON Bay.

1000(K) Moored New Farm Wharf.

FUEL: 3190 POSITION: Brisbane River.
MILES: 348

(C) WEATHER

There were an unusual number of cloudy days with very many rain squalls which made surface patrol rather difficult especially as a large number of planes were encountered in this area. The weather around the Philippines was different entirely from that encountered near HALMEHERA. The days were clear with a haze around the land which lifted in the evenings. The nights were clear and visibility unlimited. During the period the DACE was escorting the SCAMP from the vicinity of MERIR Island to SEEADLER Harbor only one fix was obtainable and that by moonlight.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION:

The current off Cape ST. AUGUSTIN sets to the North eastward part of the time, and with a strength equal to the South westerly set shown on the charts.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

None.

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(F) SHIP CONTACTS:

TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1405	02-18S			270°T.		Loaded with sacks
22 Mar	140-31E	(2) Barges	3,000	6 kts.	P	and boxes
1213	02-18S			100°T.		
23 Mar	140-20E	(2) Barges	2,000	6 kts.	P	- do -
1615	02-22S			076°T.		
23 Mar	140-24E	Sampan	3,000	4 kts.	P	
1242	02-33S	Patrol boat		230°T.		Entering
24 Mar	140-57E	Trawler	4,000	12 kts.	P	HOLLANDIA
1608	02-33S	Patrol boat		000°T.		Inside
24 Mar	140-48E	Trawler	6,000	6 kts.	P	HOLLANDIA Bay
2356	02-31S	Hospital		110°T.		
24 Mar	141-12E	Ship	16,000	10 kts.	SN	Lighted
0310	02-18S			110°T.		
25 Mar	140-20E	Barge	7,200	6 kts.	R	
1415	02-32S			280°T.		
25 Mar	140-51E	Barge type	4,000	6 kts.	Sound	
0600	00-52S			102°T.	R	
28 Mar	144-41E	SCAMP	11,800	16 kts.	SD	
0710	06-24N			260°T.		
3 April	126-33E	Sampan	5,000	8 kts.	P	Picket Boat
1108	06-14N	(2) DD		110°T.		
5 April	126-18E	(1) ACV	18,000	18 kts.	P	
0012	05-55N	(4) DD		160°T.		
6 April	126-09E	(3) CL's	17,800	22 kts.	R	

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(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Cont'd)

TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
0132 7 April	06-41N 126-12E	(1) PC (1) Unidet.	17,500	220°T. 12 kts.	R	About 700 yds off beach--not steady contact.
1750 19 April	00-00N 148-15E	(4) CV's (8) DD's	19,000	260°T. 17 kts.	SD	Own force.
1850 19 April	00-15N 148-15E	(4) Unidet.	24,500	Westerly Course	R	Suspected own force.
1947 19 April	00-29N 148-15E	(5) Unidet.	21,900	Westerly Course	R	Suspected own force.
2045 27 April	03-30N 128-37E	(2) Ships Unidet.	23,000	270°T. 20 kts.	R	High speed and small, probably DD's
1910 1 May	04-26N 128-35E	PARGO	16,000	135°T. 15 kts.	SD	
2230 1 May	04-21N 128-42E	Tanker (1) PC (1) DD	18,750	225°T. 15-16 kts.	R	

Column 6 Abbreviations:
P - Periscope
R - Radar
SD - Sighted Daylight
SN - Sighted Night

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE & SPEED	ALT.	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1105 17 March		A-20	7 mi.	NE	2,000	Sighted	Exchanged signals.
0824 19 March	04-10S 140-40E	Large bomber 4-engine	10 mi.	230°T.	2°	Sighted	
1015 19 March	03-56S 146-28E	2 Engine Bomber	8 mi.	160°T	3°	Sighted	
1240 19 March	03-40S 146-15E	Unknown	8 mi.			I.F.F.	Exchanged signals.
1345 19 March	03-18S 146-02E	Unknown	10 mi.			I.F.F.	Exchanged signals.
1538 21 March	00-24N 140-16E	Large	3 mi.	210°T	4,000	Sighted	
0813 25 March	02-27N 140-56E	(2) BETTY's	10 mi.	280°T		Periscope	(2) planes
0215 26 March	02-06S 140-07E	Unknown	2,900 yards	Unknown		S.J. Radar	
0945 28 March	00-44S 144-52E	Light Bomber	12 mi.	300°T	1½°	Sighted	
1345 28 March	00-42S 143-10E	(2) B-24's	Overhead	135°T	8,000	Sighted & S.J.	
0935 29 March	00-07S 139-03E	Bomber	30,000 yards	310°T	3,000	Sighted & S.J.	
1040 29 March	00-06S 138-56E	Unknown	8 mi.	320°T	400	Sighted	

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE & SPEED	ALT.	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1306 29 March	00-03S 138-32E	2 Engine Bomber	8,000	205°T	1,500	Sighted & S.J.Radar	
1015 31 March	03-15N 130-15E	BETTY	Over-head	310oT 200 kt	1,500	Sighted	Bombed--missed to Stbd.
0917 1 April	03-51N 128-42E	Seaplane DAVE	6 mi.	090°T	2° 1,500	Sighted	
0957 2 April	04-25N 128-10E	BETTY	9,000	035°T	3,000	Radar & Sighted	1 Depth charge 2 Bombs
0519 3 April	06-20N 126-35E		5,850	About 110°T		Radar	
0650 3 April	06-22N 126-34E	Seaplane 1-engine	3 mi.	Circling	3,000	Peri-scope	
0710 3 April	06-24N 126-33E	Float-type 1-engine	4 mi.	Patrol-ling over ST AUGUSTIN		Peri-scope	
1003 3 April	06-09N 126-28E	DAVE	8 mi.	- do -	2° 1,500	Peri-scope	
0853 4 April	06-30N 126-22E	DAVE	8 mi	000°T	3,000	Peri-scope	
1145 5 April	06-20N 126-20E	Carrier bas-ed Scout	6 mi.	Patrol over CV & DD's	1,800	Peri-scope	

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd

TIME & DATE	LAT LONG.	TYPE	RANGE INITIAL	EST.COURSE & SPEED	ALT	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
0645 20 April	02-55N 148-16E	Unid.	12 mi.	340°T	1°	S.D.	Exc. I.F.F.
1021 20 April	03-53N 148-14E	P-25	8 mi.	330°T 200 kt.	2,500	Sighted	
0818 21 April	05-30N 144-00E	BETTY	7 mi.	160°T 200 kt.	1,500	Sighted & Radar	
0810 22 April	05-00N 139-04E	BETTY	8 mi	110°T 200 kt.	2,000	Sighted	
1055 22 April	05-00N 138-43E	BETTY	14 mi	020°T 200 kt.	5,000	S.J. & Sighted	
1144 22 April	05-00N 138-30E	Unid	8 mi	090°T 200 kt.		S.J.	
1507 23 April	04-57N 132-41E	BETTY	8 mi	020°T	1°	Sighted	
0920 24 April	04-54N 129-25E	EMILY or MAVIS	16,800	090°T	2°	Sighted &Radar	
1030 24 April	04-52N 129-24E	MAVIS	12,000	270°T	1/2°	Sighted &Radar	
1622 25 April	04-07N 129-22E	Unid	12 mi	095°T	4,000	Sighted	
1914 29 April	03-05N 128-27E	Bomber Unid.	29,350	140°T	1°	Sighted thru periscope on Surface & on S.J.	
1156 4 May	05-01N 138-50E	B-24	4,400	120°T 200 kt.	4,000	Sighted	

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEEDS	ALT.	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1108 5 May	05-06N 143-31E	MAVIS or PBY	8 mi.	000°T 150 kt.	1°	Sighted	
1223 5 May	05-06N 143-37E	Unid.	10 mi.	040°T 200 kt.	1°	Sighted	
0630 7 May	01-28S 148-17E	PBY	10 mi.	220°T 150 kt.	3°	Sighted	
1145 8 May	07-09S 149-21E	PBY	6 mi.	230°T 150 kt.	1°	S.J.	

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE Torpedo Attack No. ONE. Patrol No. THREE.

Time: 0041-38(I) Date 6 April Lat. 06°-05'-30" N
Long. 126°-09'-30" E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Three CL's or CA's escorted by four destroyers.

Ship(s) sunk: None.

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage determined by: None

Target draft: 18 feet Course: 190°T. Speed: 20

Range: 3000 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 5.8 Course 262°T. Depth: 65 feet Angle: Zero (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

The target was tracked for 15 minutes on the surface and then, at radar depth until the range decreased to 4,500 yards. The final stages of the attack were conducted at periscope depth in bright moonlight. Two torpedoes were fired at each cruiser longitudianl spread.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

ATTACK NO. ONE

Tubes Fired	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle	104P	105P	100P	100P	93P	94P
Gyro Angle	4R	3R	8R	8R	15R	14R
Depth Set	10	10	10	10	10	10
Power	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	25448	39760	39873	39222	25255	39879
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	12432	10603	7585	7586	12262	7857
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	16	16	16	16	16	16
Serial No.	9696	1246	10134	5356	10321	10563
Explosive	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval		8	9	10	8	10
Type Spread			- Longitudinal -			
Sea Conditions	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two
Overhaul Activity	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON

Remarks: Torpedoes missed astern due to speed error of two knots. Target was actually (by later tracking) making 22 knots instead of 20 knots used.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE Torpedo Attack No. TWO. Patrol No. THREE.

Time: 0539(K) Date: 2 May 1944 Lat. 03°-23' N
Long. 127°-56' E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One tanker, one DD, one PC

Ship(s) sunk: None.

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None.

Damage Determined by: None

Target draft: 12 feet Course: 180°T. Speed 15

Range 5300 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 18 Course: 230°T. Depth: Surface

Angle: Zero (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Tracked the target for six hours on the surface, and then made a night surface attack using T.B.T bearing and Mk VIII angle solver, zero gyro, 1/2° spread. Detected by escort at time of firing. Believed target zigged away thus causing miss astern.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

ATTACK NO. TWO

	#6	#5	#4	#3	#2
Tubes Fired	130P	130P	130P	130P	130P
Track Angle	0	0	0	0	0
Gyro Angle	6	6	6	6	6
Depth set	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Power	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Hit or Miss	No	No	No	No	No
Erratic	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Mark Torpedo	39654	26388	26459	26402	24481
Serial No.	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Mark Exploder	533	12708	12619	779	12241
Serial No.	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Set	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
Actuation Actual	16	16	16	16	16
Mark Warhead	1423	819	11468	2884	1911
Serial No.	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Explosive		10	11	11	12
Firing Interval		- Longitudinal -			
Type Spread		Calm with Moderate Swell from N.E.			
Sea Conditions	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON	FULTON
Overhaul Activity					

Remarks: None.

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(I) MINES

None.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

1. The most disconserting anti-submarine measure is the persistant air patrols. These were avoided during clear weather by efficient lookouts and S.J. search. However, twice during squally weather we were detected and bombed, once on the surface by a BETTY, and bombed and depth charged at another time by another BETTY. In both of these cases the approach from the rain squalls gave indications that he had some means, such as radar, for detecting us.

2. All ships encountered were escorted. Some of the escorts were pinging and some appeared to be listening. In two cases escorts were dropping nuisance depth charges at regular intervals.

3. The destroyer escort encountered on the night of 1 and 2 May apparently had radar equipment. This equipment is discussed in sections MIKE and UNCLE.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE:

11 April - #1 Main Generator Derangement.

After being on the line developing 810 K.W.H. at 680 R.P.M. (75/90) for 10 hours and 9 minutes the breakers tripped out in the maneuvering room. The engine continued to operate normally. No attempt was made to place the generator back on the line. One minute after breakers tripped out the engine was stopped for inspection of generator. The findings at this inspection are as follows:

(1) Generator temperatures normal.
(2) After bearing in good condition.
(3) Radial and axial position of armature normal.
(4) Large amount of non-magnetic steel wire burned into short pieces. This wire corresponds to specifications for the armature binding wire.
(5) One small piece of copper bar. This copper bar corresponds to specifications for armature conductor.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)

Apparently the binding wire broke and short circuited the armature causing the overload that tripped the breakers.

The total damage is not known nor can it be estimated until the armature is lifted out of the casing. This being beyond the scope the ship's force facilities no attempt has been made to repair the generator.

The generator had operated normally for approximately 2200 hours. The megger readings April 3 were field 10 meg., armature 8 meg.

17 March - #3 Main Engine Air Box Fire and Derangement.

Fire broke out in the air box of #3 main engine after it had been on the line for 5 [illegible], 46 minutes, and operating at various loads from no load to 1050 K.W. Indications of the existance of fire in the air box were sparks and heavy smoke emitted from the air box drains. The engine was secured and the fire smothered. Two units were pulled for inspection. Conditions found are as follows:

(1) Excessive amount of lub. oil in air box.
(2) Excessive gap clearance in all piston rings except the new rings which had been installed during the refit. These new rings (2 to 4 per unit) had taken the full load and had worn so rapidly that their gap clearance was almost equal to the rings that had approximately 1500 hours service. The gap clearance of all piston rings was between .049" and .056". Gap clearance data submitted by refit crew for this engine was .030" to .047". It is difficult to attribute this discrepency to wear in view of the short time in service since overhaul (app. 70 hrs.). The lower compression ring has been replaced by an additional oil ring, which is in accordance with specifications for replacement "Cast iron pistons" in GM16-248 engines.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)

This change does not apply to our engines with aluminum pistons and should not have been made. Since replacement of the lower compression ring with an additional oil ring our lub. oil consumption has increased approximately 100%. It is recommended that the lower compression ring be reinstalled in all four main engines.

Number four main engine air box drains showed signs of excessive lub. oil passing the rings and into the air box after approximately 100 engine hours. It was then decided to renew the rings in #1 and #4 engines. Spares on board were not sufficient to renew rings in #2 engine.

The following defects were found after refit:

#1 MAIN ENGINE

(1) One exhaust elbow cracked.
(2) Five heads loose.
(3) #1 main bearing loose and cocked.
(4) Excessive ring gap clearance.

#2 MAIN ENGINE

(1) Defective bearings in overspeed governor.
(2) Four leaking air starting check valves.
(3) Two loose main bearing jackscrews, one of these bearings appeared to have been driven into place with a screw driver, defacing the butt which made it necessary to renew the bearing.
(4) Regulating governor improperly set.
(5) Six heads loose.

#3 MAIN ENGINE

(1) Defective bearings in overspeed governor.
(2) Four injector spray valve nuts cracked.
(3) Excessive ring gap clearance.
(4) Ring gaps not staggered.
(5) Rings installed upside down in #9, 10, 11, 14 and 16 units.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)

#4 MAIN ENGINE

(1) Loose injector in #9 unit.
(2) Injector of one unit driven into head so hard, removal of head and use of sledge hammer was necessary to remove injector. The injector was damaged beyond repair by this method of removal.
(3) Sleeve from fresh water manifold to liner in #3 unit was cross threaded and screwed in 1-1/2 turns. Sleeve leaked.
(4) Excessive ring gap clearance.
(5) Rings installed upside down in #7, 8, 9, and 14 units.
(6) Ring gaps not staggered.

MISCELLANEOUS

(1) Unnecessary use of gaskets and washers in head assemblies.
(2) Three spare injectors required overhauling before being placed into service. Two of which had bent racks and scored plunger and bushing.

(L) RADIO

No major casualties were experienced in the radio equipment during this patrol.

At each attempt to transmit difficulty was experienced in contacting shore stations on the East coast of Australia. Regardless of our relative position at the time of transmission, East coast stations were about strength 2 or 3. All serial numbered messages were received. Prompt action was received on two "Urgent" messages transmitted. Seven minutes after transmission "Bells" repeated message over regular schedule.

(M) RADAR

During the attack upon a convoy on the night of 1-2 May, sugar jig interference was encountered from one of the enemy escorts. On the "A" scope it looked

(M) RADAR (Cont'd)

very much like another sugar jig radar. As nearly as could be determined the pulse length was the same as the S.J. When the pulse rate was varied, the pulse could not be completely stopped, but could be slowed appreciably. The trailing edge of the pulse showed a break one-third of the way down similar to an S.J. pulse when the local oscillator is slightly out of tune. No observation was made of the effect of varying the receiver turning.

The interference was first noted about five minutes after contact was first made with the target, and it was present during the remainder of the seven and one half hour attack. During this time there was no evidence that the escort was training his radar. Upon surfacing following an hour dive, the interference was present although the target was beyond radar range (24,000 yards).

Until we had closed the escort to about 7,000 yards, there was no evidence that we were detected. Soon after this the escort opened fire. Contact is not believed to have been visual. It is believed that this is either a semi-directional or non-directional radar similar to our S.D. The frequency is approximately the same as our S.J., but it does not appear to be as strong as he did not appear to pick us up outside of seven or eight thousand yards. The only other alternative is that this might have been an attempt at jamming our S.J.; however, the low pulse rate and narrow pulse width seems to eliminate the possibility of jamming by the use of "railings".

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

No casualties were experienced in sound gear during this patrol. Sound conditions were good around the Philippines.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

(1) BT cards taken during the latter part of March

(O) DENSITY LAYERS (Cont'd)

in the vicinity of HOLLANDIA showed little tendency toward density layer formation--usually a straight line showed up on the card.

(2) One card was taken on March 30 at 3-17W, 130-39-15E which showed a density layer with a negative temperature gradient at about 200 feet.

(3) From April 2 to April 6 inclusive, daily trim dives to 300 feet or more were made. The BT indicated fair to good density layers around 300 feet. This was off Cape ST. AUGUSTIN, MINDANAO, about 15 miles off shore to the S.E. The layers were accompanied with negative temperature gradients of 2°-3°F. On two occasions during this period the vessel was balanced over 1/2 hour without change of trim, and could have apparently remained stopped indefinitely.

(4) From 7 to 14 April BT cards were obtained on deep dives extending in longitude from 128-26 E to 144-50 E and in latitude from 4-53 N to 00-26 N. Cards taken during this period showed layers at around 200 to 250 feet. Eastward from 136° to 144° where the latitude of the area covered was not above 002° N., there were no signs of a layer down to 300 feet.

(5) Three cards were obtained at about 04 N, 128 E from 28 April through 1 May. All showed density layers between 250 and 350 feet. These were accompanied with about a 3° negative temperature gradient.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

During the first 15 days of patrol there were 22 mild cases of upper respirator infection--only one case was of sufficient severity to require admission to the sick list. The high incidence of colds was attributed to the disagreeable weather conditions during the latter part of recreation period and the over worked and rushed activity immediately proceeding leaving on patrol. During the remainder of the patrol there have been no colds.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY (Cont'd)

One case of suspected Dysentary developed and subject man was transferred.

One case of Vincents Angina developed, immediate isolation of mess gear to avoid spread of disease was effected--patient responded rapidly to local treatment.

The general health during the latter part of the patrol was excellent.

The food was of good quality and wide varient, and well prepared.

The habitability has been very good, the major part of the patrol being made on the surface. The air conditioning and ventilation systems keep the compartments at a comfortable temperature.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The performance of all hands was excellent. The engineers deserve special credit for their work in overhauling three main engines.

Lt.Comdr. W.G. HOLMAN's performance of duty as Executive Officer and assistant approach officer deserves special mention. His experience and excellent judgement took much responsibility off the shoulders of the commanding officer. His excellent navigation and attention to duty was of great assistance during the four days spent close to shore conducting the Special Missions assigned.

Ensign E.T. JONES also deserves special mention as this was his first patrol as Engineer and Diving Officer. He did an excellent job of overhauling the three main engines and keeping the plant in good condition. His coolness and expert handling of the boat left nothing to be desired. His performance of duty as head of department would do credit to anyone of higher rank and greater experience.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The new men received from Division 181 relief crew have proved to be well trained and adapted themselves rapidly to the routine.

The lookouts and radar operators did an excellent job as shown by the number of aircraft sighted at considerable distances.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

	MILES STEAMED	FUEL USED
(1) MILNE Bay to HOLLANDIA	1366	16,378
(2) Vicinity of HOLLANDIA	677	7,165
(3) HOLLANDIA to SEEADLER	687	10,590
(4) SEEADLER to area	930	11,109
(5) Miles in area	2209	18,837
(6) Escorting SCAMP to SEEADLER	968	7,838
(7) SEEADLER to Area	2021	21,721
(8) Miles in Area	2460	22,037
(9) Area to Brisbane	3821	41,400
	15130	157,300

(S) DURATION

	DAYS
(1) Days enroute HOLLANDIA	6
(2) Days vicinity HOLLANDIA	4
(3) Days enroute SEEADLER	3
(4) Days enroute Area	4
(5) Days in area	11
(6) Days escorting SCAMP	6
(7) Days enroute Area	6
(8) Days in Area	9
(9) Days enroute Brisbane	10
	59

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes	Fuel	Provisions	Personnel
13	8,126	20	10

The limiting factor this patrol was orders of CTF-72.

(U) REMARKS

1. Enemy Radar.

I am convinced that the escorts encountered on the night of 1-2 May had some form of radar. The interference was noted on our S.J. screen for a period of seven hours. This interference was very similar to the interference given by one of our own S.J.'s except it kept trained on us at all times, and did not sweep as our's normally does. There are two explanations of this --the most likely one I think is that it is a non-directional affair similiar to the S.D. The other explanation is that he had our interference on his screen, and kept trained on that bearing; this seems improbable because if he knew our bearing I think he would have investigated. I do believe however that he had our interference and knew we were around somewhere for the following reasons:

(a) When we submerged we [illegible] the sound gear, and at that time the target was not pinging. Soon after we went to periscope depth however he began to ping. I thought nothing of this at the time, but it does indicate that the escort knew we had submerged. When we again came up to radar depth the pinging stopped indicating that he thought we were surfaced.

(b) At 0400 escort commenced dropping nuisance depth charges for no apparent reason. He could not possibly have sighted us at this time, so he must have discovered we were around by some other means.

I think he picked us up by radar about the time we were firing. At this time his range was 8,000 yards. I do not believe he could have seen us with the visibility conditions, and the small angle on the bow we were presenting. The close escort was four thousand yards closer and the target was at 5500 yards; neither of these apparently saw us.

(U) REMARKS (Cont'd)

2. Movement of own forces.

The afternoon of 19 April this vessel encountered a friendly task force of carriers and destroyers in Lat. 0-00 N, Long. 148-12 E. Our escort was with us at the time and exchanged recognition signals identifying them as friendly. That night two other task forces were picked up on radar at points further North. They were challenged by I.F.F., but no reply was received. Radar interference was encountered so they were assumed friendly and avoided. I had no information as to the movement of these forces, and if the original contact had been at night a serious situation would have resulted as I would have made an attack. The only indication I had that the other two task forces were friendly was the radar indication which can no longer be used as an indication. I did not send a contact report because I did not think it advisable to transmit with a friendly task force in the vicinity and thus give the enemy a chance to D.F. and perhaps disclose the presence of this force. Information of movement of own forces are essential to avoid confusion and serious mistakes.

Patrol area and movements of submarines operating under SubPac and TaskForce 71 could often be used to advantage while patrolling in adjacent areas. Also, their communication plans would be very useful. With this information I think contacts could be passed along much faster and more intelligently.

3. The traffic in this area appears to be scarce and sporadic. All targets encountered were high speed which made it difficult to gain position for an attack unless the submarine was fortunate enough to be on the track ahead of the target. The wide zigs make it difficult to get in even then, unless a surface attack is feasible. I believe that better results would be obtained if areas close to harbor entrances, and passes between island groups were patrolled.

(U) REMARKS (Cont'd)

4. Enroute Brisbane one unit of #3 Main Engine was broken down for inspeation and the following results noted:

(1) Liner diameter 8.502" throughout.

(2) Ring gap clearances:

RING NO.	AT INSTALLATION	AFTER INSTALLATION
1	.036	.048
2	.036	Stuck in groove. Broken in removing.
3	.036	.040
4	.036	.040
5	.038	.045
6	.036	.049
7	.038	.046

This engine was overhauled by ship's force during the patrol and had been in operation for 546 hours since overhaul.

The following conclusions are drawn:

(a) The new type compression and wipe rings installed during last refit should be replaced with the original type rings that were installed in this engine. The conclusion is reached because of the number of rings that have been discovered to be stuck; because of the excessive smoking that has been observed since the change of rings; and, because of the great increase in lub. oil consumption.

(b) Oversize rings should be obtained for replacement during subsequent refits.

SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE EIGHTY ONE

FB5-181/A16-3
Serial (0-21)

Care Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
19 May 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE - Report of
3rd War Patrol.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Division ONE EIGHTY ONE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
(2) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Third War Patrol; Comments on.

1. Of three contacts with suitable torpedo targets DACE was able to develop two into attacks which are briefly summarized as follows:

Attack Number One: At 0041(I) on April 6, 1944, in Lat. 06-05-30N, Long. 126-09-30E, DACE fired six torpedoes at a column of three cruisers, which were escorted by four destroyers. Two torpedoes were fired at each of the three cruisers. All were misses, probably due to incorrect speed estimate. For more vulnerable targets it is frequently good policy to divide fire in order to obtain damaging hits to slow down targets for subsequent destruction. However, in this case the torpedoes were spread too thin to expect any appreciable damage with a normal percentage of hits. Even if one or more of the cruisers had received one torpedo hit, there is little assurance that the damage would have prevented her reaching port. The strong escorting force of destroyers would surely have prevented further attacks by the submarine. Had the normal spread (covering 150% target length) been fired at one of the cruisers, the two knot speed error would have been more than covered.

Attack Number Two: At 0539(K) on May 2, 1944, in Lat. 03-23N, Long. 127-56E, after tracking an escorted tanker for six hours, DACE fired five torpedoes from bow tubes. The arrival of daybreak

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SUBMARINE DIVISION ONE EIGHTY ONE

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FB5-181/A16-3
Serial (0-21)

Care Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 May 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE - Report of
3rd War Patrol.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Third War Patrol; Comments on.

- -

had forced DACE to accept a 130° track at 5500 yards (torpedo run 7000 yards). It is quite probable that the target, knowingly or otherwise, avoided by a turn away. Continuation of this attack was prevented by an aggressive destroyer escort.

2. Of more than passing interest is the fact that the above mentioned target used a non-repeating zigzag for at least four hours.

3. The Commanding Officer's confidence in his officers and enlisted men is very gratifying. The aggressive spirit shown during this patrol promises to result in future successes.

R. J. Foley

ROBERT J. FOLEY.

(6)

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FC5-18/A16-3/(11) SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Wx

Serial 056

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
23 May 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247) -
Report of Third War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Third War Patrol, comments on.

1. The remarks of Commander Submarine Division ONE EIGHTY-ONE are concurred in.

2. The casualty to number 1 main generator caused by the binding wire carrying away cut the DACE's available power to three fourths normal for the last half of the patrol. This was keenly felt on the night of 2 May when a long range attack on a valuable target had to be accepted which resulted in no damage, because a more favorable firing position could not be gained due to the small favorable speed increment.

The material condition of all four main engines was very poor, resulting in a great deal of overhaul work by the ship's force.

The efficient work of the ship's personnel in detecting the numerous defects and remedying them is very commendable.

The latest Bureau of Ships instructions regarding piston rings will be followed as soon as material is available.

3. DACE will be refitted by the Submarine Repair Unit Brisbane. It is anticipated that repairs to No. 1 main generator cannot be effected in normal refit period of two weeks.

4. It is gratifying to note that the morale remains high in spite of material casualties, lack of targets and negative results.

5. The patrol was well conducted and the special mission was successfully performed with commendable thoroughness.

6. It is regretted that no damage was inflicted on the enemy but the spirit and determination displayed should result in inflicting serious damage to the enemy on future patrols.

Eliot H. Bryant

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

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6 0409

FF12-15(72)/A1[illegible]/Lh

Serial 0180

TASK FOR[illegible] SEVENTY-TWO,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 May 1944.

3rd ENDORSEMENT to
CO DACE Report of
Third War Patrol.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Third War Patrol, comments on.

1. The remarks of the Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN are concurred in.

2. During her Third War Patrol the DACE successfully accomplished two special missions and for a period of five days acted as an escort for SCAMP who had been badly damaged by enemy action. Four days of the patrol were spent under the operational control of Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

3. The attack upon the enemy task force of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers while well and aggressively conducted was unsuccessful due primarily to a violation of existing torpedo fire control instructions. A full salvo of six torpedoes at one of the cruisers, to ensure serious damage, is believed to have been indicated in this case.

4. The remarks of the Commanding Officer concerning his contact with friendly task forces on the afternoon and night of 19 April are noted. Information concerning the location of these task forces was not available to the Task Force Commander. Transit of the submarine safety lane by submarines was prohibited by CinCPOA on 18 April during passage of major fleet units and the DACE was deliberately held in port during that period.

5. This patrol is designated as "successful" for purposes of award of Combat Insignia.

6. No damage was inflicted upon the enemy.

J. M. HAINES

FILMED

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FF12-15(72)/A16-3/Lh

Serial 0180

CONFIDENTIAL

TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

26 May 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Third War Patrol, comments on.

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CTF-72 War Patrol Summary.
OinC, S/M School, N.L. Conn. (2)
Flt. Radar Unit, Melbourne.
All SS TF-72 (May be taken to sea, but BURN prior to passing 5° South).
CO USS DACE.

F. P. HURRY,
Force Secretary.

64.

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SS247/A16-3/ (04)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
6 August 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 181.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 18.
(3) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track chart (CTF-72 only).
(C) Additional Reports.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the FOURTH war patrol of this vessel conducted in DAVAO Gulf--MINDANAO area during the period June 13, 1944 to August 12, 1944 is submitted herewith.

B.D. CLAGGETT.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-09B9C DATE 5/25/72

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived Brisbane May 12th after completing third war patrol. Held arrival conference that day and was given a refit period of thirty days because of extensive work necessary on No. One Main Generator. May 13th Commander Task Force 72 presented combat insignia and crew departed for leave and recreation. Following major jobs performed:

(1) Renewed armature and field coils in No. One Main Generator.
(2) Overhauled four main engines; replaced all split wiper rings with solid ones to eliminate excessive smoke.
(3) Overhauled auxiliary engine.
(4) Cut down bridge.
(5) Dry docked and touched up bottom.
(6) Welded doubler plates under Main Motor sump tanks.
(7) Installed SN-2 radar detector.

(B) NARRATIVE:

May 28

Officers and crew returned to ship completely happy after two weeks leave in Brisbane, Sydney and environs.

June 9

Made river dive to check for leaks.

June 10

Made deep dive to test hard patch.

June 11 and 12

Loading.

June 13

1330(K) Underway. Proceeding to SEEADLER Harbor in company with H.M.A.S. WHYALLA. Conducting training exercise enroute. Commander Submarine Division 182 acting as training officer.

June 13 (Cont'd)

Conducted numerous approaches of all types, tracking exercises, evasive tactics, and a day end around. This was the best training period I have experienced in seven patrols. It is far superior to operating daily from a base and advantage should be taken of it at every opportunity. No practice torpedoes were fired. The evening of seventeen June Commander BURLINGAME transferred to escort and we parted company. He for MILNE, we for SEEADLER. Conducted training dives and tracking drills during remainder of passage.

June 19

0620(K) Made rendezvous with escort, PC 1130 for passage through VITIAZ Strait.

1215(K) Escort departed.

June 20

0641(K) Made rendezvous with escort YMS 315. Proceeding to SEEADLER Harbor.

1500(K) Commenced fueling and taking lub oil from U.S.S. MINK; upon completion moored alongside U.S.S. EURYALE.

EURYALE made minor repairs including overhauling bridge speakers and renewing north rotor in master gyro.

June 21

1600(K) Underway for patrol in accordance with ComTaskFor-72's operation order S36-44 of 10 June 1944. Escort SC 748. In departing harbor noted that master gyro was out.

June 21 (Cont'd)

Assumed that it had not settled down since tender had worked on it. Steering by auxiliary.

1830(K) Escort departed.

2150(K) Exchanged recognition signals with DARTER's escort returning to port.

POSIT: SEEADLER

June 22

Enroute area.

1412(K) Dived to see if we can get master gyro to settle down. Have been working on it since we got underway.

1641(K) Surfaced. Gyro still out but believe we have found the trouble--an electric lead touching the sensitive element--will have to make additional adjustment to bring gyro level.

1727(K) Fired all guns.

POSIT: 00°-33' S FUEL: 2655 MILES: 252
143°-16' E

June 23

Enroute area. Daily training dives and fire control problems.

0415(K) SD contact 18 miles--no reply to IFF challenge. (Plane contact #1).

0450(K) SD contact 8 miles--no reply to IFF challenge. (Plane contact #2).

1600(K) Set clocks back one hour to Zone (-9) ITEM times.

June 23 (Cont'd)

POSIT: 01°-09' N FUEL: 3170 MILES: 342
138°-21' E

June 24

Unless otherwise indicated all times ITEM. Enroute Area.

0814(I) SD contact 8 miles--submerged. (Plane contact #3).

0843(I) Surfaced.

1402(I) Sighted unidentified two-engine bomber, range 8 miles. (Plane contact #4.) Submerged.

1444(I) Surfaced.

1900(I) Held premier for ACE DACE Movie Theater in Forward Torpedo Room. Title "No Time For Love"--quite appropriate and greatly appreciated.

2100(I) Radar contact on HELEN Island, bearing 184° T., range 15,000 yards.

2300(I) Master gyro back in commission and level--hope it stays that way.

POSIT: 02°-30' N FUEL: 2751 MILES: 323
133°-42' E

June 25

Enroute area.

0945(I) Sighted BREAM. Exchanged signals and received dope on day and night air patrols.

1031(I) Sighted plane coming out of clouds headed in, range 6 miles. Looks like a B-17. (Plane contact #5). Submerged and sent out challenge on IFF as we went down--no reply.

June 25 (Cont'd)

1117(I) Surfaced.

1219(I) Weather overcast with scattered rain squalls. Unsuitable for surface cruising so submerged.

1822(I) Surfaced.

2030(I) Fire in after engine room. Proved to be a small electrical fire in purifier starting panel. No damage, but an excellent drill.

POSIT: 04°-07' N FUEL: 2419 MILES: 305
129°-15' E

June 26

0030(I) Entered assigned area,

0553(I) Made dawn dive at focal point of traffic lanes in eastern part of area. Weather overcast, unsuitable for surface patrol; so conducted periscope patrol until

1251(I) Surfaced.

1628(I) Rain squalls closed in so submerged.

1842(I) Surfaced. Proceeding to focal point in western part of area.

POSIT: 06°-14' N FUEL: 1015 MILES: 167
129°-03' E

June 27

Proceeding to western part of area.

0557(I) Made dawn dive at focal point listed in Intelligence Report, serial 1A-44. Have decided to remain submerged today to see what the air patrols are like. Have not been detected and will endeavor to get their search schedule. Conducting a continuous periscope patrol.

1310(I) Have seen no planes; so surfaced.

POSIT: 06°-33' N FUEL: 1340 MILES: 196
127°-41' E

June 28

Patrolling focal point of traffic lanes.

0047(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial six extending area. Proceeding to DAVAO Gulf.

0331(I) Land on radar, range 95,000 yards. Went to four engines to be in diving position.

0537(I) Submerged 16 miles east of Cape ST. AGUSTIN. Proceeding in for patrol south of Cape.

1024(I) Sighted float type plane, range 7 miles. (Plane contact #6). Patrolling area.

1840(I) Surfaced south of Cape ST. AGUSTIN. Proceeded to run up east coast of MINDANAO during night to search for traffic hugging beach.

POSIT: 06°-10' N FUEL: 2087 MILES: 226
126°-25' E

June 29

Patrolling east coast of MINDANAO. Sighted various lights on beach.

0145(I) Reversed course to be in diving position. Will cross entrance of gulf today.

0345(I) Radar contact 195°T., range 7,000 yards. (Ship contact #1). Looks small as we can't see anything and the night is clear. Commenced tracking and determined course to be 080°T., speed nine. Two targets both appear small.

0422(I) Commenced closing to investigate targets.

June 29 (Cont'd)

0429(I) Have targets in sight, range 4,000 yards. They are three small fishing boats. Broke off and proceeded to diving position.

0540(I) Submerged 16 miles east of Cape ST. AGUSTIN, proceeding across entrance. Day overcast with scattered rain. Conducting a continuous periscope patrol.

0845(I) Sighted plane--type zero, patrolling across gulf. (Plane contact #7).

1948(I) Surfaced eight miles from western shore of bay. During night patrolled in a square between Cape ST. AGUSTIN and west coast of gulf.

POSIT: 06°-08' N FUEL: 1412 MILES: 175
126°-05' E

June 30

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0535(I) Submerged in center of entrance to DAVAO Gulf. Will patrol west coast today.

0908(I) Five miles from beach, changed course to patrol parallel to coast.

1050(I) Sighted two-engine land based bomber bearing 340°T., distance 5 miles. (Plane contact #8).

1215(I) Sighted MITSUBISHI 97 bearing 220°T., distance 4 miles. (Plane contact #9). Apparently an anti-submarine patrol.

1625(I) Sighted sail boat bearing 274°T., distance 4 miles, course north.

1935(I) Surfaced; commenced patrolling across entrance to gulf proceeding upwest coast and then across gulf.

June 30 (Cont'd)

POSIT: 06°-00' N FUEL: 1345 MILES: 176
125°-48' E

July 1

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0531(I) Submerged 15 miles south of Cape ST AGUSTIN; proceeding across entrance to gulf.

1000(I) Pinging bearing 240°T. Came up for a high periscope look and discovered smoke. (Ship contact #2). Commenced closing for a better look.

1012(I) Can now see four puffs of smoke and tops of masts of one ship. Convoy is DAVAO bound. Looks like a total of four ships, speed 12 knots, range 20,000 yards. Came to a normal approach course, went ahead standard with looks every fifteen minutes.

1142(I) Gave up chase--convoy is by. We have made standard speed for over an hour now and all I have seen is his tops. Will have to wait for him to come out.

1203(I) Lost smoke bearing 312°T.

This entrance is too wide for one boat to guard both sides. I think a better division would be to split it down the center and give one boat each side. This convoy was proceeding up the middle of channel, course 340°. I was guarding the eastern approach.

1753(I) Sighted single engine float plane patrolling. (Plane contact #10).

1805(I) Sighted single engine fighter or torpedo bomber, distance four miles. (Plane contact #11).

July 1 (Cont'd)

1940(I) Surfaced. Commenced patrolling entrance to gulf.

POSIT: 06°-09' N FUEL: 1445 MILES: 182
126°-05' E

July 2

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0534(I) Submerged.

0720(I) Heard pinging bearing 200°T.

0740(I) J.P. heard screws bearing 210°. Came to normal approach course. Nothing in sight.

0804(I) Sighted masts bearing 225°T., range estimated 20,000 yards. We are about that far from the track. (Ship contact #3). Came to normal approach course. Running at standard speed with looks every fifteen minutes.

0823(I) Second target--smaller, looks like an escort ahead of main target. Targets course is 340°, speed about 15 knots. He is running five miles off the coast and we were caught off base again, patrolling the middle of the channel.

0903(I) Target is by bearing 280°T. Closest range was about 14,000 yards. He was a medium freighter; king post, stack, king post; escorted by two CHIDORIS or PC boats--one ahead and one astern. A tough one to miss.

0959(I) Unidentified plane sighted, range 15 miles. (Plane contact #12).

1223(I) Float plane sighted, distance ten miles. (Plane contact #13).

1252(I) MAVIS type flying boat patrolling Cape ST. AGUSTIN. (Plane contact #14). Perhaps they are running something in that side.

July 2 (Cont'd)

1305(I) Land based transport or bomber on northerly course, distance 6 miles. (Plane contact #15).

1445(I) Float type plane bearing 320°T., distance 12 miles. (Plane contact #16).

1510(I) Another float plane patrolling western shore of gulf. Perhaps something is coming in. (Plane contact #17).

1520(I) Sound hears pinging to south--looks good as we are only eight miles off beach. He can't get by this time.

1540(I) Pinging drawing right, came to normal approach at standard speed.

1626(I) Sighted mast and stack, distance 15,000 yards, angle on the bow large--we are well off track. (Ship contact #4). Continued in at standard speed.

1646(I) Range now 10,000 yards, angle on bow 70° starboard. His speed 7 knots. Target looks like a medium, engines aft tanker. Two small escorts, one well ahead and other astern. After escort pinging. Set up looks good. We are just about holding our own on bearing. Will get in for 110° track and about 2,000 yard torpedo run.

1705(I) Range 5,500 yards. Still holding bearings. Periscope is foggy, sea very smooth, cannot see him too well, but he now looks like a small tanker. Made ready all tubes.

1726(I) Slowed down for final set up before firing. Raised periscope expecting a tanker at about 2,500 yards, and found it to be a small net tender with engines aft, range 500 yards.

July 2 (Cont'd)

Two small extrawlers were travelling in company, the after trawler still pinging. Changed course to open in great disgust. Four contacts now, no hits, no runs, all errors. Took cut and found myself .8 mile off the beach.

1937(I) Surfaced. Patrolling entrance.

POSIT: 06°-17' N FUEL: 1340 MILES: 177
125°-51' E

July 3

Patrolling entrance.

0540(I) Submerged to patrol western half of entrance. Rain squalls--visibility bad.

1111(I) Sighted float type plane patrolling. (Plane contact #18).

1127(I) Heard pinging bearing 340°. Came to normal approach and went ahead standard.

1146(I) Sighted masts, range estimated 20,000 yards, angle on bow 30° port. Can see tops of two ships. (Ship contact #5). Continued on normal approach at standard speed with looks every ten minutes.

1203(I) Range of 4,000 yards--have identified targets as follows: (a) one excostal type steamer of about a thousand tons, apparently used as an anti-submarine or escort vessel; (b) two killer type partol vessels also sound equipped. They are steaming in column, course 190°, speed 7. Discontinued approach and commenced opening.

July 3 (Cont'd)

1230(I) Sighted two more killer type patrol vessels following about two miles astern of original outfit. I don't understand this; it doesn't seem to be an anti submarine search as they are steaming in column and all pinging at various times. Only explanation I can see is that they are going to a patrol station or to pick up a convoy to escort in. Of course, it may be a sucker's game to get us over to this side while the real stuff runs up the other side.

1335(I) Sighted JAKE type plane patrolling. (Plane contact #19). Range 8 miles, bearing 210°T.

1538(I) Sighted MAVIS type plane bearing 280°T., range 11 miles. (Plane contact #20).

1545(I) Sighted JAKE again. (Plane contact #21).

1655(I) Sighted two-engine land based bomber. (Plane contact #22).

1810(I) Sighted smoke bearing 245°T., going into harbor. Our position 17,000 yards from beach, cannot see ship so assumed it is one of our patrol boats returning.

1940(I) Surfaced and commenced night patrol of entrance.

POSIT: 06°-07' N 125°-47' E FUEL: 1500 MILES: 180

July 4

Patrolling entrance of DAVAO Gulf.

0534(I) Submerged for day patrol.

0858(I) Sighted two-engine bomber, range 3,000 yards. (Plane contact #23).

1520(I) Sighted two MAVIS type planes, range 12 miles. (Plane contact #24).

July 4 (Cont'd)

1944(I) Surfaced and began night patrol--usual beat across entrance.

2010(I) S.J. contact 24,000 yards, bearing 018°T. Identified as plane with lights. This full moon makes me feel awfully naked to night flying planes. (Plane contact #25).
Noted radar interference on S.J. and also on radar detector. Proved to be caused by hot air blower that was being used to dry out flooded T.B.T.

POIST: 06°-03' N 125°-50' E FUEL: 1460 MILES: 180

July 5

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0534(I) Submerged for day patrol.

0858(I) Sighted float type plane 283°T., 13 miles, patrolling beach. (Plane contact #26).

1151(I) Sighted two more float type planes. (Plane contact #27 and #28).

1157(I) Heard distant explosion. May be CERO.

1246(I) Sighted smoke bearing 210°T., drawing left. Came to normal approach and commenced tracking.

1328(I) After running at standard speed for ten minutes between second and third observation could not find smoke; so changed course to his true bearing, 200°T. Never saw smoke again. Must have been a small boat on a southeasterly course.

1354(I) Sighted plane bearing 270°T., range eight miles. (Plane contact #29).

July 5 (Cont'd)

1940(I) Surfaced for night patrol. Patrolled along east coast of Cape ST. AGUSTIN.

POSIT: 06°-13' N 125°-47' E FUEL: 1415 MILES: 179

July 6

Patrolling Cape ST. AGUSTIN.

0529(I) Submerged east of Cape ST. AGUSTIN. Have decided to patrol eastern side of channel for a change.

0855(I) Sighted unidentified type plane, range 8 miles. (Plane contact #30).

1006(I) Sighted JAKE type plane, range 12 miles. (Plane contact #31).

1015(I) Another JAKE, range 8 miles. (Plane contact #32).

1022(I) Still another JAKE, range 7 miles--they are out in force today. (Plane contact #33).

1115(I) Sighted JAKE type plane, range 8 miles. (Plane contact #34).

1520(I) Closed Cape ST. AGUSTIN to look for radar installations and take pictures. No indications of radar. Took pictures of light and point from a position 3,000 yards, 260°T., from light house. No indication of gun emplacements. Only thing observed was light and house; telephone poles in back of house may have been for radio antenna. Native village noted further up coast. Shore very steep at this point.

1940(I) Surfaced.

July 6 (Cont'd)

2006(I) S.J. contact on aircraft, range 21,500 yards. Aircraft observed from bridge carrying lights. (Plane contact #35).

Patrolled across entrance of gulf and back, and then again patrolled coast of ST. AGUSTIN.

POSIT: 06°-10' N 126°-06' E FUEL: 1405 MILES: 203

July 7

Patrolling ST. AGUSTIN.

0528(I) Submerged for another day's patrol of eastern half of channel.

0710(I) Heard pinging bearing 325°T. Commenced closing.

0735(I) Have smoke. Looks like he is coming around point. (Ship contact #6). Commenced tracking and closing point at standard speed.

0740(I) Can see masts bearing 320°, range about 15,000 yards. Looks like an escort as I have to come up to 60 feet to see him. Hope he is leading something. Came to normal approach and proceeded in.

0755(I) Can see two other puffs of smoke to left of escort. They haven't rounded point yet.

0756(I) to 0758(I) Three depth charges not very close. Thought they might have come from plane but don't see any. Escort can now be made out as a PC--he is at a range of about 5,000 yards. He must think he has something. Continued closing point.

0801(I) Escort has turned toward us, angle on bow zero, range about 5,000 yards.

0805(I) One of other contacts can now be heard pinging. Looks like an anti submarine sweep, or perhaps they know we are here.

July 7 (Cont'd)

0807(I) Another depth charge closer this time. PC is at about 3,000 yards still comming in. Changed course to left to avoid at periscope depth.

0809(I) Two more charges.

0830(I) Can make out three vessels now--all AS; one PC, one killer type patrol, and the other looks like the same coastal freighter we saw the other day. They are all pinging and have fanned out; two on port bow, one on starboard. There is indication of a fourth pinging, but have not been able to see him.

Looks as if we were picked up coming in this morning. I submerged closer to the point than previously--9 miles. They are pretty definitely searching the area south of the point as if they suspected something. I do not think it is an anti-submarine sweep ahead of a convoy or task force because they are searching this particular area rather than continuing on. I don't believe they have picked me up as yet. I am now seven miles south of the point. I will close in case it is a sweep ahead of something coming in.

0908(I) Again the original PC has a zero angle, range 6,000 yards.

0912(I) Commenced changing course to avoid PC at periscope depth.

0920(I) Range on PC now 2,000 yards, angle on bow still zero. They seem to have a pretty good idea that I am here. I have one on each beam and one ahead. Constant bearing for last ten minutes on coastal type vessel. PC is definitely on the beam; so decided to ease her down and see if I can loose them.

July 7 (Cont'd)

0924(I) PC heard to pass across stern. Then he appeared to turn to come in again. No drops. Guess this eight degree gradient threw him off.

1014(I) They seem to have lost us, so started up.

1045(I) At periscope depth, all clear. Commenced closing entrance again. I am now 10 miles south of the point.

In retrospect I think that this was a definite search for us. We played ball with them for over two hours without anything showing up behind them, so do not think they were clearing way for anything coming out. Must have been picked up somehow this morning. Will submerge further out in the future. These boys have been very cooperative in furnishing good training both for approach and evasive tactics, but sure wish they would bring out something worthy of a torpedo.

1222(I) Sighted KATE type plane bearing 130°T., range 6 miles. (Plane contact #36).

1725(I) Sighted float type plane bearing 200°T., range 6 miles. (Plane contact #37).

1940(I) Surfaced. Patrolling entrance of gulf.

POSIT. 06°-15' N 126°-10' E FUEL: 1410 MILES: 177

July 8

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0316(I) Radar interference bearing 240°T., looks like CERO.

0535(I) Submerged. Will patrol center of channel today.

0841(I) Sighted plane bearing 135°T., range 10 miles. (Plane contact #38).

July 8 (Cont'd)

0847(I) Sighted land based plane bearing north, range 9 miles. (Plane contact #39).

1000(I) T.D.C. out of commission. Burned out training follow-up head. No spare--trying to repair same.

1515(I) Sighted plane bearing 285°T., range 6 miles. (Plane contact #40).

1640(I) Sighted land based transport plane bearing 350°T., range 5 miles. (Plane contact #41).

1725(I) Sighted plane bearing 210°T., range 6 miles. (Plane contact #42).

2008(I) Surfaced.

POSIT: 06°-20' N FUEL: 1630 MILES: 184
125°-57' E

July 9

Patrolling Cape ST. AGUSTIN.

0030(I) T.D.C. back in commission after much hard work, ingenuity and skill on the part of Lt.(jg) A.A. EBEL, PARDEN, L.B., CEM, and WILLIAMS, W.O., FC2c.

0525(I) Submerged proceeding to point five miles northeast of ST. AGUSTIN for day patrol.

1145(I) Sighted smoke bearing 240°T. (Ship contact #7). Observed this vessel's actions for over an hour. His smoke was coming out in big puffs. He would make smoke for about five minutes and secure for about ten. It had all the indications of a mechanical smoke maker and appeared to be a trap to draw us off to the east. I did not follow which later proved very fortunate.

July 9 (Cont'd)

1401(I) Have pinging bearing 358°T. (Ship contact #8). Changed course to 358°T. At present I am patrolling 5.5 miles off the beach and in an excellent position to intercept target.

1425(I) Taking frequent looks with lots of periscope, but target is not in sight. Poor visibility, with haze over land. A target close to the beach will be hard to see. Bearing is slowly drawing left so came left to course 345°. Called away tracking party.

1435(I) Pinging is getting louder. Sound has picked up screws and still there is nothing in sight! Bearing continues to draw left so decided to close beach some more. Am now five miles off shore and can not see how a target of any size can remain unseen. Cannot wait longer so came left to 270° and headed in even though closing the beach may prove costly. A strong current is setting on the shore and if the target is still far away or comes left to round Cape I may not be able to get out to sea against the current.

1447(I) Closing beach at six knots. Slowed. Sighted CHIDORI type torpedo boat, range 3,000 yards followed by large AP, range 3,500 yards, bearing 20° relative, angle on bow 70° port. Another Chidori or mine layer about 1,000 yards astern of target. Came left immediately for 110° port track in order to gain time. Ordered all tubes made ready and went to battle stations. Two more quick set ups gave a speed of 12½ knots, course 175°T; torpedo run will be 3100 yards, but do not have any opportunity to close at this late date. The Japs had come from out of nowhere and the organization of the ship was put to a severe test in meeting the emergency. Not a man was found wanting, for without confusion battle stations were manned, tubes made ready and at

July 9 (Cont'd)

1452-28(I) Five minutes after sighting the enemy commenced firing a six torpedo salvo 150°/o divergent spread, 110° track, torpedo run 3175 yards using continuous bearing method. Gyro angle 358.5.

1452-39(I) Fired two. Gave left full rudder to keep the gyro angles small. Gyro angle 357; torpedo run 3,200.

1452-47(I) Fired three; gyro angle 357½; torpedo run 3,150.

1452-57(I) Fired four; gyro angle 353; torpedo run 3,225.

1453-30(I) Fired five; gyro angle 352; torpedo run 3,300.

1453-45(I) Fired six; gyro angle 000.5; torpedo run 3,250.

Torpedoes were observed to run hot, straight and normal making much smoke. Why they were not seen in this glassy sea I will never know.

Continued swinging left at standard speed bringing stern tubes to bear on after escort.

1454-52(I) First torpedo hit. Loud explosion. Periscope was just being lowered at the time. It was raised immediately and much smoke observed on target. Neither target or escorts had changed course.

1455-10(I) Low order explosion; either a low order detonation or an explosion on target.

1455-43(I) Another heavy torpedo explosion.

1456(I) Leading escort turning toward.

1456-06(I) Another low order explosion.

1456-35(I) Leading escort has a zero angle on bow, bone in teeth, range 4,000 yards, decided it was time to go deep. Took another look at target and

July 9 (Cont'd)

observed her with an angle on the bow of 180°, listing to port, surrounded in smoke, headed for the beach which was 3,000 yards away. After escort had signal flags flying but as yet had not altered course appreciably. Set up on him was unfavorable; sixty degree gyro, long torpedo run so did not fire.

1458-29(I) Two explosions--sounds like internal explosion on target.

1502-25(I) First pattern of eight depth charges--pretty close, but above.

1505-30(I) Another good pattern of six, still above.

1507-20(I) Five ih this pattern. They are rattling the boat, but no damage so far. Am steering a southerly course taking advantage of the current. Changing course constantly making two-thirds speed. Wish I had more than this one degree gradient.

1508-35(I) Two more depth charges.

1508-55(I) Two more. We have at least slowed him down. Escorts seem to be making alternate runs using both pinging and listening.

1509-45(I) Three more charges.

1516-25(I) Another one not close this time.

1517(I) One more fairly well off. This two knot current is a big help.

1517-30(I) Two distant explosions probably on target. Both escorts are still pinging but appear to be further away. Thought we had lost them, but was wrong again.

July 9 (Cont'd)

1527-50(I) to 1528-30(I) Received ten more in close patterns of two or three with a single here and there.

Both vessels continued to search but we seem to have lost them--their pinging has become progressively weaker, so at

1720(I) Commenced coming up to periscope depth.

1753(I) At periscope depth--all clear, but still have pinging to north. Secured from depth charge and silent running. Continued opening island to surface.

This attack proves again that in order to see ships running close to the shore line you must be practically on the beach. I was patrolling five miles off the beach, trying to cover as much area as possible, and if it had not been for the escorts pinging I probably would not have seen this target until too late to shoot. Target was searched for with ten feet of periscope exposed twelve minutes prior to picking him up at 3,000 yards range. Fortunately the interval between observations was used to close the coast at standard speed or we would have been out of range.

Target was large A.P. of modern construction with two kingposts forward of stack and probably two aft. There was much superstructure; length by periscope formula was 600 feet. Height of stack by ranging on CHIDORI and comparing it with range to target was between 65 and 70 feet. The closest resemblence in O.N.I. 208j is the PRESIDENT HARRISON, page 43; however, his kingposts were not as high as those shown in the pictures. Two positive hits were obtained and one timed hit resulted in a low order detonation. Target was last seen surrounded in smoke headed for the beach which was 3,000 yards away. The beach at this

July 9 (Cont'd)

point is nearly vertical so it is believed that it would be impossible to beach a ship here, and it is further believed she sank. The area was thoroughly searched the next day with no trace of target.

1954(I) Surfaced. Cleared area. Will take a turn out to sea and return to scene of the crime tomorrow.

POSIT: 06°-22' N 126°-18' E FUEL: 1300 MILES: 176.5

July 10

Surface patrol.

0053(I) Radar contact, range 11,000 yards. (Ship contact #9). Appeared to be small craft; was avoided and lost contact at 18,500 yards. Believed to be one of the escorts still searching.

0510(I) Submerged for day patrol.

Patrolled within a mile off the beach where yesterdays action took place and observed nothing.

1140(I) Sighted two land based fighters--appeared to be searching, range 3 miles. (Plane contact #43).

1416(I) Sound thinks they have screws. Nothing seen.

1949(I) Surfaced and proceeded to new area.

POSIT: 06°-20' N 126°-16' E FUEL: 1616 MILES: 173.2

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

July 11

Patrolling west of SARANGANI Island.

0320(I) Radar contact, range 7,000 yards, bearing 306°T. Identified by sight as a small patrol boat. (Ship contact #10). Avoided.

0520(I) Submerged southwest of SARANGANI Bay. Will investigate bay today.

Investigated entrance to bay, results negative.

1940(I) Surfaced in rain.

POSIT: 05°-46' N 125°-05' E FUEL: 1319 MILES: 198

July 12

Patrolling west of SARANGANI Pass.

0520(I) Submerged south of SARANGANI Bay. Will look in again today.

0757(I) Picked up pinging bearing 025°T. Headed toward it.

0842(I) Sighted smoke bearing 038°T. Came to normal approach at standard speed, and commenced tracking.

0950(I) Closed to 4,000 yards and identified targets as five small craft similar to the "DAVAO Sound School". (Ship contact #11). Largest was an engines-aft-affair of about 400 tons. Looked like an oil barge. Believe these boats are running supplies from SARANGANI to DAVAO or vice versa.

1000(I) Sighted sail boat bearing 150°T., range 1 mile. (Ship contact #12). Avoided and patrolled to south.

July 12 (Cont'd)

1615(I) Sighted small fishing vessel or barge bearing 117°T., range 3,000 yards. Avoided. (Ship contact #13).

1821(I) Sighted two small boats bearing 057°T., range 5,000 yards. (Ship contact #14). Avoided.

1943(I) Surfaced. Patrolled to south of SARANGANI.

POSIT: 05°-35' N FUEL: 1242 MILES: 185
125°-13' E

July 13

Patrolling western approach to DAVAO.

0519(I) Submerged--western approach to DAVAO.

1000(I) Sighted smoke bearing 349°T. Commenced tracking.

1024(I) Two small craft id ntified as a small engines-aft net tender and small patrol boat--course 205°T., speed five knots. (Ship contact #15).

1340(I) Sound contact bearing 250°T. Identified as three more small craft proceeding north. (Ship contact #16).

1400(I) Sighted float type plane bearing 328°T., range 3 miles. (Plane contact #44).

1940(I) Surfaced. Will make a sweep to south tonight at high speed in order to cover approach to DAVAO from that direction.

POSIT: 05°-56' N FUEL: 1350 MILES: 178
125°-45' E

July 14

Making search to south at four engine speed.

July 14 (Cont'd)

0535(I) Submerged in western part of entrance. Will patrol five miles off coast looking for traffic coming up that side.

1013(I) Sighted smoke bearing 328°T. Began closing.

1145(I) Identified as two of usual spit-kits on southerly course, speed five knots. (Ship contact #17).

1350(I) Sighted float type plane bearing 230°T., range 8 miles. (Plane contact #45).

1945(I) Surfaced. Radar interference to eastward; probably the DARTER.

POSIT: 05°-55' N FUEL: 2771 MILES: 206
125°-45' E

July 15

Patrolling western approach to DAVAO.

0531(I) Submerged for patrol west of SARANGANI Island.

1946(I) Surfaced. Took a turn up to SARANGANI Bay, then a sweep around SARANGANI Island.

POSIT: 05°21' N FUEL: 1329 MILES: 173
125°21' E

July 16

Patrolling south of SARANGANI Island.

0323(I) Radar interference bearing 290°T., probably the CERO.

0450(I) Radar contact bearing 280°T., range 11,000 yards. Radar interference also. It looks like CERO, but began tracking. (Ship contact #18).

July 16 (Cont'd)

0525(I) Radar contact disappeared confirming belief it was CERO.

0532(I) Submerged 12 miles south of the entrance to SARANGANI Bay.

0803(I) Sighted smoke of two small vessels bearing 100°T., range seven miles, course south. (Ship contact #19).

1020(I) In entrance of SARANGANI Bay. Took picture of both sides from position 2½ miles off.

1313(I) Sighted unidentified plane bearing 020°T., range 12 miles. (Plane contact #46).

1942(I) Surfaced. Will take another turn around SARANGANI Island tonight.

1950(I) Radar interference to west; probably CERO--tried to close to see if he has any dope, but he is apparently steaming west.

POSIT: 05°-47' N 125°-08' E FUEL: 1564 MILES: 183

July 17

Patrolling entrance to DAVAO Gulf.

0324(I) Radar interference to westward; probably CERO.

0515(I) Submerged twelve miles south of entry to SARANGANI Bay; will patrol entrance again.

1640(I) Sighted land based fighter bearing 324°T., range 6 miles. (Plane contact #47).

1750(I) Sighted four small craft similar to picture of "Crab Catcher" in O.N.I. 208j, range

July 17 (Cont'd)

4,000 yards, course 180°. (Ship contact #20).

1937(I) Surfaced.

2134(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial 35 change of area assignment--proceeded to new area.

POSIT: 05°-48' N FUEL: 1207 MILES: 171
125°-03' E

July 18

Enroute to LEBAK harbor for submerged patrol.

0545(I) Submerged twelve miles northwest of Port LEBAK.

Patrolled within two miles of shore; investigated the entire harbor. Nothing there except village and radio tower.

1944(I) Surfaced. Will patrol north along coast. Took sweep in to COTABATO and then patrolled around to PAGADIAN.

POSIT: 06°-34' N FUEL: 2015 MILES: 200
123°-59' E

July 19

Patrolling coast of MINDANAO.

0525(I) Submerged two miles off entrance to COTABOTO. Patrolled into POLLOC Bay--no ships present. Numerous sail boats in sight throughout day.

1946(I) Surfaced.

2036(I) Commenced search to south at four engine speed.

POSIT: 07°-18' N FUEL: 1440 MILES: 186
124°-06' E

July 20

Searching traffic lanes between DAVAO and ZAMBOANGA.

0530(I) Submerged eight miles bearing 285°T from Port LEBAK.

0605(I) While coming up from deep submergance sound picked up echo ranging, bearing 105°T. We are on 105°T. heading for LEBAK so came up immediately to periscope depth, but could see nothing as it was still twilight with much haze over land. Went to battle stations --made tubes ready.

0605-0624(I) Sound reports pinging dead ahead and on both port and starboard bows. Pinging is drawing both left and right so can not be sure whether to turn north or south to intercept. Assumed that the escorts were making a sweep of harbor entrance so continued to close the beach in the direction of the harbor while awaiting a definite indication of convoy's intention. Periscope still no help, but sound is providing excellent information considering the fact that there are three escorts pinging continuously. Sound now reports that the bearing on the escort dead ahead and that on the starboard bow is drawing right. He further reports that the escort on the port bow seems to be doubling back, and that its bearing is also beginning to draw right. Estimated that the first two escorts were patrolling ahead and the third escort was patrolling astern of main target or targets. Confirmed my estimate when upon telling sound to search for a target between leading and after escorts soundman reported heavy screws in that direction. Convoy is definitely going south. Came right to normal approach course and speeded up to close.

0624(I) Have smoke bearing 106°T. (Ship contact #21).

July 20 (Cont'd)

0632(I) Can make out one target now. It is a PC, bearing 132°T., angle on bow 80° starboard, range about 8,000 yards. This is leading escort.

0637(I) Now have target. A medium tanker or engines-aft freighter, mast, kingpost, stack, mast. Bearing 115°T., range 7,000 yards, angle on bow 90° starboard. There are two escorts ahead and one astern. All escorts are PC boats and all are echo ranging continuously. Continued on normal approach course at standard speed.

0647(I) Target is by, bearing 124°T., angle on bow 100° starboard, range 8,000 yards. After escort is passing abeam at 4,000 yards. Will track target to get speed, open coast, surface, and make end around.

Target came out of Port LEBAK and headed south hugging coast. He apparently passed within four to six thousand yards of us while it was still too dark to see. If he had started a half hour later we would have had a perfect set up.

0723(I) Changed course to 230° to open coast. Still tracking.

0735(I) Sighted two float type planes patrolling over target. (Plane contact #48).

0738(I) Heard seven distant depth charges from target group.

0840(I) Smoke is drawing to right. Changed course toward to determine if he was going to sea rather than hugging coast as previously estimated.

0920(I) Smoke out of sight. He still seems to be hugging coast. Continued opening beach at two-thirds speed.

July 20 (Cont'd)

1107(I) Surfaced 9 miles off coast. While taking a periscope search prior to surfacing observed a small motor sampan. Decided it would take too long to clear him so surfaced anyway. (Ship contact #22). He has no radio so decided against delaying chase to sink him with gunfire. It will take him over an hour to reach the coast and by that time we will be well away.

Will make end around keeping 20 to 25 miles from coast. This will cover all courses from hugging beach to 220° and speed up to eight knots. Do not consider it possible to keep target in sight with coast background without being discovered by plane escort.

1215(I) Sighted sail boat bearing 257°T., range 10 miles. (Ship contact #23).

1400(I) Sighted smoke bearing 035°T.; possibly target.

1529(I) Sighted MAVIS type plane bearing 050°T. Patrolling on southerly course. (Plane contact #49).

1532(I) MAVIS reversed course.

1535(I) MAVIS patrolling on westerly course.

1538(I) MAVIS turned toward.

1541(I) Submerged. MAVIS still headed toward, range 12 miles. Do not believe he has seen us yet. Submerged to avoid detection.

1558(I) Surfaced and continued end around.

1640(I) Sighted smoke close to entrance of SARANGANI Bay. (Ship contact #24).

1655(I) Can now see bridge of patrol boat apparently entering SARANGANI, so at

July 20 (Cont'd)

1657(I) Submerged twelve miles south of SARANGANI. Continued closing coast at five knots.

1937(I) Surfaced four miles off coast. Will patrol west along coast. Do not see how we could have missed him unless he speeded up considerably. Plot checked him at five knots, T.D.C. at seven. This is a tough one to miss after the end around.

POSIT: 06°-07' N FUEL: 2424 MILES: 213
123°-49' E

July 21

Patrolling westward eight miles from coast.

0537(I) Submerged seven miles south of TUNA Bay. He may have holed up in here. Investigated this and Port LEBAK during day.

0635(I) Sighted sail boat. (Ship contact #25).

2005(I) Surfaced six miles west of Port LEBAK. Will patrol ZAMBOANGA--DAVAO route tonight.

POSIT: 06°-16' N FUEL: 3086 MILES: 259
123°-55' E

July 22

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA--DAVAO route.

0538(I) Submerged seven miles southwest of Port LEBAK.

1940(I) Surfaced.

2100(I) Received ComTaskFor-72's serial 41 extending patrol twelve days.
Proceeded south to patrol ZAMBOANGA--CELEBES routes.

July 22 (Cont'd)

POSIT: 06°-35' N 123°-58' E FUEL: 1449 MILES: 175

July 23

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA--CELEBES route. Will conduct surface patrol--weather permitting.

0611(I) Made dawn trim dive.

0650(I) Surfaced.

1018(I) Sighted BETTY type plane bearing 200°T., range 7 miles. (Plane contact #50). Submerged to avoid detection.

1053(I) Surfaced.

1144(I) Sighted three BETTYS bearing 210°T., range 7 miles. (Plane contact #51). Submerged to avoid detection.
Low hanging clouds and passing rain squalls are unsuitable for surface patrol.

1928(I) Surfaced.

POSIT: 06°-13' N 123°-43' E FUEL: 2113 MILES: 238

July 24

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-CELEBES route.

0611(I) Submerged. Low hanging clouds and rain squalls.

1503(I) Surfaced for sun line.

1510(I) Submerged.

1928(I) Surfaced. Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-CELEBES-DAVAO routes.

July 24 (Cont'd)

POSIT: 05°-53' N FUEL: 958 MILES: 148
123°-34' E

July 25

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

0605(I) Submerged; patrolling ZAMBOANGA-CELEBES route.

1246(I) Surfaced for sun line and for a surface observation.

1300(I) Submerged.

1415(I) Surfaced for sun line and for a surface observation.

1422(I) Submerged.

1433(I) Surfaced for sun line and for a surface observation.

1436(I) Submerged.

1657(I) Surfaced for sun line and for a surface observation.

1700(I) Submerged.

1918(I) Surfaced; patrolling ZAMBOANGA-CELEBES-DAVAO routes.

POSIT: 05°-56' N FUEL: 1005 MILES: 165
123°-36' E

July 26

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-CELEBES-DAVAO routes.

0608(I) Made dawn dive.

July 26 (Cont'd)

0615(I) Sound reports echo ranging bearing 160°T. Came to periscope depth but unable to see anything as it is still twilight. Decided to remain submerged until I can get a good periscope look.

0650(I) It is now light--nothing in sight through periscope. Surfaced to see what the score is.

0651(I) Sighted smoke bearing 220°T., distance 20 miles. Changed course to 220°T., and commenced closing. (Ship contact #26).

0657(I) Sighted aircraft (BETTY) bearing 355°T., range 7 miles; apparently headed for convoy. (Plane contact #52).

0658(I) Submerged to avoid detection. This was the first of eight dives made in order to track convoy and still avoid detection. Later three more planes joined convoy providing a very effective air umbrella. Contact was maintained throughout day by keeping smoke in sight through periscope. As soon as smoke was lost we would surface and close. Planes were in sight at practically all times searching an area ahead and astern, and about twenty miles each side of convoy. An excellent job by the lookouts was the only thing that kept us from being sighted. The movements of each plane, sometimes all four in sight at one time was followed, and whenever they started a search toward DACE we submerged; and, start the cycle over again. Even though the planes were a mental hazard they were also very helpful in as much as they were nearly always in sight and helped locate the convoy at times when smoke was lost.

July 26 (Cont'd)

0735(I) Surfaced to regain contact.

0755(I) Sighted another BETTY joining patrol bearing 200°T., distance 8 miles. (Plane contact #53). Submerged to avoid detection.

0919(I) Sighted two more planes (BETTYS) joining the convoy. (Plane contact #54).

0955(I) Surfaced to regain contact.

1025(I) Submerged to avoid air sweep astern.

1234(I) Surfaced.

1307(I) Submerged to avoid plane.

1407(I) Surfaced.

1440(I) Submerged to avoid plane.

1515(I) Surfaced.

1529(I) Submerged to avoid plane.

1618(I) Surfaced.

1717(I) Submerged. Observed two of the planes returning to MINDANAO.

1754(I) Surfaced.

1858(I) Submerged to avoid plane. It is getting dark rapidly; expect this to be last dive as planes should depart soon.

1945(I) Surfaced to regain contact. Commenced chase on four main engines. Sky overcast, visibility good. Convoy has been tracked on a westerly to northwesterly course, speed about eight knots. Have written up three contact reports only to get a change in course each time I was

July 26 (Cont'd)

in a position to send same. Will wait until radar track gives me reliable dope before sending report.

2042(I) Radar contact 295°T., range 21,000 yards. Commenced tracking and gain position ahead. Radar which has consistantly given excellent performance seems to be acting up tonight. Ranges don't seem to be as strong as usual, and we are having trouble getting accurate bearings.

2042-2313(I) Tracking and working up ahead. Radar indicates three ships in convoy with numerous escorts. Ships are zig zagging on base course 285° with thirty degree zigs each side. Length of legs is ten minutes. Speed nine and one-quarter knots. Sent contact report on 2880 KC's.

2313(I) Have now worked my way up on the starboard bow and have determined the formation to be as follows: three ships in column with six escorts; two ahead, two astern and one on each beam. Starboard escort is patrolling on station; keeping from two to four thousand yards abeam. Leading escorts are 2,000 yards ahead. Conditions don't look promising from ahead so decided to drop back on quarter and see what the situation looks like from that angle.

2348(I) Attack from quarter doesn't look good either as the after escorts are keeping well closed up. They have these babies surrounded like a picket fence.

Decided that best bet is from the starboard bow--ships are zig zagging simultaneously which throws the escorts out of position at times, also bunches targets so that it presents a better shot. Background is best for star-

July 26 (Cont'd)

board side so will come in fast, and trust to short time interval plus small silhouette to keep us undetected. Moon has set; sky overcast--too dark for a periscope approach but visibility is still good.

POSIT: 04°-45' N FUEL: 1824 MILES: 202
123°-45' E

July 27

Tracking convoy.

0033(I) In position 13,000 yards broad on starboard bow of target group. Center ship has been picked as target as it is definitely the larger both from sight and radar pips. Will wait until they come around on starboard leg of zig and go in for a 70 to 90 track, fire bow tubes at this target; turn, and fire stern tubes at the leading ship. If starboard screen is closed in and abeam of target will fire under him; if outside will try to get inside passing either ahead or astern whichever presents the more favorable opportunity. If discovered by escort too early will dive and head under convoy firing as I go down.

0034(I) Commenced closing target for attack. Keeping small silhouette toward target group. Target course now 285°T, should zig to 315° prior to firing.

0047(I) Target has zigged to 315°, escort is 2,000 yards on quarter so will have to come in ahead of him. Ships have been identified from bridge as follows: leading ship a medium A.K., next a large tanker or engines aft freighter, third ship a medium A.K. Both the leading and trailing ships were smoking heavily which made identification difficult. The engines aft job seemed to be of modern construction while the

July 27 (Cont'd)

other two looked older. Near escort appears to be a large PC.

Continued in taking ranges and bearing on both target and escort. Have had a constant bearing on escort for several minutes, range is now 2,400 yards so took last set up on target, changed course ten degrees to right to get a zero angle and at

0049-17(I) Commenced firing a salvo of six torpedoes at target 65° starboard track; 3,800 yard torpedo run; depth set six feet; constant bearings from T.B.T. Total spread 4°. Gyro angle 013.

0049-27(I) Fired two; gyro angle 007; torpedo run 3720.

0049-36(I) Fired three; gyro angle 008; torpedo run 3550.

0049-51(I) Fired four; gyro angle 008; torpedo run 3550.

0049-59(I) Fired five; gyro angle 007; torpedo run 3320.

Radar had been shifted to escort at commence firing and range had now closed to 1,400 yards. Gave right full rudder, all ahead full.

0050-07(I) Fired six; gyro angle 006; torpedo run 3260.

Bridge reported escort turning toward, angle on bow 30 starboard. Range was now 1,250 yards so cleared bridge and at

0051(I) Dived to avoid being rammed. Do not have time to steady up on course to get bearing of new target, and am swinging too fast for a bearing now, so will fire stern tubes with same set up. First two targets are only a ship length apart and second target is only a quarter ship length ahead of third. Hope the spread gives us hits in other ships too.

Range to escort as radar went under was 1,150 yards; last observed angle on bow zero.

July 27 (Cont'd)

Commenced going deep firing on way down.

0051-37(I) Fired seven, 65° starboard track; 2,200 yard torpedo run, depth set six feet. Gyro angle 220.

0051-46(I) Fired eight; gyro angle 213; torpedo run 2210.

0051-55(I) Fired nine; gyro angle 209; torpedo run 2180.

0051-57(I) Heard explosion. Hit from bow tubes.

0052-05(I) Fired ten; gyro angle 204; torpedo run 2250.

Several explosions heard as we were going down, but due to noise of clearing bridge and diving, times were not recorded.

0053-50(I) One loud explosion; definitely a torpedo. These Mark 18's make more noise than a 14.

0054-20(I) Another torpedo hit.

0056(I) First pattern of 10 depth charges. I didn't know these fellows could get off a pattern that large; perhaps two escorts made a combined run.

0056(I) Commenced evading at deep submergance--all escorts joined in the hunt; screws and pinging were all around the dial. Evaded at constant speed on easterly course. I don't believe they ever had good contact as none of the charges dropped after the first salvo were very close.

0056-30 to 0100-20(I) Ten more depth charges in one pattern of four and three patterns of two.

0113 to 0114-30(I) Three distant explosions heard in direction of target group. Either very distant depth charges or explosions on target.

July 27 (Cont'd)

0130(I) Have only three escorts with us now; they are searching madly--pinging all around. The other three were heard to fade out in the direction of the attack position.

0300(I) Have left escorts behind. Can still hear their pinging and at times their screws, but they sound far off so started up. Plan to surface and give chase.

0325(I) Surfaced with nothing on radar. Still have pinging and occasional screws in direction of attack position. Upon surfacing a very strong smell of oil was noted. Have not had any oil leaks previously and none noted after that incident so perhaps it was from target.

0345(I) Radar contact bearing 240°, range 12,000 yards. Closed to investigate and found it was our three escorts. They are at the scene of the attack. Do not understand why they would leave three escorts here unless it was to protect a cripple or search for survivors. Made a complete circle at a range of 10 to 12 thousand yards; plotted them and found that they were milling around on all courses at speed from stopped to seven knots. No sign of convoy or cripple.

After working around escorts took a sweep to south and then east with no sight of convoy. Guess the other three escorts and remains of convoy must have proceeded west through island group.

0600(I) Submerged and headed north where we still have pinging.

Although all I have to base my claims for damage on this attack is three timed torpedo hits with several other untimed explosions at the proper time for torpedo hits; I believe we sank at least one ship of this convoy.

July 27 (Cont'd)

With the information we had it is inconceivable that we could have gotten one hit forward without getting at least two more. We definitely got two hits from the after tubes. Another reason for believing that at least one ship sank is that three escorts remained at the scene for at least six hours; and at least two were in the vicinity nineteen hours later. Recent personal experience and information gathered from other patrol reports indicates that if little or no damage is done the escorts give the submarine a short working over keeping him down long enough to give the convoy a start and then rejoin the convoy very rapidly.

1228(I) Sighted PC boat bearing 355°T., searching on various courses. Avoided. (Ship contact #27).

1310(I) Sighted oil drum.

1321(I) Sighted plane bearing 045°T., range 3 miles. (Plane contact #55).

1806(I) Sighted PC boat bearing 037°T., searching on various courses. (Ship contact #28). There are definitely two of them out here as we still have pinging from the other one on bearing 270°T. This is about 10 miles south of position of last night's attack. Looks as if they are annoyed.

1950(I) Surfaced. Started return to own area.

POSIT: 05°-24' N 121°-43' E FUEL: 2745 MILES: 215

July 28

Returning to area.

0610(I) Submerged in western part of area.

July 28 (Cont'd)

1935(I) Surfaced.

POSIT: 06°-02' N 123°-51' E FUEL: 1071 MILES: 165

July 29

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

0541(I) Submerged seven miles west of coast. Will search for traffic hugging coast.

1942(I) Surfaced. Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

POSIT: 06°-13' N 124°-06' E FUEL: 975 MILES: 158

July 30

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

0551(I) Submerged seven miles west of coast; will patrol close in again today.

1942(I) Surfaced. Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

POSIT: 06°-17' N 124°-05' E FUEL: 960 MILES: 158

July 31

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

0100(I) Radar contact bearing 035°T., range 3,100 yards. Identified as two small motor sampans--avoided. (Ship contact #29).

0532(I) Submerged seven miles off coast for close in patrol.

1250(I) Sighted smoke bearing 123°T. Changed course toward; started tracking. (Ship contact #30).

July 31 (Cont'd)

1330(I) Can see tops of mast--apparentely a single ship coming up coast in close to the shoals. Went to battle stations. Continued closing.

1402(I) This reminds me of the old sub school days. We have a two thousand ton engines aft coastal freighter, straight course, speed 5½ knots. We are 1,200 yards from track--he is coming on nicely. Started coming right for a stern tube shot. Have a good view of target now--he is 250 feet long by telemeter scale.

1410-52(I) Commenced firing salvo of four torpedoes with a three degree divergent spread; torpedo run 2410 yards; gyro angle 179°; depth four feet.

1411-10(I) Fired eight; gyro 178°, torpedo run 2430 yards.

1411-20(I) Fired nine; gyro 179°, torpedo run 2450 yards.

1411-32(I) Fired ten; gyro 175.5°, torpedo run 2530 yards.

1412-20(I) Heavy explosion quite close; broke several light bulbs; knocked 2 MC speaker off conning tower overhead; shook boat considerably. Took look at target no hit; believed it to be an aircraft bomb so started deep.

1414-05(I) Torpedo explosion.

1418-44(I) Distant explosion; probably torpedo hitting beach.

1419(I) Started coming up to periscope depth.

1423(I) At periscope depth; all clear. Came up to 60 feet and target is not in sight. This is just nine minutes after timed torpedo hit. In that time target could not travel more than

July 31 (Cont'd)

a mile. He was twenty-two hundred yards when last seen; we have traveled about 1,500 yards so if target is still afloat he must be within 6,000 yards, and I would see him. He could not get into the beach because of shoals extending two miles out. The only answer is he sank. During approach target was clearly seen for over forty minutes. DACE was below periscope depth for a total time of ten minutes.

It is believed that first explosion was a premature as no planes were sighted either during the approach or after.

Searched area for one half hour--nothing in sight.

1510(I) Commenced opening beach clearing area.

1945(I) Surfaced. Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

POSIT: 06°-13' N FUEL: 1060 MILES: 154
124°-05' E

August 1

Patrolling ZAMBOANGA-DAVAO route.

0535(I) Submerged seven miles southwest of Port LEBAK. Commenced closing beach.

0625(I) Heard echo ranging bearing 010°T.

0630(I) Sighted smoke leaving LEBAK--continued closing beach. Commenced tracking. (Ship contact #31). Convoy is clearing Port LEBAK. There are four escorts echo ranging. I can see leading one--he looks small; another killer type is taking a search to seaward. Can not see target yet--just smoke near point.

0700(I) Set up is now clear. We have one medium or small AK with four escorts. Target is hugging

August 1 (Cont'd)

beach on southerly course. He will pass about two thousand yards from our position. Leading escort is a PT boat or barge type landing craft painted black with silver stripe. He is dead ahead, range about 2,000 yards. He is proceeding south slowly echo ranging. The killer type escort has taken station broad on the starboard bow of target--he will probably cause trouble. A PC is trailing. The fourth escort is echo ranging on my port beam. Can hear his screws and pinging, but cannot see him. Sea is oily flat with no swell.

0701(I) Sighted float type plane patrolling over convoy. (Plane contact #56).

0714(I) Leading escort--the PT is now lying to with 10° starboard angle on the bow. He is about three thousand yards away, 20° on my starboard bow. He suspects something as he is alternately listening and pinging in this direction. He doesn't have us yet as he is still searching on both sides of our beam.

Range is now 4,800 yards, speed checks 9 by both T.D.C. and plot. I am going to have a long torpedo run, but am afraid to speed up because the PT is listening. Still have pinging and screws on port beam, and still cannot see anything. Sound conditions are excellent, we heard the target's screws at over 6,000 yards.

0720(I) Made ready four bow tubes.

0723(I) Swinging left 5° to bring gyro angles to zero. Problem is checking nicely--target course 160°, speed 9 knots. Torpedo run is going to be long but that will have to be accepted.

0724-15(I) Commenced firing four tube salvo, torpedo run 3020 yards; gyro 357°, depth set 6 feet, 4° divergent spread. Continuous bearing method, 85° starboard track.

0724-23(I) Fired two; torpedo run 3,000 yards, gyro 359°.

0724-30(I) Fired three; torpedo run 2980 yards, gyro 358°.

0724-38(I) Fired four; torpedo run 2,950 yards, gryo 001°.

Started deep immediately because of air coverage, and close PT boat.

0727-40(I) First torpedo explosion. Probably hit the reef as the run is too great unless the range was off.

0727-55(I) Second torpedo explosion.

0730-40 to 0733-08(I) Received ten depth charges--quite close. Shook us up quite a bit but no damage except the usual cleaning out of corners.
Escort continued to search the vicinity, but never regained good contact. Light screws could be heard all around, but target's screws were never heard after explosions. Continued to evade at deep depth.

0845(I) Still have echo ranging and screws, but they seem far away. Started up.

0900(I) At periscope depth. Sighted smoke to southward--probably the convoy. Sighted large PC lying to 4,000 yards on my beam. He is signalling someone with searchlight. Looks as if they left a couple of sleepers back here. Went deep again.

August 1 (Cont'd)

1000(I) At periscope depth all clear. Commenced clearing area headed home.

1954(I) Surfaced.

2005(I) Sighted small boat--avoided. (Ship contact #32).

POSIT: 06°-19'N 123°-52'E FUEL: 1107 MILES: 159

August 2

Enroute SEEADLER.

0020(I) Encountered radar interference; probably BLUEGILL.

0610(I) Cleared DACE serial three with much trouble.

0613(I) Submerged.

1920(I) Surfaced.

Received message directing us to proceed BRISBANE--much elation.

POSIT: 05°-02'N 126°-39'E FUEL: 2636 MILES: 213

August 3

Enroute SEEADLER.

0837(I) Plane contact on SD--range 14 miles. (Plane contact #57). Submerged.

0854(I) Surfaced.

1535(I) Submerged.

1857(I) Surfaced.

2001(I) Obtained fix on HELEN Island.

August 3 (Cont'd)

POSIT: 03°-48' N FUEL: 3153 MILES: 268
130°-19' E

August 4

Enroute SEEADLER.

1046(I) Sighted aircraft. No reply to I.F.F. challenge, so submerged. (Plane contact #58).

1100(I) Set ship's clocks ahead to Zone -10 (KING) time.

1228(K) Surfaced.

Sighted numerous oil drums, and a large dugout canoe.

POSIT: 02°-01' N FUEL: 4642 MILES: 343
135°-31' E

August 5

Enroute SEEADLER.

0840(K) Aircraft sighted bearing 312°T., range 12 miles. (Plane contact #59).

POSIT: 0°-01' S FUEL: 5885 MILES: 409
141°-38' E

August 6

Enroute SEEADLER.

0511( ) Sighted and rendezvoused with Escort SC747.

1130(K) Moored alongside U.S.S. EURYALE.

POSITION: SEEADLER FUEL: 4320 MILES: 382

August 6-12 Underway SEEADER HARBOR - BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA.

August 12

1030(K) Moored New Farm Wharf, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA.
Completed FOURTH WAR PATROL.

(C) WEATHER

Usual weather conditions for this time of the year were encountered. Generally overcast with frequent rain squalls. Low hanging clouds made aircraft detection difficult. Light seas from NE to SE were the average. Light variable winds from NE to SE predominated.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

(a) East Coast of MINDANAO (Cape SAN AGUSTIN):

A moderately strong current 1.5 - 2.0 knots, setting 220°T average was experienced off the eastern end of the cape. This current swept across the approach to DAVAO Gulf in the direction of LUAYON Point. South of this point a southerly set was always encountered. North of this point the effect of the current was less marked, and to a certain extent, followed the rise and fall of the tide.

(b) East Coast of MINDANAO (Between LUAYON and BANOS Point)

A southerly set averaging 1.0 knot was always experienced in this locality.

(c) SARANGANI Islands (Western end of SARANGANI Strait)

A strong, 2.5 to 3.0 knot current, setting south to southwest was encountered at this point during the flood.

(d) SARANGANI Bay (Approaches and Entrance)

The majority of the observations were taken when the current was flooding at the bay. Near the entrance to the bay a southeasterly set with an average drift of 1.0 knots predominated during this period. On two different occasion it was observed that the set changed to northeast with an average drift of .5 knots two hours before low water at the bay.

(e) West Coast of MINDANAO (PALIMBAN Point to LEBAK)

A southeasterly to southerly set, averaging 1.0 knot was experienced along west coast of MINDANAO.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION (Cont'd)

(f) Port LEBAK

A variable set averaging .6 knot was encountered off Port LEBAK.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No navigational aids were observed. Accurate cuts were obtained by using peaks and tangents on MINDANAO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

NO.	DATE & Time	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
1	0345I 6/29/44	6-20N 126-29E	3 small fishing boats	3.5 mi.	080° 9 knot	Radar	Avoided
2	1000I 7/1/44	6-06N 126-11E	Unidentified	15 mi.	340° 12 knots	Sound Pinging	Saw masts of 2 ships
3	0720I 7/2/44	6-04N 125-58E	Medium AK 2 PC Escorts	13 mi.	340° 15 knots	Sound Pinging	Could not close.
4	1520I 7/2/44	6-14N 125-48E	Engines aft: Net Tender 2 Trawler Escorts	13 mi.	000° 7 knots	Sound Pinging	Killer group
5	1127I 7/3/44	6-10N 125-50E	Coastal Steamer 4 Killer type Patrol 1 PC; 1 Killer; 1	15 mi.	190° 7 knots	Sound Pinging	A/S Killer Group.
6	0710I 7/7/44	6-10N 126-11E	Coastal Steamer	10 mi.	Various	Sound Pinging	Killer group on A/S sweep.
7	1145I 7/9/44	6-20N 126-18E	Unidentified (Mast only)	10 mi.	Undetermined	Smoke	Smoker trying to draw us off position.
8	1401I 7/9/44	6-18N 126-17E	Large AP;AM & CHIDORI Escorts	12 mi.	175° 12.5 knot	Sound Pinging	Attack #1
9	0053I 7/10/44	6-20N 126-54E	Unidentified	5.5mi.	Westerly/U	Radar	Avoided. Probably A/S's searching.
10	0320I 7/11/44	5-36N 125-01E	Unidentified	3.5 mi.	Easterly/U	Sight-Night	Avoided. Small patrol vessels.
11	0757I 7/12/44	5-42N 125-07E	Small eng. aft; 4 sml. craft (AS)	10 mi.	145° 5 knots	Sound Pinging	DAVAO Sound School See Contact #4

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(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
12	1000I 7/12/44	5-36N 125-13E	Sailboat	1 mi.	Undetermined	Periscope	Avoided.
13	1615I 7/12/44	5-28N 125-08E	Fishing Vessel	1.5 mi.	290°/ Undet.	Periscope	Avoided.
14	1821I 7/12/44	5-26N 125-04N	2 Fishing Vessels or Barges	2.5 mi.	240°/ Undet.	Periscope	Avoided.
15	1000I 7/13/44	5-53N 125-43E	Engine aft Net tender, Patrol Vesl.	5 mi.	205° 5 knots	Smoke	See contact #4
16	1340I 7/13/44	5-58N 125-47E	3 Ex-trawlers or sml. Pat. Vessels	7 mi.	000° 5 knots	Sound Screws	Avoided.
17	1013I 7/14/44	5-52N 125-50E	2 small trawlers or A/S Vessels	7 mi.	180° 5 knots	Smoke	Avoided.
18	0450I 7/16/44	5-31N 125-03E	Submarine-Friendly	5.5 mi.	005° 12 knots	Radar	CERO
19	0803I 7/16/44	5-43N 125-04E	2 small Craft	7 mi.	180° 5 knots	Smoke	Avoided
20	1750I 7/17/44	5-45N 125-07E	4 small craft-"Crab "Catcher Type"	2 mi.	180° 5 knots	Periscope	Looked like supply between SARANGANI & DAVAO
21	0605I 7/20/44	6-35N 123-55E	Medium Tanker with 3 PC Escts.	8 mi.	7 knots	Sound Pinging	Convoy clearing port LEBAK too dark to Attack
22	1107I 7/20/44	6-22N 123-55E	Sampan	2 mi.	135° 5 knots	Periscope	Avoided.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & Time	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
23	1215 I 7/20/44	6-04N 123-53E	Sailboat	10 mi.	350° 3 knots	Sighted	Avoided
24	1640I 7/20/44	5-36N 124-56E	Patrol Vessels	16 mi.	020° ---	Smoke	Unidentified patrol entering SARANGANI
25	0635I 7/21/44	6-15N 124-01E	Sailboat	3 mi.	135° 2 knots	Peri-scope	Avoided
26	0615I 7/26/44	5-04N 124-04E	Tanker or 2 AK; 1 AK 6 PC Escts.	18 mi.	285° 9 knots	Sound Pinging	Attack #2.
27	1228I 7/27/44	5-24N 121-44E	PC	3 mi.	Various	Peri-scope	Searching after Attack #2
28	1806I 7/27/44	5-16N 121-46E	PC	6 mi.	Various	Peri-scope	Second PC searching after Attack #2
29	0100I 7/31/44	6-07N 123-46E	2 Sampans	1.5 mi.	000° 5 knots	Radar	Avoided
30	1250I 7/31/44	6-14N 126-05E	Coastal Freighter Medium AK with PC,	12 mi.	335° 6 knots	Smoke	Attack #3
31	0625I 8/1/44	6-23N 123-58E	Killer, & PT Escort	10 mi.	160° 9 knots	Sound Pinging	Attack #4
32	2005I 8/1/44	5-54N 123-50E	Sampan	.7 mi.	305°/ Undetermined	Sighted Night	Avoided

Subjedt: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST.COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
1	0415K 6/23/44	0-39N 140-06E	- -	18 mi.	- -	SD	Friendly
2	0450K 6/23/44	0-41N 140-00N	- -	8 mi.	- -	SD	Unidentified
3	0841I 6/24/44	2-28N 134-22E	- -	8 mi.	- -	SD	Friendly--Answered I.F.F. Challenge
4	1402I 6/24/44	2-48N 133-18E	Two-motored bomber	8 mi.	125°T	Sighted	
5	1031I 6/25/44	4-02N 129-24E	4-motored land bomber	6 mi.	200°T	Sighted	
6	1024I 6/28/44	6-14N 126-18E	PETE	7 Mi.	125°T 150 knots	Peri-scope	Coastal Patrol
7	0845I 6/29/44	6-14N 126-02E	Land Plane Fighter	6 mi.	090°T 200 knots	Peri-scope	
8	1050I 6/30/44	6-08N 125-44E	BETTY	5 mi.	140°T	Peri-scope	
9	1215I 6/30/44	6-00N 125-44E	KATE	4 mi.	000°T	Peri-scope	
10	1753I 7/1/44	6-13N 125-54E	PETE	5 mi.	000°T	Peri-scope	Float plane
11	1805I 7/1/44	6-13N 125-34E	KATE	5 mi.	150°T	Peris-cope	
12	0959I 7/2/44	6-09N 125-52E	- -	8 mi.	090°T	Peri-scope	Unidentified
13	1223I 7/2/44	6-14N 125-50E	JAKE	10 mi.	030°T	Peri-scope	Twin float--single wing
14	1252I 7/2/44	6-15N 125-49E	MAVIS	8 mi.	135°T	Peri-scope	

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
15	1305I 7/2/44	6-15N 125-49E	TESS	5 mi.	000°T	Periscope	Transport
16	1445I 7/2/44	6-16N 125-49E	PETE	12 mi.	090°T	Periscope	
17	1510I 7/2/44	6-12N 125-48E	PETE	12 mi.	000°T--180°T	Periscope	Coastal Patrol
18	1111I 7/3/44	6-10N 125-49E	JAKE	8 mi.	140°T	Periscope	Float type
19	1335I 7/3/44	6-10N 125-50E	JAKE	9 mi.	070°T	Periscope	Convoy escort
20	1538I 7/3/44	6-12N 125-49N	MAVIS	11 mi.	280°T	Periscope	
21	1545I 7/3/44	6-12N 125-49E	JAKE	8 mi.	350°T	Periscope	
22	1655I 7/3/44	6-15N 125-49E	- -	10 mi.	016°T	Periscope	Twin-engine land based bomber
23	0858I 7/4/44	6-00N 125-49E	- -	2 mi.	350°T	Periscope	Twin-engine land based bomber
24	1520I 7/4/44	6-11N 125-52E	MAVIS	12 mi.	315°T	Periscope	(2) MAVIS Patrolling
25	2010I 7/4/44	6-07N 125-59E	Unidentified	12 mi.	350°(App.)	SJ	Running lights on. DAVAO bound
26	0858I 7/5/44	6-06N 125-51E	JAKE	13 mi.	000°T--180°T	Periscope	Coastal patrol
27	1151I 7/5/44	6-11N 125-48E	JAKE	8 mi,	135°T	Periscope	Coastal patrol
28	1152I 7/5/44	6-11N 125-48E	JAKE	8 mi.	180°T	Periscope	Coastal patrol

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
	1359I	6-13N				Peri-	
29	7/5/44	125-47E	JAKE	8 mi.	180°T	scope	Coastal Patrol
	0855I	6-08N				Peri-	
30	7/6/44	126-12E	Unident.	8 mi.	180°T	scope	
	1006I	6-07N				Peri-	
31	7/6/44	126-11E	- -	12 mi.	340°T	scope	Land based bomber
	1015I	6-07N			100°T	Peri-	
32	7/6/44	126-11E	JAKE	6 mi.	150 knots	scope	
	1022I	6-07N			000°T	Peri-	
33	7/6/44	126-10E	JAKE	7 mi.	150 knots	scope	
	1151	6-08N			340°	Peri-	
34	7/6/44	126-09E	JAKE	8 mi.	150 knots	scope	
	2006I	6-09N					
35	7/6/44	126-00E	- -	10 mi.	000°	SJ	Running lights on
	1222I	6-15N				Peri-	
36	7/7/44	126-11E	KATE	6 mi.	310°T	scope	
	1725I	6-12N				Peri-	
37	7/7/44	125-58E	RUFE	6 mi.	350°T	scope	
	0841I	6-00N				Peri-	
38	7/8/44	126-10E	- -	10 mi.	230°T	scope	Unidentified
	0842I	6-00N				Peri-	
39	7/8/44	126-10E	- -	9 mi.	090°T	scope	Unidentified
	1515I	6-20N				Peri-	
40	7/8/44	125-54E	- -	6 mi.	340°T	scope	Unidentified
	1640I	6-19N				Peri-	
41	7/8/44	125-53E	- -	5 mi.	350°T	scope	Transport
	1725I	6-20N				Peri-	Over land
42	7/8/44	125-51E	RUFE	6 mi.	210°T	scope	A/S Patrol

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
43	7/10/44 1140I	6-18N 126-15E	- -	3 mi.	090°T	Peri-scope	(2) land based fighters
44	7/13/44 1400I	5-56N 125-45	- -	3 mi.	040°T	Peri-scope	Land based biplane
45	7/14/44 1350I	5-58N 125-46E	PETE	8 mi.	135°T	Peri-scope	
46	7/16/44 1313I	5-45N 125-08E	- -	12 mi.	310°T	Peri-scope	
47	7/17/44 1640I	5-42N 125-07E	- -	6 mi.	224°T	Peri-scope	Land based fighter.
48	7/20/44 0735I	7-31N 123-57E	RUFE	6 mi.	- -	Peri-scope	Convoy escort
49	7/20/44 1529I	5-31N 124-40E	MAVIS	15 mi.	135°T	Sighted	Coastal Patrol
50	7/23/44 1018I	6-03N 123-36E	BETTY	7 mi.	200°T	Sighted	
51	7/23/44 1144I	6-14N 123-46E	BETTY	7 mi.	330°T	Sighted	(3) BETTYS in formation
52	7/26/44 0651I	5-02N 124-05E	BETTY	9 mi.	160°T	Sighted	Convoy escort(2)
53	7/26/44 0755I	5-01N 124-04E	BETTY	8 mi.	160°T	Peri-scope	Convoy escort(2)
54	7/26/44 0919I	5-00N 124-02E	BETTY	5 mi.	020°T	Peri-scope	Convoy escort (3 & 4)
55	7/27/44 1321I	5-23N 121-43E	- -	3 mi.	315°T	Peri-scope	Single engine fighter--A/S Search
56	8/1/44 0701I	6-24N 124-02E	RUFE	2 mi.	Various	Peri-scope	Convoy escort

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE & TIME	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST. COURSE AND SPEED	HOW CONTACT	REMARKS
57	0837I 8/3/44	3-55N 129-33E	- -	14 mi.	- -	SD	Unidentified
58	1046I 8/4/44	2-08N 135-31E	- -	9 mi.	050°	Sighted	Unidentified

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

(H) ATTACK DATA

(TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL No. 4

Time 1500I Date July 9, 1944 Lat. 6°-22' N Long. 126°-18'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description	Large A.P. Closest resemblance is to the PRESIDENT HARRISON, Page 43 O.N.I. 208J Revised.
Ship(s) Probably Sunk	One
Damage Determined by	Two torpedo explosions. The ship was seen to be enshrouded in smoke immediately after the explosions. One low-order detonation, probably a torpedo. Three subsequent explosions from target--apparently internal explosions.

Target Draft: 20' Course: 175° Speed: 12.5 Range:3,300 yards (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3.0 Course: 249° Depth: 66' Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:	Submerged daylight attack at periscope depth, firing the bow tubes and using a divergent spread.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK #1

Tubes Fired	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle	107½	109	108½	113	118	115½
Gyro Angle	358½	357	357½	353	352	000½
Depth Set	8'	8'	8'	8'	8'	8'
Power	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Hit	Miss	Probable Hit	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	40368	26612	39242	25965	26046	40295
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	17091	17133	14212	17083	17134	17087
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	Contact	- -	Contact	Contact	- -
Mark Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	12503	3551	11806	12297	12126	12586
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Interval	- -	11	8	10	33	15
Type Spread	- - - - - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - - - - - -					
Sea Conditions	- - - - - - - - - - Sea Calm (0) - - - - - - - - - -					
Overhaul Activity	- - - - - - - - - - Navy #134 - - - - - - - - - -					

REMARKS:

Fired divergent spread with first two to hit M.O.T., and others off-set as follows: 1½°R, 1½°L, 2½°L, 2½°R. All ran H.S.N. but smoking. Two definite hits--timed to be #2 and #5. Low order detonation--timing indicated it to be probably #4. Target was last seen to be enshrouded in smoke with its stern towards us.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of War Patrol No. FOUR.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL NO. 4

TIME: 0050I DATE: 27 July 1944 LAT: 5°-25' N LONG. 121°-43' E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One large Tanker or Engines Aft Freighter in column with a medium A.K. ahead, and a medium A.K astern.

Ship(s) Probably Sunk: One

Damage Determined by: Three timed torpedo hits; the strong smell of oil in the atmosphere after the attack; and the presence of three of the escorts at the scene of the [illegible] hours later.

Target Draft: 20' Course: 315° Speed 9 K. Range: 3,900 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 14.6 Course: 190° Depth: Surface Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Night radar attack in which the bow tubes were fired while on the surface and the stern tubes while diving and swinging to starboard. A divergent spread was used with both salvoes.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK #2

Tubes Fired:	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle	59S	59S	62S	64S	63S	62S
Gyro Angle	013°	007°	008°	008°	007°	006°
Depth Set	6'	6'	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power	- -	- -	- -	High	- -	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit	Probable Hit	Probable Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	23	23	23	14-3A	23	14-3A
Serial No.	53150	41640	41638	26436	41227	25303
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	17086	17085	17095	17066	17090	17076
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	Contact	Contact	Contact	- - -
Mark Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	11762	3540	12562	12141	11825	11770
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Interval	- -	10	9	15	8	8
Type Spread	- - - - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - - - - -					
Sea Conditions	- - - - - - - Calm with Moderate Swell - - - - - -					
Overhaul Activity	- - - - - - - - - - Navy #134 - - - - - - - - - -					

REMARKS:

Time of explosion indicated hit by torpedo #3. Torpedoes #1 and #5 were fired to hit M.O.T. and #2, #3, #4 and #6 were offset 1°L, 1°R, 1-3/4°R and 1-3/4°L respectively. Times were not recorded for the several explosions which followed the first one.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 PATROL REPORT NO. 4

Time: 0050I Date: 27 July 1944 Lat. 5°-25'N Long. 121°-43'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One large Tanker or Engines Aft Freighter in column with a medium A.K. ahead, and a medium A.K. astern.

Ship(s) Probably Sunk: One

Damage determined by: Three timed torpedo hits; the strong smell of oil in the atmosphere after the attack; and the presence of three of the escorts at the scene of the attack for several hours later.

Target Draft: 20' Course: 315° Speed 9 K. Range: 2,300 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 12.0 (Estimated) Course: Swinging Right Depth: Diving (Approx. 40') Angle 5° (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Night radar attack in which the bow tubes were fired while on the surface and the stern tubes while diving and swinging to starboard. A divergent spread was used with both salvoes.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2

Tubes Fired:	#7	#8	#9	#10
Track Angle	57S	58S	60S	59S
Gyro Angle	220°	213°	209°	204°
Depth Set	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power	- -	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss	Hit	Miss	Miss	Hit
Erratic	- - - - - - - Not observed - - - - - - -			
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	53559	53529	53552	54068
Mark Exploder	4-7	4-7	4-7	4-7
Serial No.	16537W	16140W	16509W	16497W
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	Contact	- -	- -	Contact
Mark Warhead	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	338W	87W	524W	674W
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Interval	- -	9	9	10
Type Spread	- - - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - - - -			
Sea Conditions	- - - - - - - Calm with moderate swell - -			
Overhaul Activity	- - - - - - - - Navy #134 - - - - - - - -			

Remarks:

Time of explosions indicated hits by torpedoes #7 & #10. Torpedoes #7 & #8 were fired to hit the M.O.T. and #9 & #10 were offset 1°R & 1°L respectively. The boat was swinging to starboard and submerging at the time of firing.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 4

Time: 1411I Date: 31 July 1944 Lat. 6°-11.5'N Long. 124°-08'E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Two thousand ton, engines aft, Coastal Freighter.

Ship(s) Sunk One

Damage determined by: One timed torpedo explosion and the disappearance of the target from the scene 10 minutes after the attack.

Target Draft: 10' Course: 323° Speed: 5.5K. Range: 2,300 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3¼K Course: 222° Depth: 67' Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Submerged daylight attack at periscope depth, firing the after tubes and using a divergent spread.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3

Tubes Fired:	#7	#8	#9	#10
Track Angle	102°	102.5°	101.5°	105.5°
Gyro Angle	179°	178°	179°	175.5°
Depth Set	4'	4'	4'	4'
Power	- -	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit
Erratic	- - - - - - - Not observed - - - - - - -			
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	53986	53522	53521	53533
Mark Exploder	4-7	4-7	4-7	4-7
Serial No.	16689W	16695W	16508W	16462W
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -	Contact
Mark Warhead	18	18	18	18
Serial No.	506W	551W	515W	687W
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Interval	- -	18	10	12
Type Spread	- - - - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - - - -			
Sea Conditions	- - - Sea calm with moderate swells - -			
Overhaul Activity	- - - - - - - - - Navy #134 - - - - - - - -			

Remarks:

Timed explosion indicated a hit by torpedo #10. Torpedoes #7 & #8 were fired to hit M.O.T. and torpedoes #9 & #10 were offset 1.5°R and 1.5°L respectively. A very close premature explosion occurred 48 seconds after firing the last torpedo.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4 PATROL NO. 4

Time: 0724I Date: 1 August 1944 Lat. 6°-25'N Long. 124°-01.5E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Medium A.K.

Ship(s) Sunk: - -

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: - -

Damage determined by: - -

Target Draft: 18' Course: 160° Speed: 8.5K Range: 3,100 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3.0K Course: 065° Depth 67' Angle 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack:

Submerged daylight attack at periscope depth, firing the bow tubes and using a divergent spread.

(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4

Tubes Fired:	#1	#2	#3	#4
Track Angle	82°	84°	83°	86°
Gyro Angle	357°	359°	358°	001°
Depth Set	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power	- -	-	High	- -
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	Not observed - Sound heard all running properly			
Mark Torpedo	23	23	14-3A	23
Serial No.	52993	41219	33946	41637
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	14206	17174	17164	17140
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	12142	5927	12858	9820
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Interval	- -	8	7	8
Type Spread	- - - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - - - -			
Sea Conditions	- - - - - - - - Flat Calm - - - - - - - -			
Overhaul Activity	- - - - - - - - Navy #134 - - - - - - - -			

Remarks:

Timing of two torpedo explosions indicated an excessive torpedo run for hitting target. It is believed the torpedoes exploded against the Reef. Torpedoes were offset from the M.O.T. 0.5°R, 0.5°L, 2°L, 2°R respectively.

(I) MINES

The day after the attack off Cape SAN AGUSTIN and while reconnoitering this locality several small floating objects were observed. Some were painted white, others red. At the time they were thought to be fish net buoys, however, they might have been small floating mines.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

Anti-submarine measures were many and varied. Off DAVAO there was a decided increase in air patrol over that noted last run. There were also anti-submarine patrols or killer groups that appeared very active. These groups were formed of a great variety of types: several PC's of various sizes; several killer type patrol boats; one small freighter type; and at least one engines aft job similar to our net tenders were noted. They are all sound equipped using both echo ranging and listening. They normally cause much smoke and apparently try to attract attention. They may be used as decoys for important traffic. In our case their search was ineffective as we made numerous approaches on them without detection.

All convoys were well escorted with a minimum of two for a single ship and a maximum of six for a three ship convoy. Air escorts were used in most cases. It is peculiar that the ship contact of 9 July failed to have an air escort close to DAVAO while both contacts at Port LEBAK had air cover. The convoy of 27 July had air cover of four BETTY's throughout the daylight hours. After being at deep submergence for one hour and a half after the attack on 1 August came up thinking it all clear and found a large PC lying to only 4,000 yards away. The old sleeper play.

All attacks, with the exception of the single ship contact resulted in very quick and accurate initial depth charging. The depth charges encountered this run appear to be larger than those previously encountered. After the initial runs the charges were in general further away.

Evasive actions consisted of going deep and retiring at four knots, steering various courses in the same general direction.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(a) ENGINEERING:

Auxiliary Engine: Examination of engine after being stopped due to abnormal noise revealed the following: An exhaust valve in #4 unit had broken off at base of stem and fallen inside cylinder. Following damage was caused: Broken injector tip, bending of remaining exhaust valves, extensive over-all damage to cylinder head. All damaged parts renewed and engine was placed back in commission.

Main Gyro: Departed from tender with gyro not settled down. Gyro did not settle down as expected and an inspection revealed that south gyro rotor lead was making contact with follow up coil support arm thus preventing the sensitive element from settling on meridian. Lead was cleared and gyro settled.

(b) GUNNERY:

T.D.C.: Arcing of the contact rollers on the collector ring of the RAB mechanical follow up head collector ring assembly in the position keeper burned the insulation to such an extent that a short circuit resulted. The charred insulation (bakelite) was scraped out and new insulation built up by the use of a segment of fiber and sealing wax. This was fitted in the assembly and proved satisfactory for the rest of the patrol.

T.B.T.: Both forward and after units flooded. Forward unit was dried out and a spare synchro transmitter installed. Lack of another spare transmitter and flooded leads did not warrant opening the after unit.

(L) RADIO

No major casualties occured and the performance of the equipment was of the highest.

All serial numbered messages were received. Reception was good and no difficulty was experienced in copying schedules. On the other hand, great difficulty was experienced in raising

(L) RADIO (Cont'd)

a shore station during two of our four transmissions. Our second transmission was immediately acknowledged and the third transmission was sent blind on 2880 Kc's.

(M) RADAR

The performance of both radars was satisfactory and no major casualties occured. The lack of a suitable SD radar was again felt during this patrol.

No contacts were made on the SH-2 radar detector although several realistic sixty cycle indications were traced down to noisy fan motors. On one occasion the interference also showed up on the S.J. radar as pulses similar to another radar but slightly broader and with a random pulse rate.

Only interference encountered was that caused by S.J. radar of friendly submarines.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Although no major casualties occured in the sound equipment it is felt that the "QB" equipment is not operating at maximum efficiency in that it lacks sensitivity. A new "QB" head will be requested.

Sound conditions in the area varied from good to excellent. It was noted that inside of five miles from the beach the noise level caused by fish and reef noises was so great that accurate listening could not be obtained. Outside of the five mile limit conditions were excellent. Most of the contacts made were originally picked up by echo ranging of enemy A/S vessels. Ranges as high as 15 miles were not unusual. Screws were heard at normal ranges. A log of sound contacts was kept.

The "JP" topside gear is proving itself more each patrol, but power train for this gear would improve its usefulness greatly. Hand training would still be used to develop contacts. Two sets of high impedance crystal phones were damaged beyond repair by perspiration of the operator. The crystals were actually disintegrated by the moisture.

(o) DENSITY LAYERS

Daily trim dives were made, average depth of Bathythermograph 270 feet. All density layers were accompanied by negative temperature gradients.

Three cards were taken on 26 and 27 June between MINDANAO and PALAU. One taken at 6°-30' N showed a layer accompanied by an 8° gradient starting at 100 feet. The other two cards taken at 4°-23' N showed no break down to 250 feet where a 1° gradient appeared.

All other cards were taken at various points off the MINDANAO Coast.

Thirteen cards were taken within a ten mile radius of Cape SAN AGUSTIN. These showed good layers starting from 100 feet to 200 feet and accompanied by gradients of 5° to 10°. Generally, the layers appeared to be sharper to the east of the Cape. On two occasions, however, morning cards showed no gradients. Later during those two days, fortunately, sharp breaks showed on cards taken during evasive tactics which aided the submarine to avoid the A/S vessels.

Four cards were taken east of CALIAN Point from June 30 to July 13. Three showed layers starting at 150 feet to 200 feet accompanied by 5° to 10° gradients. One layer was encountered at 40 feet with a 4° gradient down to 260 feet.

Five cards were taken south of SARANGANI Bay. All but one gave layers starting at 100 feet to 200 feet with 2° to 7° gradients. The fifth card showed no layer. On the whole, these layers were less sharp than those encountered in DAVAO Gulf.

The remainder of the cards taken were obtained off the southwest coast of MINDANAO. Six cards taken west of Port LEBAK and one in POLLOC Bay showed very gradual gradients of about 7° with no sharp layers. Three cards taken up until July 25 about fifty miles southwest of Port LEBAK showed similar conditions to those closer to shore.

One card taken east of JOLO Island showed conditions similar to those off Port LEBAK.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

The health of officers and crew was good throughout the patrol. After spending 36 out of 37 days in the area submerged all hands began to show the wear and tear which accompany an active patrol. One case of acute tonsillitis and one case of renal colic resulted in the loss of eleven days.

Habitability was greatly improved during daily dives by the use of CO2 absorbent. The cooling of the engines by the detached pumps also does much to improve habitability.

The Commissary Department maintained its usual high standard. Menus were varied and food was well prepared and served.

(Q) PERSONNEL

The performance of duty of both officers and men was of the highest quality. Their reaction during depth charge attacks left nothing to be desired. All hands rate a well done for their work on the morning of 27 July where a slip on anyone's part would have lost the boat. We were in at very close quarters, and had to make a dive at full speed; firing as we went down. The training of the crew really paid off as everything went off/smoothly as a trim dive in Long Island Sound.
as

The patrol was started with a 100% new approach party. They are now veterans and a most efficient organization. Much credit is due Lieutenant Commander R.C. BENITEZ for his untiring efforts and skill in training this organization. He has gained much experience and become an excellent assistant approach officer. Lieutenant (jg) W.J. DORWORTH, Jr. has become an excellent T.D.C. operator and much of our success is due to his efforts. Lieutenant (jg) C.C. ERHARD, Jr. assisted greatly with information from plot. Lieutenant (jg) A.A. EBEL contributed valuable radar information during the night attack. It is also due to his efforts that we had the T.D.C. in operation for the last three attacks.

Special mention is also made of the performance of duty of the following men:

(Q) PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

YOUNGER, C.M., 258 01 45, CMoMM, USN, for his outstanding performance on the sound gear that was of great assistance to the Commanding Officer both during attack and the subsquent evasions.

WRIGHT, C.L., 630 18 65, CRT, USNR for the valuable radar information furnished during the night attack.

MURPHY, H.A., 267 90 09, CTM, USN for his consistent excellent performance of duty as Chief-of-the-Boat.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

BRISBANE to Area - -	3104 miles	- -30,500 gal. fuel
In Area - - - - - -	6798 miles	- -56,406 gal. fuel
Area to BRISBANE - -	3277 miles	- -17,101 gal. fuel

(S) DURATION

Days enroute area -----	12 days
Days in area ----------	37 days
Days enroute base ------	5 days
Total -----------------	54 days
Days submerged --------	36 days

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

TORPEDOES	FUEL	PROVISIONS	PERSONNEL
0	3,500 gal.	10 days	7 days

Limiting factor of this patrol: Expenditure of torpedoes.

(U) REMARKS

The Brisbane refit was a huge success. There were no major casualties and very few of the minor ones normally experienced after a refit. The new wiper rings installed in the main engines licked the smoke problem that was experienced last run. Flooding of topside electrical gear was more numerous than experienced previously--whether this is due to age or to numerous depth charges received, is a matter of question.

(U) REMARKS (Cont'd)

The extensive night tracking again points to the desirability of a T.D.C. with a range unit of 16 to 20 thousand yards. Although it is feasible to use half scale it would be much simpler if this were not necessary. The major disadvantage is the short period of time to get shifted to the high scale and check set up when going in for the attack.

The lack of satisfactory communication between bridge and conning tower during night attacks was again keenly felt. It is hoped a successful 2 MC can be installed this refit.

A system of rendezvousing with other boats during shift of areas is recommended. In this way the latest dope on the various areas could be obtained.

FC5-18/A16-3/(11)

Serial 0103

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
8 August 1944

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS DACE (SS247)
Report of Fourth War
Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Fourth War Patrol, comments on.

1. During this patrol DACE had contact on seven occasions with targets worthy of torpedoes. She was unable to close three of these contacts but delivered attacks in the remaining four cases.

Attack No. 1

A submerged daylight attack on a large AP resembling the "President Harrison". Two hits were obtained out of a six bow torpedo spread. Forced deep by vigorous counter-attack by the two escorts of the Chidori type. AP last seen headed for beach 3000 yards distant, with a port list and enveloped in smoke. The beach in this area was thoroughly searched the next day, but no trace of the target was found.

Attack No. 2

This was a night surface attack on a convoy of two medium AKs and one small AO or AK with six escorts. The attack culminated an eighteen hour chase. During the daytime portion of the chase, DACE was forced down eight time by planes of the convoy air umbrella. After firing the six bow tubes on a 65 starboard track, 3800 yards range, DACE was forced to dive by a nearby escort intent on ramming, but fired the four stern tubes while submerging. Three timed hits were recorded out of the salvo of ten torpedoes. Results could not be observed.

Attack No. 3

A submerged daylight attack on a small unescorted engines-aft AK. One timed hit out of four torpedoes fired. Results unobserved as DACE went deep when a heavy explosion close aboard rocked the boat which was thought to be an A/C bomb. Explosion most probably was a premature. Nine minutes after firing, upon again reaching periscope depth, there was no sign of target.

9 01885

FC5-18/A16-3/(11) SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Wx

Serial 0103

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
8 August 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Fourth War Patrol, comments on.

Attack No. 4

A submerged daylight attack on a medium AK with four small escorts. Four stern tubes fired at 3100 yard range, 85 port track. Counter-attack by escorts prevented observation of results. Two torpedo explosions heard but times indicated excessive range. Torpedoes probably exploded on reef.

2. The material condition of the DACE is very good. Her state of cleanliness is excellent. No major casualties occurred, except to the T.D.C. Arcing of the contact rollers on the collecting ring of the RAB mechanical follow-up head collector ring assembly in the position keeper burned the bakelite insulation which resulted in a short circuit. Satisfactory repairs were effected by Lieut(jg) A.A. Ebel, U.S.N.R., C.E.M. L.B. PARDEN and W.O. WILLIAMS, F.C.2c. The ingenuity, skill and hard work displayed by these men in restoring the T.D.C. to operation is highly commendable.

3. DACE will be given a normal refit by the Submarine Repair Unit, Brisbane, Australia.

4. The state of health of the personnel is excellent and their morale is "tops".

5. The patrol was conducted in an excellent manner in an area where anti-submarine measures consisting of planes, "hunter-killer" groups and decoy "Smokey Joes" were constantly employed by the enemy. All attacks were carried out in an aggressive and efficient manner. The success of these attacks is attributable to a great extent, to the excellent organization of the fire control party and the high state of training of the ship's company.

6. The Squadron Commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the commanding officer, his officers and crew on a fine, well conducted, aggressive patrol and upon the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

Eliot H. Bryant

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

0283

FF12-15(72)/A16-3/Lh.
Serial 0307

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TASK FORCE SEVENTY-TWO,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

1 September 1944.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of Fourth War Patrol - comments on.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the DACE was spent in areas off MINDANAO. Seven worthwhile contacts were made of which DACE developed three into attacks. Two ships were sunk and a third damaged.

2. This patrol is designated "Successful" for the award of Combat Insignia.

3. The Task Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. DACE upon the completion of a successful patrol and for inflicting the following damage upon the enemy:

SUNK

1 Small AK	(EU)	2,000 tons
1 SMC	(EU)	1,200 tons
		3,200 tons

DAMAGED

1 Large AP	(EU)	10,000 tons

TOTAL SUNK AND DAMAGED - 13,200 tons

J. M. HAINES.

DISTRIBUTION:
ComInCh (3 - direct)
VCNO (2 - direct)
VOPNAV (Op-23c)
Com1stFlt
Com2ndFlt
Com3rdFlt
ComSubs1stFlt (25)
ComSubs2ndFlt
ComSubs7thFlt (25)
CSS-4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20.
CSD-53, 181, and 182.
OinC, S/M School, N.L.Conn.(2)
Flt. Radio Unit, MELBOURNE.
All SS TF-72 (May be taken to sea but BURN prior to entering enemy controlled waters).
CO USS DACE.

F. F. HURRY,
Force Secretary.

9 01885

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3 (F-3/eeh)

Serial: 02503

Reg. No. 12495
R. S. No. 9 01885
6 SEP 1944

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (ss247)
Report of Fourth War Patrol.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

H. W. GRAF,
Chief of Staff.

1ST COPY

DECLASSIFIED - OFFICIAL WAR RECORD
BY 9/C DATE 7-20-62

SS247/A16-3/09

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
6 November 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division 181.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 18.
(3) The Commander Task Force 71.
(4) The Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart to CTF-71.
(C) Special Reports.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the CELEBES Sea, PALAWAN Passage, and Dangerous Ground during the period September 1 to November 6, 1944 is forwarded herewith.

B.D. CLAGGETT.

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

- -

(A) PROLOGUE

August 12, 1944

Arrived Brisbane, Australia after completing fourth war patrol. Given normal refit by Submarine Repair Unit, Navy #134, in which the following major items were accomplished:

(1) Overhauled #3 and #4 main engines.
(2) Installed Gould type trim pump.
(3) Installed new 7MC.
(4) Moved 40mm aft.
(5) Filled propeller shafts with sand.

August 27, 1944

Crew returned aboard from leave. Given five day testing and loading period. Sailing date set for 1 September 1944.

Lieutenant F.P. THOMAS, USN and Lieut.(jg) C.C. ERHARD, Jr., D-V(G), USNR were detached. Lieut.(jg) E.H. JONES, A-V(RS), USNR and Ensign Philip BANTA, E-M, USNR reported aboard for duty.

September 1, 1944

1350(K) Underway in accordance with Commander Task Force 72 operation Order S56-44 in company with USS DARTER, HMAS WARRNAMBOOL and HMAS WHYALLA. Conducted training exercises with WARRNAMBOOL and WHYALLA until evening of 4 September when WARRNAMBOOL was detached. Continued training with WHYALLA until evening of 5 September when WHYALLA departed. Numerous Zed, day and night radar runs and a day and night end around were conducted. No torpedoes were fired. All guns were fired at float target.

The evening of 1 September while making a trim dive a slight jar was felt while passing

40 feet. Readings and tests taken that night indicated no trouble in the QC-JK sound head which was rigged out at the time. After the deep dive the following morning the QC head showed a zero ground. Lt. M. GODEK, USNR and YOUNGER, C.M., CMoMM, USN investegated head using the shallow water diving outfit and found a large dent in QC side. JK side apparently okay. Studs holding head were also loose indicating we hit something. Pit log and QB apparently all right. QC completely out of commission.

September 2, 1944.

Conducting training enroute DARWIN.

September 3, 1944.

Training enroute DARWIN.

September 4, 1944.

Training enroute DARWIN.

1750(K) Commander R.H. CRANE, USN transferred from USS DARTER to act as training officer.

September 5, 1944.

Training enroute DARWIN.

1540(K) Commander R.H. CRANE, USN left ship. HMAS WHYALLA departed. Training completed. This type of underway training is excellent but it is strongly recommended that faster targets be furnished, or a slower speed of advance be maintained in order that the runs could be made more expeditiously.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

- -

(B) NARRATIVE

NAME	RANK OR RATE	NO. OF PATROLS COMPLETED
CLAGGETT, B.D.	Commander, USN	8
BENITEZ, R.C.	Lt.Comdr., USN	8
GODEK, M.	Lieut., D-V(G), USNR	3
REID, S.F.	Lieut., D-V(G), USNR	3
DORWORTH, W.J., Jr.	Lt.(jg), E-V(G), USNR	3
EBEL, A.A.	Lt.(jg), E-V(RS), USNR	5
JONES, E.H.	Lt.(jg), A-V(RS), USNR	1
CALDWELL, H.H.	Lt.(jg), U.S.N.	2
JONES, E.T.	Ensign, USN	5
BANTA, P.	Ensign, E-M, USNR	1
MURPHY, H.A.	CTM(PA), USN	5
HUNTER, D.G.	CQM(AA), USN	8
WRIGHT, C.L.	CRT(T), V6, USNR	5
PARDEN, L.B.	CEM(AA), USN	12
YOUNGER, C.M., Jr.	CMoMM(PA), USN	12
MONROE, F.A.	CMoMM(AA), USN	12
MORSE, R.W.	CY(AA)	5

6 to 10 September

Enroute DARWIN in company with USS DARTER. Conducted numerous approaches and radar tracking drills on each other.

10 September

0915(k) Moored alongside USS COUCAL, DARWIN Harbor. Set clocks back one hour to "ITEM" time. All times "ITEM" unless otherwise indicated.

1530 Commenced fueling after USS DARTER completed.

10 September (Cont'd)

2130 Completed fueling, taking on lub oil, water and topping off provisions.

2140 Underway in company with USS STINGRAY enroute patrol area.

11 September

Enroute area.

0613 Made trim dive.

0634 Surfaced.

0740 Sighted STINGRAY; first of several sightings during the day.

0907 S.D. contact 18 miles. No reply to I.F.F. challenge. (Aircraft contact #1)

1235 S.J. contact on plane, 19,000 yards. No reply to I.F.F. challenge. (Aircraft contact #2)

1600 S.J. contact on plane, range 16,000 yards. No reply to I.F.F. challenge. Identified as friendly. (Aircraft contact #3)

2300 Passed between TIMOR and LETI Islands. Entered enemy controlled waters.

12 September

Enroute area.

1825 S.D. burned out transformer. This looks bad as there is no spare and this must be insulated against 20,000 volts.

- -

13 September

Enroute area.

0018 Exchanged recognition signals with DARTER by means of S.J. radar.

0602 Made trim dive.

0655 Surfaced.

Day completely overcast with low hanging clouds; bad for aircraft spotting. S.D. is still out. Have rewound coil once but that burned out too. Trying again.

1145 Sighted unidentified plane bearing 110°T, range 3½ miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #4)

1233 Surfaced.

2135 S.J. contact on plane, range 25,000 yards. (Aircraft contact #5)

2250 S.J. contact on plane, range 20,000 yards. (Aircraft contact #6)

2320 S.J. contact on plane, range 21,850 yards. (Aircraft contact #7)

2337 S.J. contact on plane, range 9,500 yards. (Aircraft contact #8) This plane closed to 5,500 yards. Did not dive because bearing was changing indicating he was not making run on us and we were passing through BANKA Passage.

- -

13 September (Continued)

Noted large fire on northwest tip of CELEBES. Ploted in at 01°-42' N, 125°-00' E. First, thought it was flood lights on landing field, but later could make out smoke and flames.

14 September

Enroute area.

0036 Completed transit of BANKA Passage.

0400 S.D. back in commission. Excellent work on the part of Lt.(jg) A.A. EBEL, USNR and WRIGHT, C.L., CRT(T), USNR. After two days work they have rewound a transformer coil that stands up under 20,000 volts.

1205 Sighted plane. Distance 18 miles. Looks like B-24 but no reply to I.F.F. challenge. Passed well clear. (Aircraft contact #9)

1413 Arrived on station. Commenced patrolling at one engine speed on scouting line.

1432 Made trim dive.

1505 Surfaced.

Have received no instruction as to speed to use in patrolling station, or how long I am to remain on patrol before fueling, so have decided to use one engine speed, 75/90. This will enable me to cover my sector twice daily and still not use an excessive amount of fuel.

1814 Sighted unidentified plane, range 7 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #10)

- -

14 September (Continued)

1850 Surfaced.

15 September

Patrolling line.

0740 Commenced mine sweeping operations. Sank six drifting type mines and exploded one moored type mine with 20mm. See section ITEM for description. All mines were in a tide rip. Decided to move patrol line 10 miles west to avoid this tide rip.

1606 Submerged for training. Held fire control drill.

1658 Surfaced.

2329 S.J. interference--probably MINGO.

16 September

Patrolling line.

0020 Exchanged recognition signals and dope with MINGO by S.J. radar.

0800 S.D. contact 9 miles. Could not see plane in rain squall. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #11)

0858 Surfaced.

1209 S.D. contact 11 miles. Closed to 9 miles so submerged. (Aircraft contact #11) Held fire control drill.

1346 Surfaced.

- -

17 September

Patrolling line.

1546 Plane contact on S.J. radar, range 18,000 yards. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #13)

1645 Surfaced.

2320 Radar interference. Exchanged information with MINGO.

18 September

Patrolling line.

0721 S.D. contact 9 miles, closed to 4 as we submerged. Plane not sighted in rain squall. (Aircraft contact #14)

0817 Surfaced.

1504 S.J. plane contact 12,000 yards. Not sighted in rain squall. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #15)

1545 Sighted float-type plane ZERO through periscope. (Aircraft contact #16)

1623 Surfaced.

2330 Radar interference. Probably MINGO.

19 September

Patrolling line.

0225 Communicated with MINGO by S.J. radar.

19 September (Continued)

0903 Sighted unidentified bomber while making periscope sweep. Distance nine miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #17)

1009 Surfaced.

1605 Submerged for fire control drill.

1654 Surfaced.

20 September

Patrolling line.

0407 S.J. contact on plane, range 23,000 yards. Closed to 20,000 yards, then disappeared. (Aircraft contact #18)

0855 Unidentified aircraft sighted, range 7 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #19)

0942 Surfaced.

1130 Submerged.

1146 Surfaced.

1604 Submerged for fire control drill.

1705 Surfaced.

21 September

Patrolling line.

21 September (Continued)

0900 Sighted two-engine bomber. S.D. range 14 miles, northerly course. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #20)

1140 S.D. contact 24 miles. (Aircraft contact #21)

1523 Submerged for drills and training.

1553 Surfaced.

22 September

Patrolling line.

0425 S.J. contact on aircraft 18,000 yards. Closed to 15,000 yards. (Aircraft contact #22)

0900 BETTY-type bomber sighted, range 15 miles. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #23)

0945 BETTY-type bomber sighted, range 9 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. Watched it cross three miles ahead. (Aircraft contact #24)

1007 Surfaced.

1008 S.D. contact 12 miles. Sighted float type ZERO. Submerged to avoid detection. Watched it cross ahead. (Aircraft contact #25)

1034 Surfaced.

1100 Sighted float-type ZERO, range 10 miles. Observed it turn and start in. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #26)

- -

22 September (Continued)

1212 Surfaced.

1630 Submerged.

1705 Surfaced.

23 September

Patrolling line.

1606 Made dive by hand. Time 90 seconds.

1700 Surfaced.

24 September

Patrolling line.

0520 Received Commander Task Force 72's serial 72 directing us to return to WOENDI.

0830 Submerged.

0921 Surfaced.

1207 Entered Safety Lane. Departed patrol line.

1216 S.D. contact 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #27)

1434 Surfaced.

25 September

Enroute WOENDI.

0335 S.J. contact on STINGRAY. Exchanged recognition signals and dope.

25 September (Continued)

0550 Made dawn dive.

0707 Surfaced.

0810 Sighted HALMEHERA Island bearing 135°T, distance 60 miles.

Sighted numerous friendly planes throughout the day.

26 September

Enroute WOENDI.

0522 S.J. contact--9,000 yards. Exchanged recognition signals with DARTER.

During the day sighted various friendly aircraft on patrol and bombing missions.

27 September

Enroute WOENDI.

0230 S.J. contact on BIAK Island bearing 245°T, range 50 miles.

0745 Entered WOENDI Lagoon.

0825 Moored alongside U.S.S. SALAMONIE.

1430 Completed fueling.

27 September (Continued)

1723 Moored alongside U.S.S. ORION (AS18). Received a delightful reception from Commander Submarine Squadron 16, Commander Submarine Division 162, and all hands of U.S.S. ORION. This vessel has never been so royally received or treated. Accomplished all of our work requested and suggested and in addition accomplished additional jobs. All in all they made our visit most pleasant at a very advanced base.

28 September to 30 September

Moored alongside tender. Following items of work accomplished:

(1) Repaired JK-QC sound head.
(2) Repaired S.D. and S.J. radar.
(3) Replaced sensitive element of master gyro.
(4) Repaired port propeller.

1 October

Conducted training operations, and tested port propeller which had been bent by submarine mooring alongside. Propeller satisfactory submerged to 80 r.p.m. Above that speed very noisy. No excessive vibration at full power on the surface.

2 October

Master gyro discovered to have a variable error of from 7 to 10 degrees. Tender worked on same all day to no avail and finally renewed sensitive element. Did not have time to check this before dark so DACE very reluctantly joined "Reluctant Dragon 'Club'" and sail-

2 October (Continued)

ing was postponed to 0530 the third.

3 October

0530 Underway for patrol in accordance with Commander Task Force 71 dispatch orders 139-44.

0902 Made trim dive.

0916 Surfaced.

Numerous friendly plane contacts during next three days which will not be listed.

0955 Sighted convoy of friendly ships on opposite course.

4 October

Enroute area.

0334 Radar contact on NARWHAL--exchanged recognition signals with S.J.

0713 Sighted U.S. submarine through high periscope. Assumed to be STRINGRAY.

1840 S.J. contact on NAUTILUS. Passed time of day by S.J.

2250 Plane contact on S.D. and S.J. closing. Pulled flare and was answered with Very Stars. Identified as Black Cat making an excellent run on us as his bearing had been steady from a range of 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #28)

- -

5 October

Enroute area.

0307 Another Black Cat making run. Identified ourselves as before. (Aircraft contact #29)

0343 S.J. contact on MOROTAI Island bearing 248°T, range 45 miles.

Numerous friendly S.D. contacts throughout day--not using I.F.F.

2000 Put on third engine in order to transit SIBUTU tomorrow night and thus gain an additional day in area.

6 October

Enroute area on three engines.

0620 Trim dive.

0635 Surfaced.

Took resistance readings on Main Generators--#2 shows only 100,000 ohms on the armature. Cleaned it entirely and still the same reading. Will use it in case of emergency only.

1530 Set clocks back one hour to Zone -8. All times now "HOW".

1600 Sighted plane, distance 12 miles. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #30)

2215 Commenced transit of SIBUTU.

2234 Completed transit.

- -

7 October

Enroute area.

0526 Dawn dive.

0635 Surfaced.

0640 S.D. contact; 12 miles. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #31)

0803 S.D. out of commission. Sky completely overcast. Bad for spotting planes, so at

0841 Submerged until it clears or S.D. repaired.

1539 Surfaced. S.D. repaired.

8 October

Enroute area.

0517 Decided to conduct submerged patrol off southern tip of PANAY during morning in order to kill time to arrive at EAST APO pass at night.

1341 Surfaced.

2009 Commenced transit of EAST APO pass.

2300 Completed passage.

9 October

Enroute area.

0521 Dawn dive.

0710 Surfaced.

- -

9 October (Continued)

0712 Sighted unidentified plane, range 8 miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #32)

0814 Surfaced.

1221 S.D. contact 13 miles. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #33)

2300 Received CAVALLA and BECUNA's contact report. From first message it appears that convoy is headed down PALAWAN Passage, but BECUNA's position indicates passage through Dangerous Grounds. Decided to send message to DARTER requesting rendezvous at northern edge of area in order to work this together and cover more area. In this way will keep ahead of convoy and take advantage of additional reports.

10 October

Enroute area.

0500 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Received orders for submerged patrol of eastern half of PALAWAN Passage.

0613 Submerged for patrol.

1111 Sighted BETTY bearing 110°T, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #34)

1830 Surfaced. Commenced patrol of 100 fathom curve.

11 October

Surface patrol.

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11 October (Continued)

0210 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Received word that she would patrol BALABAC Strait--we patrol off shoal as yesterday.

0535 Dawn dive.

0728 Surfaced.

0815 S.D. contact 9 miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #35)

0915 Surfaced.

0925 S.J. contact 10 miles. Two BETTY's sighted on southerly course. One fighter on northerly course. Did not dive. (Aircraft contact #36)

0958 S.D. contact 21 miles. Six bombers flying in formation, northerly course. (Aircraft contact #37)

1215 S.D. contact at 17 miles. Not sighted--did not dive. (Aircraft contact #38)

1232 S.D. contact at 13 miles, closing. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #39) Held fire control drill.

1420 Surfaced.

1424 S.D. contact 8 miles. Submerged as he closed to 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #40)

1546 Surfaced.

2230 Received Commander Task Force 71 serial #45.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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12 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0130 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Received instuctions to patrol western entrance of BALABAC Strait.

1835 Surfaced.

2200 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Received orders to patrol BALABAC again plus dope on DARTER's convoy.

13 October

Patrolling western approach of BALABAC Strait.

0545 Submerged at the 100 fathom curve southwest of BALABAC Island.

0802 Heard echo ranging bearing 085°T.

0809 Sighted smoke bearing 090°T. Commenced approach using standard speed--looks every 15 minutes.

0937 Sighted masts.

0958 Sighted seven ship convoy with two escorting destroyers. Range 18,000 yards, angle on bow 90 starboard. Convoy is by. Will have to chase tonight. They came due south from BALABAC Island sticking to the shallow water along the island and hugging the coast the whole way. I have closed to the 50 fathom curve, but have been unable to get any closer than 16,000 yards. Do not think it wise to go any deeper into this Strait.

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13 October (Continued)

1019 Commenced clearing BALABAC Strait.

Convoy is the one attacked by DARTER yesterday. It consists of three large A.O.'s and four large A.K.'s, one of which might be an A.P. They were escorted by two destroyers, one leading and the other patrolling on starboard quarter of the formation. Ships were formed in two loose columns of three ships each led by the A.K.'s with the A.O.'s at the rear. The third A.O. which looked larger and more modern than the others was in the middle of the formation flanked by the A.P. and an A.K. This middle group of three overlapping ships makes a beautiful target.

1100 Sent contact report on 2880. Repeated at 1200, 1600, and 1700.

1527 Surfaced to clear Strait and start end around.

1530 S.D. contact at 6 miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #41). Surfaced at 1555.

1830 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Gave them all available dope and decided that we would chase convoy south inside of reefs. DACE to attack from ahead, DARTER from quarter. Estimated we would be in position at midnight. Will make night attacks and return to area for tomorrow's patrol.

2240 Radar contact on convoy bearing 181°T, range 23,000 yards. Commenced tracking and end around. Sent contact report on 2880.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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14 October

Tracking convoy to gain attack position.

0010 Slowed to listen for echo ranging and discovered three sets of echo rangers.

0015 Battle stations. Have determined convoy's base course to be 220°T; he is using constant helm zig-zag plan superimposed on a regular plan whose legs are 25° each side of base course. Speed 7.5 knots checks nicely. The night is dark with various rain squalls. However the horizon is good between the rain squalls. Saw the DARTER at 9,000 yards in one of these light spots. Land background makes it hard to see anything but dark shapes in the target group. Will go in for bow shot at the middle target group which consists of the following: one large A.P. or A.K., one large A.O. plus another A.K. They are all overlapping and make a beautiful target. All pips on radar screen line up and vary in range only by 500 yards each. Will then turn right and fire stern tubes at leading group on way out. Will fire at fairly long range as the dope is checking perfectly and I want to evade on the surface in order to make another attack before dawn.

0018 Started closing slowly for attack.

ATTACK 1A:

0102-15 Commenced firing six tube salvo at center ship in starboard flank--large A.P. or A.K.; torpedo run 4,000 yards, 65° starboard track, small gyro angles, 8 second firing interval,

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14 October (Continued)

depth set 6 feet, 1° divergent spread. Target group is still overlapping with the A.O. 500 yards abeam of the target, and the other A.K. 500 yards abeam of the A.O.

0102-35 Received report from bridge that number three torpedo was making a circular run to the right. Gave left full rudder and all ahead flank to clear torpedo, followed by right full rudder to bring stern tubes to bear on leading group of ships.

0102-57 Completed firing bow tubes; shifted to leading group which consists of two large overlapping A.K.'s.

0104-55 Heard and saw torpedo #1 hit near target. Large cloud of steam and smoke persisted for several minutes.

0105-30 Heard and saw #2 hit middle target of group. Escorts commenced firing--no splashes noted.

ATTACK 1B:

0105-55 Commenced firing stern tubes at leading target. Torpedo run 5,000 yards, 90° starboard track, small gyro angles, 10 second firing interval, 6 foot depth, 1° divergent spread. The two A.K.'s are still overlapping making a perfect target.

0107-20 Heard explosion in target group.

0111-28 Torpedo explosion. Timed to be #7 in near target--large A.K.

0111-47 Torpedo explosion. Timed to be #8 in the same. These explosions felt by DACE; not observed probably due to heavy Winton smoke screen. They were felt, heard, and seen by DARTER.

14 October (Continued)

0119 Very heavy explosion in target group. Sounds like a boiler explosion.

Continued opening at flank speed with escort closing. Do not believe he saw us, but just chased out in the direction he thought the attack was coming from. Pulled well clear in order to make reload and give DARTER an opportunity to attack.

Of the seven ships and three escorts the following was observed after the attack. One target group was tracked south into KIMANIS Bay. DARTER tracked this outfit,and observed it to consist of five large ships, and one escort. One cripple remained stopped at position of attack guarded by two escorts. This ship appeared to be a tanker as observed by DACE and DARTER. One ship noticeably absent. The final box score appears to be: one large A.K. (E.C.) 7,500 tons sunk; one large A.P. or A.K. (E.C.) 7,500 tons damaged; and one large A.O. (E.C.) 10,000 tons severely damaged and probably sinking. The (E.C.) classification is given from daylight observations made by both DARTER and DACE. The A.O. is believed to have been in a sinking condition because she was stopped indicating a hit in the engineering spaces, and was closely guarded by two destroyers--one close in taking off crew or trying to tow, and the other patrolling at a range of 4 to 5 thousand yards. The remaining five ships had proceeded with only one escort indicating that the cripple was in great need of help and protection.

The three misses in the bow tubes are hard to explain, unless they were caused by the swinging of the ship while avoiding the erratic torpedo run from #3 tube. This erratic run was

14 October (Continued)

apparently due to faulty depth control as the torpedo was first sighted leaping completely out of the water. It then took a zig left across the bow, and then circled right porpoising, and snorting like an angry bull. After about a 120° turn to the right it settled down on a steady course and went over the hill much to everyone's relief.

0140 Reload completed. Decided to take 15 minutes off for trim dive having heard SEAHORSE's story about being too light to submerge after a surface reload. Discovered we were 10,000 lbs. light which was quickly remedied, and surfaced to proceed with attack.

DARTER apparently following main body south so I will go after the cripple.

Made a try from the west but was driven off by the patrolling escort. He apparently picked us up by sound, only making two-thirds, at about 9,000 yards. I don't think he actually saw us as he didn't follow us out when we headed away and did not shoot. However he came for us and would not let us close target. During this approach discovered DARTER trying to close from southwest.

0300 Tried to make approach from the north, and had no better luck, so at

0408 Started clearing area in order to get back to my patrol station in PALAWAN Passage. Have been away from there for some time now and do not consider it wise to leave it unguarded for another day in view of orders to

14 October (Continued)

report expected major units of the Jap fleet. Will have to leave the rest of this convoy to HAMMERHEAD and the boys down south. Did not send another contact report as they were on schedule.

0544 Submerged southwest of MANTANANI Island proceeding to station.

1015 Surfaced for fix for passage through shoals into PALAWAN Passage.

1037 Submerged.

1121 Hit uncharted shoal; depth 60 feet; wiped off starboard sound head, but apparently no other damage. During next ten minutes was aground and off again two more times.

1138 Surfaced to clear shoals.

1144 S.J. plane contact 10,000 yards. Tried to dig fox hole to hide in but was brought up abruptly at 57 feet. (Aircraft contact #42) Stopped; lowered periscopes, S.D. mast, and waited for expected bombing that never materalized.

1215 Surfaced for another go at trying to clear shoals. Ran on four engines for 20 minutes with fathometer readings varying from 6 to 10 fathoms.

1234 In PALAWAN Passage--clear of shoals.

1253 Submerged for patrol.

1826 Surfaced proceeding to rendezvous with DARTER.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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15 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0125 Made rendezvous with DARTER. Was informed that they observed all four of our hits, and that one target of convoy was missing. Received orders to patrol BALABAC Passage for next three days.

0630 Submerged at 100 fathom curve southwest of BALABAC Island.

1835 Surfaced.

16 October

Enroute to position southwest of BALABAC Strait.

0537 Submerged in assigned position.

1845 Surfaced. Headed back to BALABAC.

17 October

Patrolling BALABAC Strait.

0534 Submerged on 100 fathom curve southwest of BALABAC Island.

1830 Surfaced proceeding to rendezvous with DARTER.

2230 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Instructed to patrol PALAWAN passage. DARTER to patrol BALABAC.

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18 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0534 Submerged for patrol.

1824 Surfaced.

19 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0233 Received message assigning evening rendezvous to form combined search for BLUEGILL's convoy.

0954 Sighted submarine bearing 207°T. Commenced approach until recognized as friendly; fired identification smoke float and at

1005 Surfaced 3,000 yards from DARTER.

1010 S.J. and sight contacts on two ships bearing 051°T, range 18,000 yards. Submerged; went to battle stations and commenced approach.

ATTACK #2:

1020 Targets in sight through periscope appear to be two P.C.'s or small destroyers. They are in line abreast--right hand one has a 10° port angle on the bow; selected that for target and started closing track.

1025 Original target has zigged left giving me an angle of 70° starboard. Shifted to other target which has a 20° starboard angle on the bow--range 11,000 yards, speed high. Kept looking for convoy but have seen nothing else.

19 October (Continued)

Action of these two indicate they are on an A.S. search. Swinging right closing track at standard speed.

1033 Target has zigged right giving me a large port angle, so again shifted to right hand target which has a 20° port angle on bow. I seem to be on base course so decided to head in: tracking one target to get speed and take which ever target gave me a good set up at firing point. Both targets are echo ranging, and seem to be covering the area pretty thoroughly. Sea is moderate with about three foot waves, weather overcast, periscope fogging badly.

1037-30 Target heard to speed up on sound. Took a look and observed heavy black smoke on starboard target, angle on bow zero, range 4,200 yards. Believe we have been picked up. Gave right full rudder to get off track for stern tube shot. Have speed check of 16 knots, but will have to increase that now.

1039-30 Next look shows a 15° port angle on the bow. Set up looks good. Am about 700 yards off track so slowed to one-third speed still swinging right for 90° port track. Noticed three letter signal flying but could not decipher it. Later learned this was just after DARTER firing so was probably a signal about torpedo wakes.

1040-20 Next look shows that he has zigged further right, angle on the bow now 70 port, range 2,800 yards. Torpedo run is going to be long, but will take a chance using a 200% spread. Speed checks at 18 knots. At this time identi-

19 October (Continued)

fied the destroyer as FUBUKI class. This is the first good look I have had of them due to a combination of periscope fogging, and small angle on the bow at the closer range.

1045-10 Commenced firing a salvo of four torpedoes from the stern tubes; 124 port track, 3,000 yard torpedo run, 200% spread, six foot depth, small gyro angles. Firing on #10 tube was delayed due to a fuse failure in ready light circuit.

As #10 tube fired observed a 40° zig away. There goes the ball game.

1046-45 Heard a depth charge, followed by numerous small explosions sounding like shot gun shells. Destroyers observed to be searching a point about 5,000 yards to south of us.

1052 Two more depth charges. Destroyers still searching area well distant but working up in this direction.

1057-30 Destroyers are still closing our position, in slow deliberate approach, angle on bow of one has been zero for some time now. Other one is pinging on his beam and appears to be coaching this one on; so at

1058-30 With range of 2,200 yards angle on bow zero, decided that discretion was the better part of valor and started deep rigging for depth charge and evaded to the north and west. They pulled all of the tricks of pinging and listening, but apparently could not get a definite fix on us.

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19 October (Continued)

1353 Have not heard them for over an hour so started up for a look. Excessive water in motor room bilges has caused salt water to enter port reduction gear lub oil sump. Want to get that cleared up before we surface.

1428 At periscope depth. Continued submerged patrol on starboard shaft flushing out port sump tank.

1500 Tried to raise DARTER on 2880 to see if she has any dope. No luck.

1700 Again unsuccessful in trying to raise DARTER.

1800 Have flushed out port reduction gear sump tank twice now. Oil seems clear so put shaft back in commission.

1821 Surfaced. Proceeding to rendezvous with DARTER.

2015 Rendezvoused with DARTER. Received orders for combined search via line throwing gun. We are to patrol eastern half. Submerged at northern edge of area during day. Sweeping north at night. Will patrol this area for last two days on station.

20 October

Patrolling eastern part of PALAWAN Passage.

0435 Received DARTER's contact report on two destroyers. We are north of her position so will be able to intercept if they come this way.

20 October (Continued)

0444 Have DARTER's radar interference but no sign of their targets.

0525 Decided targets must have gone south so submerged on station.

1130 Master gyro shows variable error. Put it out of commission and commenced repairs.

1150 Surfaced for sun line.

1158 Submerged.

1825 Surfaced.

2200 Master gyro back in commission.

2341 S.J. interference--probably DARTER.

21 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0056 Received DARTER's message saying she was returning to BALABAC.

0526 Submerged on assigned station.

1816 Surfaced.

22 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage.

0040 Received DARTER's report of three ships headed northeast. Set course to intercept at four engine speed.

0115 Received amplyfing report giving course 020°T, speed 20 knots. Set course to intercept at their 0500 position. This is the closest point I can intercept. I will be

22 October (Continued)

on station at 0430 which will be just about right. I will track from ahead for a dawn submerged attack. Indications are they are battleships which means they probably have radar.

Continued to receive excellent hourly position reports from DARTER. This is an excellent example of combined operations. DARTER is furnishing all the dope so that all that is necessary is for us to be in front of them. They have not only furnished us with hourly positions, but have given us the zig-zag plan and speed: 22 knots.

0430 Patrolling normal to their track at their 0500 position.

0515 Received report that target had changed base course to 335°T. Set course to try to intercept. Haven't much chance to get in unless they change course to north or east.

0716 Received report that DARTER had lost contact.

1015 Have covered all possible interception courses. Discontinued search; set course for home; sent serial three giving negative results of search.

1050 Received Commander Task Force 71's serial 12 giving air contact on convoy headed through area.

1639 Sent serial four requesting extension of patrol to work convoy.

1708 Submerged to flush out fuel ballast tank.

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22 October (Continued)

1818 Surfaced.

2350 Rendezvoused with DARTER.

23 October

Patrolling PALAWAN Passage talking to DARTER.

0025 Radar contact 30,000 yards bearing 137°T. Secured conference and commenced tracking.

0030 S.J. out of commission. Fell in astern of DARTER until we get it repaired.

0122 S.J. back in commission--continued tracking gaining position ahead.

0200 Plot shows a steady course of 038°T, speed 15 knots. Formation consists of twelve ships formed in two columns of four heavy ships each with destroyers flanking. Distance between columns 5,000 yards. Much radar present on detector.

0400 DACE and DARTER both ahead of formation. DARTER says she will take western column and instructed DACE to take station to northeast ahead of eastern column for dawn attack. This will assure one of us getting in no matter which way they zig. If they hold course we will both get in. I have not sent any contact reports because the excellent ones furnished by Task Group Commander leaves nothing for me to add.

0510 DARTER submerged.

0517 Submerged 18,000 yards ahead of the st'bd. column 12,000 yards northeast of DARTER. Could made out dim shapes from the bridge, but could not identify anything.

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23 October (Continued)

0530 Can make out dim shape of leading target. Angle on the bow looks small. Started heading toward.

0532 Heard five torpedo explosions. DARTER must be getting in.

0534 Four more torpedo hits. DARTER is really having a field day. Can see great pall of smoke completely enveloping spot where ship was at last look. Do not know whether he has sunk but it looks good. Ship to left is also smoking badly. Looks like a great day for the DARTER. Can see two destroyers making smoke headed for scene. There is much signalling, shooting of very stars, etc. It is a great show. The big ships seem to be milling around; I hope they don't scatter too far for me to get in. Light is still pretty bad but I have counted eight large ships, battleships or cruisers plus two destroyers. Two of these large ships have been hit so far.

0538-0544 Four depth charges; distant.

ATTACK #3

0542 The situation is beginning to clear up. I have now picked a target--it looks like a battleship. Angle on bow 10 port, range 7,000 yards. Commenced swinging left for 90° port track.

0545 Have identified target as a heavy cruiser of the ATAGO or NACHI (E.C.) class. There are two of these, but can now see a larger ship astern--looks like a battleship. Famous statement: "Will let them go by--they are only heavy cruisers." Shifted targets. He is taking

23 October (Continued)

evasive action from the DARTER's position; if he doesn't settle down and present a good set-up there are two more coming up the line. This is really the submariner's dream--sitting right in front of a task force. If I only had some torpedoes aft! After the DARTER's attack the formation has broken up so that I can't estimate too well how the ships were originally formed, but now with the better light conditions I have seen the following: two ATAGO or MACHI cruisers leading a battleship or CA--my target; there are two other BB's believed to be ISE class in column about 1,500 yards to the westward and behind my target presenting a zero angle on the bow; there are several destroyers milling around DARTER's position about 6 miles away; there is one large unidentified ship well to eastward--this looks like either a carrier or perhaps another battleship; however, I can't make him out very well. Total eight heavy ship, four DD's.

0552 The two cruisers passed ahead at about 1,500 yards. They were overlapping; appeared to be running screen for my target presenting a beautiful target--a submarine should have 24 torpedo tubes. Had a beautiful view of them and identified them positively as ATAGO or MACHI class. My target can be seen better now, and appears to be a KONGO class battleship (E.U.). He looks larger than the two cruisers that have just passed ahead--he has two stacks, and superstructure appears much heavier. Have not checked the identification as well as I should as I have been busy getting complete composition of force which I consider essential for contact report. Sound also reports target screws as heavier and slower than those of cruisers.

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0554-41 Commenced firing a salvo of six bow tubes; torpedo run 1,800 yards, 115 track, small gyro longitudinal spread from forward aft: four to hit, one a quarter length ahead, another a quarter length astern. Have increased his speed to 18 knots because of the excessive bow wave he is making.

0554-54 Fired #2.

0555-05 Fired #3.

0555-13 Fired #4.

0555-23 Fired #5.

0555-31 Fired #6.

Took quick look around and saw next battleship still had a zero angle on the bow, range close so started deep turning into his wake.

0556-04 First hit.

0556-16 Second hit.

0556-25 Third hit.

0556-43 Fourth hit.

JP had been tracking the cruiser and target screws for some time. Immediately after the fourth hit JP heard the target's screws stop.

0601 and 0602-30 Heard two tremendous explosions both on sound and through the hull. These explosions were apparently magazines as I have never heard anything like it. The soundmen reported that it sounded as if the bottom of the ocean was blowing up. They were obviously shallow as there was neither any shaking of the boat

23 October (Continued)

nor water swishing through the superstructure. Nothing could cause this much noise except magazines exploding.

0603 Heard tremendous breaking up noises. This was the most gruesome sound I have ever heard. I was at first convinced that it was being furnished by the DACE, and called for a check of all compartments and was much relieved to receive reports that everything was all right. Noise was coming from the northeast--the direction of the target, and it sounded as if she was coming down on top of us. I have never heard anything like it. Comment from Diving Officer: "We better get the hell out of here!" After about five minutes of these tremendous breaking up noises, continued to have smaller ones and much crackling noises for next twenty minutes. These noises could be heard on sound and throughout the boat. I am convinced that this ship sank; nothing else can explain thes noises. If additional proof is necessary the following is submitted: screwswere heard to stop therefore it is reasonable to presume she could not have continued with the remainder of the force. If she proceeded north at reduced speed she would have been given adequate protection; of the four destroyers conducting the depth charge attack--three were seen by DARTER around the crippled cruiser at 0830. It is logical to assume that each cripple would have had two destroyers if there were two cripples. Finally, it is logical to assume that if one cripple went south both would go south and if this had happened DARTER would have seen our victim.

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0605 First depth charge--not close but they got progressively better and we received a severe working over for the next half hour. Total depth charges recorded was 36 of which it is estimated 32 were sent to us; would like a more equal distribution next time. Attack was highlighted by one division depth charge practice which was definite first team work. Later four perfect individual runs were made in which no charges were dropped; could hear their screws through the hull for about two minutes as they came in; tracked them directly overhead from bow aft and hear them go out astern. This suspense was worse than the depth charging. Evaded to south at deep submergence. Had screw noises, close pinging, and sono bombs until after nine o'clock.

1030 Still have echo ranging, but it is distant, so started up.

1100 At periscope depth--nothing in sight. Commenced reload, adjusted trim, served breakfast.

1121 Sighted float type plane (ZEKE). (Aircraft contact #43). He continued to patrol over damaged CA the rest of the afternoon.

1200 Reload, completed, back to normal except the port reduction gear which has salted up again. Started working on it.

1214 Sighted BETTY-type plane. (Aircraft contact #44)

1255 Changed course to head for distant echo ranging.

1425 Saw tops of masts, bearing 359°T--headed for same.

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23 October (Continued)

1510 Can now make out target as a damaged ATAGO cruiser guarded by two destroyers patrolling well out. He also has air cover. Decided that possibilities on getting in for a daylight attack are pretty slim. Cruiser is definately stopped at scene of DARTER attack, and doesn't look like there is much possibility of his getting underway. Will clean salt water out of sump this afternoon, get in a partial charge tonight, and make a submerged night attack.

1722 Port shaft back in commission.

1845 Surfaced. Sent serial five to Commander Task Force 71 giving composition of enemy task force, and results of attack. Gave DARTER the dope on cripple, and was directed to rendezvous with her.

2053 Made radar contact with enemy bearing 351°T, range 24,000 yards. Commenced tracking and sent information to DARTER. Target is now underway on southwesterly course, speed varying from four to six knots. DARTER cancelled rendezvous and directed DACE to track from port bow.

2256 DARTER said she would try surface attack from quarter. If she was forced down or chased off by destroyers we were to attack from bow.

2330 Received message that DARTER was making end around to west, was instructed to attack when ready. Commenced end around for better background for submerged attack. Night is dark but have good horizon to east and will be able to make out target against it.

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24 October

Making end around on port side of cripple.

0007 Received message from DARTER saying she was aground. Decided to delay attack until I can get more information. Do not want to alert enemy or be held down while DARTER is aground. Target is having difficulty making way to southwest at speed from four to six knots. If DARTER can get off will still have sufficient time for attack; if DARTER can not get off believe my job is to rescue crew and destroy DARTER first, and then attack. Started closing DARTER's position.

0124 Ran through large oil slick from cruiser.

0140 Contacted DARTER aground on BOMBAY Shoal.

0153 Flooded down and approached DARTER--got line over from bow to DARTER's stern and commenced rescue operations. Salvage impossible as tide has gone out leaving DARTER screws out of water. Reef is fan-shape here, and I have breakers all along starboard side about 50 yds. away. Looks like good water to port.

Transferring DARTER personnel via two rubber boats--a slow task. Used up half the battery maneuvering to keep off reef. Current setting me on.

0439 Last boat load containing Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of DARTER came aboard. Cast off and backed clear. Received word that demolition charges and warhead were set for 0455 so decided to wait until then before torpedoing.

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24 October (Continued)

0500 Have heard slight explosion, but can see no damage. Torpedo war head did not go off;demolition charge might have.

0510 Fired two torpedoes at DARTER; 140 port track. Both exploded on reef. Depth set four feet and zero.

0530 Fired two more on a 180° track--first missed slightly to starboard and exploded on far reef--its depth setting zero. Second one set at four feet looked like a perfect hit just under quarter but caused no apparent damage. It must have hit reef just under DARTER.

0545 Commenced firing with deck gun. Expended 30 rounds of ammunition for 21 hits. These appeared to do little damage except to start a fuel oil fire in a forward fuel group which caused much black smoke.

0558 Caught by plane in the unenviable position of lying to with 25 men topside. Submerged with ammunition on deck and gun trained out. Heard two explosions which sounded like small bombs quite distant. Plane apparently picked DARTER for target. (Aircraft contact #45)

0710 BETTY is still patrolling over DARTER.

0805 Surfaced to send message to Commander Task Force 71 requesting assistance in destroying DARTER. Tried every frequency, but could raise no one. Finally got some surface ship to accept it, but continued trying to get a receipt on ship to shore or 2880 KC's, until

0950 S.D. contact nine miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #46)

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24 October (Continued)

1018 Heard echo ranging.

1036 Sighted destroyer approaching DARTER. Destroyer approached reef and lay to with a BETTY furnishing a very effective AS screen flying fifty feet off water. Pulled clear.

1830 Surfaced and started closing DARTER. Will make sweep around and come in from northwest for better light conditions.

2001 Radar contact on DARTER. Started slow approach to see if any activity is present. If destroyer is gone will send boarding party with DACE demolition outfit: covering them with automatic weapons.

2020 Received serial 18 saying ROCK would come to demolish DARTER.

2112 When 2,000 yards from DARTER picked up definite echo ranging on sound. This was so close that it was heard by both the Commanding Officer and the Commanding Officer of DARTER who were on the bridge at the time. Cleared area at high speed. Believe this was a submerged submarine making an approach on DACE. Eight distinct pings were heard by the sound operator. Bright moonlight night; no targets were visible and nothing on radar. Decided it unwise to make surface approach and sent results to Commander Task Force 71. Requested permission to depart area.

25 October

Awaiting orders.

0600 Received order to proceed to FREEMANTLE.

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25 October (Continued)

0742 S.D. contact 8 miles. Submerged to avoid detection. (Aircraft contact #47)

1830 Surfaced.

1225 S.D. contact 23 miles. (Aircraft contact #48)

1230 S.J. and S.D. contact 10 miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #49)

1307 Surfaced.

26 October

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

0330 Departed area.

1104 Submerged.

1112 Surfaced.

27 October

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

1005 Sighted sailboat bearing 243°T, range 10 miles.

28 October

1418 S.J. and S.D. radar contact 15 miles. Disappeared at 21 miles.(Aircraft contact #50)

1700 Submerged to delay entrance to KARIMATA Strait until nightfall.

28 October 1944(Continued)

1854 Surfaced.

2040 Commenced transit of KARIMATA Strait.

29 October

0500 Cleared KARIMATA Strait undetected.

0829 Master gyro out of commission; shifted to auxiliary.

0912 S.D. contact 26 miles. (Aircraft contact #51).

1238 Sighted sailboat bearing 145°T, range 10 miles. Avoided.

1307 Sighted two more sailboats bearing 138°T, range 10 miles. Avoided.

2100 Master gyro back in commission.

30 October

0025 Sighted sailboat bearing 180°T, range eight miles. Avoided.

0304 Sighted sailboat. Avoided.

0505 S.J. contact bearing 190°T, range 5,000 yards. Small boat.

0537 Submerged.

0615 Surfaced.

Numerous sailboats sighted and avoided during day.

- -

30 October (Continued)

1515 Submerged.

1832 Surfaced.

31 October

Sighted numerous fishing boats north of LOMBOK. Avoided.

0420 S.J. contact bearing 209°T, range 9,000 yards. Identified as a patrol boat or possible submarine patrolling north of strait.

0501 Submerged for transit of LOMBOK Strait.

1316 Cleared Strait.

1527 Surfaced to air out boat. With 165 people on board used several bottles of oxygen and much CO2 absorbent. Conditions were not bad.

1540 Submerged.

1845 Surfaced.

2055 Exchanged recognition signals with REDFIN and BARBERO and gave them dope on LOMBOK.

1 November

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

2 November

0600 Exchanged messages with HADDO.

0706 Submerged.

0732 Surfaced.

- -

3 November

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

4 November

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

5 November

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

1512 Submerged.

1543 Surfaced.

2010 S.D. contact at 10 miles. Did not close. (Aircraft contact #52)

6 November

Enroute FREEMANTLE.

0535 Exchanged calls with escort.

Moored alongside U.S.S. EBRYALE port side to in nest with LAPON.

- -

(C) WEATHER

Weather conditions as described in Sailing Directions were encountered. Frequent squalls, low hanging clouds, and hazy atmosphere predominated.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Variable currents were experienced in PALAWAN Passage, however, a set from north to northeast with an average drift of .6 knots predominated in the vicinity of 9°N.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

(1) No navigational aids were observed.
(2) A shoal, extent unknown, exists in Lat.06-55N Long.116-02E. DACE hit bottom at 57 feet here. Position determined by radar fix on MONTANANI Island one hour prior to grounding.
(3) Following observations were made in Dangerous Ground:

(a) SABINA Shoal - Sighted breakers and rock at 10.5 miles.
(b) BOXALL Reef - Breakers at 6 miles.
(c) SECOND THOMAS Shoal - Not sighted at 10 miles.
(d) ALICIA ANNE Reef - Not sighted at 10 miles.
(e) FIRST THOMAS Shoal - Breakers at 8 miles.
(f) MISCHIEF Reef - Sighted at 12 miles. Very low with several large rocks widely scattered. Appear to be ships at a distance.

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE (A)

(F) SHIP CONTACTS;

TIME & DATE	L.T. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
		(4)Large A.K.				
0802H	07-07N	(3)Large A.O.		180°T.	Sound	Attack #1A & 1B
1:13 Oct	116-44E	(3)large D.D.	18 mi.	8 Kts.	Pinging	
1010H	08-55N	(2)FUBUKI		190°T.	SD & SJ	
2:19 Oct	116-48E	D.D.'s	9 mi.	18 Kts.	Radars	Attack #2
						Estimated composi-
0025H	08-34N	Major Orange		038°T.	S.J.	tion: 3 B.B's; 1
3:23 Oct	116-15E	Task Force	15 Mi.	15 Kts.	Radar	CV,4 CA, 4DD; ATK #3
1018H	09-22N			350°T.	Sound	
4:24 Oct	116-48E	D.D.	12 mi.	18 Kts.	P'ng.	Investigated DARTER

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

NO	DATE	TIME & LONG.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1	11Sept	0907I 11-10S 128-48E	UNK.	18 mi.		SD Radar	
2	11Sept	1235I 10-24S 128-28E	UNK.	10 mi.		SJ Radar	
3	11Sept	1600I 09-43S 128-12E	UNK.	8 mi.		SJ Radar	
4	13Sept	1145I 00-35S 126-23E	UNK.	5 mi.		SD Radar	
5	13Sept	2135I 01-25N 125-30E	UNK.	13 Mi.		SJ Radar	No lights.
6	13Sept	2250I 01-40N 125-25E	UNK.	10 mi.		SJ Radar	No lights.
7	13Sept	2320I 01-52N 125-20E	UNK.	11 mi.		SJ Radar	No lights.
8	13Sept	2337I 01-53N 125-13E	UNK.	5 mi.		SJ Radar	No lights.
9	14Sept	1205I 03-55N 122-52E	B-24	18mi.		SD Radar	
10	14Sept	1814I 04-38N 122-25E	UNK.	7 mi.		SD Radar	
11	16Sept	0800I 03-48N 122-16E	UNK.	10 mi.		SD Radar	
12	16Sept	1209I 03-42N 122-21E	UNK.	11 mi.		SD Radar	

ENCLOSURE (1)

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Continued)

NO	TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
	1546I	04-14N				SJ	
13	17Sept	122-28E	UNK.	10 mi.		Radar	
	0721I	03-22N				SD	
14	18Sept	122-26E	UNK.	8 mi.		Radar	
	1504I	04-09N				SJ	
15	18Sept	122-25E	UNK.	6 mi.		Radar	
	1545I	04-11N				Peri-	
16	18Sept	122-26E	PETE	3 mi.		scope	
	0907I	03-34N				Peri-	
17	19Sept	122-30E	UNK.	8 mi.		scope	
	0407I	04-20N				SJ	
18	20Sept	122-30E	UNK.	12 mi.		Radar	
	0855I	03-19N				SD	
19	20Sept	122-30E	UNK.	7 mi.		Radar	
	0900I	03-34N				SD	
20	21Sept	122-48E	UNK.	14mi.		Radar	2 engine bomber
	1140I	03-26N				SD	
21	21Sept	122-52E	UNK.	24 mi.		Radar	
	0425I	04-22N				SJ	
22	22Sept	122-45E	UNK.	9 mi.		Radar	
	0900I	03-32N				SD	
23	22Sept	122-39E	UNK.	15 mi.		Radar	
	0945I	03-24N				SD	
24	22Sept	122-39E	BETTY	9 mi.		Radar	
	1008I	03-23N				SD	
25	22Sept	122-39E	PETE	12 mi.		Radar	

ENCLOSURE (A)

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Continued)

NO	TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
	1100I	03-17N				SD	
26	22Sept	122-39E	PETE	10 mi.		Radar	
	1216I	03-26N				SD	
27	24Sept	122-35E	UNK.	8 mi.		Radar	
	2250I	02-57N				SD	
28	5 Oct	138-08E	PBY	12 mi.		Radar	Friendly
	0307I	02-50N				SD	
29	5 Oct	129-12E	PBY	9 mi.		Radar	Friendly
	1600I	04-43N				SD	
30	6 Oct	121-15E	UNK.	18 mi.		Radar	
	0640H	12-25N				SD	
31	7 Oct	120-03E	UNK.	12 mi.		Radar	
	0712H	12-25N				SD	
32	9 Oct	119-01E	TRANSPORT	8 mi.		Radar	
	1221H	11-42N				SD	
33	9 Oct	118-46E	UNK.	13 mi.		Radar	
	1111H	09-07N				Peri-scope	
34	10 Oct	117-10E	BETTY	10 mi.			
	0815H	09-19N				SD	
35	11 Oct	117-21E	UNK.	9 mi.		Radar	
	0925H	09-14N	(2) BETTYS			SJ	
36	11Oct.	117-17E	(1) ZEKE	12 mi.		Radar	
	0958H	09-16N				SD	
37	11 Oct	117-10E	BETTY	20 mi.		Radar	

(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Continued)

NO	TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	EST. COURSE & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
	1215I	09-09N				SD	
38	11 Oct	117-19E	BOMBER	17 mi.		Radar	
	1232I	09-12N				SD	
39	11 Oct	117-16E	UNK.	13 mi.		Radar	
	1424I	09-17N				SD	
40	11 Oct	117-15E	UNK.	8 mi.		Radar	
	1530I	07-42N				SD	
41	13 Oct	116-38E	UNK.	6 mi.	UNK.	Radar	
	1144I	06-55N				SD	
42	14Oct.	116-02E	UNK.	5 mi.	UNK.	Radar	
	1121I	09-16N				Peri-	Patrolling over
43	23 Oct	117-14E	ZEKE	8 mi.	VARIOUS	scope	crippled CA.
	1214I	09-18N				Peri-	
44	23 Oct	117-13E	BETTY	8 mi.	VARIOUS	scope	Same as #43
	0558I	09-26N			250°T.	SD	
45	24 Oct	116-55E	BETTY	6 mi.	250 Kts.	Radar	Bombed D. RTER
	0950I	09-26N				SD	Patrolling near DARTER
46	24 Oct	116-50E	UNK.	9 mi.	VARIOUS	Radar	50' off water.
	0742I	09-57N				SD	
47	25 Oct	117-08E	UNK.	20 mi.	UNK.	Radar	
	1225I	09-53N				SD	
48	25 Oct	116-14E	UNK.	23 mi.	UNK.	Radar	
	1230I	09-51N				SJ &SD	
49	25 Oct	116-13E	UNK.	10 mi.	UNK.	Radars	

ENCLOSURE (A)

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Continued)

NO	Time & Date	Lat. & Long.	TYPE(S)	RANGE	Est. Course & Speed	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
	1418H	01-06S					
50	28 Oct	107-45E	UNK.	21 Mi.	UNK.	SD Rad.	
	0912H	04-23S				SD	
51	29 Oct	110-17E	UNK.	26 Mi.	UNK.	Radar	
	2010H	30-50S				SD	
52	5 Nov.	114-07E	UNK.	10 mi.	UNK.	Radar	Friendly

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 1-A Patrol #5

Time: 0102H Date: 10/14/44 Lat.06-05N Long.115-55E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Seven ship convoy escorted by three large destroyers and consisting of one large AP or AK, 7,500T; three large AK's, 7,500T; and three large AO's, 10,000T. This was the same convoy that had been contacted the previous morning, and attacked by DARTER on 12 October.

Ship(s) Damaged or: Probably Sunk: Probably sunk one large AO,(E.U.) 10,000T, and damaged one large AP or AK, 7,500T. (E.U.)

Damage determined by: One observed torpedo hit on each target and the presence of at least one cripple after the convoy had fled the scene of the attack. AO could not stay with convoy and when last contacted was lying to with two escorts standing by.

Target draft: 20' Course: 218°T Speed: 7.5 Range 4,500 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 8 Course: 110°T Depth: Surface Angle -- (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type attack: Night radar attack on the surface using the T.D.C. with radar ranges and bearings to obtain the firing set-up. A divergent spread was fired and the constant bearing method used.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA - 1A

	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Tubes fired:						
Track Angle:	61½S	62S	61½S	64S	65½S	64
Gyro Angle:	346½	346	346	347	348	344½
Depth set:	6'	6'	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power:	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss:	Hit	Hit	Erratic	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic:	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Mark torpedo:	23	23	23	23	23	23
Serial No:	49564	49591	41206	49527	49747	49370
Mark Exploder:	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No:	12763	1085	13958	12440	17176	17181
Actuation Set:	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual:	CONTACT	CONTACT	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead:	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No:	12219	11461	2771	13491	1598	4114
Explosive:	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX
Firing Interval:	- -	10	8	7	8	9
Type Spread:	- - - - - - -		DIVERGENT		- - - - - - -	
Sea Conditions:	- - - - - - -		FLAT CALM		- - - - - - -	
Overhaul Activity:	- Submarine Repair Unit, Navy No. 134 - - - -					

REMARKS: All torpedoes were observed to run HSN with the exception of #3. It porpoised many times on various courses upon leaving the tube. Finally passed aft close aboard to starboard on or near the surface.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 1-B Patrol #5

TIME: 0106H Date: 10/14/44 Lat. 06-05N Long. 115-55E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Same convoy as described in attack #1-A.

Ship(s) Sunk: One large A.K. (7,500t)(E.U.).

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk:

Damage determined by: Two observed torpedo hits; and the presence of only five ships in the convoy after it fled the scene of the attack. The presence of only five ships corroborated by DARTER.

Target Draft: 30 Ft. Course: 218° Speed: 7.5 Range: 5,400 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 15 Course: 290° Depth: Surface Angle - - (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Night radar attack on the surface using the T.D.C. with radar ranges and bearings to obtain the firing set-up. A divergent spread was fired and the constant bearing method used.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA 1-B

	#7	#8	#9	#10
Tubes Fired:				
Track Angle:	89S	89½S	91S	89½S
Gyro Angle:	194	189	194½	194½
Depth Set:	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power:	- -	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss:	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic:	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18	18
Serial No.:	53768	54075	54013	53899
Mark Exploder:	4-7	4-7	4-7	4-7
Serial No:	16134W	16589W	16626W	16425W
Actuation Set:	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual:	CONTACT	CONTACT	- -	- -
Mark Warhead:	18	18	18	18
Serial No:	98	96	159	43
Explosive:	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX
Firing Interval:	- -	11	10	10
Type Spread:	- - - - -	-DIVERGENT - - - - - - -		
Sea Conditions:	- - - - -	-FLAT CALM - - - - - - -		
Overhaul Activity:	Submarine Repair Base, Navy #134			

REMARKS: All torpedoes were observed to run HSN. These torpedoes had been charged two days previous to firing.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No 2 Patrol No. 5

TIME: 1043H Date: 10/19/44 Lat. 08-55N Long. 116-48E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGED INFLICTED

Description: Two FUBUKI class Destroyers.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None.

Damage Determined by: - -

Target Draft 9' Course: 255° Speed: 18 Range: 1800 yds. (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 2.5 Course: 146° Depth: 65' Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged day periscope attack using the T.D.C. with periscope bearings and ranges to obtain the firing set-up. The constant bearing method was used. A divergent spread set in, and a salvo of four torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes at the leading destroyer. Misses due to zig away by target.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA - #2

Tubes Fired:	#7	#8	#9	#10
Track Angle:	123½	123	125	143
Gyro angle:	165	165½	163½	146
Depth Set:	6'	6'	6'	6'
Power:	- -	- -	- -	- -
Hit or Miss:	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18	18	18	18
Serial No:	93381	54039	53889	53966
Mark Exploder	4-7	4-7	4-7	4-7
Serial No:	16640W	16224	16413W	16461W
Actuation Set:	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual:	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark War Head	18	18	18	18
Serial No:	124	40	45	576
Explosive:	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX
Firing Interval:	- -	10	12	28
Type Spread:	- - - - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - - -			
Sea Condition:	- - - - - - - LOW SHORT SWELL - - - -			
Overhaul Activity:	Submarine Repair Unit, Navy #134 --			

REMARKS: Torpedoes were heard to leave the tubes correctly and run HSN

(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 3 Patrol No. 5

TIME: 0554H DATE: 10/23/44 LAT. 09-28N LONG. 117-20E

TORPEDO DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: KONGO type battleship or CA escorted by two ATAGO or NACHI cruisers.

Ship(s) Sunk: One KONGO Class Battleship or CA (E.U.).

Ship(s) Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by: Four timed torpedo hits on target, accompanied by two tremendous explosions from direction of target. Very loud breaking-up noises from direction of target started eight minutes after first hit and persisted for thirty minutes. These noises were also heard by DARTER.

Target draft: 27½' Course: 049°T Speed: 17 Range 1700 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3 Course; 140°T Depth: 65' Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged dawn periscope attack.using the T.D.C. with periscope ranges and bearings to obtain the firing set-up. A longitudinal spread was set in by point of aim method and a salvo of six torpedoes were fired from the bow tubes.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA - #3

Tubes Fired:	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle:	114P	117½P	118P	119P	120P	121P
Gyro Angle:	331	334	338½	341	344	348
Depth Set:	10'	10'	10'	10'	10'	10'
Power:	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Hit or Miss:	Miss	Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss	Hit
Erratic:	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo:	23	23	23	23	23	23
Serial No:	49513	49295	49377	41194	49524	49474
Mark Exploder:	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No:	12730	17171	17139	14150	17079	17132
Actuation Set:	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual:	- -	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	- -	CONTACT
Mark Warhead:	16	16	16	16	16	16
Serial No:	1592	2052	2552	10071	812	11175
Explosive:	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval:	- -	13	11	8	10	8
Type Spread:	- - - - - - - - LONGITUDINAL - - - - - - - -					
Sea Conditions:	- - - - - - - - FLAT CALM - - - - - - - -					
Overhaul Activity:	- S/M Repair Unit, Navy #134 - - - -					

REMARKS: There is no explanation for #5 not hitting.
All torpedoes left the tubes correctly.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(H) TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 4 Patrol No. 5

TIME: 0500H Date: 10/24/44 LAT. 09-26N LONG. 116-55E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) aground on BOMBAY Shoal, South China Sea.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) Damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: - -

Target Draft: 0' Course: 230°T Speed 0 Range 1,000 (at firing)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 0 Course: 270° 230° Depth: Surface Angle: 0 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Day radar attack on the surface using the T.D.C. with radar ranges and radar and periscope bearings to obtain the firing set-up. All fish were fired to hit using the constant bearing method. All torpedoes exploded on the reef.

(H) TORPEDO ATTACK DATA - #4

Tubes Fired:	#1	#2	#3	#4
Track Angle:	140P	140P	180	180
Gyro Angle:	355	359	358	356
Depth Set:	4'	0	0	4'
Power:	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Hit or Miss:	MISS	MISS	MISS	MISS
Erratic:	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo:	23	23	23	23
Serial No:	49503	49560	49646	49824
Mark Exploder:	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.:	13281	10165	17072	14006
Actuation Set:	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual:	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead	16	16	16	16
Serial No.:	9059	4713	4612	4420
Explosive:	TNT	TNT	TNT	TNT
Firing Interval:	Torpedoes fired over period 15 min.			
Type Spread:	- - - - - - - NONE - - - - - - - - -			
Sea Condition:	- - - - - - - FLAT CALM - - - - - - -			
Overhaul Activity:	S/M Repair Unit, Navy No. 134			

REMARKS: All torpedoes exploded against coral reef on which the DARTER was aground.

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(H) GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Gun Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 5

TIME: 0530H DATE: 10/24/44 LAT. 09-26N LONG. 116-55E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Damaged: U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) aground and abandoned on BOMBAY Shoal, PALAWAN Passage.

Damage Determined by: Twenty-one observed hits with 4" 50 cal. high capacity sheels.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Type Gun: 4" 50 cal. deck gun.

Type Ammunition: High capacity - 26 rounds.
Common - 4 rounds.

Type Attack: Local control was used with radar ranges. The 4" 50 cal. shells appeared very ineffective against the stell pressure hull. Action was broken off upon the approach of enemy aircraft.

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(I) MINES

Seven mines were sunk by 20mm fire in the vicinity of Lat. 03-37N, Long. 122-32E. Of these one was a moored type mine fitted with the conventional horns. This mine exploded when hit with gunfire; the remaining six mines were of the drifting type. They were tear shaped, fitted with vanes or fins, and painted either a solid black or red. These mines were sunk, but not exploded by gunfire.

All the above were found in a tide rip and within a radius of ten miles of the above position.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No new anti-submarine measures were encountered. All contacts were escorted by three or more destroyers. The escorts for the convoy encountered 13 October were echo ranging night and day. The escorts for the task force were not echo ranging prior to the attack.

The counter measures encountered after attacks number 1 and 2 were quite ineffective. The one after the attack on the task force was quite effective; however, the Japanese shortage of destroyers is indicated by the small number encountered with this important task force.

The usual evasive tactics of going deep and clearing area on varying courses keeping escorts astern were used.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(A) RADIO AND SOUND:

(1) S.D. Radar.--A short from primary to secondary in filament section of oil filed main power transformer caused oil to boil, thus exploding the case and burning out the primary. Transformer rewound using one fourth inch of varnished CAMBRIC insulation; case was soldered and refilled with hydraulic oil. Transformer stood 20,000 volts across windings and was replaced with spare 200 hours later.

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(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Continued)

(A) RADIO AND SOUND (Continued)

(2) Several high resistance joints in the center conduction of the R-F coax were found dirty. One of these being where the coax leaves the transmitter had the same effect as a short one fourth wave length away across the oscillation tubes thus preventing the latter from oscillating. Repair consisted of dismantling the R-F plumbing and cleaning all joints.

(3) QC-JK head struck by submerged object on QC side denting head and bending spider. Although head itself was not damaged the bending of the spider cut the leads and shorted them. JK side could be used at reduced efficiency. Head repaired by ORION. QB head was wiped when ship grounded while submerged.

(B) ENGINEERING:

(1) Auxiliary Engine--Cap on wrist pin on #8 unit worked loose. Subsequent rise in temperature due to friction between cap and cylinder liner allowed the wrist pin to expand and thus lock the needle bearing. Wrist pin carried away and piston seized. Liner and a new unit were installed.

(2) Port Main Motor and Reduction Gear Sump--Excessive leakage through stern tubes at deep submergence allowed water to reach the level of the attached lub oil pump flange. Water entered sump tank on two occassions and it is believed a faulty gasket is causing the leak. Sump pumped dry, flushed, and oil renewed in each instance.

(3) Gyro Compass--Three different times during the patrol the master gyro was placed out of commission because of a variable error. The sensitive

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Continued)

(B) ENGINEERING (Continued)

element was renewed by ORION but three weeks later this error again appeared. It is believed that the casualties were caused, not by the sensitive element, but by the damping or follow up systems. The only abnormal condition existing is the splashing of oil from the sump by the north rotor. In each case repairs were effected by securing the gyro, cleaning the mercury, and the damping system. This is a serious casualty as the gyro is not dependable and was the cause of much concern during the patrol. A thorough check of the entire system is requested.

(C) ORDNANCE:

An air leak developed in a MK23 torpedo at the valve group connection of the high pressure air line from the preheater. Leak was repaired by silver soldering. Torpedo ran HSN.

(L) RADIO

Reception was reliable at all times with the 9 megacycle band best for night use, and either the 12 or 16 megacycle band best during the day. No Japanese attemps at jamming were noticed.

No difficulty was encountered in night transmission from the area, but it was impossible to get receipt for day transmission of DACE serial eight. It was sent blind and later retransmitted on Bakers. South of the barrier enemy jamming and false receipting was experienced. (See section U).

The use of the area frequency for communication with the DARTER was excellent and presented no problems. No jamming was experienced. Communication using vertical antenna was unsatisfactory with both boats submerged; however, with one boat on the surface limited use could be made of it.

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(N) RADAR

SJ - Performance of SJ was very good. Again it was used during the day as well as at night to search for aircraft. Approximately one third of the aircraft contacts were by SJ with ranges up to and exceeding 15 miles. Contact on an enemy battleship force was made at fifteen miles. In addition to normal tube failure the only casualties experienced were grounding of the secondary of the high voltage rectifier filament transformer shorting the high voltage power supply, and the shorting of condenser C-18 shorting the plate of the bias generator to ground.

SD - As far as results were concerned the SD performed very well by picking up planes up to thirty miles and consistently above fifteen and twenty. Maintenance, however, was a problem due partially to instability caused by low resistance readings in the mast. (See Major Defects).

SN-2 - While tracking the Jap task force on 23 October the SN-2 picked up an enemy radar on 150 megacycles with a P.V.F. of approximately 2,000 cycle per second.

(N) SOUND

Sound conditions in the area were good. Echo ranging could be heard as far as eighteen miles and attacking destroyers seemed to have little difficulty in locating and maintaining contact with DACE after the attack on October 23rd.

Sound heads were damaged on two occassions. (See Major Defects)

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

Good density layers were encountered in the area.

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(O) DENSITY LAYERS (Continued)

Below are tabulated layes observed:

DATE	LAT.	LONG.	SURFACE TEMP.	DEPTH OF LAYER	TEMP. DROP
9-19	03-42N	122-29E	86	220	3
9-20	05-07N	122-42E	85	Thermoiline	5
10-7	07-17N	120-23E	86	230	3
10-8	11-36N	122-43E	84	200	4
10-13	07-21N	116-13E	83	260	9
10-15	07-40N	116-43E	84	260	10
10-16	07-07N	115-01E	85	260	13
10-17	07-41N	116-39E	85	260	10
10-19	07-30N	117-03E	83	220	13
10-23	09-25N	117-20E	83	210	11

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY

Health of both officers and men was above average although near the end of the patrol several cases of patrol fatigue were noticed, especially among those men who have made five or more patrols. One case of cellulitis of the leg had to be transferred before departure from advanced base. Food was well prepared and served. Habitability was that expected of this type boat in tropical waters.

After the DARTER crew came on board living conditions became crowded but not to the extent imagined when 165 men are carried. Men were assigned to compaements and requested to remain there the major part of the time. There was only time for two meals but soup was available throughout the day. Maximum time submerged was ten and one half hours. Liberal use was made of CO2 absorbent and O2 in order to revitalize the air.

Although there was no room to spare and the quality and quantity of food declined the last few days it is believed that no one suffered any undue hardship during the last eleven days of the patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

- -

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - - - - 74
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 51
*(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - - 8
(d) Number of unqualified men making their - - - first patrol - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 3
(f) DARTER officers and crew - - - - - - - - - - - 81

*Because of the crowded conditions on board qualifications had to be stopped prior to departure from area.

The training of officers and crew is excellent. Their performance of duty under combat conditions is in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service. During the various attacks and also during the rescue operations and subsequent attempt to destroy the DARTER numerous individuals displayed outstanding courage and resourcefulness. These men are recommended for suitable awards in a seperate letter.

Appreciation is expressed for the conduct of the DARTER personnel while on board. Although conditions were crowded due to the limited space available in a submarine their conduct made a pleasant cruise out of what could have been an intolerable situation.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

		MILES	GAL.FUEL
Base to Area -	BRISBANE--BARRIER	3,513	45,577
	WOENDI --Area	699	8,505
In Area -	Part 1 (CELEBES SEA)	2,992	26,443
	Part 2 (D-6)	6,999	59,720
Area to Base -	CELEBES - WOENDI	699	7,400
	BARRIER - FREEMANTLE	1,500	15,000
	TOTAL	16,402Mi.	162,645Gal.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

- -

(S) DURATION

Days enroute area - - - - - - - - -	14
Days in area - - - - - - - - - - - -	39
Days enroute area--MIOS WOENDI - -	2
Days enroute area--FREEMANTLE - -	6
Days at MIOS WOENDI- - - - - - - - -	6
TOTAL- -	67
Days Submerged - - - - - - - - - - -	16

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

TORPEDOES	FUEL	PROVISIONS	PERSONNEL
0	1,000 gals.	3 days	7 days

Limiting factor this patrol: Expenditure of torpedoes.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

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(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS - JAMMING OF THE ENEMY

1. Ship or station: U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
2. Position, bearing and altitude when enemy radio signals were observed:
3. Position of Transmitting Station: 15°S; 115°E
4. Date & Time of Jamming: 2200H on 11/1/44 to 0100H on 11/2/44 and 2300H to 2400H on 11/2/44.
5. Frequencies jammed: 840 Kc
6. Describe signal jammed: Own signal CW
7. Use of circuit: Operational
8. Was enemy jamming signal stable: Yes
9. What was ratio of strength of own signal to enemy jamming signal: 1 to 4
10. What was power output of own transmitter at time of jamming: 200 watts
11. Location of enemy jammer:
Shipborne ____ Airborne ____ Landbased ____ Unknown X
12. Type of jamming signal: was random keyed CW
13. Effectiveness of jamming: Very effective
14. Action taken to overcome jamming: was to slightly shift frequency and to send breaks during the jamming
15. Bandwidth covered by enemy jamming signals: was 10 kcs in receivers used.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS - JAMMING BY THE ENEMY(Cont'd)

16. Did jamming transmitter appear to be monitored by a look-in receiver: Yes
Additional trouble was encountered with false transmissions. False receipts for DACE serial 12 were obtained from enemy stations using the calls VIXO and Z4N. When trying to send DACE 13 three stations using VIXO and two stations using VLM were encountered. When asked to authenticate the enemy stations asked us to stop transmitting or said they had nothing more for us. Both messages were received by VIXO due to excellent work by their operators.

17. If frequency was shifted, how long before enemy jammed new frequency: Frequency shifted but could not establish communication. Enemy did not jam. Had to resort to original frequency to clear message.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number FIVE.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSIONS

1. Ship or Station: U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

2. Area covered on this mission: Phillipine Area from 10/7/44 to 10/26/44

3. Was enemy radar:
Shipborne: X Airborne: Landbased: Unknown:
(Battleship or heavy cruiser)
(a) Describe enemy installation: Unknown

4. Intercept equipment: SN-2

5. (a) Frequency: 150Mcs. Dial Readings: 150, 180 Mcs.
(b) PRF 3000 pps How Measured: Est. by tone
(c) Pulse Width: Unknown How Measured:

(d) Sketch Pulse:

(e) Was Lobe Switching Used: No.
(f) Polarization of enemy signal: Not determined.
(g) Sweep Rate: 4 rpms

6. (a) Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI: Search (whether surface or air not determined).

7. Action of enemy radar including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc.: Radar was first detected at 12 miles after radar contact (SJ)had been established. Enemy made two sweeps then secured for one minute. At one time the tone disappeared and only a high noise level was heard for about thirty minutes. Sweeping disappeared indicating a possible casualty to enemy radar.

(V) REMARKS

1. No mine sweeping activities were noted.

2. Enemy merchant traffic in the area appears to hug the coast as much as possible passing inside BALABAC Passage, and the Borneo Barrier Reef. A good intercept point is at 09°-15'N, 117°-20'E where the traffic is forced outward into PALAWAN Passage by shoals. North of BALABAC the traffic apparently anchors overnight, but inside the barrier reef it apparently remains underway.

The three warship contacts used the deep water passages apparently relying on speed for protection. Two of the three contacts used PALAWAN Passage while the third went through Dangerous Ground.

3. During the last refit an extensive range and bearing repeater system was installed from radar and T.B.T. to the T.D.C. and plot. This proved very successful and is strongly recommended for all boats. Detail description of system is not included here as it is essentially the same system as described by the JACK.

4. The highest praise is given to the main engines and to Submarine Division 182 Relief Crew who overhauled them. On three sepearate and long end arounds it was necessary to run them at full power (100%) for extensive periods. They responded perfectly and never failed us.

5. The Commanding Officer wishes to take this opportunity to say that it has been a great pleasure to work with the Task Group Commander, Commander D.H. McCLINTOCK. The excellent judgement displayed in coordinating the search and attack doctrine of the two boats left nothing to be desired, and was largely responsible for the success of the task unit. All the movements of the two units were carried out with a minimum of communication; neither doubt nor confusion

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as to the action to be taken existed at any time. It is deeply regretted that his gallent ship was lost.while aggressively engaging the enemy, but no regrets will ever be necessary when considering her record. The officers and crews of both vessels regret that they will be unable to operate together again.

FC5-18/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Bn

Serial 0219

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 November 1944.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Fifth War
Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number Five.

1. The fifth war patrol of the DACE is divided into two parts. The first part, from 1 to 27 September, the DACE was on a patrol line under operational control of CTF-72. No contacts were made although aircraft contacts were plentiful. She returned to Mios Woendi and after six days in port she departed under operational control of CTF-71 joining the DARTER in a coordinated attack group under Commander D.H. McClintock, Commanding Officer of the DARTER, for patrol in the vicinity of Palawan Passage. Three torpedo attacks were made.

2. Attack No. 1-A On 13 October DACE sighted a convoy previously reported and attacked by DARTER. The convoy remained in mineable waters which prevented a day submerged attack. After dark an end around was made in conjunction with U.S.S. DARTER. Six steam torpedoes were fired in a night surface attack range 4,000 yards. This long range was imposed by the possibility of mine fields close in. Two hits were registered in two ships. One torpedo made an erratic run and the maneuvers of the DACE to avoid probably accounts for the four misses since she kept firing while swinging to clear the erratic torpedo.

Attack No. 1-B followed immediately thereafter. Four Mark 18 torpedoes were fired at two overlapping freighters at extreme range. Two hits were made in one freighter and were observed by DARTER. The DACE then pulled out, reloaded and came back in to polish off a cripple which had been left behind by

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the convoy. Alert escorts frustrated her attempts to attain attack position. Further attempts could not be made because of the necessity of arriving on a new patrol line in obedience to orders.

Attack No. 2 was a coordinated attack on one of two Fubuki destroyers probably on an anti-submarine search. The DARTER got in an unsuccessful attack. Shortly thereafter the DACE fired four Mark 18 torpedoes in a day periscope attack from good position. A zig away just after firing the last torpedo caused all torpedoes to miss. The destroyers conducted a search but no depth charge attack.

Attack No. 3 on 23 October, shortly after midnight while in company with the DARTER, radar contact was made on what developed to be a large task force enroute up Palawan Passage. With beautiful teamwork the DACE took position ahead of the starboard column of ships and the DARTER the port column. The submarines submerged in good position ahead, just before daylight. Within fifteen minutes the DACE heard the DARTER attack, five hits followed two minutes later by four more. Ten minutes later at 0600 the DACE identified her column as being two Atago class heavy cruisers with a third vessel astern identified as a Kongo class battleship. Five other heavy vessels were in sight with a significantly light destroyer screen. In order to get the heavier ship astern the two Atagos were allowed to pass; then, from excellent position at a range of 1800 yards, six torpedoes were fired, spread by periscope. Four hits were obtained. The DACE went deep to avoid the escorts. Tremendous explosions and breaking up noises were heard for a half hour. A counterattack was made by the escorting destroyers. In the afternoon, upon return to periscope depth, one Atago cripple guarded by two destroyers was sighted. The DACE closed this target during daylight and after contacting DARTER upon surfacing that night commenced an end around on a southwesterly course on the cruiser which was making about five

knots. Just after midnight on 24 October the DACE received word that the DARTER had run aground on Bombay Shoal. The DACE broke off the approach on the cruiser and went to the rescue of the DARTER.

3. Displaying superb seamanship the Commanding Officer maneuvered the DACE within fifty yards of the reef on which DARTER was aground and by means of both vessel's rubber boats all DARTER personnel were removed to the DACE. The demolition charges in the DARTER failed to function so the DACE fired her four remaining torpedoes at the hulk. All torpedoes exploded on the reef without apparent damage to the DARTER. The deck gun was manned and twenty-one hits scored with little apparent damage. Fire was interrupted by the arrival of a plane just before dawn. During the day a Japanese destroyer arrived on the scene but evidently departed about sunset. After dark the DACE closed the DARTER to put aboard the DACE's demolition charge. When about one mile off loud pinging was heard, although in bright moonlight, nothing was seen, leading to the conclusion that it was from a submarine. It could not have emanated from the DARTER as all sound gear had been wrecked. The DACE pulled clear and departed for Fremantle. The trip to base was uneventful, Lombok Strait being transited submerged.

4. The DACE returned in very good material condition and will be refitted by the U.S.S. EURYALE and One Eighty-One - Two relief crew.

5. Of special interest is the sighting and sinking of six drifting and one moored type mine in the middle of the Celebes Sea. Communications by the two submarines was remarkably good and accounts in large part for the success of the group. The Commanding Officers' remarks regarding traffic lanes and the enemy's use of Dangerous Ground are particularly valuable.

6. Even though the DACE had 165 men on board for the return trip the state of cleanliness and morale was excellent.

FC5-18/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Bn

Serial 0219 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 November 1944.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number Five.

- -

7. The Squadron Commander heartily congratulates the DACE on this fine patrol. In addition to the heavy damage inflicted on the enemy the DACE's performance in saving an entire submarine crew from capture or destruction is an outstanding performance and merits the sincere appreciation of the entire submarine service.

ELIOT H. BRYANT

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/1e

Serial 01458 30 November 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DACE Conf. Ltr.
A16-3/09, dated 6 November
1944. Report of Fifth .
War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. DACE Fifth War Patrol was conducted in CELEBES SEA; and in the SOUTH CHINA SEA as a member of a coordinated Search and Attack Group composed of DACE and DARTER.

2. Routine reconnaissance duty in the CELEBES SEA from 14 September to 24 September was productive of no torpedo targets. In position (03-37N 122-32E) DACE disposed of seven floating mines.

3. At 0958 on October 13th, while submerged, DACE sighted a convoy heading south from BALABAC ISLAND; too distant to attack. He cleared BALABAC STRAIT and surfaced with the convoy out of sight at 1530. As a result of decisions reached during a rendezvous held with DARTER at 1830, DACE was ordered to take station for attack on the starboard bow of the convoy which was estimated to be proceeding southward inside of N. FURIOUS SHOALS. Radar contact was regained at 2240, and in these shallow and foul waters, he delivered a long range attack at 0102 from 4000 yards. Ten torpedoes were fired, resulting in four hits on two targets. DACE reloaded, made a trim dive, and returned to the vicinity of a heavily damaged cripple. DACE did not follow the convoy because he assumed, first, that DARTER was in contact with the main body; and, secondly, that restricted waters in the vicinity of SOUTH HILL ROCK were not suitable for multiple submarine attacks. However, DARTER had not followed the convoy, but had also remained in the vicinity of the cripple. The presence of two patrolling escorts deterred further attack by either submarine.

4. At 0025 on the 23rd of October both DACE and DARTER contacted and tracked a large Task Force heading north through PALAWAN PASSAGE. A pre-dawn submerged attack was wisely chosen on the assumption that this was the most effective form of dual submarine attack upon a Task Force which was unlikely to radically alter base course in PALAWAN PASSAGE until after morning navigational positions had been plotted. This plan worked out perfectly. DARTER attacked at 0532, and the Task Force was still

1 0674

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DACE Conf. Ltr.
A16-3/09, dated 6 November
1944. Report of Fifth
War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

- -

apparently unwilling to risk radical change in base course, because it steamed on and twenty minutes later DACE struck, sinking an ATAGO Class CA. In a short period of time this submarine team sank two heavy cruisers and damaged a third.

5. At 1100 DACE was back at periscope depth, and at 1510 she made out DARTER'S stopped cruiser. The Commanding Officer decided not to attack until after dark because the presence of air cover and two destroyers made daylight submerged attack inadvisable until his very tired crew had been given a short rest period.

6. At 2053 radar contact was regained on the damaged cruiser, and DACE was ordered to track from enemy's port bow, and await DARTER'S attack before launching her own. Tracking was discontinued at 0007 when DACE broke off contact to assist DARTER who was aground on BOMBAY SHOAL.

7. DACE arrived at the scene of DARTER grounding at 0140 and stood by to render assistance as required. By 0439 all DARTER'S personnel had been rescued. The assistance rendered to DARTER is a splendid example of effective seamanship.

8. DACE was unable to place a torpedo hit in DARTER'S hull because all four of her torpedoes exploded on the reef. She did succeed in scoring twenty one hits with her four inch gun, but these hits appeared to do little damage except to start a fuel oil fire in the forward fuel group.

9. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

10. The Force Commander congratulates DACE Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew upon their contribution to the great victory scored in the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES. The DACE - DARTER team struck the first blow. The following damage was

14237

A16-3(2)(c)

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/pr

Serial 01458 30 November 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DACE Conf. Ltr.
A16-3/09, dated 6 November
1944. Report of Fifth War
Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

- -

inflicted upon the enemy:

SUNK

1 - AO (Large - EU)	10,000 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - AP (Large - EU)	7,500 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - CA (ATAGO Class - EU)	9,900 Tons	(Attack No. 3)
Total	27,400 Tons	

R. W. CHRISTIE.

ORIGINAL COPY

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P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

1 0674

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Reg. No. 17189
R. S. No. 1 0674

A16-3(F-3-4/wmw)

Serial: 03571

26 DEC 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DACE conf. ltr.
A16-3/09 of 6 Nov. 1944.

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Fifth War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Fifth War Patrol of the USS DACE embraces one of the most outstanding contributions by submarines to the ultimate destruction of the Japanese Navy. Teamed with the USS DARTER, the DACE on 23 October contacted in Palawan Passage a large enemy task force composed of cruisers and battleships which were bound for Leyte Gulf bent on stopping our invasion of the Philippines. In a splendidly executed attack DACE sank a heavy cruiser, making a total of three heavy cruisers stopped by this team. In addition timely contact reports revealed the magnitude of the enemy force. The early receipt of this information enabled our forces to formulate and put into effect the counter measures which resulted in a major disaster for the Japanese in the Second Battle of the Philippine's Sea.

3. It is regrettable that with two submarines in the vicinity, the damaged cruiser remained helpless for over twelve hours and then finally escaped at creeping speed.

4. The fine seamanship and good judgment shown by the DACE in rescuing the entire complement of the grounded DARTER is a tribute to our submarine force.

5. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the Commanding Officer and crew of the USS DACE for a brilliant accomplishment, in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval Service.

C. E. VAN HOOK,
Deputy.

Copies to:
ComSubs7thFlt
ComSubRon-18
CO USS DACE

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12b/pr

Serial 01590 25 December 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Revision of damage inflicted during Fifth War Patrol.

Reference: (a) ComSubs7thFlt 2nd End. FE24-71/A16-3 (Serial 01458) of 30 November 1944 to USS DACE Conf. Ltr. A16-3/09, dated 6 Nov. 1944 (Report of Fifth War Patrol).
(b) ONI 222-J (A Statistical Summary of the Japanese Navy).

1. The assessment of damage inflicted on the enemy during the subject War Patrol, was credited by reference (a) as follows:

SUNK

1 - AO (Large - EU)	10,000 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - AP (Large - EU)	7,500 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - CA (ATAGO Class - EU)	9,900 Tons	(Attack No. 3)
Total	27,400 Tons	

2. Reference (b) indicates that the latest Statistical Summary of the Japanese Navy estimates the ATAGO class cruiser as being of 12,500 tons displacement rather than the former estimate of 9,900 tons. Damage is therefore revised as follows:

SUNK

1 - AO (Large - EU)	10,000 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - AP (Large - EU)	7,500 Tons	(Attack No. 1)
1 - CA (ATAGO Class - EU)	12,500 Tons	(Attack No. 3)
Total	30,000 Tons	

4

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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
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FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12b/pr

Serial 01590 25 December 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. DACE - Revision of damage inflicted during Fifth War Patrol.

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Vice Opnav Op-23c	(1)		CTG-71.9	(2)	
ComlstFlt	(1)		ComSubRon-12	(2)	
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CTF-71	(7)		S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)	
CTG-71.3	(2)		SubAd, Mare Island.	(2)	
CTG-71.4	(2)		S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)	

THIS CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

1ST COPY

SS247/A16-3
Serial 01

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
28 January, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DACE (SS247).
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Charts (1 copy only).
(C) Special Reports.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the sixth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the South China Sea area during the period 2 December 1944 to 28 January 1945 is forwarded herewith.

Approved.
O.R. COLE, JR.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-09B9C DATE 5/25/72

DECLASSIFIED

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

- -

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Fremantle, Western Australia on 6 November 1944 from fifth war patrol. Received excellent refit of normal duration conducted by Relief Crew of Submarine Division 181 and U.S.S. EURYALE. Drydocked twice, bottom cleaned and painted, replaced port screw, and renewed woods to eliminate shaft squeaks. Accomplished the following major items: converted #4 M.B.T. to carry fuel, installed Loran Gear, APR-1, AN/SPA-1, OAO, new antenna for VHF and APR, grid type SJ reflector, replaced wiped QB sound head, and installed DACE-type fire control communication system. Ship's company returned from rest camp and took over the ship from relief crew on 21 November 1944. On same day Commander Otis R. COLE, JR., U.S. Navy relieved Commander Bladen D. CLAGGETT, U.S. Navy as commanding officer. During period 21 November to 1 December conducted sound tests, electronics tests, independent exercises, loading, fueling and a five day continuous underway training period which included deep dives, evasion, gun shoot, day and night approaches. Training was supervised by Commander Submarine Division 182 (Commander C.C. BURLINGAME, U.S.N.) whose helpful suggestions were greatly appreciated. Ensigns C.M. YOUNGER, Jr., USN and E.T. JONES, USN were detached. Lieutenant W.W. PRICE, JR., USN reported aboard for duty. Ready for sea 2 December 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE

(All times HOW unless otherwise stated.)

Names of all officers and Chief Petty Officers attached to U.S.S. DACE during this patrol and total number of previous patrols made are as follows:

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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RANK & NAME	NO. PATROLS
Commander O.R. COLE, JR., USN	4
Lt.Comdr. R.C. BENITEZ, USN	8
Lieutenant W.W. PRICE, JR., USN	4
Lieutenant M. GODEK, DE, USNR	3
Lieutenant S.F. REID, DE, USNR	3
Lieutenant W.J. DORWORTH, JR., DE, USNR	33
Lieut.(jg) A.A. EBEL, DE(R), USNR	5
Lieut.(jg) E.H. JONES, (E)RL, USNR	1
Lieut.(jg) H.H. CALDWELL, USN	2
Ensign P. BANTA, EM(L), USNR	1
MURPHY, H.A., CTM(PA), USN	5
WRIGHT, C.L., CRT(AA)(T), V6, USNR	5
OGLE, P.L., CMoMM(AA)(T), USN	4
KERR, "J" "C", CMoMM(AA)(T), USN	4
PARSONS, E., CEM(AA)(T), USN	3
SMITH, G.O., CQM(AA)(T), USN	5
MORSE, R.W., CY(AA), USN	5
CHIARELLI, S.F., CMoMM(AA), USN	4

2 December 1944

1310 Underway from Fremantle, Western Australia on sixth war patrol in company with U.S.S. BERGALL.

1550 Dove for trim and conducted day and night approaches on U.S.S. ISABEL.

2300 DACE and BERGALL parted company with ISABEL and set course for Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia.

3 December 1944

0506 Made trim dive.

1300 Conducted day approaches on BERGALL and acted as her target.

- -

1650 Passed Unidentified south bound U.S. submarine (probably BLACKFIN).

4 December 1944

0514 Made training and trim dive. Tested all torpedoes in tubes for tightness at 65 feet with outer doors opened for 15 minutes.

0632 Passed British submarine on horizon (probably HMS TANTALUS).

0840 Conducted submerged approaches with BERGALL.

1300 Conducted searchlight and radar communication drills with BERGALL.

2100 Conducted night surface approaches with BERGALL.

2320 Made radar contact with land bearing 105°T, range 55,000 yards.

Torpedo check shows evidence of carelessness on tender's part in getting torpedoes ready. (See REMARKS).

5 December 1944

0215 Sighted VLAMING HEAD Light bearing 091°T, range 30,000 yards.

0520 Entered EXMOUTH Gulf, Western Australia. Shaped course for oil tanker.

0827 Moored port side to U.S.S. BERGALL on starboard side of oil tanker. (Tanker yawing badly.) Exchanged voyage views with Commanding Officer, BERGALL.

- -

0920 HMS STOIC moored starboard side to port side of tanker. Commanding officers of DACE and BERGALL paid courtsey calls on the Commanding Officer of HMS STOIC.

1135 Commenced fueling.

1300 Called on Commanding Officer Base and Tender.

1515 Completed fueling having received 9,000 gallons diesel oil.

1620 STOIC underway. Standing out. DACE and BERGALL being ready to leave at same time, both Commanding Officers agreed to proceed to LOMBOK Straits in company to continue training and prevent possible mixups.

1625 Underway standing out of EXMOUTH Gulf enroute LOMBOK Straits in company with BERGALL.

1815 Held gun shoot (4" and 40mm guns) to practice radar spotting on wreck near VIAMING HEAD.

1843 Secured shoot.

2347 Radar contact followed by visual contact on unidentified submarine on course 315°T, speed 10. Undoubtedly HMS STOIC but kept clear anyhow.

6 December 1944

0529 Made training and trim dive.

1516 BERGALL and DACE dove together 1,500 yards apart on divergent courses. Tested out underwater sound communications, ping ranges (maximum range obtained 3,925 yards), and conducted listening tests upon each other.

- -

1638 Surfaced. Tests completed.

1647 Dove. (Dive by hand training dive).

1800 Conducted ABK test with BERGALL.

2035 Dove. (Night training dive).

2122 Dove. (Night training dive).

No. 3 main generator armature is down to 100,000 ohms. (See MAJOR DEFECTS).

7 December 1944

0328 Dove. (Night training dive).

0407 Dove. (Night training dive).

0937 Made submerged approach on BERGALL.

1913 Made end around night submerged radar approach on BERGALL.

8 December 1944

The war enters its third year.

0918 Made trim dive.

1030 Test fired small caliber guns and checked engines thoroughly prior to transiting LOMBOK Straits.

2125 In the dark of the moon with partly overcast sky and 4 main engines on the line commenced transit of LOMBOK Straits astern of BERGALL. All was uneventful until

2214 When radar contacted an object at 9,000

yards, bearing 328°T. (Ship contact #1). Commenced tracking but ceased to be annoyed by him when he dropped aft and tracked at speed zero.

2243 Radar contact bearing 009°T, 12,000 yards tracked on course 185°T, speed 8. (Ship contact #2). Avoided by turning right and at

2306 Resumed base course 020°T.

2308 Radar contact bearing 354°T, 13,900 yards tracked on course 200°T, speed 11. (Ship contact #3). Avoided by turning right and at

2326 Resumed base course 020°T. Had received BERGALL's warning by voice concerning these last two contacts.

2327 Radar contact bearing 060°T, range 12,000 yards. (Ship contact #4).

2329 Radar contact bearing 330°T, range 7,700 yards. (Ship contact #5). With DACE on course 000°T this put one ship on the port bow and one on the starboard both closing. At this point the DACE and BERGALL parted company. We turned right to end around both contacts #4 and #5. Fortunately #4 tracked at 21 knots on 297°T (#5 at 12 knots on 100°T) so we passed at a great rate with closest range 3,800 yards, and by

2340 Had eased the ship's head around to 050°T with open sea ahead. The Nips have LOMBOK well covered tonight and I am thankful for the dark night and excellent radar, tracking, and plotting teams.

2345 Radar contact range 3,000 yards. (Ship contact #6). Manned the 40mm and 30 cal.

guns and turned away. This was a small boat or object and was soon left astern.

9 December 1944

0030 Clear of the LOMBOK patrol parade and on course 012°T, 75/90 on 3 main engines.

0100 S.J. radar interference 220°R. Assume BERGALL.

0422 Passed SEKALA Island 10 miles to port.

0558 Made trim dive.

0613 Surfaced. Sighted BERGALL astern through high periscope.

0827 Dove for unidentified plane sighted by lookout. (Plane contact #1).

0930 Surfaced.

0933 Dove for unidentified plane sighted by lookout. (Plane contact #2). Sky overcast with low clouds so decided to remain down until

1210 Surfaced and bent on 3 main engines, 75/90 so as to make KARIMATA Straits tomorrow night.

1515 Sighted unidentified ship through high periscope. (Ship contact #7). As we had SJ interference and he appeared to be a sub we challenged on SJ radar. Received no reply, so at

1610 Reversed course to investigate.

1636 Came back to base course having identified ship as a small schooner, probably native manned.

- -

1820 Sighted small native sailing canoe by high periscope. Avoided.

1845 Sighted GREAT MASALEMBO Island through high periscope.

1905 Radar contact 9,000 yards. Native boat.

10 December 1944

0230 Radar contact 7,000 yards. Small fry--probably native boat. Avoided.

0350 Radar contact 17,450 yards. (Ship contact #8). Stationed tracking party and closed range to 12,500 yards. Target tracked on course 053°T, straight course, speed 7.5. Sky partly cloudy but with enough moon to prevent close undetected surface approach, yet too dark for periscope. Set up looks like small fry but perhaps he is big enough to shoot at. Decided to track from ahead, get on his track and dive for dawn approach.

0545 Dove (depth of water 30-35 fathoms), obtained trim and BT card at 120 feet (no gradient), came up to 58 feet and sighted target at about 10,000 yards. Still no change in set up. Am glad we waited to view target for he turned out to be a war color painted A/S or mine sweeper type trawler (no colors), too small to shoot at.

0632 Commenced hauling off track and watching him go by. He had awnings rigged so couldn't see his armament, but considered him not a gun target, particularly with the seas picking up and nearness of SURABAYA's airfields, so at

0853 With target out of sight surfaced and headed for KARAMATA Straits at 2 engine speed into the teeth of a local storm. Impossible to make KARAMATA tonight. Regret yesterday's fuel expenditure in the attempt.

1100 Passed BAWEAN Island 30 miles to port.

1620 Received CTF-71's serial 2 telling us to complete our special mission as soon as possible so as to take our place on a scouting line.

2000 Continued wind, seas, and rain squalls from ahead.

2038 Weak radar pip at 14,000 yards. Avoided.

11 December 1944

0618 Dove at southern approaches to KARIMATA Straits and set course towards the narrows. Plan to remain submerged today so as to transit the narrows undetected tonight. Storm is passing to westward but there are still low clouds and rain squalls. Routined all torpedoes and found further evidence of careless tender torpedo work, ie. screwdriver in midship section. (See REMARKS).

1916 Surfaced.

1923 Radar contact 068°T, 6,000 yards. Avoided. Making two engine speed, working up to 75/90 on 4 engines as soon as engines become secured from battery charge.

12 December 1944

0048 Radar contact on KARIMATA Island bearing 330°T, 55 miles.

- -

0230 Weak SJ interference from ahead growing stronger and at

0333 Obtained radar contact 225°T, range 10,000 yards.
Although I am sure this was the PARGO, we could not get any response to our several challenges by SJ. We are in the narrows now.

0400 Clear of KARIMATA Straits. SJ contact lost and interference growing weaker.

0600 Slowed to 2 main engines.

0950 Dove for trim. Yatching weather has returned.

1026 Surfaced.

1504 Sighted PEDJANTAN Island bearing 256°T at 50 miles.
Decided to carry out tradition and dive under the equator so at

1722 Dove and at

1739 Crossed under the equator at Longitude 107°-01' East at 65 feet.

1744 Surfaced.

1815 Sighted BADAS Islands bearing 357°T at 30 miles.

1924 Made radar contact on TOKONG KEMOEDI Island bearing 348°T at 22 miles.

2245 Radar contact bearing 268°T at 18,230 yards. (Ship contact #9). Commenced tracking. Night pitch black with rain and lightning.

- -

Depth of water 25 to 30 fathoms.

2300 Began "to smell a rat" when contact tracked at zero speed but decided to close and be ready for all eventualities, going to battle stations at

2315 and preparing the tubes.

2330 At a range of 3,000 yards the target was identified in the lightning as a junk, so we secured from battle stations and resumed base course. Our SJ radar has obtained contacts on small stuff at extremely long ranges.

13 December 1944

0012 Radar contact on CAMEL's HUMP Island bearing 051°T at 22 miles.

0638 Sighted PULO RIABU Island bearing 302°T at 42 miles.

0653 Dove for trim.

0710 Surfaced.

0927 SD contact 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #3). Plane apparently circling as contact remained at about 22 miles until

0935 When it opened out to 25 miles and disappeared.

1255 Passed 2 oil drums. Latitude 03°-34' N, Longitude 107°-01' E.

1308 Sighted GREAT NATUNA Island bearing 067°T at 75 miles.

2100 Changed base course to 032°T to follow SINGAPORE-HONG KONG sea route.

- -

14 December 1944

0642 Dove for trim.

0706 Surfaced.

1000 Passed 3 life rafts (2 bamboo, 1 modern painted white with Jap characters on it). Latitude 07°-17' N, Longitude 108°-11' E.

1100 Commenced passing through wreck strewn waters. Wreckage consisted of small bales, planks, light bulbs, life floats and rings, and various other articles. Maneuvered and recovered 1 life buoy, 1 life ring (both with Jap characters on them), one inner tube with Jap bayonnet attached, one sign with "KOKURYO MARU No. 3" painted on it in English. Posit: Latitude 07°-31' n, Longitude 108°-16' E.

1156 Resumed base course.

1800 After 5½ days in water of 12 to 35 fathoms finally crossed the 50-fathom mark.

15 December 1944

0433 Weak SJ interference drawing aft. Probably BASHAW.

0635 Dove for trim and BT card.

0717 Surfaced.

0836 Left SINGAPORE-HONG KONG trade route and headed toward patrol area to northward.

0942 Dove for 2-engine bomber sighted by lookout. (Aircraft contact #4).

- -

1017 Surfaced. Seas and wind from ahead picking up.

1217 At Latitude 11°-27' N, Longitude 110°-23' E sighted a barnacle encrusted spherical horn type mine which proved an elusive target in the heavy seas for 20mm, 30 cal. machine gun, and Thompson submachine gun. Ammunition expended--3 pans 20mm, 2 belts 30 cal. and 4 clips .45 cal. Registered three or four hits but mine still floated and at

1246 Resumed base course having decided we could waste no more time and still accomplish our mission tonight. It is well we so decided for at

1250 The radar warning bell rang and down we plunged. SD contact was 10½ miles closing. (Aircraft contact #5).

1335 Surfaced and while in the act of opening the hatch the radar warning bell rang again, so at

1335-15 Down we plunged again. SD contact was 6 miles this time. (Aircraft contact #6). Guess we were a bit premature on the surfacing but if this keeps up we will be thrown a day behind schedule.

1436 Surfaced and put on 3 engines to make up for lost time.

2022 SJ contacted land bearing 262°T at 50 miles.

2150 Converted #4 from Reserve Fuel Ballast to Main Ballast Tank. This was a welcome help to our speed and buoyancy as the head winds and seas are building up.

16 December 1944

0230 Passed PULAU GAMBIR Island abeam to port distance seven miles.

0330 Commenced special mission in confined 12 fathom waters with a rough sea and 3 knot southerly current.

0445 Completed special mission. The shoreline looked awfully close at 1,000 yards so opened the coast at 4 engine speed.

0605 As dawn was breaking dove for a much needed trim dive in 60 fathoms, six miles east of PULAU GAMBIR and decided to patrol submerged during the day 3 to 4 miles east of island. Routined torpedoes and gave all hands a much needed rest. I had intended to send our "completed mission" message prior to diving but due to our late completion time I felt that we would not have time to set up and clear message before dawn, and that we were to close to the scene of our night's activity.

1758 Heard a heavy, loud, distant explosion. Probably a mine. Nothing in sight through the periscope. Seas very heavy and wind strong from the north. Visibility impaired by seas and rain squalls.

1846 Heard another distant explosion same as one above but not quite as loud. Nothing in sight.

1917 Surfaced a couple of miles south of our diving point. We had been combating southerly currents of 3 to 4 knots and could make not headway submerged at 2/3 speed. Opened to the northeast and at

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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2355 Transmitted DACE serial one to CTF-71 informing him of successful completion of special mission.

17 December 1944

0030 Upon completion of radio transmission headed south surf riding on 30 foot waves.

0304 Received expected orders (CTF-71 serial 40) telling us to relieve GUAVINA at 2000 off CAMRANH Bay. Decided to ride out storm on surface 40 to 50 miles off Cape VARELLA drifting slowly southward with our 3 knot current.

1055 SJ contact 30,000 yards closing fast. SD contact 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #7). Changed course to a diving course and awaited developments. Sky overcast and low ceiling.

1058 Both radars lost contact.

1100 SD regained contact 10 miles closing to 8 miles. Dove.

1115 Periscope depth--nothing in sight.

1135 Surfaced.

1137 SD contact 14 miles. (Aircraft contact #8).

1140 Plane moved out to 16.5 miles and SD lost contact.

1320 Received garbled version of MINGO's task force contact. There is a possibility we can intercept so increased speed to 75/90 on 4 main engines and ran with the seas on 150°T.

- -

1400 Gave MINGO my position and course informing him I was in on the chase and requested latest information. Tried to raise GUAVINA also, so she would know I would not be on relieving station by 2000 tonight. Unable to raise GUAVINA but as our primary mission was to scout this task force, I expect my station will be changed anyhow due to task force's departure CAMRANH Bay.

1430 MINGO coming in fine by voice. His latest information plus our last fuzzy sun line makes it look bad for our intercepting the Nips. Will hang on for a while and hope for the breaks.

1817 Weak SJ interference on starboard beam.

Possibly MINGO.

1930 We are on task force's track and quite a ways astern of his DR position. Our chase looked hopeless so at

1935 Changed course to head for CAMRANH Bay.

2000 Notified GUAVINA by voice that DACE would be unable to reach assigned station tonight. Sent DACE's serial two to CTF-71 telling him of our fruitless chase, giving him a possible ETA at CAMRANH Bay of 0600 18th and our very doubtful position. (No fix for 25 hours).

2227 Heavy seas forced us to slow to standard on 1 main engine and at

2300 Slowed to 2/3 on 1 M.E. My ETA was optimistic.

18 December 1944

Continued high winds and 30 to 40 foot seas from north. Position very doubtful. We believe

- -

we are about 40 miles off INDO CHINA's Coast.

0730 Decided to patrol 30 to 40 miles off coast on 10 mile tracks 320 - 050 to make as much northing as possible and hope for a fix.

0815 Weak SJ interference at 175°T. Maybe MINGO is looking for her spot too.

1250 Dove to routine torpedoes and give all hands a brief respite from the heavy weather.

1829 Surfaced.

1900 Challenged SJ interference to the southwest and MINGO replied. Strong radar interference on APR at 200 MC.

2043 Received CTF-71's serial 47 directing BECUNA, DACE, PADDLE, HOE, AND FLASHER to constitute an offensive reconnaisance group under Commander STURR in BECUNA. DACE's assigned station remains as before.

2100 Position definitely fixed by radar. Commenced running to the north, arriving in assigned area about 2230.

19 December 1944

0358 Our 197 to 200 MC radar is coming in strong on APR. Apparently shorebased.

0613 Dove in 65 fathoms of water 7 miles from mainland and 4 miles from HON NAI Island. Seas still heavy, 3 knot southerly current, periscope depth difficult. Plan to work our way stern first to a position about 3 or 4 miles from mainland and six miles south of HON NAI, then head into current and adjust speed to maintain position.

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0915 Sound picked up pinging to the southward.

0916 Sighted masts bearing 161°T. Changed course and headed for same. Stationed tracking party. (Ship contact #10).

0922 Ship appeared to be a large escort, angle on the bow of 70 port, range about 5,000 yards. (This ship and the other 2 escorts encountered later looked exactly like type DE - UN-1 except they appeared flush deck).

0923 Sound heard another pinger and upon looking aft a similar type of escort was sighted, followed shortly after by a third. All were to seaward of us. Commenced approach on the middle escort although it would have been impossible to hit him in the very rough seas with his shallow draft. From here on things started happening fast.

0925 Went to battle stations submerged. Sighted the tops of a large ship inshore of us. Shifted approach to him. First escort had passed ahead about 2,000 yards from us. Target was made out as a new, big, engines aft tanker of about 10,000 tons. We were between the tanker and escorts. Upon further examination astern of target at least four more big ships in close column were sighted; the two nearest were big tankers and the other two might well have been but were not definitely identified. Decided to let the first tanker or so go by along with the escorts and get in shots at the last 2 or 3 astern of the last visible escort. Convoy course was about 018°T, speed 8.5 knots. At about

1000 I noticed that the first tanker had turned about 90° to go south and to seaward of HON NAI Island and was passing about 1,500 to

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2,000 yards directly across my bow with a 90° starboard track. (We are on a northerly course).

This set up looked too good to be true except that #3 escort was astern to starboard and a little close on last look. While taking a final sweep around he was noted to have shifted to my port quarter about 700 to 1,000 yards distance. Had decided to accept this hazzard and was in the act of getting the tanker set up on the TDC when at

1001 Received a series of four very close depth charges or depth bombs. Apparently slightly aft. The boat shook violently and cork and paint chips filtered down from the overheads. We are in 45 to 50 fathoms of water. Ordered 250 feet, rig for depth charge and silent running, securing tubes and changing course to the right. Don't know positively how we were detected but strongly suspect the periscope was exposed too much in the rough seas. Heavy seas either kept the periscope under or over-exposed. We had to use large angles to keep from broaching in heavy seas and we may have even exposed the screws. At any rate the Nips apparently aren't too near sighted. No planes were sighted on a couple of brief sweeps but there should have been some and hindthought makes me believe this counter-attack was by plane. (Aircraft contact #9).

1011 to 1012 Received seven more well placed depth charges closer than the first and apparently across the stern. More cork and paint, several screws in ventilation ducts sheared, light bulbs went, contactors sent out blue flames, No. 7 Main vent operating lever worked up and down violently, Main and Hull Induction pins fell out, oil leak reported by the After Battery, but this was just an

- -

inboard fuel vent that had backed off as did several others plus one head valve, and after torpedo tube vent. We were at about 250 feet on course 130°T taking advantage of the 3 knot current we had cursed so roundly before. A doubtful sounding taken during the last series of charges gave 18 fathoms under the keel so decided to ease down to 300 feet. Much pinging and thrashing about above.

1019 Scraped bottom at 308 feet. All stop. Guess we will sit here for a while. No temperature gradient. We are thankful for the heavy seas--oil leaks might not be so discernible. Pinging is mostly to the northwest but not too far away. One sound head apparently bent. Abandoned conning tower.

1040 At least one escort has been detailed to look after us. Apparently he is conducting a pinging and listening search sweep and he seems to have contact. He is in no hurry and apparently sure of our position as he has moved up and down our sides and came right over once. Decided to remain on the bottom as he had still failed to drop, however the current began to take charge of us and to carry us bumping and turning on the bottom with accompanying loud scraping, grinding and clanking noises. We were slewed around 90° to the left. Could not understand how we could remain undetected with all this racket going on so decided to get off the bottom at the first opportunity. By

1056 No screws could be heard by JP so we decided to get off the bottom and get going. Commenced blowing Safety and for the next 15 or 20 minutes we made more noise blowing, venting, starting and stopping hydraulic,

making speeds up to 120 rpm, pumping and scraping bottom than I ever thought was possible.

1115 At 160 feet going up. Trouble opening Negative flood. Down angle and speed won't hold her down so at about 100 feet opened safety outboard vent and commenced getting control of the boat although she nearly bottomed again. We were just about squared away at 270 feet when JP reported what we had all been expecting--"SCREWS, coming in fast at 180°". We relaxed, however, when we learned the screws were our own.

1142 Faint pinging astern.

1216 Up to periscope depth for a look. All clear as far as the weather would let us see.

1230 Secured from depth charge and silent running. Believe everyone offered at least a silent prayer of thanks. Those bombs and charges were as close as I have ever heard them.

Submerged to 100 feet to pump bilges and survey damage. Managed to rig in JK-QC sound head. JK side ruined--QC side okay. Forward torpedoes exposed to depths as great as 200 feet prior closing doors.

[illegible]. Will have to check them all. Bow planes noisy, loud rumble aft--probably stern planes, one shaft has developed an intermittent squeal. Otherwise everything seems all right. I had intended to surface at least by 1400 when I figured I would be far enough from land to get off my contact report to the Group Commander. However, things took longer than I expected, so at

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1555 With only two forward torpedoes ready, surfaced and got off my contact and amplifying reports to the Group Commander, and told him I was diving. Noted superstructure hatch dished in aft.

1616 Dove and went to work on the torpedoes again.

1929 Changed course to surface and was just about to do so when SJ radar went out of commission for a half an hour.

2000 Surfaced. Informed Group Commander the events of the day and of my noisy conditions. He reassigned DACE to FLASHER's position about 40 miles northeast of CAMRANH Bay. Proceeded in that direction against the ever present wind and heavy seas.

2016 APR has our 200 MC friend again. Much SJ interference.

2120 Radar contact on BECUNA bearing 078°T, range 6,400 yards. Avoided.

2312 Radar contact on FLASHER bearing 096°T, range 11,550 yards. Spent the next hour avoiding. Closed to 2,000 yards and we still could not see him.

20 December 1944

Making our way northward in the teeth of the gale--not making much headway. Do not desire to head directly into seas as we would be unable to dive quickly for planes.

0730 Passed through debris and by one floating mine.

1048 SD contact 22 miles. Turning at full speed with full rudder to get seas astern for diving.

(Aircraft contact #10).

1052 . With plane at 12 miles closing pulled the plug. Plane had closed to 8 miles by the time SD went under. The Japs surely fly in any kind of weather.

1205 Surfaced.

21 December 1944

Continued high winds and heavy seas from the north.

0459 Radar contact bearing 073°T at 15,640 yards. (Ship contact #11). Stationed tracking party.

0530 Enemy on course 320°T, speed about 4 to 6 knots. Target apparently stops every 10 or 15 minutes. Sent Group Commander a contact report.

0548 Dawn will be approaching soon so decided to close enemy even though he does appear small. Went to battle stations torpedo and headed in.

0615 Closed to 4,600 yards and still couldn't make our more than a small blob in the approaching daylight, so opened target to clear him before it gets too light. It was a good tracking drill.

0628 Enemy has turned toward us and speeded up. Guess we are now rendering target services for him. Increased to full speed on 4 main engines and opened range but he is crowding us into the beach and it is getting very light.. Informed Group Commander that I was retiring and that contact was a patrol boat.

0651 With the shore and the patrol boat both in sight, the latter 11,000 yards astern and

to seaward of us, we dove figuring we could shake him easier submerged.

0652 Flooded No. 3 main engine on dive.

0707 Pinging astern but nothing in sight due to high seas. Opened coast and target on 130°T.

0750 With pinging faded out astern decided to utilize time below checking No. 3 main engine, and treating the torpedo after bodies which were flooded on the 19th. Check showed No. 3 main engine outboard exhaust valve inoperative --apparently caused by depth charging as we hadn't used this engine since our being attacked. The air chamber of the depth mechanism in one of the pressure exposed torpedoes was found flooded, so we will have to check the other five torpedoes for the same defect. More surface patrol time lost.

1504 Surfaced and headed north with torpedoes checked but No. 3 main engine out of commission.

1804 Radar contact bearing 356°T at 13,190 yards. As we had SJ interference on the same bearing we assumed it was one of our subs so pulled clear.

2020 Attempted to put 2 men on deck to fix No. 3 outboard exhaust valve but seas were too rough so decided to get under the lee of HON LON Island for repairs.

22 December 1944

Heavy seas and high winds from the north.

0100 From a position 4 miles south of HON LON, and 5 miles from the mainland headed into seas at slow speed while KERR, "J" "C", CMoMM, USN and FITZGEARLD, L.H., MoMMlc, USN went to

work on the exhaust valve. A rocker arm pin was found missing and was replaced by robbing the inboard induction distant operating gear of a similar pin. Also secured loose fuel oil hose in superstructure, and removed two metal deck hatches that had been battered and partly unhinged due to rough weather, heavy seas, and depth charging.

0235 All work completed. Hauled clear of coast.

0844 Passed floating mine 2,000 yards abeam to port.

1215 SD contact 14 miles closing. (PC #11) Dove.

1252 Surfaced.

1300 Received contact reports from HOE and PADDLE on an escorted tanker about 60 miles south of us. Headed south at full speed.

1322 Contact report from Group Commander on same outfit stated that they were headed for CAMARANH Bay to arrive there at 1500 and ordering DACE to make daylight attack. Our chances do not look too good but maybe he will be slowed down by the seas or another boat. Tried to get my position and search course and speed to Group Commander but couldn't clear message.

1527 SJ contact on tanker bearing 270°T, at 27,000 yards. Commenced tracking and closing. (Ship contact #12).

1535 Navigational plot shows him hugging the coast 5 miles from harbor entrance--headed in. We are now 10 miles from the target and only 16 miles from CAMRANH Bay entrance, so at

1536 Reluctantly broke off chase and headed out to sea.

1545 SD contact 13 miles closing. (P.C. #12).

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1546 Dove. Plane apparently target's air coverage. Maintained a periscope patrol until

1924 When we surfaced and started north to our station. Reported results of chase to Group Commander.

2035 Received CTF-71's serial 76 reassigning areas to various submarines. DACE and BECUNA are to share Area C-3. Commander STURR in BECUNA to coordinate.

2101 Received orders from Commander STURR to patrol off of Cape VARELLA. Set course for new station.

23 December 1944

No change in weather.

0506 Had just reached new station when a FLASHER contact report followed by a BECUNA report on a 5 ship convoy 80 to 90 miles south of us. was received. Headed south making 20 knots with the seas astern.

0725 Passed a floating mine.

0830 Having failed to find convoy along estimated course commenced a retiring search to the northeast. Notified Group Commander of my movements and requested latest information. He replied that the ships had made port, so at

1018 Headed north once more into the seas.

2130 Arrived on station off of Cape VARELLA. Commenced patrolling about 10 miles off the coast.

2350 SJ contact 16,000 yards bearing 210°T.

(Ship contact #13). Commenced tracking. Target appears small and making very little speed.

24 December 1944

0033 Secured tracking.

0101 Made radar contact and exchanged calls by SJ with BECUNA.

0623 Dove. Conducting submerged patrol off Cape VARELLA. Plan to patrol close to VARELLA in the morning, and drop down to the entrance to VAN FONG Bay in the afternoon in hopes of catching north bound shipping "holing up" for the night.

0800 Sighted native sail boat.

1136 Sighted a bomber by periscope, distance 4 - 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #13).

1203 Sighted native sail boat.

1801 Sighted single motored plane headed towards us 3 or 4 miles distant. Believe we were undetected but sought the safty of the depths for a few minutes. (Aircraft contact #14).

1918 Surfaced. Weather has finally started to improve a little. Surface patrolling 10 to 12 miles off shore.

25 December 1944

Merry Christmas!

0431 Exchanged recognition signals with BECUNA.

0626 Dove for submerged patrol same as yesterday. Enjoyed Christmas carols on records and a good Christmas dinner.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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1928 Surfaced. Patrolling about 10 miles east of VARELLA.

26 December 1944

0400 Exchanged SJ recognition signals with BECUNA.

0628 Dove for usual submerged patrol. Routined all torpedoes.

1303 QB picked up pinging astern which grew in intensity. We are about 4 miles off Cape VARELLA, sky overcast and seas have some white caps with heavy swells from north, visibility lowered due to light rain.

1320 Unable to see target. Pinging very strong. Went to battle stations submerged.

1330 Sighted mast, bridge, and stack of a ship emitting black smoke--range about 9,000 yards, angle on bow 30°starboard. Can not identify. Came to NAC. No other targets in sight. (Ship contact #14).

1335 Target appears to be a PC boat or small DD or DE with raised forecastle mounting 1 gun, stick foremast just abaft bridge, searchlight platform, tall vertical single stack, small stick mast aft. Tracked him on course 355°T at about 8 knots, and got within about 3,000 yards of him, but believed him too shallow draft and small to hit in these seas, besides maybe something better is astern. Watched him go "over the hill" and closed VARELLA.

1411 Secured from battle stations. Apparently he was just conducting a periodic sweep.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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1928 Surfaced. Patrolling from VARELLA northward ten miles off shore.

2351 SJ radar contact on BECUNA bearing 024°T, 12,000 yards.

27 December 1944

0627 Dove for submerged patrol off Cape VARELLA. Visibility poor and unable to maintain periscope patrol in the heavy seas, so commenced clearing coast and at

1113 Surfaced.

1636 Received BECUNA's message asking if we had seen any mines. Answered that we had seen 3.

1707 Received orders from BECUNA to retire to Longitude 110°-30' E. She had sighted ten mines near her position to the north. As the current is still a strong southerly current DACE gladly complied.

28 December 1944

Patrolling 40 to 60 miles east of Cape VARELLA.

0404 Went to 4 engine speed and commenced closing the coast. Hope we can spot the mines before they spot us.

0618 Dove for submerged patrol northeast of VARELLA.

1058 Unable to maintain periscope depth on northerly courses due to heavy seas. Am south of VARELLA. Have been fighting a losing battle with 3 to 4 knot current so changed course to 180° to continue the struggle off HON DOI Island and southward.

1112 Sighted the masts and stack of a ship bearing 327°T at 8 miles. (Ship contact #15). Commenced tracking.

1114 Sighted a JAKE (Aircraft contact #15) patrolling over and ahead of ship. Visibility not too good with a misty land background and overcast sky. We are about halfway between Cape VARELLA and HON DOI Island opposite the shallow water indentation in the coastline, but in 40 to 60 fathoms of water. As we could not make periscope exposures on northerly courses nor make headway in that direction, I decided to run with enemy and try to make the attack as he passed near HON DOI Island.

1216 Target apparently making 7.5 knots on about 180°T. Cannot see him all the time. Can now see two ships astern of leader in a rough column about 1,000 yards apart. The last one may be an escort. Plan to fire four torpedoes at the first ship and attempt to fire the remaining two at the second ship.

The next hour presented its difficulties with trying to keep track of our position, keeping track of the plane, and track the targets. The problem was made more complex when the stern plane contactors became overheated to the point of melting the insulation, making it necessary to complete the attack with the stern planes in hand power.. This constituted a major casualty considering the rough sea conditions, but was ably handled by the diving officer, Lieutenant W.W. PRICE, JR., U.S.N.

1243 Target has apparently slowed to about 5 knots and has an angle on the bow of 50 port. It looks like we may be getting too close to HON DOI so decided to go to 80 feet.

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and come to course 000°T then swing back to about 270°T in hopes of placing myself in a position for a shot at the first two targets, and still be not too close to the beach. There now appear to be four ships.

1255 On course 240°T with the first target on a 110° port track, but with a longer range than anticipated due to zig away while we were turning.

1258-49 Commenced firing at the leader (fired 4 torpedoes).

1259-40 Commenced firing at the second ship (fired 2 torpedoes).

1300 As we had six torpedoes fanning out from our large impulse bubble (#6 poppet didn't function), and as I had lost track of the air escort I went deep immediately and evaded on course 130°T, rigging for depth charge and silent running.

1301-55 Loud explosion, followed shortly after by a fainter explosion whose time was not recorded.

1304-17 Explosion.

1304-20 Explosion.

1306-38 Explosion.

1307-13 Explosion.

1307 QB and JP (manned by experienced operators) heard definite breaking up noises in the direction of the targets. This was substantiated by two other operators plus the sound officer. These noises were heard over a period of about twenty minutes. Noises also heard through hull.

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1312-30 Depth charge undoubtedly dropped by the plane as no screws were heard close by. The charge was close, but not "tooth shaking".

1323-10 JP heard noises like oil burning on the surface in addition to breaking up noises. No gradient at 300 feet.

From the above facts I am positive we sank one of the two targets (Probably the second one), and possibly hit the other. The first target was a medium MFM AK of about 4,000 tons similar in appearance to the OSAKA MARU or CHERIBON MARU (page 132 and 131, ONI 208(J)Rev.). The second one was not very well identified. It may have been used as a tanker, but resembled in appearance the WAKANOURA MARU (Page 138, ONI 208(J)Rev.). It appeared lower in the water than the first target but approximately the same size. The remaining two ships were not identified. One appeared to be an escort. Subsequent checking of data substantiated by navigational data showed that our firing data was excellent and the problem was checking on TDC when we fired.

1400 All clear on sound, but have decided to remain down until the stern planes are repaired. Depth control is difficult in these heavy seas and I don't want to run the risk of losing control with the air screen they must have above.

1530 Stern planes are repaired. (Resistor was burned out.) Came to periscope depth. All clear but visibility poor. Secured from rig for depth charge and silent running and pumped bilges, made reload and checked after torpedoes.

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1627 Heard and felt a series of six distant explosions that sounded like depth charges. Guess the Japs are working over our area.

1927 Surfaced.

2120 Received GURNARD's contact report. Perhaps we can get in on this force, so commenced patrolling along enemy's probably track.

2320 Weak interference on APR at 153 MC--probably a night plane. The moon is full and bright tonight.

2321 BECUNA sent word that she was going south to a new station. This gives DACE all of Area C-3.

29 December 1944

Patrolling along probable track of a reported contact 20 to 30 miles off shore. APR gets 153 MC (500pps) interference at odd intervals.

0304 Weak SJ contact at 16,000 yards. Probably a patrol vessel. Spent the next hour avoiding. There are apparently two small ships.

0800 Guess our contact isn't going to develop. Will patrol eastern side of area on surface today and let Cape VARELLA cool off after our attack.

1547 Dove for trim and to give reload torpedoes a pressure test. Am glad we did for one of them flooded.

2008 All torpedoes checked. Surfaced.

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30 December 1944

0545 Weak 198 MC interference on APR.

0629 Dove about 9 miles northeast of VARELLA and adjusted position 2 to 3 miles northeast of the Cape.

0928 Raised periscope just in time to see a floating mine pass by about 50 yards to port.

1041 Sighted a JAKE patrolling to the northward about 8 miles distant. Assume something is headed south. (Aircraft contact #16).

1058 Plane appeared to be diving at periscope so went to 150 feet.

1105 Periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Heavy swells from north.

1114 JP heard high noise level at 290°T. While searching I saw five big bombers, apparently FRANCES, in addition to our JAKE. Figured we had hit the jackpot if our still invisible convoy had a six plane escort, but apparently the bombers were just flying south for they soon disappeared. (Aircraft contact #17).

1120 JP reported screws on 280°T. We are trying to close the contact.

1200 Targets were identified as three medium size sea trucks about 500 to 1,000 yards from the beach. (Ship contact #16).

1219 Broke off approach and continued patrolling.

1943 Surfaced. Made night sweep to seaward. Moon is full and apparently no traffic moves along the coast at night.

31 December 1944

0622 Dove in our usual spot northeast of Cape VARELLA.

0956 Sound heard pinging on 240°T. This is probably the force reported in GURNARD's third last night.

1000 Sighted tops of four or five ships standing up the coast from the south bearing 201°T. (Ship contact #17). Commenced tracking. We are on course 345°T, the visibility around the shore and to south is not good. Seas have a moderate swell from north with little or no white caps. Current is usual 3 knot southerly current. We are two to three miles off shore a little north of VARELLA.

1005 It now appears that there are two parallel columns of ships. The near ship is a transport at about 12,000 yards, angle on the bow 15° port with an escort on his port bow. It looks as though the outboard column has an escort on its starboard bow. My plan is to get between the two columns and try to fire bow and stern tubes, and keep from closing the shore too much. (Water shoals rapidly near shore.) Targets appear to be on course 005°T with the range to the transport about 9,000 yards.

1008 Leading ship (transport) zigged 30° to his port, angle on the bow is now 15 starboard.

1011 Changed course to 000°T, but as depth control and periscope feather are worse on this course than any other, at

1017 Reversed course coming right to 180°. Two JAKES (Aircraft contact #18) are now in sight

patrolling over convoy. Submerged to 80 feet during the turn.

1022 Periscope depth. Inshore escort is headed over our way. Sound gets screws and pinging on several bearings.

1025 From the looks of things I am just to seaward of a column of four DD's or DE's. This was what I thought until now was a second column of big ships. It appears that they had been on a converging course with the inshore column, and that plus the offshore distance I gained on my right turn placed me in this most undesirable position.

1028 Screws of escort that turned towards us have slowed and stopped. I am now about 4,000 yards from the transport. Right full rudder and more speed.

1032 Changed course to 290°T. Escorts commenced passing us one by one all pinging furiously. The closest passed about 300 to 400 yards from us. Can't locate the transport.

1036 Screws of our suspicious escort have started up again.

1038 Have lost sight of transport. Convoy speed is about 12 knots.

1039 Shifted targets to two almost overlapping tankers; angle on the bow about 120° port, range about 3,500 yards. We were getting a set up on these, when at

1041 I spotted an escort carrier against the land background with a DD or DE in line with it. Angle on the bow about 110° port, range about 4,000 yards. This was the last

target in the column. We had three Mk 14's loaded forward (the others were Mk 23's), so

1045 TDC was shifted to low power. Depth set at 6 feet (in hopes of hitting the escort also).

1048 Trouble getting correct solution light on TDC. (Should have used Mk 8 Angle Solver, but thought we would get a near enough solution on the TDC--time was getting short.)

1050-50 Fired tube #1.

1050-59 Fired tube #3.

1051-09 Fired tube #5.

1052 Commenced changing course to 130°T, and going deep. Rigged for depth charge and silent running.

1101 Depth charge or depth bomb explosion--not close. Apparently no torpedo hits. No gradient at 300 feet. Much pinging and many screws which remained in evidence until

1202 At which time we came to periscope depth and secured from rig for depth charge and silent running.

1207 Commenced opening coast at 2/3 speed so we can surface, broadcast our contact report to the ROCK which is north of us, and make an end around on the target.

1233 While making preparation for surfacing received a depth bomb--not too close. Plane apparently sighted our 2/3 speed periscope feather. Guess we will have to clear this spot prior to surfacing. (Aircraft contact #19).

- -

1433 Surfaced. Commenced transmitting contact report.

1434 SJ and SD both got a plane at 8 miles closing. (Aircraft contact #20). There may have been two planes according to SJ radar.

1435 Dove.

1511 One depth charge explosion--not close; probably dropped on our diving point. From the next sequence of events I believe the plane must have dropped a marker float at some previous time and called an escort, for at

1512 Heard and felt two depth charges--not close. Went deep and rigged for depth charge.

1513 Heard and felt one more depth charge.

1515 Heard and felt eight more depth charges.

1516 Heard and felt eleven more depth charges. What a barrage! None were too close, but were close enough to jar the boat. Sound heard pinging at 260°T.

1627 All clear apparently. No screws are in evidence. The Nip's convoy has too good a start on us now to intercept him. Seas are building up from the north.

1920 We were all set to surface when suddenly sound picked up what sounded like air compressors, or some ship's auxiliary machinery dead ahead and quite loud. The noise was rhythmical but too fast for screws. All of our sound talent agreed that it sounded like machinery. The moon isn't up yet and nothing can be seen through the periscope.

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The bearing is drawing southward from about 090°T, but the intensity doesn't diminish. Figuring perhaps it was a "sleeper" patrol boat conducting a listening search we went deep and rigged for silent running. This sound continued to baffle us and remained very loud until about 2020 when it began to diminish slowly in a southerly direction. By

2045 The noise was very faint so we came to periscope depth and could see nothing in the moonlight, so at

2100. Surfaced. All clear.

2110 SJ radar out of commission for a half an hour.

2200 Cleared contact report of today's force. (DACE's third to CTF-71.) Patrolled off shore.

1 January 1945 (Happy New Year!)

Patrolling on surface.

1014 SD contact 15 miles. (Aircraft contact #21). Closed to 8 miles, so at

1016 Dove.

1054 Surfaced. All clear.

1920 Weak SJ radar interference to the north.

2338 SJ radar out of commission.

2 January 1945

0045 Cleared DACE's fourth to CTF-71 giving a resume of the patrol so far, and giving 3 January as the limit of our endurance if we

- -

are to make SAIPAN by the new prescribed routing with a safe fuel margin.

0113 Put on three main engines to reach the 0500 position of a reported contact. This will put us slightly out of our area to the east, but the adjoining area is vacant.

0402 SJ is back in commission. Attempted without results to exchange recognition signals with a submarine to the southwest of us. I guess the GURNARD or GUITARRO is searching also.

0643 SJ radar commenced flickering on and off.

0755 SJ repaired. Seas are building up to real large ones once more.

1200 Convoy is seven hours overdue on our estimated 0500 position. Broke off search and headed back to our area.

1526 Patrolling on the surface in the southern part of our area headed north.

2040 Received CTF-71's serial 41 to the DACE stating that it was desired DACE remain on station another week, and to conserve fuel unless developing contacts, but to advise CTF-71 when we leave the area.

Fuel needs and mileage were recomputed carefully and fuel safety factor cut down. Considering adverse currents, head seas, past engine performance, zig-zagging, etc., I believe 38,000 gallons to be our minimum fuel allowance for reaching SIAPAN. We will stretch out our "velvet fuel" as long as possible.

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3 January 1945

0625 Dove for submerged patrol between VARELLA and HON DOI. This is the first really good day we have had from a weather and seas point of view. Current is checking at only 2 to 2.5 knots south.

1952 Surfaced. Patrolling 12 miles off shore.

2030 Took advantage of the good weather to grease the topside. Weak APR interference on 193 MC.

2326 Intercepted a "Close Urgent" message from the GUITARRO to the GURNARD. From a previous message we knew her position, and that she was limited to 10 knots with stern planes jammed on hard rise. As we were less than 50 miles from her and figured the GURNARD might be more distant we commenced closing her at 4 engine speed, and sent a message to her asking if we could assist and giving our position. Message was not receipted for.

4 January 1945

Closing GUITARRO at top speed.

0027 Nothing having been heard from the GUITARRO we told the GURNARD that we were closing the GUITARRO giving our ETA and asking if he could get there sooner.

0034 Received message from the GUITARRO stating that the GURNARD was assisting her, so at

0040 Reduced speed and resumed patrolling to the northward.

0613 Dove northeast of VARELLA for our usual submerged patrol. Passed six small sail boats during the morning.

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1952 Surfaced. Patrolling 10 to 14 miles off shore.

2332 Plane was contacted by SJ and verified by SD at 27,000 yards, bearing 190°T. Faded out rapidly. (Aircraft contact #22).

5 January 1945

Patrolling near coast.

0038 SJ contact bearing 325°T at 6,300 yards. Lookouts can see a small blob. Avoided.

0615 Dove northeast of VARELLA and closed the coast for submerged patrol. Sighted five small sailboats during the day.

1931 Surfaced. Patrolling 12 miles off shore.

2200 Converted No. 5 R.F.B.T. to watter ballast tank.

2316 Dove to wash oil out of No. 5 M.B.T.

2333 Surfaced.

6 January 1945

Surface patrolling 12 miles off shore.

0621 Dove. Conducted submerged patrol off VARELLA.

1024 Sighted a large unidentified bomber through the periscope. (Aircraft contact #23).

1938 Surfaced. Patrolling northward 12 to 15 miles off shore.

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7 January 1945

Surface patrolling.

0237 Cleared DACE's serial five to CTF-71 reporting that we were departing Area C-3 at 0700 due to fuel shortage and that we had no further contacts.

0630 Crossed northern boundary of Area C-3 enroute SAIPAN.

1325 Dove for trim.

1342 Surfaced.

1745 Received CTF's serial 65 ordering us to pass to operational control of CTF-17 at a certain position at 1200H the eighth, and bidding the DACE a warm farewell and best wishes.

2100 Converted No. 3 R.F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

2213 Dove to wash oil from No. 3 M.B.T.

2238 Surfaced.

2355 Transmitted DACE's serial one to CTF-17 telling him that we were reporting for duty at 1200H on the eighth and informing him of our proposed route to SAIPAN, our speed of advance, fuel, torpedoes, etc.

8 January 1945

Enroute SAIPAN.

1430 Made trim dive.

1447 Surfaced.

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1807 Sighted sails of two ships about 15,000 yards, bearing 074°T. We are silhouetted against the afterglow of the sunset. Closed at high speed, manned all bridge level guns, and had other gun crews standing by below.

1830 Ships appear to be Chinese junks. (We are about 90 miles from the China coast). Continued to close and passed astern of them at 2,500 yards, then turned northward to silhouette them. Put a burst of 20mm across their bow, and they immediately commenced taking in their sails.

1847 Closed to within 400 yards and definitely identified them as Chinese junks and deemed them no gun shoot target.

1850 Resumed base course and speed.

1917 Received ComSubPacFor's welcome message (serial 92 Peter).

9 January 1945

0040 Picked up weak SJ interference on 320°T.

1205 SD contact 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #24).

1212 Lost SD contact at 22 miles.

1227 Made landfall on PRATAS Island by SJ at 22,950 yards bearing 313°T. There are two tall radio towers on this island.

1711 Received ComSubPacFor's serial 97 Sugar giving important routing instructions, and requesting acknowledgement and weather report.

2205 Cleared DACE's serial 2 to ComSubPacFor in answer to the above serial.

- -

10 January 1945

0558 SD contact 28 miles. Closed a little, then faded out. (Aircraft contact #25).

0628 Dove for trim.

0650 Sighted two small single-engine planes through periscope. (Aircraft contact #26).

0701 Surfaced.

0712 Land (FORMOSA) on SJ bearing 060°T, at 55 miles.

0950 Dove for SD contact at 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #27).

1025 Surfaced.

1047 Dove for plane sighted by lookout and SD at 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #28).

1157 Surfaced.

1330 Dove for SD contact 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #29).

1400 Surfaced.

1444 SD contact 14 miles closing. (Aircraft contact #30).

1445 Dove.

1515 Surfaced.

1518 SD contact 18 miles. (Aircraft contact #31).

1521 Dove with plane at 14 miles closing.

1625 Surfaced.

- -

1640 SD contact 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #32).

1644 Dove with plane 13 miles closing. Decided to remain submerged until sunset.

1815 Surfaced.

1945 SJ contact on an unidentified object at 5,280 yards bearing 060°T. Avoided.

2000 SJ contact on BATAN Island bearing 103°T, 95,000 yards.

2105 Received ComSubPacFor's serial 6 Yoke giving us further routing instructions.
Picked up various islands near BALINGTANG Channel on schedule.

11 January 1945

0050 Completed transit of BALINGTANG Channel and set course southward along the coast of LUZON Island.having rounded BABUYAN Island at ten miles distance to the north and east.

0100 Commenced getting SJ radar interference.

0225 SJ contact bearing 040°T at 35,000 yards on DIDICAS ROCKS.

0247 SJ radar contact on our SJ "interference friend" at 9,950 yards. Tried unsuccessfully several times to challenge and closed to 8,000 yards, but got no response. Believe him to be U.S.S. CROAKER. Lost contact at 10,000 yards.

0310 Intermittent SD interference on APR.

0618 Dove for trim.

0643 Surfaced.

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0822 Dove for SD contact 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #33).

0902 Surfaced.

0945 SD contact 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #34).

0946 Dove with plane at 13 miles closing.

1035 Surfaced.

1820 No. 2 main generator was put out of commission due to commutator casualty. (See MAJOR DEFECTS). Unable to effect repairs at sea.

12 January 1945

0558 Dove for trim.

0619 Surfaced.

0750 Liberator bomber sighted by lookout bearing 130°T at 10 miles, flying low. (Aircraft contact #35).

0752 SJ contact on same plane at 18,000 yards. Watched him pass ahead, close to 4 miles, then disappear at 8 miles. Apparently he never saw us.

0804 SJ contact on a plane bearing 265°T at 30,000 yards (a different plane). This one changed bearing rapidly, closed to 28,000 yards, and then faded. (Aircraft contact #36).

2125 Received CTG 17.7 despatch 120637 giving us further routing and rendezvous information.

13 January 1945

0637 Dove for SD contact at 11 miles which closed to 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #37).

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0702 Surfaced.

0830 Completed transmission of DACE's serial 1 to CTG-17.7 giving him our position, speed of advance and time at rendezvous point.

0901 SD contact at 19 miles closing very slowly. (Aircraft contact #38).

0903 Above plane sighted by lookout and OOD. Apparently a Liberator on patrol. Faded from view and SD at about 17 miles.

1042 Large low-flying plane sighted by lookout and JOOD. Neither radar could pick it up. Estimated range 18 miles. (Aircraft contact #39).

1047 Plane disappeared. It appeared to be a large bomber.

1200 Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -9 zone time. (ITEM time).

1315I Dove to routine torpedoes.

1740I Surfaced.

1859I Lookout sighted what appeared to be a green flare bearing 020°T, distance about 6,000 yards. As there was no indication of anything on the radar we thought it might be from a downed aviator, so we changed course to 000°T and ran for 3 miles, fired a recognition flare (which brilliantly illuminated us), and turned east.

1930I Broke off search.

2142I Strong interference on APR at 223mc sweeping every 48 seconds.

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14 January 1945

1153I SD contact at 19 miles. (Aircraft contact #40).

1158I Plane disappeared from radar screen.

1204I SD contact at 22 miles (possibly same as contact #40). (Aircraft contact #41).

1207I Lost contact at 23 miles.

1950I SJ interference to the north on a westerly course. Attempted unsuccessfully to challenge. Believe this was U.S.S. CHARR.

15 January 1945

0600I Dove for trim.

0613I Surfaced.

0945I SD contact at 21 miles closing. (Aircraft contact #42).

0952I With plane 6 miles and closing, and still being unable to see him we fired a flare and dove.

1015I Surfaced.

1541I SD contact at 32 miles. (Aircraft contact #43).

1546I Plane opened to 34 miles and disappeared.

1600I Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -10 zone time (KING time).

1935K Weak 107mc APR interference.

2155K Weak 200mc APR interference.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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16 January 1945

0020K Arrived at escort rendezvous point.

0032K Contacted escort by SJ. Closed and spoke him. Escort was LCI 677. Proceeded toward SAIPAN, the lights of which were visible to us 70 miles away. From here on many friendly planes were contacted. They will not be individually reported herein.

0407K SAIPAN contacted on SJ bearing 102°T, at 45 miles.

0645K Entered TANAPAG Harbor, SAIPAN Island.

0730K Moored starboard side to U.S.S. SKIPJACK in nest along port side of U.S.S. FULTON.

While at SAIPAN accomplished minor repairs and fueled ship. The repairs on No. 2 main generator were deemed too big a job for the tender to accomplish during our short stay, so will proceed to Pearl Harbor, T.H. with it out of commission.

The facilities, willingness to help, and courtsey shown us by the tender were greatly appreciated.

17 January 1945

Moored TANAPAG Harbor, SAIPAN.

18 January 1945

1000K Underway from SAIPAN enroute Pearl Harbor, T.H., with LCI 1061 as escort.

1256K Sighted ANATAHAN Island bearing 010°T at about 60 miles.

1450K Dove for trim.

1520K Surfaced.

- -

1700K Released escort.

2030K Sighted SARIGAN Island bearing 046°T at 35 miles.

2200K Transited passage between SARIGAN and GUGUAN Islands passing the latter 8 miles abeam.

All during the day and evening many friendly planes and ships were sighted. These are not included herein.

19 January 1945

1028K PBM sighted by quartermaster and picked up on both radars at 14 miles. (Aircraft contact #44).

1320K Dove for trim.

1331K Surfaced.

1545K Unidentified plane sighted at 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #45).

20 January 1945

No remarks.

21 January 1945

1000K Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to -11 zone time (LOVE time).

1340L Dove for trim.

1405L Surfaced.

22 January 1945

No remarks.

23 January 1945

Reconverted No. 4 R.F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

1245L Dove for trim and to wash oil from #4 MBT.

1319L Surfaced.

1920L Sighted green flare to southward. Searched for forty minutes and fired a flare, but had no results.

1955L Weak SJ interference apparently to southward on opposite course.

24 January 1945

0600L Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -12 zone time (MIKE time).

1235M Dove. Conducted six hour battery discharge in preparation for Navy Yard layup. Routined all torpedoes and compensated magnetic compasses.

1728M Surfaced.

1830M Completed battery discharge.

24 January 1945 (West Longitude date)

0705M 25 January 1945 East Longitude time and date crossed 180th meridian into zone plus twelve (YOKE) time, and turned the calendar back one day repeating the 24th of January.

0935Y Dove for trim.

1010Y Surfaced.

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25 January 1945

1300Y Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to plus 11 zone time (XRAY time).

1517X Dove for trim.

1550X Surfaced.

26 January 1945

1145K Passed two friendly submarines believed to be LAGARTO and HADDOCK abeam to port.

27 January 1945

0015X Passed and exchanged recognition signals with POMFRET.

0615X Dove for trim.

0640X Surfaced.

0807X Unidentified aircraft sighted and contacted on SD radar at 23 miles opening. (Aircraft contact #46). (From here until end of patrol sighted many friendly planes which will not be individually listed herein.)

28 January 1945

0130X Sighted KAUAI Island 65 miles to the north.

0430X SJ contact on OAHU Island 55 miles bearing 072°T.

0435X Contacted our escort, PC 485, and proceeded to port in company.

1000X Moored Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

--END OF SIXTH WAR PATROL

(C) WEATHER

Weather conditions encountered were those expected for the area during the NE monsoon. Heavy seas, contiuous rain, overcast skies, and moderate winds predominated. In general, the weather was unsuitable for submarine operations.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Currents as described in Coast Pilot were encountered. The drift, however, averaged 3.0 knots instead of the normal 1.5 knots, and in some instances a drift as high as 4.0 knots was recorded.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No new navigational aids were observed. Two radio towers were observed on PRATAS Island. Longitude 20°-44'N, Latitude 116°-46' E. Loran equipment was carried for the first time, and although the lack of stations did not allow maximum use of the equipment it is felt that this instrument will become invaluable for submarine navigation. A fair fix was obtained 1,400 miles from the station on the NW coast of Australia.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

NO.	TIME : DATE	LAT.& LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL RANGE	EST.CRS & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1	2214H : 8 Dec	08-35S: 115-43E	Unknown	4.5mi.	Stopped	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol
2	2243H : 8 Dec	08-26S: 115-48E	Unknown	6 mi.	185T : 8 kts.	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol
3	2308H : 8 Dec	08-20S: 115-54E	Unknown	7 mi.	200T : 11 kts.	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol
4	2327H : 8 Dec	08-17S: 115-58E	Unknown	6 mi.	297T : 21 Kts.	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol
5	2329H : 8 Dec	08-17S: 115-58E	Unknown	3½ mi.	100T : 12 Kts	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol
6	2345H : 8 Dec	08-14S: 116-02E	Unknown	1½ mi.	Unk.	SJ Radar	Lombok Patrol or stationary object.
7	1515H : 9 Dec	06-00S: 115-15E	Sailing vessel	13 mi.	090T : 5 Kts.	High Perisc.	Avoided.
8	0350H : 10 Dec	05-25S: 112-38E	Minesweeper or Trawler	9 mi.	053T : 7½ Kts.	SJ Radar	Too small for torpedo.
9	2245H : 12 Dec	00-54N: 106-33E	Junk	9 mi.	Stopped	SJ Radar	Closed to identify.
10	0915H : 19 Dec	11-59N: 109-22E	(3)AO,(2)Unid. (3) Escorts.	5 mi.	018T : 8½ Kts	Pinging	Air covered--detected prior to firing.

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(F) SHIP CONTACT (CONT'D)

NO.	TIME : DATE	LAT.& LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL RANGE	EST.CRS & SPEED	HOW CON: TACTED	REMARKS
	0459H	12-13N	Patrol		320T	SJ	
11	21 Dec	109-31E	Vessel	7½ mi.	4 Kts.	Radar	Closed to identify.
	1527H	11-42N			315T	SJ	Entering CAMRANAH
12	22 Dec	109-35E	A.O.	13½ mi	11 Kts.	Radar	Bay.
	2350H	13-07N	Unidentified		020T	SJ	Too small for
13	23 Dec	109-33E	small vessel.	8 mi.	3 Kts.	Radar	torpedo.
	1330H	12-53N	Large PC		355T	Sound	Shallow draft
14	26 Dec	109-30E	or DE	7½ mi.	8 Kts.	Pinging	Heavy Seas
	1112H	12-46N	(3) Med. AK's		180T	Peri-	Attack #1
15	28 Dec	109-32E	(1)Und. Escrt.	7 mi.	5½ Kts	scope	Air covered.
	1200H	13-00N	(3) Sea Trucks		180T		
16	30 Dec	109-29E		6 mi.	6 Kts.	J.P.	Air covered.
	0956H	12-56N	(1)CVL,(1)AP,		000T	Sound	Attack #2
17	31 Dec	109-29E	(2)AO, (5)DD.	8 mi.	12 Kts	Pinging	Air covered.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No.	TIME : DATE	LAT.& : LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL RANGE	EST.CRS & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
1	0827H : 9 Dec	06-19S: 116-17E	Unknown	9 mi.	100T : Unk.	SD	
2	0937H : 9 Dec	06-18S: 116-13E	Unknown	12 mi.	010T : Unk.	SD	
3	0927H : 13 Dec	02-55N: 106-52E	Unknown	22 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
4	0942H : 15 Dec	11-02N: 110-28E	2-Engine Bomber	8 mi.	090T : Unk.	SD	
5	1250H : 15 Dec	11-28N: 110-22E	Unknown	11 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
6	1335H : 15 Dec	11-30N: 110-22E	Unknown	6 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
7	1055H : 17 Dec	12-26N: 110-12E	Unknown	16 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
8	1137H : 17 Dec	12-27N: 110-12E	Unknown	14 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
9	1001H : 19 Dec	11-58N: 109-22E	Unknown	Unk.	Unk.		Not sighted.Air cover for convoy.Rec.4 D.C.
10	1048H : 20 Dec	12-06N: 109-47E	Unknown	22 mi	Unk.	SDR	
11	1215H : 22 Dec	12-17N: 109-44E	Unknown	14 mi	Unk.	SDR	

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (CONT'D)

NO.	TIME : DATE	LAT.& : LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL RANGE	EST.CRS & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
12	1545H : 22 Dec	11-42N : 109-34E	Unknown	13 Mi.	Unk.	SDR	Air cover for Ship contact #12
13	1136H : 24 Dec	12-51N : 109-31E	Bomber	5 mi.	130T : 150 Kts	Periscope	
14	1801H : 24 Dec	12-50N : 109-31E	Fighter, Single-motor	3 mi.	200T : 150 Kts	Periscope	
15	1114H : 28 Dec	12-46N : 109-32E	JAKE	7 mi.	Patrolling	Periscope	Air cover for convoy.
16	1041H : 30 Dec	13-03N : 109-29E	JAKE	8 mi.	Patrolling	Periscope	Air cover for Sea Trucks.
17	1114H : 30 Dec	13-02N : 109-29E	(5) FRANCES	4 mi.	180T : 200 Kts	Periscope	
18	1017H : 31 Dec	12-57N : 109-29E	JAKE	4 mi.	Patrolling	Periscope	Air cover for convoy.
19	1233H : 31 Dec	12-50N : 109-33E	Unknown	½ mi.	Unk.		Not sighted. Received One Depth Bomb
20	1434H : 31 Dec	12-41N : 109-38E	Unknown	8 mi.	Unk.	SJR	Patrolling.
21	1014H : 1 Jan	13-35N : 110-28E	Unknown	15 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
22	2332H : 4 Jan	12-54N : 109-38E	Unknown	14 mi.	Unk.	SJR	

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (CONT'D)

NO.	TIME : DATE	LAT.& : LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL: RANGE	EST.CRS. & SPEED	HOW CON: TACTED	REMARKS
23	1023H : 6 Jan	12-55N: 109-29E	Unidentified Bomber	5 mi.	180T 200 Kts.	Peri- scope	
24	1205H : 9 Jan	20-56N: 116-37E	Unknown	22 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
25	0558H : 10 Jan	21-53N: 119-52E	Unkno	28 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
26	0650H : 10 Jan	21-55N: 119-58E	BETTY	4 mi.	Unk.	Peri- scope	
27	0950H : 10 Jan	21-30N: 120-13E	Unknown	8 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
28	1047H : 10 Jan	21-15N: 120-27E	Unknown	9 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
29	1330H : 10 Jan	20-59N: 120-43E	Unknown	7 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
30	1444H : 10 Jan	20-51N: 120-50E	Unknown	14 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
31	1518H : 10 Jan	20-49N: 120-51E	Unknown	18 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
32	1640H : 10 Jan	20-44N: 120-56E	Unknown	22 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
33	0822H : 11 Jan	18-11N: 122-25E	Unknown	8 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
34	0945H : 11 Jan	17-54N: 122-28E	Unknown	16 mi.	Unk.	SDR	

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (CONT'D)

NO.	TIME & DATE	LAT. & LONG.	Type(s)	INITAL RANGE	EST. CRS & SPEED	HOW CONTACTED	REMARKS
35	0750H 12 Jan	15-03N 125-19E	B-24	10 mi.	030T 150 Kts	SD	
36	0804H 12 Jan	15-03N 125-21E	Unknown	15 mi.	Unk.	SJR	
37	0637I 13 Jan	15-14N 130-09E	Unknown	11 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
38	0901I 13 Jan	15-14N 130-44E	B-24	19 mi.	300T 150 Kts	SDR	
39	1042I 13 Jan	15-13N 131-09E	BOMBER	18 mi.	180T Unk.	SD	
40	1153I 14 Jan	15-07N 136-35E	Unknown	19mi.	Unk.	SDR	
41	1201I 14 Jan	15-07N 136-36E	Unknown	22 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
42	0945I 15 Jan	15-08N 141-25E	Unknown	21 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
43	1541I 15 Jan	15-12N 142-34E	Unknown	32 mi.	Unk.	SDR	
44	1028K 19 Jan	18-05N 148-48E	PBM	14 mi.	320T 150 Kts	SD	
45	1545K 19 Jan	18-25N 149-51E	Unknown	12 mi.	200T Unk.	SD	

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Torpedo Attack Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol #6

Time: 1300H Date: 12/28/44 Lat. 12-39N Long. 109-30E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Four ship convoy in column with approximately 1200 yards between the first and second ships which were identified as medium freighters. The after two ships were not well identified--at least one appeared to be an escort.

Ship Sunk: One (1) Medium MFM AK, approximately 4,000 tons, similar in appearance to the WAKANOURA MARU (PP 138, ONI 208(J) Rev.).(EU).

Ship possibly Damaged or Sunk: One (1) Medium MFM AK, approximately 4,000 tons, similar in appearance to the ASAKA or CHERIBON MARU (PP 132 & 131 ONI 208 (J) Rev.). (EU).

Damage Determined by: One definite timed torpedo hit and one fainter explosion timed to hit the leader (i.e. more distant ship) followed five minutes later by breaking-up noises which could be heard through the ship's hull and which were identified by four experienced sound operators and the sound officer at the JP & QB sound stations. These breaking up noises came from the general direction of the second ship, but had a very broad bearing (20° or more) and persisted for about 20 minutes. Noises resembling burning oil were also heard.

Target Draft: 12' Course: 180°T Speed: 5.6 Range: 3900 (at 3300 (firing)

(H) ATTACK DATA (Torpedo Attack Form) CONT'D)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3.0 Course: 240°T Depth: 65' Angle: 0(at firing)

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: A submerged daylight attack was made at periscope depth using the T.D.C. with periscope ranges and bearings supplied to obtain the firing set-up. A four torpedo salvo was fired at the leaking AK and a two torpedo salvo was fired at the second AK. A divergent spread was introduced into each salvo, and the check bearing method of firing was employed.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (CONT'D)

Tubes Fired	#3	#4	#5	#6	#1	#2
Track Angle	127P	127P	128P	126P	115P	114P
Gyro Angle	352	352	351	354	007	008
Depth Set	8'	8'	8'	8'	8'	8'
Power	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit	Miss	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3A	23	14-3A	23	14-3A	23
Serial No.	26472	50197	63599	65910	63601	50008
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	25901	19629	8120	8824	19957	19806
Actuation Set	- - - - - - - -		CONTACT		- - - - - - - - -	
Actuation Actual	--	--	CONTACT		-CONTACT	--
Mark War Head	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	14686	3546	14734	14759	14684	34237
Explosive	- - - - - - - -		TORPEX		- - - - - - - - -	
Firing Interval	--	9"	8"	9"	25"	8"
Type Spread	- - - - - - - -		DIVERGENT		- - - - - - - -	
Sea Conditions	- - - - - - - -		ROUGH SEA		- - - - - - - -	
Overhaul	#2, #4, Navy #137					
Activity	#1, #3, #5, #6, U.S.S. EURYALE					

Remarks:

It is believed that all torpedoes ran HSN.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Torpedo Attack Report Form)(CONT'D)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 6

Time: 1055H Date: 12/31/44 Lat. 12-55N Long. 109-29E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Escorting Aircraft Carrier which closely resembled the CHITOSE Class CVL.

Ship(s) Sunk: None.

Ship(s) Damaged or Probable Sunk: None.

Target draft: 18' Course: 000°T Speed: 12 Range: 4500 (at firing).

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3.0 Course: 328°T Depth: 62' Angle: 0 (at firing).

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Submerged daylight attack was made at periscope depth on the escorting carrier at long range. Periscope bearings and ranges were used in the TDC to obtain the firing set-up. With only three Mk 14-3A torpedoes in the bow tubes, a three torpedo salvo in low power was fired using the check bearing method, and employing a divergent spread. The torpedoes were fired without a correct solution light on the TDC (caused by 240 sec. torpedo run cutout). The Mk 8 Angle Solver was not employed as it was thought the TDC solution would be near enough to get hits. The torpedoes are believed to have missed the target astern. Torpedo depths were 6 feet because there was a chance to hit a DD near the carrier if the carrier was missed.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (CONT'D)

Tubes Fired	#1	#3	#5
Track Angle	132½S	132½S	135S
Gyro Angle	344½	344½	346½
Depth Set	6'	6'	6'
Power	LOW	LOW	LOW
Hit or Miss	MISS	MISS	MISS
Erratic	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	26432	24222	25114
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	26905	19949	26763
Actuation Set	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual	- -	- -	- -
Mark War Head	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	14713	14671	14683
Explosive	TORPEX	TORPEX	TORPEX
Firing Interval	- -	9"	10"
Type Spread	- - - - - DIVERGENT - - - - -		
Sea Conditions	- - - MODERATE SEA - - - - - -		
Overhaul Activity	- - - U.S.S. EURYALE - - - - -		

Remarks: All torpedoes are believed to have run HSN.

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(I) MINES

In accordance with Commander Task Group 71.1 Operation Order No. 167-44 this vessel laid a field of eleven Mark 12 mines on the arc of a circle between PULAU GAMBIR Island and the Indo China coast. All mines were dropped from the after tubes with the ship on the surface, and in a flooded down condition in water of 11 to 12 fathoms. The plant was a difficult one due to pattemdesired, weather, currents, and close proximity to the shore (about 1,000 yards to the nearest point). During the same day the plant was made two probable mine explosions were heard. Full details concerning the plant are contained in C.O. U.S.S. DACE serial 001 of 17 December 1944 addressed to Commander Task Force 71.

During our stay off the Indo China coast this vessel sighted about four spherical horn type mines, and nearby submarines to the north and south sighted many others. At one point we were ordered to clear the coast due to the close proximity of many floating mines. It is believed that the extremely rough weather encountered caused the mines to break their moorings from fields to the north and the strong current caused them to drift rapidly southward. We possibly sank one mine, but due to rough seas and close proximity to the coast the others could not be sunk. Perhaps the mines became unarmed upon breaking their moorings, but I don't desire to be the one to test them, and operating in these waters particularly at night was rather nerve wracking.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

Perhaps the Japs are at last waking up to the fact that we use Lombok Straits. DACE encountered four good sized (and perhaps two other) craft equally spaced and apparently patrolling across the northern entrance to the straits making our transit difficult. I do not believe any of these were radar equipped however, but at least one was a 21 knot ship.

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(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS (CONT'D)

All convoys contacted were surface and air escorted. The surface escorts appeared for the most part to be DE's or small DD's. The planes were invariably JAKES. Regular shipping appeared to hug the coast closely with the escorts to seaward of their convoys.

The Japs still ping blindly telegraphing their presence before they can be sighted. They also still employed the stop and listen search. Once our presence was detected they employed their usual depth charging and search tactics. Apparently they were able to keep a plane or two over the area for sometime after detection, and it is believed that on one occasion our supposed position was marked with a float of some kind and a surface escort sent for.

Judging from our "drubbing" on the 19th of December, I would say that a JAKE can carry four good size depth charges or bombs.

Our evasion tactics invariably consisted of going to about 300 feet (if depth of water permitted), using 65 turns on one shaft and 60 on the other, and running silently in the direction of the current and away from the coast.

No new countermeasures were noted.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

ENGINEERING:

1. Failure of No. 3 main engine outboard exhaust valve to close caused flooding of that engine. Investigation showed that the pin linking the main drive stem with the rocker arm assembly was missing. The pin was replaced with one of the same size from the inboard engine induction flapper operating mechanism. No permanent damage was sustained by the engine or the exhaust valve. Damage was due to depth charging.

2. Misalignment of the drive shaft in the compressor of No. 1 vapor distiller unit caused excessive wear of the bearings, lobes, and timing gears. Compressor

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (CONT'D)

was disassembled and all defective parts renewed from spares.

ELECTRICAL:

Stern Planes - Dynamic breaking resistance open circuited, causing the shunt brake to heat excessively. Relay coil renewed.

Main Generators - Low readings were obtained on main generators as follows. Upon completion of refit #1 main generator read 6 megs; #2 main generator 400,000 ohms; #3 main generator 500,000 ohms; and #4 main generator 2.5 megs. During the training period readings on #2, 3, and 4 dropped. After #2 main generator was sprayed again, it improved and has remained about 1 meg. #3 main generator dropped to 100,000 ohms, and still is 100,000 ohms although it has been run the same number of hours as the others. #4 main generator has steadily dropped and is now 250,000 ohms.

No. 2 Main Generator - Some of the commutator bars (due to either heat or centrifugal force) lifted. The current feeding through partially lifted brushes to brush holders caused the brush holders to melt. The metal therefrom accumulated between the commutator bars, and caused a short circuit which in turn burned the brushes and caused considerable sparking. Inspection showed burned brushes, melted brush holders, high commutator bars, disintegrated mica and charred commutator. The generator was placed out of commission as the repair work to be done is well beyond the capacity of the ship's force.

(L) RADIO

Reception of BAKERS schedules was good with no interference from the enemy. No serials were missed. During both day and night, 9250 kcs. was the best frequency.

SUB FOX reception was difficult shortly after shifting op-control to CTF-17 due to atmospheric

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(L) RADIO (CONT'D)

conditions and interference from nearby enemy stations although there did not appear to be any intentional jamming of NPM. Reception improved after leaving the China Sea. No lettered serials were missed. 6045 kcs. was the best frequency during the night with 16,730 kcs. best during the day.

Radio Chungking (NKM) was guarded every night while in the China Sea during the broadcasts to submarines. Many good contacts were included in the messages. There was, however, a lot of useless material also included which needlessly increased the load of the coding board. A great deal of interference was encountered on these broadcasts, but the NKM signal was so strong that there was usually no difficulty in copying. Following is a list of the NKM number and date-time group of all messages received.

- - 161650 (DEC. 1944)
318-171642 "
18th (couldn't raise)
322-190915 (DEC. 1944)
323-191732 "
324-201730 "
326-211711 "
327-211723 "
22nd (couldn't raise)
329-230922 (DEC. 1944)
330-240105 "
331-240900 "
332-251520 "
338-261715 "
341-271655 "
342-271630 "
345-281645 "
346-281637 "
344-280940 "
349-291705 (DEC. 1944)
353-301607 "
354-301620 "
355-301704 "
357-311705 "
368-011652 (JAN. 1945)
369-011656 "
376-021627 "
377-021630 "
381-031640 "
387-041720 "
388-041710 "
391-051615 "
392-051637 "
6th (couldn't raise)
400-071735 (JAN. 1945)
403-081707 "
404-081657 "
405-081728 "

The 9 messages originated were cleared with unusually little trouble, and no interference from the Japs.

(M) RADAR

The SJ-a radar gave excellent results from the standpoint of ranges, particularly on small targets. The slotted reflector completely eliminated side lobes, and is probably responsible for the increased range on small targets such as sailboats. Except for normal tube failures, the only casualty was the breakdown of the modulation network due to leakage of oil.

The SD radar provided very reliable performance with contacts usually twelve miles or better, and up to thirty miles on aircraft.

The radar detector (APR-SPA) yielded four contacts on enemy radar with data as given in (U).

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions in the area were poor with a high water noise level due to the strong current and shallow water. During evasive tactics on the morning of 19 December the JK side of the JK-QC head was wiped on the bottom. Due to the poor sound conditions and the insensitivity of the remaining QB head the results obtained by sound were below average.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

No density layers were encountered. The areas in which this vessel operated were stormy and current ridden. It is believed these two factors broke up any tendency to form density layers.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY

The health of the officers and crew was good. One case of URETHRITIS, non-specific, was successfully treated with penicillin. Sulfathiozole was used to treat a case of ARTHRITIS of the right knee.

Although habitability was good due to the cool outside temperature the heavy weather did much to reduce the comforts within the boat. It was a case of "hanging on" seventy-five percent of the time. Ship is badly in need of fumigation.

Food was well prepared and served. Excellent pastries were greatly appreciated by all hands.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY (CONTID)

The "D and D" brand of Australian orange juice being issued to the SoWesPac boats is unfit for human consumption. The beef issued this vessel for this patrol was below standard. It was impossible to obtain enough tinned flour for patrol needs. While bagged flour was available, it is deemed unfit for submarine patrol use due to lack of proper stowage facilities.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men on board during patrol - 76
(b) Number of men qualified at start of patrol - 57
(c) Number of men qualified at end of patrol - 66
(d) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol - 6
(e) Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 2

The performance of duty on the part of the officers and crew during this patrol left nothing to be desired and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Navy. The reaction of all hands on the 19th of December when the ship was severely bombed and depth charged, followed by bottoming in shallow water soon after was excellent. Too much credit cannot be given Lt.Comdr. R.C. BENITEZ, U.S.N., who as Executive Officer and Navigator organized and trained the ship's company exceptionally well, navigated the ship during a difficult mine plant in shallow, current ridden waters, and whose timely advice and suggestions based upon a wealth of experience were most helpful to his Commanding Officer.

Much credit is also due the following officers and men:

Lt. W.W. PRICE, JR., U.S.N. for his excellent performance as diving officer under stress of attack, and for his many helpful and useful suggestions throughout the patrol.

Lt. W.J. DORWORTH, JR., U.S.N.R., torpedo officer, for his excellent handling of the mine plant

- -

(Q) PERSONNEL (CONT'D)

and his extra and successful efforts in keeping the poor torpedoes which we were issued in working order.

The team of Lt.(jg) A.A. EBEL, U.S.N.R., Radar Officer, and WRIGHT, C.L., CRT(AA)(T), U.S.N.R, for their valuable services in operating and keeping in operation both radars, their deductions concerning enemy radar signals, and their excellent supervision of Communications.

FITZGEARLD, L.H., MoMM1c, U.S.N. for his excellent work in successfully accomplishing several difficult engineering repair jobs.

The five day training period allowed this vessel off Fremantle was excellent, and was considered sufficient to bring to high pitch an all ready well trained ship's company. On patrol "qualification school" was held continuously. All officers received refresher T.D.C. training while six of the watch officers received three to four days of practical work in Navigation.

The addition of new equipment and consequently the necessity for more watch standers made it necessary to carry 76 men. The above number allows a well balanced watch section.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Base to area (Fremantle to BARRIER)	1711 mi.	20,710gal.
In area	7,274 mi.	79,443gal.
Area to base (South China Sea to Pearl Harbor)	4,606 mi.	62,648gal.

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area	8
Days in area	35
Days enroute to base	14
Days submerged	14
Days partially submerged	10
Days at Saipan	2

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

- -

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

(Torpedoes	Fuel	Provisions	(Personnel Factor)
11	*6500	7	10

*SAIPAN

Limiting factor this patrol:

This patrol was terminated a day and a half early due to low fuel. More than the usual amount of fuel was needed to make the nearest fueling port due to the round about routing the ship was forced to take to make this port.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

There was no radar jamming by the enemy.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSIONS


1. Ship or Station U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

2. Area covered on this mission 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Phillipines

3. Enemy radar was land based near LOMBOK STRAIT.

4. Intercept equipment APR-SPA

5. (a) Frequency 198 mcs.
   (b) PRF 1050 determined by SPA.
   (c) Pulse Width 5 micro-seconds determined by SPA.
   (d) Sketch of Pulse:



   (e) Lobe Switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization of enemy signal not determined.
   (g) Sweep rate 1/3 RPM

6. Radar was probably air search because of the frequency and because it had a wide beam width.

7. Radar was detected at 2130H on 8 December about 20 miles south of LOMBOK STRAIT and was lost while transitting the strait.

ENCLOSURE (A)

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES (CONT'D)

INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSIONS


1. Ship or Station U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

2. Area covered on this mission 9 December - 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Phillipines.

3. Enemy radar was apparently land-based near the entrance to CAMRANH Bay.

4. Intercept equipment APR-SPA

5. (a) Frequency 197 mcs.
   (b) PRF 1050 determined by SPA
   (c) Pulse width 12 micro-seconds determined by SPA.
   (d) Sketch of pulse:



   (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization was not determined.
   (g) Sweep Rate 1/5 RPM

6. Radar was probably air search because of the frequency and because it had a wide beam width.

7. The radar was picked up on 18 and 19 December just after sunset and just before sunrise from a position about 15 miles east of CAMRANH Bay. It made about six sweeps during a period of one-half hour and then secured. While sweeping, pronounced and numerous side lobes were evident.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Report of War Patrol Number SIX.

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(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES (CONT'D)

INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSIONS

1. Ship or Station U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

2. Area covered on this mission 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Phillipines.

3. Enemy radar was probably shipborne.

4. Intercept equipment APR-SPA

5. Frequency 153 mcs.
   (b) PRF was about 500 determined by SPA
   (c) Pulse width was 10 micro-seconds determined by SPA
   (d) Sketch of pulse:



   (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization of the signal was not determined.
   (g) Sweep rate 1 RPM

6. Purpose of radar unknown.

7. Radar was picked up out at sea at 2235H on 28 December in position 12°-19'N; 109°-46'E. No other contact was made with the enemy. The radar swept around for about five minutes and secured for fifteen. Contact was maintained for one hour.

(U) RADIO AND RADAR COUNTERMEASURES (CONT'D)

INTERCEPTION OF ENEMY RADAR TRANSMISSION

1. Ship or Station U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

2. Area covered on this mission 9 December to 12 January 1945 South China Sea - Phillipines.

3. Enemy radar was probably airborne.

4. Intercept Equipment APR-SPA

5. (a) Frequency 167 mcs.
   (b) PRF was 500 (doubtful) determined by SPA.
   (c) Pulse width was approximately 10 micro-seconds determined by SPA.

   (d) Sketch of pulse:



   (e) Lobe switching was not used.
   (f) Polarization not determined.
   (g) Radar was not sweeping.

6. Radar was probably an ASV.

7. This interception, picked up at 2245H on 8 January at 14°-20'N; 113°-43'E, was very weak and fading irregularly similar to a distant aircraft radar. Because of the weak signal strength the data may be slightly in error.

(V) REMARKS

1. I do not recommend transit of LOMBOK STRAITS in company with another ship, particularly I do not recommend being behind the leading ship for the following reasons:

(a) Constant watch must be kept on ship ahead thereby diverting radar, OOD's, and lookout's attention.
(b) Evasive maneuvers are hampered and restricted.
(c) Most shots fired are aimed at submarine's wake at night and that leaves "tail end Charlie" in line of fire if leading ship is fired upon.
(d) Patrols that fall astern of leading ship while chasing him are likely to shift the chase to rear ship with good results.

2. The majority of the torpedoes issued this ship for this patrol were carelessly prepared and carelessly handled in delivery. This carelessness was of such an extent that much trouble was experienced with torpedoes throughout the patrol. A full report on this matter is being submitted to Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN (C.O. DACE's Serial 84).

3. This vessel was unable to obtain either a Nautical Almanac or an Air Almanac for 1945 for use on patrol due to lack of same in Fremantle.

4. From our observations all shipping along the Indo China coast, except fast warship traffic, traveled only by day, hugged the coast, and was air and surface escorted. No mine sweeping activity was noted. It is believed that VAN FONG Bay is not used as an overnight anchorage.

5. The mortar type recognition flare projector rusted very quickly and became unreliable with too heavy a coating of grease. It is believed that this

(V) REMARKS (CONT'D)

projector should be made of a non-corrosive material or chrome plated.

6. It is believed that there is room for improvement in the method of securing the topside metal superstructure access hatches. The method of spot welding them closed is not satisfactory and is an admission that the designed method of securing these hatches is unsuitable. In our case we had two welded hatches break loose and were forced to spend a considerable time breaking the weld on a third in heavy seas so as to repair an outboard exhaust valve. It is suggested that the hatch rims be rubber gasketed to keep them quiet, and some form of a non-corrosive "C" clamp arrangement be designed to properly secure them.

7. The elevation locks on the 20mm guns are unsatisfactory for submarines. These guns become loose and "flop around" on a dive, frequently.

8. The various victrola records and movies now available to submarines are much appreciated, and furnish a much needed diversion on patrol.

FB5-45/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FIVE

Serial: 04

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

30 January 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO DACE Conf. ltr. SS247/
A16-3 Ser. 01 of 1/28/45
Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol No. SIX.

1. The SIXTH war patrol of the U.S.S. DACE was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA under the operational control of the Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE. The patrol was of fifty-eight days duration and was the first for the new Commanding Officer as such.

2. The entire patrol was considerably handicapped by extremely rough weather. Early in the patrol the DACE conducted successfully an extremely difficult mine plant

3. All torpedo attacks conducted were aggressive and were made under difficult conditions in that all contacts were heavily escorted by both air and surface escorts. A summary of attacks follows:

ATTACK No. 1 - 28 December 1944 - This was a daytime periscope attack against a four ship convoy escorted by both surface and air escorts. Six Mark 14 and 23 torpedoes were fired; four at a medium freighter and the other two at another medium freighter or small tanker. The Commanding Officer believes that one hit was obtained in both targets and that the closer one, the medium freighter or tanker, undoubtedly sank because of the extremely loud breaking up noises that followed. Observation of the results could not be made because of the fan like pattern of the torpedo wakes and because one of the poppet valves stuck open allowing a large impulse bubble to surface. Because of their small size, it is quite probable that at least one, or possibly both, of these targets sank.

ATTACK No. 2 - 31 December 1944 - This was another daylight periscope attack against a large, heavily escorted, convoy that also had an air escort. The DACE unfortunately got into a poor position in that she was blocked out by a close column of escorts and was unable to fire at any of the transports. The DACE, however, did fire the only three long range Mark 14 torpedoes at a trailing escort carrier. All three missed, undoubtedly due to fire control errors and the long range.

FB5-45/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FIVE

Serial: 04

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

30 January 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO DACE Conf. ltr. SS247/
A16-3 Ser. 01 of 1/28/45
Report of SIXTH War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol No. SIX.

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4. The DACE was also unfortunate in an early attack when in a most advantageous firing position and about to fire, an alert escorting plane dropped four close depth bombs near the DACE. A subsequent depth charging caused considerable damage to the DACE and forced her to bottom.

5. The DACE returned from patrol unusually clean and with morale high. The DACE will soon depart for overhaul on the west coast.

6. The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and men for the completion of a successful and difficult mine plant and the damage inflicted on the enemy.

E. W. GRENFELL

SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 11/jfs

FC5-4/A16-3

Serial: 0103

1 February 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Report
of Sixth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Sixth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. DACE upon completion of a very strenuous patrol, and for the resulting damage inflicted upon the enemy.

3. It is recommended that the U.S.S. DACE be credited with the following:

SUNK	DAMAGED
1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons	1 - AK(EU), 4,000 tons

Total Sunk or Damaged - 8,000 tons.

W. V. O'Regan

W. V. O'REGAN

FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 2 02171 mr

Serial 0107

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 February 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DACE Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 656
U.S.S. DACE - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Sixth War Patrol (2 December, 1944, to 28 January, 1945).

1. The sixth war patrol of the DACE, under the command of Commander O. R. Cole, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the South China Sea. The DACE in addition to independent offensive patrol and coordinated group patrol conducted a special mission.

2. A separate report has been made of the special mission successfully carried out by the DACE. In addition to this job well done, the DACE with aggressive area coverage made three convoy contacts. Enemy air coverage was always present, and in closing the first convoy for attack the DACE was severely bombed and depth charged. She was forced to bottom in 308 feet of water, and through sheer courage and determination made her escape without major damage. It is estimated that a medium AK was sunk and another damaged as a result of her aggressive attack on the second convoy contacted. The long range attack on a Chitose Type CVL in the third convoy contacted unfortunately failed.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the DACE for this aggressive, successful patrol. The DACE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - Medium AK (EU) - 4,000 tons (Attack No. 1)

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 0107

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 February 1945

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THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DACE Report of
Sixth War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 656
U.S.S. DACE - SIXTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Sixth War Patrol (2 December, 1944, to 28 January, 1945).

- -

D A M A G E D

1 - Medium AK (EU)	-	4,000 tons (Attack No. 1)
TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED		8,000 tons *

*NOTE: Since the above damage was done in areas under the operational control of Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE, he is requested to assume credit accordingly.

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Deputy ComSubsPac.

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E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

1ST COPY

SS247/A16-3/(015)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Official Channels.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the seventh war patrol of this vessel conducted in the KURILE ISLANDS and Sea of OKHOTSK Area during the period 25 May 1945 to 10 July 1945 is forwarded herewith.

2. During most of this patrol the DACE was a member of the coordinated attack group known as LAUTRUPS LARKS.

O.R. COLE, JR.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-09B9C DATE 5/25/72

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(A) PROLOGUE:

Arrived PEARL HARBOR, T.H. on 28 January 1945 from sixth war patrol. Received voyage repairs and proceeded to SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA for the DACE's first yard overhaul. Underwent a complete and thorough overhaul at the Submarine Repair Basin of Bethlehem Steel Co. in accordance with the standard submarine overhaul plan during the period 8 February 1945 to 25 April 1945. During this period personnel was sent on thirty days leave and to various schools. The ship received many authorized alterations the most important of which were as follows:

(1) Enlarged and re-arranged conning tower.
(2) Relocated SD Radar and replaced SD-3 with an SD-5.
(3) Rearranged Radio Room.
(4) Installed ballistic steel around bridge and conning tower.
(5) Installed modified TREPANG type venturi.
(6) Installed 5"-25 caliber gun aft (replacing 4" gun).
(7) Moved 40mm gun to forward gun platform.
(8) Installed twin 20mm gun on after bridge deck.
(9) Installed 5"-25 caliber ammunition scuttle.
(10) Installed and re-arranged 5", 40mm, 20mm and .50 caliber topside ammunition stowages.
(11) Installed ST Radar.
(12) Replaced bronze hatch covers with steel ones containing thin T-shaped gaskets with retaining ring.
(13) Installed hydraulic hoists for both periscopes and SD radar mast.
(14) Cast iron pistons and smoke eliminator oil rings were installed in all main engines.
(15) Hydraulic submerged signal ejector gun installed aft.
(16) Bow planes were modified to rig out on 15° dive.
(17) Variable speed operation of bow and stern planes installed.
(18) Ice cream freezer installed.
(19) Replaced GE washing machine with Bureau type.
(20) Installed lower depth charge hatches on hatches aft of the conning tower and holding straps on all upper hatches.

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Subject; U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(21) Speed halving device for T.D.C. installed.
(22) Installed improved ventilation system main cooling coils.
(23) Auxiliary engine exhaust was altered to lead into main engine exhaust.
(24) Installed Mk 7 Arma D.R.T. in Conning Tower.
(25) Installed one Mk 9 and one Mk 8 T.B.T. with range and true bearing indicators in control room and conning tower.

Detached the following officers: Lt.Comdr. Rafael C. BENITEZ, USN (executive officer), Lieutenant Walter W. PRICE, Jr., USN (engineering officer and diving officer), Lt.(jg) Edward H. JONES, E-R(L), USNR. Transferred 22 men including many "plank owners". Received aboard for duty 23 men as replacements. On 12 March 1945 Lieutenant Frederick J. RUDER, USN reported aboard as Executive Officer and Navigator.

On 26 April 1945 departed SAN FRANCISCO enroute PEARL HARBOR in company with U.S.S. WHALE (SS239). Conducted training enroute.

Arrived PEARL HARBOR 5 May 1945 and underwent a six day voyage refit conducted by Submarine Base which accomplished the following items:

(1) Installation of directional A.P.R. equipment.
(2) Moved twin 20mm gun to main deck forward.
(3) Installed an additional 40mm gun on bridge aft.
(4) Increased topside ammunition stowage.
(5) Installed (12) .50 caliber M.G. mounts.
(6) Minor voyage repairs.

12-24 May 1945: Conducted training and loading under supervision of Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN. Captain C.C. BURLINGAME, U.S.N. acted as training officer. Training included the firing of ten torpedoes, sound and cavitation tests, deperming, convoy exercise, life guard exercise, various types of approaches, and special exercises. This was a long and tiring training period but it is felt much valuable training was obtained.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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Less than 24 hours before sailing transferred Lieutenant William J. DORWORTH, JR., DE, USNR (torpedo Officer and T.D.C. operator) to the hospital. No trained replacement could be located on the base or in any of the four tenders present. Was informed one would be waiting for us at MIDWAY.

Ensign James C. MATHESON, U.S.N. reported aboard for duty on 25 May 1945.

(B) NARRATIVE:

All times are minus ten (KING) unless otherwise stated.

The following is a list of the officers and chief petty officers who were attached to and serving on board the DACE during this war patrol together with the number of previous patrols made.

NAME, RANK OR RATE	NO.PATROLS MADE
Commander O.R. COLE, JR., USN	5
Lieut. F.J. RUDER, USN	3
Lieut. M. GODEK, DE, USNR	4
Lieut. S.F. REID, DE, USNR	4
Lt.(jg) A.A. EBEL, DE(R), USNR	6
Lt.(jg). H.H. CALDWELL, USN	3
Lt.(jg) P. BANTA, EM(L), USNR	2
Ensign R.C. LIGHT, E(L), USNR	1
Ensign J.C. MATHESON, USN	0
ADE, E., 328 46 26, CTM(T)(SS), USN	9
FITZGEARLD, L.H., 386 06 67, CMoMM(AA)(SS)(T),USN	6
KERR, "J""C", 356 13 82, CMoMM(AA)(T)(SS),USN	4
MILLESON, C.J., 261 66 95, CRM(PA), USN	0
MORSE, R.W., 268 48 28, CY(T), USN	6
OGLE, P.L., 362 13 71, CMoMM(AA)(T)(SS), USN	5
PARSONS, E., 279 52 33, CEM(AA)(T)(SS), USN	6
PERKINS, E.R., 272 41 26, CPhM(AA)(T)(SS),USN	2
SMITH, G.O., 291 71 39, CQM(AA)(T)(SS), USN	6

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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25 May 1945

1332(V-W) Underway from Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR, T.H. commencing seventh war patrol in company with USS CABEZON (SS334)(OTC) and in accordance with Commander Task Force 17's operation order No. 111-45 of 24 May 1945.

1430(V-W) Set clocks back one half hour to zone plus ten (WILLIAM) time.

26 May 1945 Noon posit: 24°-49'N, 161°-03'W

Conducted training dives and drills.

27 May 1945 Noon posit: 26°-37.5'N, 166°-49.5'W

Conducted training dives and drills.

1800(W) Set clocks back one hour to zone plus 11 (X-ray) time.

28 May 1945 Noon posit: 28°-22'N, 176°-39'W

Conducted training dives and drills.

29 May 1945 Noon posit; SubBase, MIDWAY, T.H.

0747(X) Sighted MIDWAY Island bearing 250°T, distance 12 miles.

0920(X) Moored port side to berth sail six, Submarine Base, MIDWAY.

1000(X) Set all clocks back one hour to plus twelve (YOKE) time.

Spent the day topping off with fuel, lub. oil, water and supplies. Made minor repairs and routined all torpedoes. Held a conference with wolf pack commander and received his operating procedure orders.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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29 May 1945 (Cont'd)

We were all very pleased and appreciative of the courtsey and interest shown us by the personnel of the Submarine Base and tenders present.

30-31 May 1945 Noon posit: 28°-03'N, 178°-26'W

0810(Y) Underway for patrol area in company with USS CABEZON. The expected T.D.C. operator did not arrive thereby necessitating a last minute re-shuffle of officers' jobs and battle stations.

0815(Y) Set all clocks back two hours to zone minus ten (KING) time. (Note: All times are KING times unless otherwise noted).

1015(31 May 1945)

Crossed International Date line and dropped 30 May from the calendar.

1 June 1945 Noon posit: 29°-38'N, 176°-41'E

Conducted training dives and drills.

2 June 1945 Noon posit: 31°-12'N, 171°-53'E

Conducted training dives and drills.

3 June 1945 Noon posit: 33°-41'N, 167°-29'E

Conducted training dives and drills.

4 June 1945 Noon posit: 36°-08'N, 163°-24'E

Conducted training dives and drills.

5 June 1945 Noon posit: 38°-23'N, 158°-39'E

Conducted training dives.

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8 June 1945 (Cont'd)

JIMA.

0330 Dove for submerged patrol parallel to the coast 3½ miles south of ATOIYA MISAKI, (Daylight comes early and stays late around here.) Can see both sides of KUNASHIRI SUIDO.

0715 Light fog set in with varying visibility.

0832 Sighted what appeared to be one large or two small sailing vessels. (Ship contact #1) Commenced closing. During the next hour we alternately found her and lost her in the mist. She tracked at about 4 knots on 050°T apparently headed thru the straits. Finally made her out to be a large vessel with sails. Determined to shoot it out with her.

0940 Sighted a second ship about 2 miles astern of first one. (Ship contact #1) Believe it to be a sailing vessel but couldn't identify her in the mist.

0943 Battle Surfaced parallel and abeam of first target, range 1,600 yards. (Gun attack #1) Manned all guns to give crews battle experience. Forward 40mm hit target in the bow on first shot. Closed range as we had no return fire. All guns scored numerous hits.

0951 A hit started a large fire on target. Target is sinking. Circled to opposite side of target and put finishing touches on her destruction.

0958 Target destroyed. She was identified as a large 300 ton sea truck similar to sea truck pictured on page 31 of AIC NOR PAC No. 874. Jap flags were painted on the sides of her hull amidship. No survivors noted.

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9 June 1945 Noon posit: 44°-20'N, 146°-38'E

0333 SJ contact 3,000 yards. Upon investigation this turned out to be the derelict of the lugger we destroyed yesterday. Only a couple of wobbling masts plus the remains of the deck house were above water. When part of the hull rose above the water due to the swells it appeared as though her back was broken. No sign of life aboard.

0407 Dove on 100 fathom curve south of ATOIYA MISAKI for submerged patrol. Visibility fair. Our lugger derelict haunted us like the Flying Dutchman all morning.

1155 Sighted by periscope the stump mast of a second derelict. This was undoubtly the remains of the sea truck we destroyed, but there was not enough above water to identify it.

1439 Surfaced. Visibility has closed in and shows no signs of improving. Surface patrolling south of ATOIYA MISAKI.

1700 Departed area and shaped course for next station (2 East) south of YETOROFU KAIKYO.

1920 Reversed course. Decided to search in Sea of OKHOTSK. Increased speed to full on 4 main engines. Sent DACE's serial 1 to Wolf Pack Commander informing him of our 2130 position in KUNASHIRI SUIDO and telling him that we were searching to the northeast. Transmitted message four times without getting a receipt. Felt that further transmission would give away our track as the Japs were jamming our frequency and were undoubtedly DF-ing us.

Received APOGON's serial 1 to Pack Commander apparently stating that he would have to go through a blind bombing zone to search in the Sea of OKHOTSK and asking for orders. No receipt for her message from Pack Commander. Feel sure APOGON intercepted

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9 June 1945 (Cont'd)

our message. Apparently MANTA and APOGON have just arrived on or near station 2 East to join the pack. Their position uncertain. Am a little anxious about CABEZON as we have not seen, heard from, nor gotten radar contact or interference from her since the morning of 7 June although we should have been anywhere from zero to 40 miles from her for two days.

2220 Completed uneventful transit of KUNASHIRI SUIDO. When in the lee of YETOROFU JIMA the sea became calmer, the mist cleared, and we became brilliantly illuminated by the phosphorescence in the water when only four or five miles from the shore. Commenced searching to the north and northeast at full speed on four main engines.

10 June 1945 Noon posit: 47°-25'N, 149°-03'E

Surface searching to the northeast.

0355 Dove for trim.

0402 Surfaced and continued search at full speed.

0620 Sighted by high periscope a large freighter and a much smaller ship, bearing 037°T at about 16,000 yards. (Ship contact #2) Visibility is varying between six and nine miles.

0621 Quartermaster on the bridge reported a sailboat broad on the starboard bow, but upon further investigation it proved to be a large DE or DD type escort. Why he didn't see us I don't know for when we put **our** stern to him he was 12,600 yards by ST radar and clearly visible from the bridge level. Our SJ radar performance is terrible. We failed to obtain a pip on this escort which was broadside to us, nor did we get a pip from the other ships.

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10 June 1945 (Cont'd)

Made the decision not to broadcast contact report to pack for the following reasons:

(a) APOGON (speaking for MANTA and herself) had apparently made the decision not to search and had requested orders from CABEZON but received none.
(b) CABEZON unheard from since early 7 June.
(c) Felt sure APOGON at least received our message giving our position and intention.
(d) Japs had jammed circuit and undoubtedly would DF. Had we been able to clear our message expeditionsly the DF-ing of our position would be a dead giveaway to the Japs that we were in contact with this convoy.
(e) Our SJ performance was so poor as to throw out any chances of tracking beyond range of visibility and our ST didn't quite have enough range for this either.
(f) Escorts were believed radar equipped (APR signals had been received by us) and most likely had radar detectors.
(g) Seas were picking up.
(h) Positions of other submarines in the pack were unknown, and at this time we were 145 miles from station 1E, and 85 miles from station 2E where the rest of the pack apparently was. To the best of our knowledge they were not in on the search.
(i) We were not in possession of any previous information which the other boats did not have.

We quickly opened the range on the escort and commenced a long end around on the far side of the convoy. Visibility was variable between six and nine miles, and remained so throughout the day. Got an occasional glimpse of the convoy. We figured that they were making 9½ knots on course 045°T.

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0844 High periscope sighted a second escort bearing 114°T, range 12,650 yards. This escort was also a large type DE or small DD, and was stationed on the convoy's port bow. We continued our tracking and end around on this escort.

1055 Figured we were 22,000 yards dead ahead of the convoy and on its base course. Do not believe convoy is zigging. Came to course 045°T, slowed to 2/3 speed, pumped bilges and made preparations below.

1130 Slowed to 1/3 speed. Manned sound gear--escorts apparently not pinging.

1234 With one escort just visible dove, reversed course, and commenced approach. Seas were picking up with about eight to twelve foot waves.
Plan if possible to pass inside of port escort and shoot three torpedoes each at the two ships in the convoy, and fire stern tubes at the port escort.

1245 Heard two escorts pinging long scale.

1258 Sighted starboard escort bearing 214°T at about 6,500 yards.

1305 Sighted port escort on our starboard bow, range about 4,000 yards, and convoy dead ahead. The picture is: DACE headed between the two escorts towards the convoy which consists of one (1) medium size freighter of about 5,000 to 6,000 tons (similar to EIHUKU MARU, page 134 ONI 208-J revised) almost equidistant between the two escorts and only slightly behind them. (Escorts are MIKURA-class Frigates as described on page 7 CincPacCinCPOA Bulletin 56-45 of 26 Feb. 1945). The remaining ship is very small and is still

10 June 1945 (Cont'd)

unidentified. Possibly it is a third escort. It is close astern of the freighter. I believe the convoy is suspicious because the starboard escort has moved up from the starboard quarter to the starboard bow, both escorts are pinging, both are patrolling back and forth on either bow of the convoy, and the convoy is apparently zigging on short legs, or constant helming.

1309 Starboard escort passed 1,200 yards abeam. Shifted setup to port escort. Freighter has a 30° port angle on the bow. Believe I can carry out my original plan of giving the port escort stern tubes and the convoy the bow tubes.

1316 Just about ready to let go with bow tubes at the freighter when she zigged to her left giving a sharp starboard angle on the bow with small fellow slightly on her starboard quarter. Left full rudder. From here on in things happened fast, and we had the double problem of continuing the approach and avoiding collision at the same time. Freighter's bow surely looks big in low power. Periscope up continuously. Setup changed to stern tubes. The stern small ship will clear us--(I think and hope). She looks like a very small coastal tanker or barge (similar to the "Small MARU" of the Victor Baker Division) very low in the water, 90 to 100 feet long, 100 tons.

1322-20 Fired tube No. 8 (Torpedo Attack #1A) at MOT of freighter with 1° right spread, estimated range 500 yards, torpedo depth of 7 feet, angle on the bow 120 starboard. We were set to give her another tube when at

1322-35 Saw, heard, and felt first torpedo hit the freighter at the MOT sending a cloud of smoke and debris 200 to 300 feet in the air. Shortly there-

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after heard a smaller explosion which was probably her boilders as we hit under her stack. Shifted set up to small ship which was past us now having passed too close to us for comfort.

1323-20 Fired tube No. 10 (Torpedo Attack #1B) at MOT of small ship at an estimated 450 yards, 110 starboard angle on the bow, torpedo depth of 7 feet. This torpedo apparently missed. Freighter has commenced to list. ("Monday morning quarterbacking" makes it appear that we were a huhdred yards or so closer than we figured, and the torpedo probably ran under the target. It is hard to see how it could miss at that range. Torpedo run for the first torpedo was 383 yards.) Made a sweep for the escorts and saw that the starboard escort was reversing course to head for us, estimated range about 3,500 yards. Got a quick setup on him and at

1324-35 Fired tube No. 7 (Torpedo Attack #1C) at the starboard escort, estimated range 3,000 yards, angle on the bow 30°starboard. Port escort not sighted.

1325 Commenced going deep and rigging for depth charge. When last seen the freighter was apparently stopped as the small ship was passing it rapidly. Popping and crackling noises were heard from the freighter.

1327-14 Torpedo explosion. From subsequent events this hit was apparently not in either escort, and it is believed that tube No. 7 torpedo hit the freighter. (See special torpedo supplement to this patrol report.) We are at 250 feet going down to 300. Passed through a 4° gradient at about 100 feet. Personnel in the various compartments hear breaking up noises through the hull. Escorts are pinging. JP, JK, and QB all hear loud breaking up noises in the target's direction over a wide band.

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Put same on loud speaker and all hands present, most of whom have heard breaking up noises before, are convinced that the freighter is on her way down. Target's screws were not heard after the first torpedo hit.

1329-29 First depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1329-44 Second depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1330-39 Third depth charge, astern, starboard and above.

1331-34 What sounds like gun fire above the popping and crackling of the freighter which can be heard from 170° to 090° relative.

1333-24 Fourth depth charge, astern, starboard, above.

Escorts are ping searching.

1353 Escort shifted to short scale, and is apparently coming up from astern. Can not hear screws, but sound conditions for screws have not been good today. Pinging is quite loud.

1356-19 Fired tube No. 9 (Torpedo attack #1D). (See special torpedo supplement to this patrol report.)

1413-09 Heard a light explosion near the surface followed in rapid succession by a barrage of nineteen other explosions all of which sounded on or very near the surface. These sounded too light for the usual submerged depth charges. It is possible he was hit and set off some charges on the surface.

1419 A barrage of twelve depth charges. These sounded near the surface but louder than the previous barrage.

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1425 Still hear breaking up noises from the bearing of the freighter. Pinging still continuous from both escorts. We are evading at 60-90 turns at 300 to 350 feet, fish-tailing on course about 180°T. This is the only time I have ever "sweated it out" and been very cold at the same time. The Conning Tower is like an ice box.

1430 The pinging from one escort is much fainter and was soon lost. The other one still persists at about the same intensity but seems to remain at the bearing of the attack scene.

1500 Heard pings on two different frequencies from the same escort--one high the other low. Can it be that one escort is alongside the other with both pinging?

1615 Pinging is begining to grow weaker. Started up.

1645 At periscope depth. Visibility about eight miles. All clear. Went back to 100 feet, pumped bilges, made reload aft and checked forward torpedoes, pumped down pressure and got a trim.

1730 Quite a few people in various parts of the ship heard a heavy, distant explosion.

2044 Surfaced. Seas picking up. Returning to scene of attack and resuming search for remnants. Forward T.B.T. and bridge gyro repeater flooded.

2230 Completed search of attack area. No contacts. I guess this is to be expected for the seas are to rough for radar to pick up small objects, and it is too dark to see much if indeed we are in the exact attack locality. Resumed search along convoy's track.

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10 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2300 Took a big sea down the hatch.

2340 Received Wolf Pack Commander's serial 2 ordering us to break off search and take station 3E (KITA URUPPU SUIDO).

2400 Broke off search in compliance with orders. Doubted the value of further search anyway due to roughness of seas and their extreme phosphorescence, our short ranged radar, shallow draft and small size of targets, and the fact that they had been thoroughly alerted. Drafted DACE's first to ComSubForPac, ComSubForPacAd Comd. and the Pack Commander giving position, results to date, and intention to take assigned station.

11 June 1945: Noon posit: 47°-00'N, 149°-56'E

Attempting to clear message.

0339 Unable to clear radio message. Dove to routine torpedoes and give all hands a much needed rest enroute our new area which we will enter about midnight.

1700 Completed routining torpedoes.

1832 Surfaced. Attempted to clear radio message. Antennae grounded out.

1915 Gave up trying to clear message. Set course for new station.

2024 SJ contact on BUROTON TO bearing 115°T, range 50,000 yards.

2225 Weak SJ interference. Was never able to identify it and it disappeared at dawn (about 0330).

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14 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1200 Light fog has set in.

1300 SJ radar is back in commission. We have had constant electronic troubles since our recent overhaul.

1322 Surfaced.

1739 Dove, visiblity having again improved.

2036 Surfaced. Have grave doubts as to the effectiveness of our SD radar. Have had no pips since arrival MIDWAY although high peaks are numerous in our area.

15 June 1945 Noon posit: 46°-34'N, 151°-08'E

Surface patrolling in KITA URUPPU SUIDO.

0010 Picked up APOGON's SJ radar interference.

0324 Dove for submerged patrol in the straits.

1030 APR signal on frequency 120, PRF 250.

1430 Surfaced. Visibility has closed in.

1519 Exchanged calls with APOGON by SJ Radar.

1730 Visibility has increased. Can see CHIRIHOI TO and BUROTON TO fifteen to twenty miles away. Decided to surface patrol as we depart from this area tonight.

2000 Converted No. 4 F.B.T. to a main ballast tank.

2023 Submerged to replace stern plane contactor and flush out No. 4 M.B.T.

2135 Surfaced. Proceeded towards station patrol line No. 1 for a seaward sweep.

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15 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2255 Cleared DACE serial one to Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet information the LARKS giving results to date, missing serials, latest NAN notice, report on poor radar performance, and the usual routine data.

16 June 1945 Noon posit: 46°-30'N, 154°-04'E

Enroute new patrol station on easterly courses.

0020 Exchanged recognition signals with westbound MANTA.

0022 Could see her phosphorescent wake and bow wave at 7,000 yards. Obtained radar contact at 6,200 yards.

0800 Arrived in position on scouting line. APOGON and CABEZON 15 miles on either side. Commenced advance at the prescribed speed of 10 knots.

0800 Commenced remounting and connecting up forward Mk 9 T.B.T. This proved to be a big job involving block and tackle, meger, etc.

0830 Received APOGON's serial 4 giving position, course and speed. Receipted for same.

0859 Received APOGON's serial 5 requesting we report our position. Receipted for same. Complied by sending our 0900 position at

0920 To APOGON (DACE Serial No. 2).

1015 Received APOGON's serial 6 giving position and "enemy course and speed" and ordering immediate rendezvous. Receipted for same and headed her way at full speed. Visibility very poor.

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16 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1217 SJ contact at 8,200 yards on one of our Pack's boats followed shortly after by contact on the other. Played tag with one of the boats for 45 minutes, and although we got close enough to see her wake several times she always managed to elude us in the fog.

1324 Closed and spoke CABEZON. She was invisible at 400 yards most of the time. Her loud hailer was a great help in communications. We were unable to obtain one prior departure, and had a hard time making ourselves heard. Gleamed the following bits of information:

(a) CABEZON was not hearing us by radio and apparently we were not hearing him. Frequency plans checked. We both hear APOGON well, and she apparently hears us. Mystery is unsolved. Agreed to exchange messages at about 1600.
(b) Checked navigation and scouting line plots. DACE had been in error.
(c) CABEZON was 30 miles from scene of our attack on the 10th. We were sure we were "lone wolfing it". This was a heart-breaker--communications again.
(d) Our receipt for her "Break off search" message of 10 June was never received by her.
(e) APOGON was not in contact with the enemy.

1342 Broke up rendezvous, proceeded to scouting line station.

1344 APOGON loomed up in fog on opposite course at 500 yards or less.

1555 Sent DACE serial 3 giving position, course and speed to CABEZON three times during next hour or so. No receipt.

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16 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1630(about) Came out of fog bank. Visibility unlimited.

1638 Received unaddressed Wolf Pack drill message uncoubtedly from CABEZON so receipted to her for same.

1810 Transmitted DACE serial 3 for the fourth time. Included APOGON in address this time. Received APOGON's receipt.

1850 Requested APOGON to relay my message to CABEZON.

1856 Receipt from CABEZON. Communications are still far from good.

17 June 1945 Noon posit: 49°-33'N, 157°-50'E

Surface patrolling on line No. 1. Visibility fair, sky overcast.

0320 Made dawn trim dive.

0337 Surfaced.

0942 Exchanged SJ recognition signals with APOGON.

1354 SJ contact 18,000 yards. Surface visibility good--sky overcast, nothing in sight. TBT in a state of disassembly with 2 additional men topside. Lost pip momentarily and picked it up again at about 12,000 yards moving in fast.

1355 Dove with plane 6,000 yards. (Plane contact #1) Plane not sighted. This the end of our Mk 9 forward T.B.T. for this run.

1359 At 200 feet--no bombs.

1438 At periscope depth.

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17 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1454 Surfaced. All clear.

1500 Lookout reported 2 planes low on horizon. Not verified, but could have been.

1518 Sighted APOGON by high periscope.

1530 Sent DACE serial 4 two times reporting aircraft.

APOGON only receipted.

1852 Received CABEZON's serial 6 and Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet 170712. The former ordered CABEZON and DACE to search north of and APOGON south of ADAIDO TO for the downed aviators reported by the ComSubForPac message.

1915 Set course for ONEKOTAN SUIDO full speed.

1956 Sent DACE serial 5 twice giving position, course and speed. APOGON only receipted.

2015 SJ interference to southward.

2130 SJ contact on CABEZON, at 8,600 yards. Exchanged recognition signals, and she gave us her course and speed. We paralleled her and proceeded independently, but close by her.

2227 Made landfall on SJ radar at about 30,000 yards, bearing 295°T on ONEKOTAN TO.

18 June 1945 Noon posit: 51°-01'N, 155°-49'E

0030 Completed transit of ONEKOTAN KAIKYO and shaped course for ARAIDO TO at full speed. Visibility good.

0130 Dawn is hearlding its arrival with a red eastern

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sky brilliantly silhouetting the rugged snow-capped peaks of PARAMUSHIRU TO and adjoining islands.

0236 Sighted friendly submarine by high periscope.

0300 Sighted ARAIDO TO. This is a 7,654 foot, perfect cone-shaped, snow covered peak--a wonderful landmark, and beautiful sight. Took pictures.

0400 Commenced search for downed aviators. Spent all morning surface searching and covered the 15 mile, 10 mile, and 7 mile circles in sector 065°T to 305°T from ARAIDO TO. Although for short periods the visibility was poor it in general was good to excellent. Seas were calm. We felt awfully conspicious surface searching so close to the beach, and as events turned out we were undoubtedly sighted.

1100 APR signals on frequency 78.5, PRF 500 sweeping.

1300 Opened to the northwest and west.

1400 Cleared DACE serial 06 to CABEZON reporting position, search sector covered, negative results, and that we were breaking off search.

1446 Received CABEZON's serial 08 ordering us to search to the west. Complied with same. Scenery beautiful, sea calm, visibility phenomenal. Allowed all hands desiring to come topside for a look. Mountains of KAMCHATKA visible to the north.

1529 Dove for trim.

1550 Surfaced.

1615 Sighted a VAL-type plane (Plane contact #2) patrolling over our morning search area. He was about 15 miles away, but plainly visible. Watched him

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18 June 1945 (Cont'd)

for quite a while until he disappeared over PARAMUSHIRU TO. No SD contact on him nor on any of the various peaks.

1720 Lookout sighted a ZEKE-type plane at 6 or 7 miles closing rapidly. SD radar is definitely not working.

1721-30 Dove to 200 feet.

1800 Periscope depth--all clear. Continued further research on SD. Found two broken connections in antenna mast in its base. Believe one connection is broken at the top. Will open same up after dark.

1953 Surfaced. Sun is setting but it is still very light.

2001 Lookout sighted a submarine or small ship (Contact #3) to the east, near PARAMUSHIRU. Checking the chart she was fully 15 or more miles from us. There must be some remarkable refraction in this area. Believed this was APOCON at this time. She flashed a light at us several times. I am sure we were plainly visible to her as we surfaced broadside to her and were silhouetted in the sunset.

2015 Saw gunfire flashes from this ship. Saw 2 or 3 antiaircraft bursts over her and heard several long delayed explosions. Put our stern to her. During the next 10 or 15 minutes saw several large gunfire flashes from her direction, saw one more AA burst, heard several very heavy explosions, and observed much yellow-green smoke in her direction It is all very mysterious, and we can only explain it as a light bombing raid plus AA defense fire. Although the flashes looked as if they were met for us we saw no surface splashes. Opened to westward

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in quest of a quiet spot so we can open up our SD antenna at the top and attempt repairs unmolested.

2133 Received and receipted for CABEZON's serial 09 ordering DACE, and APOGON to act independently in certain areas until 26th. We are to patrol down the KURILE Chain to the southward.

2142 Received APOGON's serial 10 giving contact report to southward. Secured charge and put 4 engines on propulsion to close. Should make it about midnight.

2226 Received CABEZON's serial 11 requesting our position. Was about to transmit same when at

2240 SJ got a contact at 120°T, range 9,600 yards (Ship contact #4). Commenced tracking and recomposing message.

2245 Received CABEZON's serial 12 requesting that we reply to her serial 11.

2258 Cleared DACE pack serial 07 to CABEZON giving position and contact data. Contact tracks at 220°T, speed 13.

2300 We are on her starboard quarter between her and the moon. Night fairly clear with half moon shinning brightly, sea calm. Decided to end around her stern and approach from the dark side for better cover and identification. Shortly thereafter we entered a small fog bank which was quickly left behind, and soon the sky became overcast with a slight horizon haze but good visibility for night attack. Phosphorous in the water is extremely brilliant and most embarassing. Our SJ will not hold contact at much beyond 9,600 yards.

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2321 Received APOGON's serial 13 stating she was attacking. Her contact is definitely a different one from ours. Believe the night patrol are looking for us.

2330 Target has been steering about 220°T at 12 to 13 knots. We have been "ending around" at full speed.

2331 Target zigged left to 175°T, still at 12 knots. Went to Battle Stations Torpedo.

2346 Heard two or three distant explosions followed a short time later by a very heavy, distant explosion which shook the ship slightly. After this several other distant explosions were heard which sounded like depth charges. Shortly after this APOGON in her serial 14 reported attack completed, and in her 15 reported results as 2 or 3 (hits or ships??). Shortly after this our target slowed to 9 knots, but remained on about 175°T.

19 June 1945 Noon posit: 50°-42'N, 154°-09'E

0019 With the target tracking nicely at 9 knots on 175°T, and with DACE 45° on his port bow, range 8,700 yards, changed course to 300° and headed in at standard speed. The phosphorescence in the water is terrific, so we gradually slowed down until at

0027 We were making but 40 rpm, and showing very little wake or bow wave. Set up checking nicely for about a 90 port track. Quartermaster got a glimpse of the target at about 5,000 yards, but couldn't tell much excepting that it appeared to have a broad angle on the bow. We are manning No. 1 periscope for bearings. Our flooded forward T.B.T. will be missed very much.

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0030 Target zigged to 140°T, speed still 9 knots, range 3,900 yards. Believe this is a normal zig--don't think we have been detected. She is in sight from the bridge but not from No. 1 periscope. Have been giving him not more than 10° silhouette. We can still shoot on about a 50 port track. She looks like a DE or Frigate and is, I guess, looking for us. More tense moments of waiting. Then with the target at about 2,300 yards, 45° port angle on the bow, 55° torpedo track, run of 2,000 yards, at

0034-41 Fired tube No. 3. (Torpedo Attack #2)

0034-53 Fired tube No. 4.

0035-06 Fired tube No. 5.

0035-15 Fired tube No. 6.

0035-30 Right full rudder, all ahead flank. No. 1 periscope hadn't been able to see him, so we fired on radar bearings with 2 torpedoes to hit MOT, 100% spread for 275 foot target. Depth set 4 feet. I am sure he saw us as soon as we fired for our bow lighted up brilliantly due to impulse air and torpedoes distrubing the phosphorous. At the time of firing his angle on the bow as estimated from the bridge checked well with setup. Manned after TBT.

0036 Target observed to turn towards us. Torpedo wakes are lighted up like main street on a Saturday night. Torpedoes appear to be running hot, straight and normal without broaching. Our engines are now smoking furiously.

0037 Steadied on 070°T. T.B.T. can't see because of engine smoke. Range 1,600 yards.

0038 Came to 085°T, so T.B.T. could see.

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19 June 1945 (Cont'd)

0038-48 Fired tube No. 8 down the throat on radar bearings.

0039-01 Fired tube No. 10 down the throat on radar bearings.

0039-01 Target fired a 2 gun salvo of about 4" caliber at us. Control party below thought our torpedoes had hit, but we on the bridge knew better.

0039-01 In anticipation of obtaining pictures of the Nip blowing up, we filmed his first salvo.

0039-20 Fired tube No. 7 down the throat. (See Special Torpedo Supplement report to this patrol report.) We should have waited longer but gun fire is a great "hurry upper" when pointed in your direction.

0039-40 Three more shots from escort. His powder isn't flashess. Saw one splash close off our starboard beam. A couple whistled overhead. Believe our smoking Wintons are spoiling his aim.

0040-00 Dove to 300 feet. Rigged for depth charge. Turned left off track.

0041-40 Fired tube No. 9. (See Special Torpedo Supplement to this patrol report.) Setup for this one is excellent. We are under a 6° temperature layer. All we can do now is hope and hang on. They won't be long in coming. Pinging heard.

0046 Depth charge #1.

0047 Depth charge #2,3,4,5,6,7, and #8.

0048 Depth charge #9,10,11,12,13 and #14.

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0049 Depth charge #15 and #16.

0050 Depth charge #17 and #18. All were close and shook the ship considerably. They were all apparently slightly aft and above with some to port and some to starboard.

0051--0150 During this period we attempted to put our stern to our attacker and fishtail away. This proved impossible as she always seemed so close. Screws and pinging could be heard most of the time. She stopped and listened a couple of times. Once she went up our port side close aboard, crossed ahead, started down our starboard side then came right over head with screws very audible through the hull. Several times she appeared to be getting good echoes off of us. Once she was getting echoes, shifted to short scale, speeded up, passed right overhead (screws again audible through the hull), and astounded us all be her failure to drop.

0145 All three sound gears heard twice in rapid succession sounds that closely resembled two torpedoes being fired. We hoped that the rest of the pack was helping us out but as it turned out this was wishful thinking. Maybe the Jap fired two fish at us.

0151 Decided to fishtail on course 315°, and clear the scene regardless of where the Jap appears to be. We had planned to fire evasive weapons but our hydraulic gun aft proved disappointing. First there wasn't enough air to shoot it, then we were unable to push FTS out by hand. We didn't desire to be blowing air about the ship so we secured all noisemaker operations.

0212 Depth charge #19 and #20.

0228 Depth charge #21,22,23,24,25, and #26.

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0229 Depth charge #27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 and #36. These were not so close as the first. Apparently his depth charge racks hold 18 charges total. Believe this fellow is a MIKURA class frigate.

0330 Believe we are losing him although his pinging is still strong. Have heard another occasional, very distant pinger.

0430 Pinging very weak. Started up to periscope depth.

0510 Periscope depth. Apparently all clear. Sea flat calm. Visibility good.

0517 Secured from rig for depth charge and silent running.

0525 Secured from Battle Stations. Commenced reload and getting squared away below. Survey shows damage due to our severe depth charging to be slight. (5" ammunition scuttle flooded, minor leak in after loading hatch, searchlight lense shattered, after engine room 200 lb. salvage air check valves slightly damaged, Maneuvering Room Fuel oil vent and compensating water system vent backed off and leaked, #1 main motor fan has a knock (this may be serious and is a source of noise), much cork and paint chips plus several light bulbs.)

0600 Sea is a flat calm, visibility good. Decided to conduct a submerged patrol during the day as everyone is tired out from the past two days operations, plus the fact that planes from PARAMUSHIRU will undoubtedly be searching and our SD radar is out of commission. Plan to proceed out to sea and fix the antenna at the top.

2118 Surfaced after 20 hours and 38 minute dive.

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19 June 1945 (Cont'd)

Commenced disassembly of SD antenna. Routined torpedoes.

20 June 1945 Noon posit: 49°-21'N, 151°-54'E

Continuing work on SD.

0130 Commenced trying to clear DACE second to Com SubForPacAd Comd., ComSubForPac, AND LARKS giving recent attack information and data requested by ComSubForPacAd Comd.'s 161831.

0200 Received CABEZON's serial one to ComSubPacFor info LARKS stating that APOGON sank 2 and possibly 3 MARUS and CABEZON sank the remainder. I guess we picked on the "sleeper escort". Well maybe we kept one escort occupied for the rest of the pack. This accounts for the second distant "pinger" which we heard intermittently during our evasion.

0400 Ceased transmitting after 2 and 1/2 hours of unsuccessful continuous attempts to clear our message. It is long after daylight and we have been unable to reassemble the SD antenna mast. It will be necessary to open the bottom of the mast at the same time the top is opened to effect reassembly. This necessitates rendering the boat non-watertight. Decided to patrol at sea again today and effect repairs after dark tonight when detection and quick dives are unlikely.

0950 Picked up a white cork life ring with Jap characters and metal tag.

2030 APR signals on frequency 80, pulse rate 500. Sweeping.

2130 Recommenced repairs to SD. Converted No. 5 F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

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20 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2200 Top of SD mast is secured. The boat is water-tight again.

2230 Recommenced attempts to clear DACE second message to ComSubForPacAd Comd, ComSubForPac and LARKS.

21 June 1945 Noon posit: 46°-59'N, 150°-50'E

Surface patrolling enroute KITA URUPPU SUIDO area.

0300 Ceased transmitting having attempted unsuccessfully for 4½ hours to clear our message.

0320 Dove for trim and to flush out No. 5 M.B.T.

0345 Surfaced.

0540 SD radar is back in commission--supposedly.

1047 Made landfall on BUROTON TO by SJ bearing 220°T, range 50,000 yards. No SD pip on peaks.

1145 APR signals on frequency 82. Sweeping.

1433 While peacefully zigging in plain view of BUROTON TO was surprised to see a submarine surface 2,000 yards on our port beam. Put our stern to her until recognized as a U.S. submarine then paralleled her.

1435 Steadied on course 025°. After exchanging signals found her to be the MANTA. Ordered her by semaphore to "Close to speak". She was on our starboard quarter at this time. She sent "INT speed", and we sent back "Six". She increased speed and maneuvered to close us to our starboard. When within speaking distance, and after exchanging a few words it was noted she was still converging on an estimated course

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21 June 1945 (Cont'd)

of 010° at a speed slightly greater than ours. I was about to call over and tell her Commanding Officer that he was getting too close when I noted him turn towards his conning tower hatch and I assumed he had given an order to sheer off to his right--away from DACE. Shortly after this it became apparent to us that collision was imminent. The MANTA was still converging, her bow was about opposite our bridge apparently dropping aft slowly. Applied the general prudential rule at

1450 By putting on right full rudder, all ahead full, and sounding the collision alarm, hoping to pull ahead and throw my stern clear of her bow.

1451 MANTA's bow touched our stern at about frame 90 on the shell plating of No. 6C M.B.T. The blow was a glancing one and did not jar us much. MANTA dropped aft and at

1452 We started back to course 025° decreased speed to 1/3, and secured from collision. The only visible damage is a 4-inch dent in No. 6C M.B.T. Sent to MANTA by light "No damage x Close to speak x Course 025°, speed 6 x Not so close this time".

1515 (about) Spoke MANTA and asked him what had happened. All hands on the bridge were amazed when her Commanding Officer answered to the effect that he had been dead in the water, and that we had rammed him. Understood him to say that he thought we were closing him, which is hard to believe in view of the order we had sent him by semaphore, his request for our speed, and in view of the fact that we had been steady on course 025°T at 1/3 speed for fifteen minutes while he had maneuvered from about 2,500 yards on our starboard quarter to alongside of us, never once getting his bow much beyond our bridge.

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21 June 1945 (Cont'd)

From the ensuing conversation I gather that he is carrying out the original schedule as set forth by the Pack Commander.

Told him that we were going to the ETOROFU KAIKYO area, and that we might be back up to the KITA URUPPU SUIDO area on the 23rd or 24th. Also told him that members of the pack were acting independently so far as I knew until the 26th.

1522 Reversed course to proceed on our way. He turned away and dove soon after.

1801-30 Bridge watch was startled by the whine and roar of an airplane engine, and looked up in time to see a VAL-type plane diving at us from 150° relative. (Aircraft contact #4) Bridge was cleared and at

1802 Dove. (Before all hands had cleared the bridge the plane was seen to pass over us at about 300 feet. Why he didn't strafe or bomb on this run we will never know. SD got no contact so assumed it never was fixed.)

1803 Going to 200 feet in a hurry. Heard strafing followed by one light bomb which was close, but set shallow. No damage.

1830 Periscope depth. All clear, but sky is partly overcast.

1846 Heard three distant depth bombs or charges.

1850 Investigation shows SD radar upper antenna connection broken again. Commenced preliminary work for repair of same.

2052 Heard one or two more depth bombs or charges, still distant but closer than the last ones.

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21 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2201 Surfaced. It never gets really dark up here and today is the longest day of the year.

2230 Commenced opening top of SD antenna. Proceeding towards YETOROFU KAIKYO about 15 miles off the coast of URUPPU JIMA.

22 June 1945 Noon posit: 45°-29'N, 149°-02'E

Proceeding on surface. Moon bright--visibility good.

0200 Found it necessary to open top and bottom of SD mast rendering boat non-watertight again for a short time. Dawn commencing to break.

0315 Dove for submerged patrol in YETOROFU KAIKYO.

Plan to reconoiter sulphur refinery on the shores of MOYORO WAN at the northeast end of YETOROFU JIMA as a possible bombardment target for complying with ComSubForPac's 160738. ST and SD radars both out of commission.

0723 Sighted two small luggers about 3 or 4 miles distance going away from us, and well in YETOROFU KAIKYO. (Ship contact #5) After due deliberation decided against gun attack because of their small size, the lack of two out of three of our radars, with the good possibility of being surprised by aircraft with gun crews on deck, and confined waters, and the interuption, if not cancellation of our bombardment plans.

1400--1530 Made close-up reconnaisance of MOYORO WAN. Can make out only one building. It doesn't check the sulphur plant. No shipping present. Continued to check currents through the day and observe the WAN.

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22 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2135 Surfaced and commenced surface patrolling just south of the Straits. Our SD shows small pips on peaks at 10 miles. This is the first time our SD has functioned since before entering the area some sixteen days agoo--weak though it is.

23 June 1945 Noon posit: 45°-22'N, 148°-57'E

Surface patrolling. Light fog in patches set in about dawn. Also APR received what we believed was airborne search radar (frequency 155, P.R.450) which swept for about one hour and half commencing about 0300. (Research shows it could have been either airborne, or a type of shore aircraft warning radar.) SD radar showed no plane pip. Decided to surface patrol until fog blows clear.

0713 SD contacted two planes (Aircraft contact #5 and #6)--one about 10 miles, and the other moving in and out from about 11 to 8½ miles. As fog was mostly dissipated and what little there was was clearing fast, decided to dive for submerged patrol off MOROYO WAN.

0715 Dove. During the day we patrolled close in across the mouth of the WAN. Visibility excellent. We still haven't seen our sulphur plant nor any of the other buildings shown on the chart except the one which we thought we observed yesterday. At the northern end of our sweep we observed what was undoubtedly a shore battery located on the side of the mountain in the vicinity of IKOMO ISO. In view of this and in view of the fact that we have never been able to locate our sulphur refinery target, decided to take position about 9,000 yards from the shore of the WAN (i.e. about 4,000 yards from the nearest land) and surface about dusk, lob a few 5 inch shells at the beach in compliance to

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23 June 1945 (Cont'd)

ComSubForPac's 160738, and then head up towards KITA URUPPU SUIDO.

1920 Noted fog bank rolling in from the east.

1921 Battle Stations Surface.

1934 Surfaced. The fog beat us by a couple of minutes, so we fired 4 rounds of 5 inch at the beach on navigational range and bearing. All apparently hit the island. I guess the Japs know we are here.

1937 Secured from Battle Surface Station and cleared area.

2030 APR picked up the same type of radar that we had this morning.

2130 Commenced transmitting DACE second to ComSubFor Pac, ComSubForPacAd Comd., info LARKS. Gave them resume of our activities from our 19 June attack to date and answered ComSubForPac's 200537 and ComSub ForPacAd Comd's 161831.

2355 After many frequency shifts and much Jap jamming managed to clear message.

24 June 1945 Noon posit: 46°-33'N, 151°-31'E

Enroute KITA URUPPU SUIDO. Weather foggy.

0430 Commenced surface patrolling across the SUIDO.

Weather remained foggy all day.

25 June 1945 Noon posit: 46°-41'N, 151°-01'E.

Surface patrolling across KITA URUPPU SUIDO. Weather squally, seas picking up, no fog.

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25 June 1945 (Cont'd)

0409 Dove for submerged patrol taking ten minute high periscope looks and ST radar sweeps at 55 feet. Depth control difficult.

2052 Surfaced. Sea rough but weather clear. Patrolling in the Straits.

2330 Fog set in.

26 June 1945 Noon posit: 47°-12'N, 147°-48'E

0040 Exchanged calls by SJ radar with TINOSA and told her the Straits were clear of patrols.

0100 Departed KITA URUPPU SUIDO enroute station on scouting line in south central part of Sea of OKHOTSK in accordance with the Pack Commander's serial 09.

0315 Received CABEZON's serial 20 ordering the pack to take scouting position on her, course 270°T, speed 9, distance 15 miles. Her 0400 (26th) position was given as 47°-30'N, 149°-40'E. Changed course to comply.

0630 Emerged from fog bank. Visibility excellent.

0742 Arrived in scouting line position. Exchanged calls by SJ with APOGON to the northeast.

0817 Cleared DACE serial 09 to CABEZON telling her that we were in position.

0825 Sighted APOGON on southwesterly course, and exchanged searchlight messages concerning our position and attack data.

1822 Weak APR signals on 97 m.c., 500 pps; also another weak signal on 76 m.c.

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26 June 1945 (Cont'd)

2250 Received CABEZON's serial 23 telling us to reverse course at midnight, and giving his position which was garbled. We have missed CABEZON's serial 22.

2330 Cleared DACE's serial 10 to CABEZON stating that we would reverse course at midnight, giving him our position, and stating that we had missed his serial 22 and part of his 23.

2400 Reversed course to 090°T.

27 June 1945 Noon posit: 47°-18'N, 147°-49'E

Surface patrolling in Sea of OKHOTSK with excellent visibility and a full moon.

0318 Lookout sighted a light bearing 030°T, range about 14 miles. (Ship contact #6) Can see several bright lights through high periscope. Believe ship to be a hospital ship or a Russian. Commenced end around to dive ahead and observe him. Dawn is breaking.

0416 Cleared DACE serial 11 to pack informing pack of contact, and that I was investigating.

0450 With the target steering a steady course of 030°T, along the U.S.S.R. shipping lane at a speed of 10 knots, and apparently a single unescorted large freighter, decided a high speed end around was a useless expenditure of fuel. Slowed and headed towards ship for positive identification.

0512 SJ radar finally crashed through with a measley range of 16,600 yards on the broadside, plainly visible freighter.

0535 Range now 9,500 yards. Ship is definitely a

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properly marked Russian EC2-SC1 Liberty type ship of 7,176 tons, as shown on page 68 of AIC NORPAC No. 653 Revised. Sheered off and resumed surface patrol.

0659 Ceased transmitting DACE serial 12 to pack after sending it double two times with no receipts. This reported contact as Russian, gave our posit., and the fact that we were abandoning investigation. (Determined later on in the day that CABEZON had received this message.)

0750 Received CABEZON's serial 24 giving us scouting line information.

0820 Received CABEZON's serial 25 to pack giving further data on course changes.

1117 Sighted CABEZON to the north.

1245 Closed CABEZON to signalling distance and exchanged positions and information. Then headed southeast for our scouting line position.

1418 Received CABEZON's serial 26 requesting estimate of fuel needed by DACE for return to base.

1450 Answered above query with DACE's serial 13.

1717 Exchanged SJ signals with CABEZON.

2400 Reversed course to 270°T.

28 June 1945 Noon posit: 47°-04'N, 147°-55'E

Surface patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.

0944 O.O.D., J.O.O.D., QM and lookout sighted two

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28 June 1945 (Cont'd)

large bubbles in quick succession each about 5 yards long by 3 yards wide about 40 yards off the starboard beam. They had the appearance of impulse bubbles or a submarine venting air-ridden tanks. Put stern to it and cleared area to northwest.

1103 Received CABEZON's serial 27 to reverse course to 090°T at noon.

1115 Bridge personnel plus Commanding Officer and high periscope watch sighted a long, straight, and moving streak in the water about 1,500 to 2,000 yards to the south and parallel to our base course. This was not positively identified as a torpedo wake, but could easily have been. Sound gear could hear nothing.

1200 Reversed course. This takes us back past this morning's scenes of activity, but we are steering to leave them well south of us.

1342 Periscope sighted by lookout close aboard to port. (Ship contact #7) Put stern to and avoided to north and northeast. This sighting was made by the port lookout who said he saw a black tapered object appear once, disappear, then reappear with about two foot exposed, and a slight feather around the base. In view of the fact that our pack had been patrolling in this area for some time sending quite a few radio messages, and in view of the periscope, possible torpedo wake, and bubbles sighted by DACE, I was convinced a submarine was present, so when our evasive action was deemed completed, DACE's serial 14 to the pack was composed reporting possible submarine contacts and requesting a new area.

1520 (about) Radio was just about to transmit serial 14 when CABEZON's serial 28 was received changing

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28 June 1945 (Cont'd)

scouting line and course. Held up on our message. A check of the chart shows us about on the western scouting line. Our ordered assignment to the eastern line would mean 75 to 100 miles of high speed steaming. Due to our evasive actions I figured the rest of the pack was east of us. Therefore DACE serial 14 was recomposed to include a request for assignment to western line due to low fuel. Took scouting course 040°T on western line in anticipation of an early affirmative to our request.

1557 Transmitted DACE's serial 14. Received immediate receipts from MANTA and APOGON, but none from CABEZON. During the next hour and a quarter message was transmitted double four times including once on the old frequency with no receipts from CABEZON.

1638 Sighted U.S. submarine on horizon bearing 358°T on a westerly course.

1650 (about) Submarine turned towards us and dove. Assumed she was making an approach on us so commenced ending around to eastward, fired emergency recognition flares, and set sound watch for sonic identification.

1717 CABEZON receipted for DACE serial 14.

1737 (about) U.S. submarine surfaced. DACE fired more flares.

1745 Established SJ communication and identified her as APOGON. Tried to explain our reason for being out of position but was unable to get message through.

1818 Sighted and exchanged calls with MANTA to our starboard.

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28 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1835 Transmitted DACE serial 15 to CABEZON requesting reply to our last message to which she answered affirmative (her serial 29).

1836 Commenced taking station to the west of APOGON. Signalled her by light that we would be west of her, apologized for causing her to dive, and exchanged navigational positions.

2120 Reported in position to CABEZON (DACE's serial 16).

2222 Received CABEZON's serial 31 requesting our position and a repeat of our 16.

2310 Complied with same in DACE's serial 17. Thus ends a day full of minor incidents.

(Note: After exchanging stares with an inquisitive seal for a full minute at close range about sunset, and noting that there were whales in our vicinity this morning, it is a fifty-fifty chance our Jap submarine suspicions were caused by the activities of these two classes of sea mammals.)

29 June 1945 Noon posit: 50°-04'N, 151°-06'E

Surface patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.

0322 Dove for trim.

0334 Surfaced.

0535 Passed a medium sized, heavy metal tank with various pipe appurtenances.

0715 Passed an object identified as a medium sized ice box in good condition.

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29 June 1945 (Cont'd)

1334 Exchanged SJ calls with APOGON.

2100 Converted No. 3 F.B.T. to a water ballast tank.

30 June 1945 Noon posit: 52°-29'N, 154°-20'E

Surface patrolling on scouting line. Visibility good.

0240 SJ interference on our starboard beam.

0305 Dove for trim and to flush out No. 3 M.B.T.

0327 Surfaced.

0730 Am becoming anxious concerning scouting line courses. Original plan calls for a reverse of course at 0800, yet on the other hand the pack hasn't been following the original plan since 17 June. To further complicate matters we are getting quite far north and nearing KAMCHATKA.

1030 Still no information from the Pack Commander. Decided to reverse course anyway and ask for information.

1031 Cleared DACE serial 18 to CABEZON giving position, and requesting scouting line information. Determined our wolf pack frequency receiver to be out of commission although the usual static noises were heard continuously. Guess this accounts for the lack of information. Don't know how long it has been defective.

1345 Received CABEZON's serial 36 ordering DACE to patrol in accordance with Pack Patrol Instructions of 29 May. We can't make our position on the scouting line by 1600 at which time the line breaks up, so set course for our lane in area 4

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30 June 1945 (Cont'd)

West (ONEKOTAN KAIKYO). Check shows we have missed CABEZON's serials 32, 33, 34, and 35.
(Note: We now have two receivers on the Wopaco frequency and two radiomen on watch at all times.)

1400 Composed DACE's serial19 to CABEZON informing her of the missing serials, and that DACE would be in Area 4 West about 0100 tomorrow.

1600 Unable to get a receipt for our message although sent double two times.

1645 Land sighted bearing 120°T, distance 73 miles. Identified as ARAIDO TO.

1925 Received APOGON's serial 35 to DACE requesting our position.

2000 Answered APOGON's message with DACE serial 20 and also transmitted DACE serial 19 again to CABEZON. Received receipt for both messages.

2200 SJ contact on the southern peaks of PARAMUSHIRU bearing 150°T, about 95,000 yards.

1 July 1945 Noon posit: 49°-51'N, 154°-54'E

Enroute Area 4 West. Visibility good.

0130 Commenced patrolling DACE lane off ONEKOTAN KAIKYO.

0324 Passed an unidentified corpse.

0329 Dove for submerged patrol in the straits. Two times during the day fog banks rolled in, and then passed clear. Visibility was for the most part good. Maintained 55 foot ST radar periscope patrol when in reduced visibility. Sea flat calm.

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1 July 1945 (Cont'd)

1830 Planned to surface as fog had rolled in again, but SJ radar went out of commission at this point. Decided to remain submerged for repairs.

2106 Surfaced--SJ repairs completed.
Between 2230 and 2330 we had the after glow of sunset, fog, excellent visibility, overcast, clear, starlite sky, light rain and moonrise not to mention brilliantly phosphorescent water. Slowed to 100 rpm to reduce phosphorescent illumination.

2 July 1945 Noon posit: 49°-55'N, 155°-58'E

Surface patrolling, visibility poor to excellent. No SJ interference from the rest of the pack but assume other boats are patrolling in their nearby lanes.

0336 Dove at sunrise although it has been light for more than an hour. Commenced submerged patrol of ONEKOTAN KAIKYO. Visibility remained excellent all day. Sea calm. Routined all torpedoes.

0915 Sighted plane (identified as an EMILY) (Plane Contact #7) through periscope at an estimated range of 4 miles. Increased depth to 100 feet.

0925 Periscope depth--all clear.

2114 Surfaced.

2220 Transmitted DACE's serial 21 to CABEZON informing her that we were proceeding to Area 3 West (KITA URUPPU SUIDO), that we would rendezvous in accordance with original patrol instructions, and requested her position.

2243 Received CABEZON's serial 41 giving her posit. about 60 miles north of her Area 4 lane.

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2 July 1945 (Cont'd)

2324 Transmitted DACE's serial 22 telling CABEZON that we had missed her serials 38, 39, and 40, requesting a repeat of her latitude, and asking if DACE was operating independently.

2354 Received CABEZON's serial 42 giving same posit. and telling us that we were operating independently until 5 July. We had previously been ordered to carry out original patrol plan. Whereabouts of APOGON and MANTA unknown. Decided to comply with original patrol plan taking DACE's prescribed lane for trip to Area 3 West.

3 July 1945 Noon posit: 49°-21'N, 152°-41'E

Proceeding towards KITA URUPPU SUIDO at slow surface speeds. Visibility good.

2024 Received CABEZON's serial 43 telling the pack to operate independently until 5 July at which time each submarine was to be in its assigned lane in Area 3 West. Speeded up so as to arrive at this station by early morning 4 July.

4 July 1945 Noon posit: 46°-56'N, 151°-08' E

0230 Entered Area 3 West (KITA URUPPU SUIDO)and commenced surface patrolling across DACE and CABEZON's lanes. Weather during the day was alternately foggy and clear but in general visibility was not too good.

0408 Dove for trim.

0425 Surfaced and continued surface patrolling.

2200 Received APOGON's serial 40 stating that she was in her lane to the south of us.

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5 July 1945 Noon posit: 46°-47'N, 151°-05'E

Surface patrolling in DACE lane on Sea of OKHOTSK side of KITA URUPPU SUIDO. Visibility fair to poor all day.

0220 SJ radar interference on 040°T. Assume this to be CABEZON but was unable to establish communications.

0344 Dove for trim.

0403 Surfaced and continued surface patrol.

1035-1100 Received weak sweeping APR signals in 80 megc. and 76 megc.

1340 SJ interference at 252°T, probably APOGON. Believe she tried to contact us but we were unable to establish communications.

2020 Received CABEZON's serials 44 and 45. The former breaking up the pack (giving APOGON charge of APOGON and MANTA), and the latter ordering DACE to take station 5 miles on CABEZON's port flank.

2022 Set course for new position.

2120 Cleared DACE serial 23 to pack giving posit., course, speed and ETA.

2123 Received ComSubPac's 051013 ordering DACE and CABEZON to depart area at sunset 7 July.

2218 Received CABEZON's serial 46 telling us to take our time and save fuel.

2330 Completed transit of KITA URUPPU SUIDO.

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6 July 1945 — Noon posit: 46°-15'N, 158°-58'E

Enroute CABEZON's port beam. Visibility poor.

0101 — Exchanged recognition signals with CABEZON.

0117 — In position on CABEZON's port beam conforming to her courses and speeds.

0335 — Dove for trim.

0352 — Surfaced. Surface patrolling to seaward.

0421 — Received CABEZON's serial 47 giving course and speed data. Weather alternately clear and foggy during the morning, but very clear all afternoon (land 90 miles away was visible).

2030 — Rendezvoused with CABEZON and transferred DACE patrol narrative and track charts.

7 July 1945 — Noon posit: 44°-24'N, 156°-26E

Surface patrolling. Persistent light fog prevails.

0400 — Dove for trim.

0417 — Surfaced.

2000 — Departed from assigned area in company with U.S.S. CABEZON enroute MIDWAY in accordance with ComSubPac 051013.

8 July 1945 — Noon posit: 40°-22'N, 163°-17'E

Enroute MIDWAY. Light fog prevails.

0325 — Dove for trim.

0340 — Surfaced.

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8 July 1945 (Cont'd)

1423 Commenced six hour battery discharge.

2019 Completed discharge.

9 July 1945 Noon posit: 36°-30'N, 169°-10'E

Enroute MIDWAY. Light fog pervails

0030K Set clocks ahead one hour to conform to -11 time (LOVE time).

10 July 1945 Noon posit: 32°-27'N, 175°-20E

Enroute MIDWAY.

0417 Dove for trim.

0421 Surfaced.

0630L Set all clocks ahead one hour to conform to -12 zone time (MIKE time).

1107M Received ComTask Group 17.5's 092124 giving routing instructions.

1332M Received ComSubPacAd.Comd.'s 100036.

11 - 10 July 1945 Noon posit: 28°-15.3N, 178°-13.'W

Enroute Midway.

0622 Crossed international date line. Changed day to 10 July.

1314 Rendezvoused with airplane escort.

1640 Moored at berth S-9, MIDWAY, T.H.

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(C) WEATHER

Weather conditions enroute to the area were excellent and included calm seas and clear skies all the way.

A few miles off the KURILE Chain in the Sea of OKHOTSK the fog bank disappeared, but as long as the weather was calm a slight haze persisted. At times this haze prevented celestial observations using a natural horizon.

Nearly all over the Sea of OKHOTSK, between the KURILE's and SAKHOLIN Island the water was highly phosphorescent, especially so when the water was choppy.

Fog in all the straits of the KURILE Island chain was frequent but not always present. Some days were exceptionally clear with refraction bringing into view objects which were beyond the natural horizon. The fog extended about ten miles off shore and was thickest on the lee side of the chain. At no time was it as thick as previous reports led us to expect. Usually the visibility in the fog banks was about 1,000--2,000 yards.

On June 16 a fog bank with visibility less than 500 yards extended out into the Pacific for about 20 miles off of SHIMISHURO TO. The fog existed only on the surface for an estimated depth of 100 feet. Most of the time the fog was in belts with good visibility between belts. This made surface patrolling close to the beach or to targets risky as far as depending on fog cover for unvisibility was concerned.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

A southerly set of about .7 knots was experienced at all places along the western side of the chain, and a northeasterly set was the predominant current in the straits.

On June 22 the following current information was compiled. Times are -10.

Place: ETOROFU KAIKYO along 100 fathom curve outside of MOYORO WAN.

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(D) TIDAL INFORMATION (Cont'd)

TIME		
0307 - 1120 K	1.1 Kts	015°
1120 - 1315 K	0	- -
1315 - 1400 K	0.4 Kts	160°

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

LORAN stations were too distant for LORAN navigation in this area.

On June 16, July 6, July 7, July 8, and July 9 while in a fog bank, it was possible to take bubble sextant observations of the sun. The bubble sextant with averaging device (Type AN-5851-1) was used with good results and is highly recommended for navigation in this area.

The high, rugged peaks of this area are an invaluable aid to Radar Navigation during fog and the limited darkness. It was quite possible to patrol a strait on the surface using Radar Navigation without once seeing the surrounding land.

No lighthouses or similar navigational aids were sighted in operation.

(F) CONTACTS

NO.	TIME DATE	LAT. LONG.	TYPE(S)	INITIAL RANGE	EST.CRS. & SPEED	HOW CONT.	REMARKS
1	June 8 0832	44-20N 146-35E	Lugger Sea Truck	8,000	010T 3 Kts.	P	Sank both with gunfire.
2	June 10 0620	46-37N 147-52E	(1)5-6;000 ton AK.,(1) 100 ton V-B class Small MARU,(2)MIKURA class Frigates	14,000	045T 8 Kts.	P	Sank AK. Evaded Frigates; possibly damaged one

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(F) CONTACTS (Cont'd)

NO.	DATE TIME	LAT. LONG.	TYPE(S)	INIT. RANGE	EST.CRS. & SPEED	HOW CONT.	REMARKS
3	June 18 2001	50-51.5N 154-56.5E	Unident. MIKURA class Frigate(EU)	30,000 9,600	-- 178T 9 Kts.	Look-out R	Attacked--missed; was counter attacked.
4	June 18 2240	50-44N 154-33.4E					
5	June 22 0727	45-33N 149-00E	(2) small Luggers	6,000	100T 6-8 Kts	P	
6	June 27 0415	47-15N 154-44.5E	Russian Frieghter	20,000	030T 9 Kts	Look-out	
7	June 28 1342	47-16N 147-48E	Possible Periscope	300	--	Look-out	Evaded.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

The area around PARAMUSHIRU TO showed evidence of daily A/S sweeps by land based aircraft of the VAL and ZEKE type. Three contacts were encountered.

One of the above planes, a VAL, was seen circling the northeast corner of ARAIDO TO. He was possibly looking for us in the area which we had vacated earlier.

One EMILY was sighted while we were patrolling ONEKOTAN SUIDO. It was patrolling the KURILE chain in a southeasterly direction.

Two plane contacts were made by SD radar in the area of ETORUFU SUIDO and one VAL was sighted just south of KITA URUPPU SUIDO. This plane bombed and strafed us as we submerged, and dropped two or three more bombs during the ensuing hour.

No planes were sighted in the Sea of OKHOTSK away from the KURILE Island chain, and only one was sighted on the Pacific side of the chain, indicating that the planes stay

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(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS (Cont'd)

pretty close to land. There was indications of a possible radar equipped plane near ETORUFU SUIDO.

(H) ATTACK DATA

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1A PATROL NO. 7
Time: 1322-20 Date: 10 June 1945 Lat. 47-25N Long. 149-04.5E

TARGET DATA--DAMAGED INFLICTED

Description: Convoy consisting of one (1) Medium AK of about 5,000--6,000 tons (similar to EIHUKU MARU, Page 134 ONI 208J Rev.), one(1) very small tanker or sea truck of the V-B type, with two (2) MIKURA class frigates. Contact made by high periscope. Visibility 6-9 miles.

Ship(s) sunk: (1) Medium AK, 5,000-6,000 tons (similar EIHUKU MARU).

Ship(s) damaged: None
or probably
sunk

Damaged determined by: Torpedo heard, felt, and observed to hit under the stack at the MOT. Loud breaking-up noises and an internal explosion were heard through the hull starting at 1327. The breaking-up noises were audible on sound gear till 1425, Screws not heard after the torpedo hit. Ship was observed stopped with slight list at last look before going deep soon after firing.

Target Draft 12' Course 050T Speed 9 Range 400 yds (at firing)

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

Own Ship Data

Speed 2.5 Kts Course 191.5T Depth 65 feet Angle Oo (at firing)

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Submerged periscope attack on a snap set up based on previous tracking information. Continuous periscope bearings and stadimeter ranges were used.

Tubes Fired--	No. 3
Track Angle--	147.5
Gyro Angle--	188
Depth set--	7 ft.
Power--	HIGH
Hit or Miss--	HIT
Erratic--	NO
Mark Torpedo--	14-3A
Serial No.--	95130
Mark Exploder--	6-5
Serial No.--	33612
Actuation Set--	CONTACT
Actuation Actual--	CONTACT
Mark Warhead--	16-4
Serial No.--	20177
Explosive--	TPX
Firing Interval--	- -
Type Spread--	DIVERGENT
Sea Conditions--	5
Overhaul Activity--	S/M Base, Pearl Harbor

REMARKS: It was intended to fire two torpedoes at this target with a total divergent spread of 2°. After the first torpedo was observed to hit shifted to the next target before the second torpedo was fired.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1B PATROL NUMBER 7

Time: 1323-20 Date: 10 June 1945 Lat: 47-25N Long: 149-04.5E

Target Data--DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Same as Torpedo Attack 1A. Target is Small MARU, V-B type.

Ship(s) sunk: None

Ship(s) damaged: None
or probably sunk

Damage determined by: None

Target draft: 8 ft. Course: 050T Speed: 9 Kts. Range: 350 yds. estimated (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed: 2.5 Kts. Course: 183T Depth 65 ft. Angle: 0° (at firing)

Type Attack: Submerged periscope attack on a snap set up based on previous tracking information. Continuous periscope bearings and stadimeter ranges were used.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

Tubes Fired: Tube No. 10

Track Angle--	154°
Gyro Angle--	201°
Depth Set--	7 ft.
Power--	HIGH
Hit or Miss--	MISS
Erratic--	NO
Mark Torpedo--	14-3A
Serial No.--	91995
Mark Exploder--	6-5
Serial No.--	32926
Actuation Set--	CONTACT
Actuation Actual--	- -
Mark Warhead--	16-4
Serial No.--	20135
Explosive--	TPX
Firing interval--	- -
Type Spread--	- -
Sea Conditions--	5
Overhaul Activity--	S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS: Range and size of target were overestimated. Initial dive of torpedo carried it beyond the target--resulting in a miss.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2A PATROL NO. SEVEN

Time: 0035 Date: 19 June 1945 Lat: 50-23.9N Long: 154-34E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by SJ radar at 9,600 yards. Visibility 5,000 yards.

Ship(s) Sunk: None

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: None

Target Draft 10 feet Course 140°T Speed 9 Kts. Range 2,300 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 4 Kts. Course 288T Depth Surface Angle 0° (at firing)

Type Attack: Night surface attack using SJ radar ranges and bearings.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

Tubes Fired:	#3	#4	#5	#6
Track Angle--	38°-30'P	40°-50'P	41°-30'P	41°-10'P
Gyro Angle--	353°	351°-10'	350°-30'	350°-30'
Depth Set--	4'	4'	4'	4'
Power--	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Hit or Miss--	MISS	MISS	MISS	MISS
Erratic--	NO	NO	NO	NO
Mark Torpedo--	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.--	95144	91997	104163	64674
Mark Exploder--	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.--	33090	28065	28084	14234
Actuation Set--	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual--	- -	- -	- -	- -
Mark Warhead--	16-4	16-4	16-4	16-4
Serial No.--	20133	15961	29355	33527
Explosive--	TPX	TPX	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval--	- -	12"	13"	9"
Type Spread--	DIVERGENT(100% coverage for a 275' target.			
Sea Conditions--	0	0	0	0
Overhaul activity--	Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.			

REMARKS: At instant of firing target appeared to see us and turned toward. Water was extremely phosphorescent and wakes plus impulse air bubbles caused brilliant illumination.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

(Torpedo Attack Report Form)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER 2B PATROL NO. 7

Time: 0039 Date: 19 June 1945 Lat: 50-24N Long: 154-34E

Target Data--Damage Inflicted

Description: Same as Torpedo Attack 2A.

Ship(s) sunk: None

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: None

Target Draft 10 ft. Course 090T Speed 14 Kts. Range 1,750 (at firing)

Own Ship Data

Speed 18 Kts. Course 090T Depth Surface Angle 0° (at firing)

Type Attack: Night Surface attack using SJ radar ranges and bearings. "Down the throat shot".

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

Tubes Fired--	#8	#10
Track Angle--	009°P	008°P
Gyro Angle--	166°-30'	167°-30'
Depth Set--	4'	4'
Power--	HIGH	HIGH
Hit or Miss--	MISS	MISS
Erratic--	NO	NO
Mark Torpedo--	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.--	66429	95141
Mark Exploder--	6-5	6-5
Serial No.--	42644	19956
Actuation Set--	CONTACT	CONTACT
Actuation Actual--	- -	- -
Mark Warhead--	16-4	16-4
Serial No.--	21348	19768
Explosive--	TPX	TPX
Firing Interval--	- -	13"
Type Spread--	NONE	NONE
Sea Conditions--	0	0
Overhaul Activity--	S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.	

REMARKS: TBT bearings could not be obtained due to smoke from our own engines. Water extremely phosphorescent.

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

(GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) GUN ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 7

Time: 0943K Date: 8 June 1945 Lat: 44-20N Long: 146-38.3E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Destroyed: One (1) sea truck of about 300 tons and
One (1) lugger of 75 - 100 tons.

Damage determined by: Aththe time of "cease firing" on the first target, she was observed to have her decks awash while her rigging and superstructure were burning fiercely. Several internal explosions were noted during the firing.

The second target was a shambles and was settling rapidly when last seen. Both targets were predominately wooden, and and it is doubtful if they actually sank. However, the damage inflicted was definitely irreparable and both targets were reduced to derlict hulks.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Action occured during daylight, with visibility reduced to 3,000 yards by fog and mist. The following guns were used, and fired the number of rounds indicated.

5"/25 - - - - - - - - - - - -	50	
40mm fwd. - - - - - - - - - -	100 HEIT	100 AP
40mm aft. - - - - - - - - - -	168 HEIT	168 AP
Twin 20mm	400 HEIT	200 HET
(4).50 cal. machine guns	312 API	312 INC
		156 TR

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(H) ATTACK DATA (Cont'd)

Deflection for 5" gun was given from periscope. Range corrections were passed by SJ radar. The Conning Tower had direct communication with Sightsetter by battle power phones.

Open sights and tracer ammunition enabled both 40mm's to obtain a high percentage of hits.

Five inch and 40mm fire were very effective. The .50 caliber guns had little effect, but were used to give personnel a taste of gun action which may prove valuable in the future. The twin 20mm should prove effective when personnel have gained more experience. Improvement was noted during this action.

(GUN ATTACK REPORT FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) GUN ATTACK NUMBER 2 PATROL NO. 7

Time: 1934K Date: 23 June 1945 Lat: 45-26N Long: 148-56E

Damage: Undetermined.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Fired four (4) rounds of 5"/25 at the beach in compliance with Comsubspac 160738 from a range of 8,000 yards (nearest land 4,000 yards). Shells were aimed at shoreline from navigational plot. Loud explosions at this range seem to indicate shells hit on land. It is unfortunate that a heavy fog bank prevented us from spotting ranges and deflection on the building we had previously observed. Gun fired normally after being immersed in 34°F water all day.

(I) MINES

No mines or mine laying operations were noted with the exception of the two mines sighted and sunk by the U.S.S. CABEZON while enroute to patrol area in company with DACE.

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(J) ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No new countermeasures or new tactics were noted. This ship was counterattack on two occasions with depth charges from Jap Frigates, strafed and bombed by a Jap plane, fired at with deck guns of a frigate and probably with two torpedoes from this same ship. On the occasion of being fired upon the Japs manned their guns and got off at least five well aimed shots from guns of about 4" size at night in a very short time. If she fired torpedoes at us they were ineffective at our depth of 300 - 350 feet.

The Jap Frigates used echo ranging with very poor results most of the time, but on occasions they stopped and listened apparently with equally poor results. Good density layers were always present.

Our evasions consisted mostly of silent running at 300 - 350 feet while fish-tailing away on a certain course. Due to mechanical difficulties noise makers were not employed.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(1) HULL and MACHINERY:

Electrical - An unexpected dive necessitated by an approaching plane flooded the already opened bridge pelorus, forward T.B.T. and cable putting the equipment out of commission for the remainder of the patrol.

Bow & Stern Planes: After Yard overhaul both bow and stern planes failed to go into power operation without manual aid. The clutch meshed well but solenoid would not pull the clutch into the fully engaged position. Brackets and pins as positive locks were installed which guaranteed power on the planes. Additional troubles were caused

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(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE (Cont'd)

by the tilting limit switch; the bow planes failed to respond when the controller was put on "dive" and "dive" had to be put on by hand. The tilting limit switch, interlock, contactors, controllers and lines were checked but the system has not yet been made reliable.

Main Motor No. 1 — After depth charge attack, which was evaded at deep submergence, No. 1 M.M. developed a click which sounded like the fan hitting the housing. The noise was not present upon surfacing and has not reoccurred.

Auxiliary Generator — Water coming through the engine induction and eventually leaking down to the Auxiliary Generator terminal block resulted in flooding out the cables and putting the generator out of commission. Cables were cleaned and reinsulated, and a canvas spray shield designed to cover the terminal block which has prevented any further trouble.

(M) ORDNANCE and GUNNERY

No current; defects or damage

(L) RADIO

No major radio material defects were noted, the following information on transmission and reception is as given below:

TRANSMISSION

Radio transmission was hampered by atmospheric disturbances, particularly within the Sea of OKHOTSK. Best results were obtained on 8470 KCS. Attempts on the other

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(L) RADIO (Cont'd)

bands were without success.

DATE TIME	LAT. LONG.	FREQUENCY	RESULTS
6/11/45 1400-1730Z	47-07N 149-50E	8470	Heard NPN. Called NPN and NDO. No answer.
6/15/45 1233-1255Z	46-34N 151-08E	8470	Message sent. Roger from NPN.
6/19/45 1537-1800Z	50-42N 154-09E	4235, 8470 and 12705	Heard NPN and NTF. Called each. No answer.
6/20/45 1235-1715Z	49-21N 151-54E	4235, 8470 and 12705	Head NPN and NPM. Called each. No answer.
6/23/45 1130-1343Z	45-22N 148-57E	8470	Message sent. Roger from NPN.

RECEPTION:

Radio reception of NPM Primary Fox Schedules was good. 6045 KCS was copied from 1100Z to 1700Z, 13655 KCS or 16730 KCS thereafter. Of the latter two, reception was usually best on 16730 KCS.

(M) RADAR

SD-5 Radar:

While enroute from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor, excellent performance was obtained from the SD-5 with ranges on planes up to 75 miles. In Pearl Harbor the antenna base plug was replaced with the fixed type. After leaving Pearl Harbor it was discovered that the range was practically zero. At Midway the gear was retuned, but 5 miles seemed to be its maximum range, and the transmitter current was slightly high. While in the area the antenna was found to be open-circuited. Removal of the base plug showed that connecting strips from both the shoe terminals to ends of the conductors running up the mast were broken indicating that the antenna head had probably been raised after the

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(M) RADAR (Cont'd)

the strips were installed. Further investigation disclosed a br... in one conductor just below the "baxooka" matching transformer necessitating pulling the antenna head. The transmitter current returned to normal following these repairs, and sensitivity improved sufficiently to pick up a 6,000 foot peak at 10 miles. It is obvious, however, that performance is very far below par, and that the mast and equipment should be thoroughly checked for the cause.

SJ-a Radar:

Ranges obtained on the SJ following the overhaul were very low, and material casualties occured at least daily during the first half of the patrol. When the patrol began, 8,000 yards was the maximum range that could be obtained on a U.S. submarine, and tracking had to be done at 5,000 to 6,000 yards.

Most of the plugs on the coaxial cables have required replacement due to careless installation, and many loose connections have been found. In spite of replacement of the fuse clips and the use of depth charge clamps, the main line fuses in the control unit persist in burning out about every 48 hours due to heating in the clips. A separate fuse box permitting the use of higher capacity clips is necessary. The present installation of the control unit does not give it sufficient cooling in hot weather. As a consequence all fuses are too hot to hold and prior to reaching the cold weather all fuses were blowing at random.

This patrol like all other patrols since the installation of the PPI was plagued by trouble with the regulated rectifiers. The PPI and now the ST have been added to the load on a circuit designed for the simple SJ, and as a result the 5U4-G rectifier tubes are so overloaded that their life is short and unreliable. Ten replacements were required after departing on patrol.

The struggle to improve the sensitivity revealed the following defects. The magnetron was weak, a faulty 5D21 tube was

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(M) RADAR (Cont'd)

excessive current, the 807 tube which drives the 5D21 was gassy and supplying a deformed pulse, the 721A T-R tube had been installed at Midway with the fin jammed, the first IF tube of the AFC was shorting most of the IF signal to ground, the waveguide was very dirty on the inside, the plug in the converter unit for the output of the IF signal was broken, and the crystal disconnect rod was making intermittent contact with the fingers at the top of the converter. The last appeared to have been caused by tuning the converter without loosening the chuck, thus bending the rod and also the fingers. The zinc chromate coating inside the waveguide is so filled with dirt it must be removed. From its condition, it appears that the SJ transmitter had rather rough handling during its storage and reinstallation following the overhaul.

Ranges obtained were finally brought up to 11,000 yards maximum on one of our submarines, although 8,000 to 10,000 yards is the usual range, and a frigate had to be closed to 9,000 yards to track. In the two chances to check performance on a large merchant ship, the SJ was disappointing possibly due to atmospheric conditions. The convoy attacked on 10 June could not be picked up although the range was closed to 12,000 yards. The weather was very foggy and rainy with a strong wind blowing. Wave pips and ring time were normal. Since the escorts were using radar of the SJ frequency, attempts to track by SJ were abandoned and the ST used. The maximum range on this convoy for the ST was 16,000 yards. Again on 27 June it was impossible to pick up a large AK until the range had closed to 16,600 although radar had the bearing to search. This time there was a slight haze and moderate wind. Three hours later, however, with no changes having been made in the SJ and apparently operating the same, it picked up the APOGON at 11,000 yards.

ST Radar

During the first part of the patrol, the ST was very unstable and difficult to tune. Careful selection of the local oscillator tube, and careful tuning to a large measure eliminated this. When surfacing with 3 inches pressure in the boat,

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(M) RADAR (Cont'd)

the mica window on the wave guide shut off valve was blown out. Ranges obtained compared very well with the SJ in its weakened condition, and often exceeded it. Submarines were picked up out to 14,000 yards, and a friendly convoy at 30,000 yards. Land echoes fell off rapidly as the range increased.

Commanding Officer's Comment: This ship should not be sent out on her next war patrol until and unless the SJ and SD radars have been placed in reliable and top-notch working order.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Best listening results were obtained with the JK, yet maximum range obtained was 4750 yards on the screws of the AK on June 9. JP listening was particularly disappointing, detecting no screws outside 1500 yards.

The JK-QC shaft developed a pronounced grinding and very noisy groan early in the patrol. After thorough inspection and lubrication the noise was attributed to missaligned salt water packing. It was not thought advisable to repack the bearing underway so the defect still exists. A careless wiring installation in the QB receiver produced a humming which was soon corrected.

Sound conditions in the area were in general poor. Marine noises and disturbances, thought to be volcanic, was heard repeatedly. The characteristic "pile driver noise" was the most common and most persistant. This was particularly pronounced in the MITA URUPPU SUIDO area.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

As has been previously reported, this area contained many and varied density layers. B/T cards taken are as given below.

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(O) DENSITY LAYERS (Cont'd)

DATE	GCT TIME	LONG.	LAT.	CARD
6/6/45	1730	151-29	42-35	2° Neg.
6/8/45	1700	146-50	44-16	6° Neg.
6/11/45	1600	149-06	47-14	5° Neg.
6/11/45	1730	147-40	47-17	6° Neg.
6/17/45	1700	157-41	49-51.5	9° Neg.
6/18/45	0900	155-07	50-50	9° Neg.
6/19/45	1721	153-23	49-45	9° Neg.
6/21/45	1630	149-08	46-53	8° Neg.
6/30/45	1740	153-31	51-49	1° Posit. at 60 feet 4° Neg. at 140 feet
7/1/45	1530	154-28	50-09	4° Neg.
7/2/45	1800	155-00	50-00	4° Neg.
7/4/45	1835	151-01	46-50	4° Neg.
7/7/45	1825	154-23	45-56	4° Neg.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, and HABITABILITY

The state of health of the ship's company was excellent. There were very few colds which was rather the opposite to what could be expected in going from a tropical climate to one of cold, dampness, and fog. There was only one admission to the sick list (a case of cellulitis) for a total of two sick days.

The selection of food we were able to obtain was good and varied, and it was in general well prepared. The baking was outstanding. STENBERG, C.L., Bkrlc(T)(SS), USNR deserves much credit for this outstanding baking. The newly installed ice cream freezer was used constantly and its products were a welcome addition to our menu. Soup was served at night during cold weather. Fresh water developed a metalic taste causing slight naseau.

The cold damp weather made parts of the boat uncomfortable at times. This was particularly true of the forward and after torpedo rooms which were not only the coldest compartments but which excelled all the rest in the quantity of dripping condensate. The air conditioning plant was run submerged to reduce

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(P) HEALTH, FOOD and HABITABILITY (ConT'd)

the condensate but the after torpedo room was never helped much by this. Towards the end of the several long dives we made the air became somewhat foul but was kept "breathable" by the use of Co_2 absorbent and oxygen.

The winter clothes issued were of sufficent quality and quantity to ward off the cold which except for night topside watches was as a rule not too severe. The designer of the jungle cloth overall trousers complete WITHOUT FLY should be made to wear the garment for a 3 or 4 hour period in the cold breezes of the Polar circuit. The Army quilts were excellent.

The cigarettes, stationary, comfort kits, and various pieces of wearing apparel donated to us by the American Red Cross were very useful and greatly appreciated by all hands.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol	27
(b) Number of men on board during patrol	77
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol	54
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol	4
(e) Number of unqualified men making first patrol	18
(f) Number of men advanced in rate during patrol	17

In spite of the large turnover of personnel since our last patrol (4 officers and 27 men--all experienced--were detached), and in spite of our nonoperating overhaul period, the state of training and performance of personnel remains excellent. Sufficient training periods were afforded us after our overhaul to "shake down" the new and old crew members.

It is a sad commentary on our submarine training program that upon the occasion of the loss of our torpedo officer and TDC operator less than 24 hours before leaving on patrol no suitable trained replacement could be found in Pearl Harbor, Midway, six submarine tenders, and approximately 40 submarines in port. The failure to obtain a trained replacement forced

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(Q) PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

us to change almost completely our officer's battle station's setup at the last minute and after all our training had been completed.

The proposed increase in personnel complement to 72 men as mentioned in ComSubForPacFlt.Adm. Conf.Ltr., serial 0870 of 20 April 1945 is a step in the right direction, but it is believed a minimum of 74 men are needed for a war complement, and the submarines should be allowed, as at present, to take extra men if the Commanding Officers deems it necessary. Considering the small increase in the number of men in submarines caused by this and the large turn over at the end of each patrol this seems reasonable.

In view of the large number of officers carried on board it is recommended that the personnel allowance be changed to allow (1) Steward and (1) Steward's Mate instead of the present unfair allowance of (2) Steward's Mates. It is further recommended in view of the increased armament on submarines that the present allowance of gunner's mates be increased from one to two.

The very few and minor casualties which occured during this patrol immediately following a complete overhaul reflect much credit upon the officers and leading petty officers, and more than repays them for the long hours they spent in careful supervision of overhaul work.

Much time and effort has been devoted to the qualification of new men. A very complete qualification course has been organized providing for frequent checks on progress. Although no man is allowed to qualify until after the completion of one war patrol the groundwork has been well laid for a mass qualification of our present new men during their next patrol.

The Executive Officer, Lieutenant F.J. RUDER, USN, making his first patrol as such, is deserving of much credit for the successful and effecient organizing of the ship's company after an "overhaul layoff" and large personnel turnover.

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(Q) PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

Lt.(jg) A.A. EBEL, USNR, and SPENCE, J.W., RT1c(T)(SS), USNR are to be commended upon their tireless efforts and many hours spent in keeping the radars in commission, and for their successful performance of a very difficult repair job on the SD antenna.

The work of MORSE, R.W., CY(T), USN, both during the overhaul and during this patrol has continued to be outstanding and deserving of special mention. It is hoped that he will soon receive his appointment as Ship's Clerk to which rank he has been previously recommended.

Upon the occasions wherein the DACE was bombed, strafed, severely depth charged, and fired upon with gunfire the officers and men acted in accordance with the highest traditions of the Navy. The Commanding Officer is most proud of the performance of his ship's company.

(R) MILES STEAMED--FUEL USED

Pearl Harbor to Area	3304	miles	29,351	gallons
In Area	6124	miles	57,036	gallons
Area to Midway	1590	miles	23,996	gallons

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area	12
Days in area	31
Days enroute to base	4
Days submerged	7
Days about half of which were spent submerged	10

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(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

Torpedoes. 13
Fuel . . . . . 8,142 gallons
Provisions . . . . . 15 days
Personal Factor. . . . . 20 days

Limiting factor this patrol....Operation Order.

(U) RADAR, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

(1) RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

The operation of the SPA-APR equipment was satisfactory. The directional antenna (type XCV) installed at Pearl Harbor flooded out in all sections before reaching the area. All interceptions were made on the original non-directional stub.

DATE TIME	LAT. LONG.	FREQ. MCS	PRF CPS	PW USEC	TUNING UNIT	REMARKS
6/20/45 2030K	49-04N 150-57E	80	500	40	TN-2	Sweeping very slowly.
6/23/45 0330K	45-24N 149-06E	156	450	6	TN-2	Sweeping 1/4 RPM; prominent side lobes.
6/26/45 1820K	47-51N 146-25E	97	500	80	TN-2	Sweeping ½ RPM
6/26/45 1845	47-41N 146-26E	76	500	36	TN-2	sweeping slowly.
7/5/45 1045K	46-57N 150-59E	80	500	40	TN-2	Weak; sweeping slowly.

While tracking the convoy attacked on 10 June, radar interference apparently from one of the frigate escorts, was noted on the SJ. The range at that time was 14,000 yards. Since it was impossible to syncronize the signal with our pulse, no

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(U) RADAR, COMMUNICATIONS, SONAR COUNTERMEASURES (Cont'd)

information was obtained on pulse shape. The pulse appeared to be about twice the width of the SJ pulse. Although the range to the escorts was closed as close as 12,000 yards on the surface, we were apparently not detected.

(2) COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

SKEDS — Jamming was tried on all frequencies by a distant station. It was ineffective.

WOPACO — Jamming was encountered within six days after the new frequencies became effective. Station jamming was close by and was 100% effective. Only at close ranges could we copy on these frequencies at all times. The Jap had two transmitters set up .1% on either side of the correct frequency and commenced jamming with CW as soon as we opened up. A third transmitter jammed intermittently with voice.

SHIP-TO-SHORE — Fairly effective jamming was encountered on the 4235 series. The jamming station appeared to be fairly close. The 4,8 and 12 bands were jammed. Jamming was even more effective on the 4 and 8 bands of the 4155 series.

LIFE-GUARD — No jamming was noted during the one day 4475 KCS was guarded.

(3) SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

Nothing new in the way of sonar countermeasures was encountered. Below is listed the frequencies which were employed by Jap MIKURA class Frigates:

DATE	LAT. & LONG.	TYPE	FREQUENCY
6/10/45	47-25N, 149-03E	Echo Ranging	15-16 kcs
6/19/45	50-42N, 154-09E	Echo Ranging	15-16 kcs

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(V) REMARKS

Plane contact reports were of no assistance due mainly to the fact that our air coverage of this area is very limited. No suggestions as to shipping routes used by the Japs in this area can be made. There is apparently some lugger traffic along the KURILE Chain. The supposedly much used KITA URUPPU SUIDO proved barren of contacts during the several days spent in this area.

Wolf pack communications were disappointing due to various operational, material, and unexplained causes. It is believed that while the Wopaco is satisfactory for exchange of attack information, it is inadequate for handling Wolf pack communications due mainly to its limited vocabulary. The following defects were noted:

(a) Lack of many simple, often used words such as AM, IF, AGAIN, ARE, FIRST, etc.
(b) Lack of a sufficient number of variants for often used expressions to provide adequate security.
(c) Lack of a syllable spelling system.
(d) With only 2 letters in each code group the garble of one letter makes the group unintelligible and undecipherable in most cases.
(e) The code is very simple and is used over a long period of time so that the Japs are very poor at cryptanalysis indeed if they cannot readily break it down.
(f) The use of this code definitely identifies the user as a submarine.

To eliminate these defects it is suggested that a four letter code similar to the Aircraft code (CSP127Ø) be employed. The Wopaco vocabulary could be doubled thereby supplying not only more words, but more variants and syllable spelling. Being a four lettered code it would lend itself to breaking garbles more readily. Several editions could be carried providing a frequent change of codes. This type of code would have the additional advantage of serving to confuse the Japs as to whether the transmissions were plane to plane, sub to plane, sub or plane to base, sub to sub, and various other combinations

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Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of War Patrol Number SEVEN.

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(V) REMARKS (Cont'd)

To the arguments that it won't work I can only point out that it has and does work for the "zoomies".

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO FORTY ONE

FB5-241/A16-3
Serial # 024

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol Dated 10 July 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO-FORTY-ONE.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Administration.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

1. The seventh war patrol of the U.S.S. DACE was conducted in the KURILE ISLAND - OKHOTSK SEA Area. The DACE was one or four (4) submarines in a coordinated search and attack group consisting of the CABEZON, APOGON, MANTA and DACE, with the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. CABEZON, Commander G. W. LAUTRUP, Jr., U. S. Navy, as Group Commander. This patrol was of forty seven (47) days duration, thirty-one (31) of which were spent in the assigned area. No opportunity was afforded the DACE to engage in coordinated attacks with the rest of the group.

2. Despite thorough area coverage only three (3) worth while torpedo targets were contacted, one (1) of which was a properly marked Russian ship. The other two (2) contacts were developed into attacks. In addition one (1) gun attack was made.

Torpedo Attacks No. 1A and 1B - 10 June 1945.

Initial contact was made in the early morning by the high periscope watch. After a long end around the DACE dove for attack. The contact developed into one (1) medium sized freighter (EIHUKU MARU type), one (1) small coastal tanker or barge, and two (2) MIKURA class frigates. One (1) MK 14-3A torpedo was fired (No. 1A) at the freighter, which was seen to hit at MOT, sending debris 200 to 300 feet in the air. Range 400 yards, track angle 147° starboard, 8° R. gyro. Target was then shifted and one (1) Mk 14-3A torpedo was fired (No. 1B) at the small tanker, which missed, probably because of the short range. Range 350 yards track angle 154° starboard, 21° R gyro. The escorts forced the DACE deep before she could observe final results on the freighter, but loud breaking up noises indicated she sank. A depth charging followed.

Torpedo Attack Nos. 2A and 2B - 19 June 1945.

A night surface attack, using radar ranges and bearings. Four (4) Mk 14-3A torpedoes were fired (No 2A) at a MIKURA class frigate. Range 2300 yards, track angle 40° port, 7° - 10° L gyros. At the instant of firing the DACE was apparently sighted as the target turned toward, and all torpedoes missed. The DACE then turned tail to target and commenced retiring. Four (4) minutes later two (2) Mk 14-3A torpedoes were fired "down the throat" at this pursuing frigate. Range 1750 yards, track angle 8° port, 13° L gyro. All torpedoes missed. Close gun-firing then caused the DACE to dive, and she was subjected to rather close depth charging.

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO FORTY ONE

FB5-241/A16-3
Serial # 024

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol Dated 10 July 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol.

Gun Attack No. 1 - 8 June 1945.

A well executed gun attack on a wooden sea truck (300 tons) in company with a wooden lugger (75 - 100 tons), resulted in their destruction. The next day derelicts of both targets were sighted - only the masts showing.

Recommended Assessment

One (1) medium class AK (EU), sunk - 5000 tons.
(Similar to (EIHUKU Class).
One (1) wooden sea truck (EC), sunk - 300 tons.
One (1) wooden lugger (EC), sunk - 100 tons.

3. A diversionary gun firing was conducted on the shores of MOYORO WAN at the northeast end of YETOROFU JIMA on 23 June 1945, in connection with the operations of HYDEMAN'S "HELLCATS".

4. The DACE returned from patrol exceptionally clean - one of the cleanest submarines I have ever observed returning from patrol - and in very good material condition. Her radio and radar difficulties will be thoroughly investigated and defects remedied. Her refit will be accomplished by the U.S.S. AEGIR and Submarine Division Two-Forty-One's Relief Crew in the normal period. Health of the crew was very good and morale high.

5. The Administrative Division Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the DACE on this aggressive and arduous patrol, and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

J. W. DAVIS,
Acting.

FC5-24/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR 11/wd

Serial: (0136)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. DACE (SS247)
Report of Seventh War
Patrol, dated 10 July 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of SEVENTH War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWO FORTY-ONE.

2. It appears that the communication difficulties and poor radar performance experienced by DACE were caused primarily by unsatisfactory material conditions. These will be corrected in a normal refit.

3. The cleanliness of DACE upon her return from patrol was outstanding.

4. The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of DACE upon the completion of another long and arduous patrol and upon the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

F. W. FENNO.

FE12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET mr

Serial 01353

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
25 July 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DACE Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 825
U.S.S. DACE - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol (25 May to 10 July 1945).

1. The seventh war patrol of the DACE, under the command of Commander O. R. Cole, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Kurile Islands and Sea of Okhotsk Areas. The DACE along with the U.S.S. MANTA (SS299), U.S.S. APOGON (SS308) and the U.S.S. CABEZON (SS334), formed a coordinated attack group with the commanding officer of the CABEZON as group commander.

2. With thorough, aggressive area coverage the DACE made two contacts worthy of torpedoes, both of which were developed into attacks. Out of the first contact, a medium sized freighter was sunk and a Mikura class frigate damaged. The second contact, a Mikura class frigate, succeeded in avoiding all torpedoes fired by the DACE. The DACE also accounted for two small craft by a well conducted gun attack and made a diversionary gun attack on the shores of Moyoro Jima at the northeast end of Yetorofu Jima during this patrol.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this fifth successive, successful patrol added to the fighting record of the DACE. The DACE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - Medium AK (Similar to EIHUKU Type) (EU)	-	4,000 tons	(Attack No. 1 and Separate Report)
1 - MIS (Sea Truck) (EC)	-	300 tons	(Gun Attack No. 1)
1 - MIS (Lugger) (EC)	-	100 tons	(Gun Attack No. 1)
TOTAL SUNK		4,400 tons	

D A M A G E D

1 - PF (MIKURA Class) (EC)	-	1,500 tons	(Separate Report)
TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED		5,900 tons	

Authentication & Distribution
on next page.

MERRILL COMSTOCK,
Deputy.

FF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 01853

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
25 July 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
DACE Report of
Seventh War Patrol.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 825
U.S.S. DACE - SEVENTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Seventh War Patrol (25 May to 10 July 1945).


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for
E. L. EYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

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DACE (SS-247)

WW II REPORT FILE

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HISTORY OF USS DACE (SS 247)

The Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut, laid the keel of hull number SS 247 in their new Victory Yard on July 22, 1942.

April 25, 1943, Mrs. O. Pomeroy Robinson christened this hull the DACE and sent her sliding into the waters of the Thames River -- the first submarine to be launched at the Victory Yard.

Three officers and about ten members of the crew of the DACE were present for the launching. Her prospective commanding officer was Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, Naval Academy class of 1933. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander W.G. Holman, Class of 1936. Other officers assigned to the ship were: Lieutenant C.R. Clark, Jr., USN, Engineering Officer; Lieutenant H.D. Thorton, USNR, gunnery officer; Lieutenant (junior grade) F.P. Thomas, USN, Commissary Officer; Ensign E.T. Jones, USN, Assistant Engineering Officer; and Ensign C.C. Erhard, USNR, Communications Officer.

On July 23, 1943, Captain W.W. Foster, of the Electric Boat Company, got the DACE underway and brought her alongside the pier at the U.S. Submarine Base, New London. The officers and crew, dressed in blues waited silently on the dock for their ship. At 1700, that afternoon, they marched aboard. After a brief ceremony the ship was formally handed over to the crew.

The next two weeks were spent in the New London area.

Over fifty per cent of the crew were green hands, fresh from Submarine School. Only seventeen men had ever been on a war patrol before. Full advantage had to be taken of this period to organize this outfit into coordinated submarine crew.

On August 9, 1943, the USS DACE went to sea for the first time on a short trip to Newport, Rhode Island. She spent a few days there test firing torpedoes then returned to New London. Prior to her arrival she made her first deep dive, without incident.

On September 6, 1943, the DACE got underway for Pearl Harbor. She stopped for a few days at the Submarine Base, Colon, Canal Zone, then completed her trip.

On October 3, the USS DACE arrived at Pearl Harbor. For two and a half weeks she went through the tests, drills, and exercises prescribed by Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, to prepare her for war. Finally, on October 20, heavily laden with torpedoes, fuel, ammunition and food, the DACE set sail on War Patrol Number One.

WAR PATROL NUMBER ONE

The USS DACE stopped at Midway from October 24-27 in order to repair one engine. On October 27, she crossed the 180th meridian for the first time. On the 31st, the barometer started dropping. On November 2, it dropped 18 points in seven hours and the DACE encountered her first heavy weather.

On the 4th, she entered her patrol area which was off the coast of the southern-most Japanese island. For several days she patrolled the area submerged in the daytime and surfaced at night.

First contact was made the night of November 7, while on the surface. There seemed to be two large ships and two small ones. The target fired at was similar to the KYAKKO MARU of 6,783 tons. One hit was felt and lots of black smoke poured out of the targets stack.

The DACE returned for a second attack but this time a large oiler with two escorts loomed up ahead. One ofthe escorts challenged her. She ignored the challenge and fired more torpedoes -- no results. The Japs flashed search-lights and dropped depth charges but the DACE had clearod the area on the surface.

The patrol continued off the coast of MIKI SAKI. Numerous planes and a few small picket boats were sighted but nothing worth-while.

On November 11, the USS DACE surfaced early in the evening in the bright moonlight. At 2130, a patrol boat was sighted. The DACE turned away and tried to open the range. The patrol boat now was revealed as a destroyer which commenced chasing. When the destroyer had closed the DACE to 6,000 yards, the submarine fired a spread of torpedoes. The Japs did not make the expectd final dive so the DACE submerged -- and fast. The Jap rushed over the top and dropped four depth charges -- not close, then continued away at high speed.

Days of routine patrolling went by. Planes were sighted and evaded by diving. Small picket boats were always present, but no worth while targets were sighted.

On November 14, she shifted to the southern part of the area and about midnight sighted HACHIJO JIMA about 40 miles away.

At the break of dawn on the 15th, an aircraft carrier of the SHOKAKU-class, and at least three destroyers passed just outside of torpedo range. It was impossible to get closer to them while the boat was submerged.

On the 19th, at about 1800, while theship was submerged a tanker and an escort were sighted. Everything looked good for a submerged attack but the Japs became suspicious and the tanker turned away. The escort located the DACE and attacked. The first depth charge was close, light bulbs broke,cork flew off the bulkheads, and few cables were pushed further into the ship.

Within an hour three more patrol boats joined the fun and tried to relocate the DACE. Fourteen more depth charges were dropped -- none very close. About 2100, the patrol boats gave up and left the vicinity. The DACE surfaced at 2315, found herself alone so she cleared the area.

The DACE remained in her area but out of sight of land on a shipping lane for the next few days. One small ship, possibly a "Q" ship and one CHIDORI were sighted at a distance but no worth -while contacts appeared.

Finally on December 4, the DACE was ordered back to Midway for rest and refit.

The combat insignia was not authorized for this patrol at this time. The Patrol lasted for 53 days.

The refit for the second patrol was started on December 11th while the crew rested on Midway.

On December 28, Lieutenant Commander J.F. Enright, USN, was relieved as Commanding officer by Lieutenant Commander B.D. Claggett, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1935. From December 29 through January 4,1944, the new Commanding Officer trained his crew in and around Midway. During this time Vice Admiral C.A. Lockwood, Jr., USN., spent a day on the DACE observing the training exercises. January 7, the ship was completely loaded and sent out on her second war patrol.

From January 7 to 18, daily drills and dives were held for training purposes. A few plane. contacts were made but the submarine was evidently undetected. On the 15th, the DACE was transferred to the operational command of Task Force 72. On the 18th the DACE entered her assigned area located between the Bismarck Archipelago and the Caroline Islands.

From the 18th to the 26th, the ship patrolled her area on the surface. Once a lot of wreckage and a lifeboat were sighted, and once six Jap planes were seen. On the 23rd, Pulosuk Island was sighted about 30 miles away. On the 24th, the area off Manila Reef was patrolled on the Palau-Truk shipping route.

Contact was established the night of the 26th on a large tanker with two escorts. For three hours the group was tracked in order to determine their course and speed. The DACE turned in to attack. Unfortunately, one of the escorts complicated the attack by interposing itself between the sub and the main target. The sub passes successfully behind the escort and fired torpedoes at the tanker. A couple of minutes later two violent explosions shook the sub but no flashes were seen because of rain squall. The target fired two red rockets. Three more explosions were then heard. The DACE turned away with one escort, which appeared to be a destroyer, chasing her. For a long time the destroyer stayed about a mile and a half dead astern then it seemed to give up the chase and left.

The DACE then went back after the target which was still on the surface and making about 16 knots. The sub was unable to catch up with her before daylight, so the chase was abandoned and normal patrol routine resumed.

On the 28th, the sub started working her way slowly to Tulagi for fuel. A couple of friendly subs were encountered and several aircraft were detected. On February 2, the DACE arrived in Tulagi and commenced fueling and minor voyage repairs. On the third, she got underway again for patrol south of the Caroline Islands near Truk. Three or four of the usual plane contacts were made but none noticed the DAVE bec use she dived out of sight.

From February 6, to 11, the submarine patrolled her area on the surface and dived two or three times a day to avoid the numerous aircraft in that particular area.

On the 11th, a convoy of five ship were contacted but because it was impossible to close them the DACE lost contact and tried to intercept them further along their possible track. Two hours later they were contacted again but closer investigation showed that they were small and not worthy of torpedo fire. Tracking was discontinued.

From the 12th to 17th, she conducted her patrol off of Helene Shoals.

On the 17th, the DACE moved to a patrol area west of Truk near Pulusuk Island. Several plane contacts were made.

On February 22nd, she exchanged signals with the USS PERMIT. At midnight, that same day, the DACE received orders to return to Milne Bay, New Guinea.

Enroute to Milne Bay, she met the USS DARTER and the two subs proceeded in company the rest of the way.

This patrol also was not successful and the combat insignia was not authorized. The patrol lasted 49 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER THREE

After a two week rest period spent at Camp Beeman, Milne Bay the officers and crew returned to the DACE on March 11th much refreshed. The DACE was ready for sea on March 16. She got underway on her third war patrol in company with the USS FLOUNDER and escorted by the USS BACHE. On March 18, she arrived at Langemak Bay to pick up passengers for special missions. She then departed for her area late the same afternoon.

After reconnoitering the coast near Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea, at close range for two days and a night, the DACE closed in on the surface, after dark, March 23rd. During this perbd the DACE had taken many photographs and made sketches of the coast and surrounding terrain. At 2315, she put off five commandos in a rubber boat -- distance to the beach one mile. At 0213 March 24th, she put of off two more boats with six commandos.

For the next two days the DACE took pictures of the coast, sighting nothing but a hospital ship and an occasional patrol boat.

Upon completing these missions the ship returned to Seeadler Harbor, Admiralty Islands for fuel arriving midday the 27th. The next day she headed out once more bound for the patrol area. On March 31, she received a two-bomb straddle from a Jap bomber which dived out of the clouds. On April 4th, the DACE sighted an aircraft carrier leaving Davao Gulf but could not close to attack. At 0012 April 6th, the DACE contacted a task force of three Jap cruisers and four destroyers. Two torpedoes weere fired at each cruiser at 0042. There were no hits. At 0130 the next morning, the DACE contacted an escorted freighter, but after a prolonged chase, the sub was detected an received three depth charges. She was unable to attack.

The DACE received orders April 10th to meet the dadly damaged USS SCAMP, and escort her home. That evening contact was established and the DACE and the SCAMP commenced their long trek back to the base, arriving at Seeadler Harbor April 16th. On April 19th, the DACE got underway for patrol once again.

During this time the DACE had a very interesting experience. The ship made a routine dive to evade a Jap plane. Due to the excitement of the moment and temporary loss of power the boat nosed gently over to an angle of 52 degrees. Everyone was forced down to the forward bulkhead. The Chief Radioman, J.H. Jemison, USN, slid out of the radio shack, inadvertently grabbed the knocker valve on the high pressure air manifold and blew the main ballast tanks. The Captain ordered all back full. Control was regained just before the boat broached so that she stayed out of sight under the surface.

That same day another emergency dive ended up with a 37 degree down angle. It seemed to be the day for steep dives. Everything stayed under control from then on, and the ship regained her normal stability. There was no further excitement until the 26th when a p periscope was sighted. This was avoided.

The evening of the 27th, several destroyers were contacted but they got away. On May 2nd, the DACE chased for several hours a large tanker escorted by two destroyers. Hampered by reduced speed due to a generator casualty, and impending dawn, the DACE fired five torpedoes at the tanker from long range. Unfortunately there were no hits, and close gun fire from the escorts drove the DACE off.One fairly close depth charge was dropped."

That afternoon, after a long and nerve-racking patrol, the DACE headed for home, and arrived at Brisbane, Australia, May 13, 1944.

This patrol was considered successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The patrol lasted 59 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FOUR

After a 30-day refit, including two weeks leave in Brisbane, Sydney, and environs, the DACE was ready for sea. She headed north June 13th with a new Executive Office, Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN. Various training exercises were conducted under Commander C.C. Burlingame, USN. She arrived at Seeadler Harbor in the Admiralties June 20th. The next day, the DACE departed for her area and on the way opened the "ACEY DACE" Movie Theater with a showing of "No Time For Love." June 26th, she entered the area and commenced hunting Japs in earnest.

The DACE patrolled submerged close to the Mindanao Coast during the day and on the surface at night. Many contacts were made, all of which either got away or were too small to be worth-while targets. The great number of planes contacted indicated considerable activity in Davao Gulf. Finally on July 9th, the DACE made a submerged attack on a large transport with two escorts. She scored at least three hits. Various countermeasures made observation of final results impossible. A total of 43 depth charges were dropped, too close for comfort, but not close enough for severe damage.

On July 16th, the DACE penetrated Sarangani Bay and took periscope photographs. At dawn, July 20 off Port Lebak, she contacted a well escorted tanker which passed just out of range. Surfacing later that morning the DACE started a long and hazardous chase in full view of the shore. The target was not seen again and the disappointment was intense.

Just after dawn July 26 smoke was seen on the horizon. This contact was chased all day, the DACE being forced to submerge eight times to avoid detection by planes. That night after dark contact was re-established and at 0049, the next morning, the DACE attacked on the surface. Ten torpedoes were fired into a convoy of three ships and six escotts -- one ship was sunk. The DACE was forced to submerge to avoid being rammed. Twenty-six depth charges were dropped.

The afternoon of July 31st, a submerged attack was made on a small unescorted freighter. One hit sank it at once but another torpedo exploded prematurely just outside the ship. It shook the boat and shattered light bulbs and gauge faces. The next morning the last four torpedoes were fired at a medium-sized freighter with four escorts. The freighter nimbly dodged all torpedoes while the escorts climbed on the DACE to the tune of 10 close depth charges. Later that morning the DACE, having expended all torpedoes, headed for the "barn." She arrived at Seeadler Harbor, August 6th, and left for Brisbane the next day. The DACE ran through very heavy weather in the Coral Sea, but arrived safely in Brisbane, Australia, on August 12th.

This patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of the patrol was 60 days.

WAR PATROL NUMBER FIVE

Two hectic weeks of renewing acquaintance and visiting in Sydney, Toowoomba, Southport, Coolangatta, Redcliffe and other areas along the east coast of Australia finally terminated with the announcement that the DACE had received an excellent refit and was ready for her fifth war patrol.

On September 1st, under the command of Commander B.D. Claggett, in company with the USS DARTER and escorts, the DACE departed from Brisbane. That same evening, while making a trim dive, a submerged object jarred the boat. Next morning an investigation with shallow-water diving apparatus revealed that the sonar head would be inoperative for the rest of the trip. Commander R.H. Crane, USN, training officer came aboard September 4th, and observed all battle and emergency drills for two days. Finally on the 10th, the DACE moored alongside the USS COUCAL at Darwin to replenish food and fuel. After an uneventful transit of Banka Passage the patrol area was reached and the DACE commenced mine sweeping operations. With 20-millimeter gun fire she sank six drifting type mines and exploded one moored type (parts of which became firmly imbedded in the desk, and narrowly missed the Officer of the Deck). Reconnaissance and mine-sweeping assignments terminated on the 27th, when we moored alongside the USS ORION in Mios Qoendi Lagoon, Schouten Islands.

An untimely cauality to the master gyro compass forced the DACE into the "Reluctant Dragon Club" and departure was delayed until October 3. She then proceeded via Sibutu and East Ape Pass and reached the assigned area of Palawan Passage and Balabac Strait on October 10. The 13th proved a lucky day when a seven ship convoy of tankers and freighters with two destroyers escorting was sighted. Shortly after midnight on the 14th (after the navigator labored over charts, bearings, soundings, and ranges) the DACE had firmly established her position inside a treacherous area of reefs, shoals and islands and proceeded to attack. While firing (on the surface) one torpedo ran erratic and only expert maneuvering allowed the boat to continue the attack and avoid her own torpedo which porpoised and circled and threatened the DACE's existence. Torpedo explosions in the targets alerted the destroyers and their tracers streaked through the air but no splashes of falling enemy shells were noticed. The DACE cleared the area at full speed to reload. Results of this attack were one 10,000-ton tanker sunk and one 7,500 ton transport sunk. Approaching daylight forced the ship to leave the hazardous area. On the 19th, two nosey, alert, Jap anti-submarine destroyers avoided our torpedoes and promptly retaliated with depth charges. Again shortly after midnight on the 22nd, while exchanging information with the USS DARTER, the radar contacted high speed enemy ships -- definite indication of men-of-war. In conjunction with the DARTER the DACE, making maxinum speed on the surface, set a course to intercept these desirable targets. But the enemy's radical change of course plus the advantage of greater speed permitted him to escape untouched and unseen.

Our orders were to return to the base. However the Skipper had that "funny-feeling in his bones" and requested that the DACE be given permission to extend her time in the "hot spot." The next night (and again minutes after midnight) while talking to the DARTER, a long range radar contact put us in pursuit of the enemy. In this instance a failure in our most vital piece of equipment caused us to lose touch with our future targets. Teamwork on the part of the DARTER and our communication set-up permitted us to continue our chase. Meanwhile the expertly trained technicians worked "like mad" and in a short time had our equipment back in shape. At about 0200, an enemy task force of 12 big and important men-of-war surrounded by fast, cautious "tin-cans" was being plotted and recorded. So the Old-Man's hunch had materialized and the DACE and DARTER were making preparations for the big event to take place at dawn.

The DARTER made the first run and did a beautiful job of destroying Jap men-of-war. Shortly thereafter the DACE expertly executed attack at dawn which cost the Japs their biggest heavy-cruiser--the MAYA. Of course a destroyer counter attack followed and the noise of torpedoes , the cruiser's magazines exploding, the depth charging, and the sinking ships' breaking up noises were terrific. The same night a crippled heavy cruiser with two torpedoes was trying to seek the safety of a nearby port, but the two subs had otherthoughts for that choice target so plans were made accordingly. Around midnight the DARTER went aground on Bombay Shoal. At 0140 on the 24th, with the DARTER still aground, the attack was brfoken off so that the DACE could stand by to render any services possible.

When it was recognized that the DARTER couldn't be saved only one alternative was left -- rescue the personnel. Hurriedly the DARTER crew was transferred in small rubber boats through surf and breakers to the DACE. On the last trip the Commanding Officer of the DARTER came aboard and the final destruction of the unfortunate DARTER was planned. While this job was being accomplished using torpedoes and guns and enemy plane appeared and dropped a couple of bombs. Luckily she selected the DARTER as his target. This interruption forced a stop to her destruction, So, with two full submarine crews aboard an already over-crowded sub, she proceeded to Freemantle, Western Australia. These two crews were together in one submarine for two weeks.

This patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 67 days.

At Freemantle, Western Australia , an excellent refit of normal duration, conducted by the USS EURYALE, was completed and the DACE was ready for her sixth war patrol. On November 21st, Commander B.D. Claggett (after four patrols as Commanding Officer) was relieved by Commander O.R. Cole, Jr., USN.

December second the DACE in company with the USS BERGALL started her run which took her to Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, and through Lombok Straits. DACE and BERGALL parted company while DACE doubled back to investigate a radar contact. Then the DACE proceeded along the Singapore -- Hong-Kong trade route with the hopes of intercepting some enemy traffic. This hope wasn't realized so the DACE continued on to Pulau Gambir. The channel between Pulau Gambir and the mainland was an excellent night refuge for shipping so the DACE was assigned the task of making that spot less desirable. After the many hours the navigator spent in determining currents, depths, reefs, the task of mining this channel was started at 0330 on December 16th, and was completed one hour and fifteen minutes later. Later that afternoon loud explosions were heard but the heavy seas prevented any visual verification of what the DACE thought to be the results of an effectively mined area.

The next assignment was the area off Camranh Bay. Heavy seas and strong wind made for a miserable existence. Submerged patrolling proved difficult because of the sea conditions. On the 19th, a convoy of five large ships with three escorts was sighted and the attack started. Bad weather was certainly in the enemy's favor. At times the targets could not be seen and again the periscopes would be exposed too much. Depth control was difficult but expertly handled. Just as the first torpedo was to be sent on its way, a series of four depth charges or bombs went off which shook the boat violently, and cork and paint chips filtered down from the overhead. More depth charges followed the initial pattern, starting some oil leaks, causing light bulbs to break , and more paint and cork to fall. The DACE decided to break off the attack and evade. She hit bottom, and while resting there anxiously waiting for the escorts to go away, the strong current took charge, and carried the DACE bumping, turning, scraping and clanking along the bottom. How the boat avoided being detected will never be known. She surfaced, after making some repairs and proceeded to an area farther north. At 0459, on the 21st, another contact put us in hot pursuit of the enemy, but after closing the range she decided the target was too small and an unsuccessful attack would only divulge her position, so the sub abandoned the chase. The enemy had another idea and promptly proceeded to launch his own attack. The DACE outdistanced the chaser without being recognized or seen and dove to definitely lose him. On that dive a main engine was flooded so she surfaced at 0750 and located the trouble. At 0100 on the 22nd, while heading into the seas at slow speed, the topside damage was repaired and the engine was put back in commission. During the next few days numerous contacts were made which were either impossible to attack or too small to sdo anything about. Christmas Day was just another day of patrol except that the cook and baker did an excellent job of preparing a delicious and unforgetable dinner.

While running on the surface many floating mines were detected so the lookouts were doubly cautious. On the 28th, another opportunity presents itself --this one resulting in sinking one medium freighter of 4,000 tons and damaging one medium freighter of 4,000 tons. In the days that followed, planes and small ships were contacted but not targets of any size worthy of torpedoes were sighted so our presence remained a secret.

December 31st, a worth,-while periscope contact of two columns of ships was made at 1000. The Captain's plan was to avoid the ever-closing escorts which were shielding the group and to locate himself between the two columns. While trying to keep in close touch with all the ships and still keep our presence unknown the Captain sighted planes -- which served to increase to our already numerous interferences. Intense anti-submarine measures were being employed by the protectors of the Japanese ships so the Skipper had to be extremely careful. Fortunately for the Japs and unfortunately for the DACE, an escort carrier (which was the target singled out for her attack) was at an excessive range for our torpedoes -- or else sighted and avoided our torpedoes, and consequently got away untouched. A plane dropped a depth bomb but his aim was off, so no damage was done. At 1233, while making preparations for surfacing another bomb was dropped -- this one also not too close. After surfacing at 1433, we set out to run down the evasive targets but a plane, forced us to dive two minutes later and again a depth charge was felt -- but wasn't close either. In the next hour or so more depth charges were dropped -- but fortunately none did any damage.

The next few days were spent in normal patrol and on January 7th, the DACE made preparations for the trip to Saipan. On the 8th, two suspicious vessels which were investigated, proved to be Chinese junks. They were left untouched. On January 17th, the DACE reached Saipan and moored alongside the USS SKIPJACK alongside the USS FULTON. On the 18th, the DACE departed Saipan enroute Pearl Harbor, where she arrived on the twenty-eighth.

The patrol was successful for purposes of awarding the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 58 days.

On January 28th, 1945, the DACE arrived in Pearl Harbor where she received voyage repairs. She then proceeded to the San Francisco Bay Area for her first Navy Yard overhaul.

From February 8th, until April 25th, the ship underwent a complete and satisfactory overhaul at the Submarine Repair Basin, Bethlehem Steel Company. During this period all personnel and offices were given 30 days leave and were transferred and new men reported aboard. Lieutenant Commander R.C. Benitez, USN, was relieved as Executive Officer and Navigator by Lieutenant F.J. Ruder, USN, on March 12, 1945.

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April 26th, the DACE departed San Francisco enroute Pearl Harbor in company with the USS WHALE.

The two subs arrived Pearl Harbor on May fifth. For six days they under-went a voyage refit then started the training period with Captain C.C. Burlingame, USN, as training officer.

The seventh war patrol started May 25th. Two subs, the DACE and the USS CABEZON, left for the cold waters of the Kuriles Islands.

On the 29th, they laid over at Midway for fuel and supplies

From April 30th, till June 7th, the two ships, enroute to station, conducted training exercises and drills individually and together. The evening of the 7th, they separated and headed in for their patrol stations. The DACE closed the coast that night and dived in Kunashiro (Channel) between the islands of Shikotan and Kunashiri.

Early that morning two sailing vessels were sighted through the periscope. The DACE tracked them with difficulty in the ever thickening fog. Finally preparations were made and at 0945, she surfaced in smooth water in a fog with Japanese islands only a few miles on either side of them. At a range of only 1600 yards she opened fire with her five-inch gun and automatic weapons.

The first shot from the forward gun hit the largest sailing vessel in the bow. In a couple of minutes, a five-inch shell which hit amidships started a roaring fire. Jap flags painted on the side made perfect targets for the gun crews. The DACE closed in to 500 yards and made certain the destruction was complete. She then turned her attention to the other sailing vessel.

A small rowboat with one or maybe two survivors was being rowed furiously into the fog towards the nearest beach. The second vessel was completely deserted. In a few minutes it too was reduced to a smouldering wreck.

By this time, the fog had cleared enough so that the nearby shores were visible. The DACE moved away from the scene of the wreckage, then dived.

This was the first time the DACE had ever surfaced and fired her guns at an enemy ship.

The DACE finally left the area on the ninth of June and headed into the Sea of Okhotsk.

The early morning of June 10th, a large freighter and a small tanker were sighted about eight miles ahead. The DACE went ahead full speed in order to run around the ships and get ahead of them. At one time the fog cleared up enough to show a large destroyer escort only six miles away. For a couple of minutes the personnel on the bridge watched this Japanese warship, then the fog obscured her again.

An hour later another escort was seen for a few minutes, then disappeared. The convoy now consisted of two rather potent escorts, one freighter, and a small tanker.

At about noon all hands had lunch, then the sub waited dead ahead of the convoy. In a half hour the first escort came into sight and the DACE submerged.

Silently the DACE slipped unseen under the water between the two escorts. The freighter was dead ahead and coming towards her bows on. The DACE maneuvered out of the way, and with the freighter only 380 yards away, she fired. Almost instantly the first torpedo hit the freighter with a tremendous explosion amidships. Quickly more torpedoes were fired at the smaller tanker but none hit. The Captain took a quick look at the escorts through the periscope and discovered one of them coming straight for the submarine. Quickly another torpedo was fired at this escort, then the DACE dived deep. Just before the periscope was lowered a quick glance at the freighter proved that the first torpedo had done its job well. As she dived to deeper depths the noise of the freighter breaking up on her way towards the bottom was clearly audible through the hull.

A couple of minutes of silence passed, then four depth charges shook the boat. Someone remarked: "If you think that was loud wait until you hear the next ones." The breaking up noises from the freighter continued. The escort could be heard coming back for another run. A quick set-up was made and another torpedo was fired.

Shortly afterwards and explosion that sounded like a torpedo hit, rumbled through the boat, In quick succession 19 more explosions went off overhead. Five minutes of silence passed. Twelve depth charges exploded close by and shook the ship slightly.

For the next few hours the DACE silently eased away from the searching escorts, one of which was probably badly damaged. Finally late that afternoon after four hours of freezing quiet the DACE came close to the surface for a periscope look -- all clear. The heaters were turned on and everyone restored circulation in their numb limbs by stamping their feet and drinking hot coffee.

After dark, the DACE surfaced in very rough seas. She went back to the scene of the action but could locate no wreckage. She then headed for the area of Kita Uruppu Channel.

June 11-16, the DACE patrolled back and forth in the channel. Some days were exceptionally clear and the snow-capped peaks of Shimishura Take towered high over her. Other days were foggy and bleak.

On the 16th, the DACE joined company with the CABEZON, the USS APOGON and the USS MANTA. The four subs made a wide patrol sweep up the eastern side of the KURILES. During this sweep the first plane for this patrol was contacted -- no bombs.

On the 17th, the pack received orders to search for the crew of a U.S, Army plane which had been forced down near Araido To. Each sub headed for her assigned area and arrived there next day early. The whole day was spent on the surface in a light mist and only five to ten miles away from Araido to. Most of the time the lofty island was clearly visible.

The aviators could not be found. That afternoon a single Jap plane took off from a nearby air field and searched a while on the other side of the island. He never saw the DACE although she was only 15 miles away. An hour later, another plane appeared only 6 miles away so the DACE dived.

That eve after she had surfaced the DACE sighted quite a bit of gunfire about 20 miles away but could not find out what it was all about.

On the 18th, the DACE proceeded down the western side of the Kuriles alon . Later that night she contacted a single ship. For a couple of hours she tracked and ran around the ship in order to get ahead of it. During this time, several distant underwater explosions were heard. The APOGON had located a convoy and was working it over.

Shortly after midnight the DACE was ahead of her target. It was very dark, but the water was constantly illuminated with phosphorescence.. She turned toward her target and waited on the surface in the darkness. Soon the target was close enough and the torpedoes were fired. The water was churned into a brilliant flue flame by force of the expulsion of the torpedoes. Each torpedo left a brilliant streak in the highly phospherescent water. The Jap saw them coming and maneuvered so that they passed down both sides of him.. By this time, the ships were very close and had materialized into a heavily armed anti submarine MIKURA-class frigate. The DACE rapidly turned away and bent on full power. A cloud of exhaust smoke poured out of her engines and momentarily hid her from view. Twin flashes appeared on the bow of the Jap and two explosions resounded through the air. A faint cheer went up from the crew below -- they thought the Jap had been hit by the DACE's torpedoes. Two shells exploded ahead of the DACE. Another salvo came so close that the whistling of the shells could be heard in the conning tower. One exploded close to the ship. The DACE fired more torpedoes -- no luck. She dived rapidly and deep, and fired yet another torpedo. This was not a case of hitting the target -- it was a case of saving the DACE for V-J Day. The next three minutes were spent hanging on as the sub rocked and was shaken by 18 large and loud depth charges.

The DACE maneuvered and evaded far below the surface while the Jap attempted to reloacate her. He dropped 18 more charges which were not too close. A couple of hours later he had wandered so far away from the DACE that she secured from battle stations and allowed everyone not on watch to turn in for a well-earned rest. Some slight damage from the depth charging was noticed, but nothing serious -- only the usual broken light bulbs, scattered cork insulations, some small leads broken and some small valves backed off of their seats.

June 20-26, the DACE patrolled in the Sea of Okhotsk.

One day during a heavy overcast, the bridge watch were startled to hear the whine of an approaching airplane. As the sub dived, the last man down the hatch saw the Japs plane roar about 100 feet overhead. A half-minute later the sub was under and bullets were dropping on to the hull as the plane tried to strafe. One small depth bomb went off, but it missed by a wide margin.

Once during this time the DACE dropped a few shells into a sulphur refinery close to the beach at Moyoro Wan, but it was so hazy that no results were observed.

On the 26th, the DACE joined the other members of the wold pack and continued a sweep through the Okhotsk Sea, and along the lower channels of the Kuriles Island chain.

On the 27th, she closed in one morning on a contact and finally recognized her as a Russian Merchant ship -- a lend-lease Liberty type ship.

On the second of July, the subs operated independently and the DACE went to Kita Uruppu channel for patrol.

No contacts were made, so on July 6th, the DACE and CABEZON again joined company and left the area.

The patrol was deemed successful for the Submarine Combat Insignia. The duration of this patrol was 47 days.

POST - WAR PERIOD

The DACE and CABEZON arrived at Midway on July 25, 1945. For two weeks the relief crew overhauled the ship while the officers and crew enjoyed themselves sunning, fishing and engaging in competitive sports. The DACE and CABEZON engaged in an athletic competion for a plaque to be presented to the winning ship. The DACE now has the plaque as a trophy in her forward battery passageway.

On August 4th, the two subs got underway for another war patrol. they arrived at Saipan on August 13th for voyage repairs.

The ship was all ready to leave on August 15th, 1945, at 1400. At ten in the morning, Japan agreed to surrender terms, and the patrol was delayed indefinitely.

For two weeks the DACE remained in Saipan. A quarter of the crew and officers were assigned to man any Jap subs which might appear for surrender. They returned to the DACE ten days later without seeing a Jap submarine.

On September 1, 1945, the DACE set sail for Pearl Harbor in company with the USS ORION, USS RAY, USS CREVALIE and USS ICEFISH.

After an uneventful trip they all arrived in Pearl Harbor on September 10,1945, and waited for the orders which would take them all home for good.

On September 13, 1945, the DACE, MUSKALLUNGE, CREVALLE, and GATO departed for Panama and home. The DACE was scheduled to return to New London on October 5th. She had made seven war patrols in two years and two months active duty, and sunk or damaged over 73,000 tons of enemy ships.

By Directive dated January 1947, USS DACE (SS 247) was later placed out of commission, in reserve, attached to the U. S. Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

SUMMARY OF PATROL RESULTS

No. of Patrols	Number and Type of Ships Sunk	Tonnage of Ships Sunk	Number and Type of Ships Damaged	Tonnage of Ships Sunk
1	0	0	Freighter (EC) KYOKKO MARU type	6,783
2	0	0	Tanker (EU)	10,000
3	0	0	0	0
4	1-AK (EU) 1-SMC (EU)	2,000 1,200	1 AP (EU)	10,000
5	1-AO (EU) 1-AP (EU) 1-CA (ATAGO class)	10,000 7,500 12,500	0	0
6	1-AK	4,000	1 AK	4,000
7	1-AK EIHUKU class (EU)	4,000	1 PF (MIKURA) (EC)	1,500

No. of Patrols	Number and Type of Ships Sunk	Tonnage of Ships Sunk	Number and Type of Ships Damaged	Tonnage of Ships Sunk
	1-MIS Sea-truck (EC)	300		
	1-MIS Lugger (EC)	100		
TOTAL FOR WAR	9	41,600	5	32,283

USS DACE earned seven Battle Stars on the Asiatic-Pacific Area Service Medal for participating in the following operations:

1 Star/Asiatic-Pacific Raids - 1944
Truk Attack -- 16 to 17 February 1944

1 Star/Western New Guniea Operation
Cape Sansapor Operation -- 30 July to 31 August 1944

1 Star/Leyte Operation
Battle of Surigao Strait -- 24 to 26 October 1944

1 Star/Luzon Operation -- 12 December 1944 to 1 April 1945

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 20 October to 11 December 1943

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 16 March to 13 May 1944

1 Star/Submarine War Patrol - Pacific -- 25 May to 10 July 1945

She also earned the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION on 22 to 23 October 1944 while on her fifth war patrol in the Pacific.

*****

STATISTICS

OVERALL LENGTH	312 feet
BEAM	27 feet
SPEED	20 knots
DISPLACEMENT	1,468 tons

*****

DATE 10 Oct-6 Nov 1944 NAME DACE
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD

SERIAL
DATE
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group

Report of Coordinated Patrol of USS DARTER & USS DACE in SOUTH CHINA SEA. Combined reconnaissance & attack sank or damaged 65,000 tons including three Japanese cruisers in PALAWAN Passage 23 Oct 44. DACE rescued entire crew of DARTER which grounded on BOMBAY SHOAL 24 October 1944, and (OVER)

FILED: War Diary

Separately under DARTER ser 022 of 5 Nov 44

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55) S-28683

DATE 16-28 December 1944 NAME DACE
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD

SERIAL 029
DATE 28 December 1944
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group Operations

Chronological report of operations of BECUNA, FLASHER, HOE, DACE and PADDLE under CDR H.D.Sturr. Operated in SOUTH CHINA Sea for primary poupose of reporting & attacking enemy forces attempting to in terfere with MINDORO Landings.

FILED: War Diary

Separately as ORIGINAL under USS BECUNA
as PHOTOSTAT under USS BECUNA

MICROSERIAL NO. 110216 | ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55) S-28683

DATE 16 December 1944 NAME DACE A
FROM C.O. USS DACE (SS-247) (Commander Task Unit 71.1.31)

SERIAL 001
DATE 17 December 1944
SUBJECT Report of Special Mission.

Narrative report covering laying of field of 11 Mark 12 mines off the coast of FRENCH INDO CHINA during Sixth War Patrol in the South China Sea.

(SOWESPAC:SUB OPS)

FILED: War Diary

Separately as CARBON COPY DUPLICATE COPY

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55) S-28683

A

DATE 10-19 June 1945 NAME DACE

FROM CO - USS DACE(SS-247)

SERIAL 001

DATE 10 July 1945

SUBJECT Torpedo firing reports, Forwarding of

Forwards two form reports of action during SEVENTH WAR PATROL. Claims one freighter from Mark 28 firing.

(NORPAC; SUB OPS)

FILED: War Diary

Separately
as Enc. to SUBSPAC ser 00235 of 24 Jul 45

MICROSERIAL NO. | ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55) S-28883

DECLASSIFIED - DOD DIR. 5200.9
of 27 SEP 58
BY OP-09B91C DATE 1APR60

DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. DARTER (SS227)

% Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Cal.

[5NOV 44]

SS227/A16-3

Serial 022

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DARTER
(Group Commander of Coordinated
Patrol of DARTER and DACE).

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: (1) Commander Submarine Division ONE
EIGHTY-ONE.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
(3) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S.S.
DARTER and U.S.S. DACE. (DARTER
4th Patrol, DACE 5th Patrol).

Reference: (a) CTF-71 Opords. 138-44 and 139-44.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Coordinated Search and Attack
Instructions, U.S.S. DARTER Conf.
serial 003 dated 1 Oct. 1944.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the coordinated part of the above two patrols conducted in the South China Sea during the period 10 October, 1944 to 6 November 1944, is forwarded herewith.

D. H. McCLINTOCK.

U.S.S. DARTER (SS227)

SS227/A16-3
Serial 022

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(A) PROLOGUE

The first half of these two patrols was conducted independently on reconnaissance for the Morotai Operation. During the short refit period at Biak 27 Sept. to 1 Oct. 1944, orders were received to conduct the latter half of the DACE-DARTER patrols as a unit in area Dog-6. Little (but enough) time was available for planning; none for combined training.

(B) NARRATIVE

1. The reasons for decisions reached and detailed movements during this coordinated patrol are given in DARTER Patrol Report #4. Detailed reports of actions are given in above and in DACE Patrol Report #5.

2. A condensed summary is given below:

(a) The general plan was to cover Palawan Passage, since no large convoy can escape detection by two submarines in that narrow passage.

(b) Communication was in accordance with Enclosure (B). Frequent conferences (by megaphone) were held during dark of the moon, for the exchange of information. One amazing feature of our communications on 2880 Kcs is the following: while in contact with three heavy ships one night and a major task force the next night a total of 20 tactical despatches and contact reports were sent at no greater range than 22,000 yards from the Jap units. We were not DF'd by these forces, (evidenced by their making no move to avoid us) although possibly we were from the beach. There is no evidence that we were DF'd at all. Reception on 2880 Kcs was excellent except when both boats

SS227/A16-3
Serial 022

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(B) NARRATIVE, Cont'd

were submerged. Reception was good, however, when only one was submerged.

(c) Navigation was hazardous due to the shoal ridden area. During a chase inside the Borneo Barrier Reef DACE touched bottom four times while submerged. DARTER was lost by grounding while chasing a crippled cruiser in Palawan Passage. Entire crew was rescued by the DACE.

(d) The latter part of the patrol was influenced by the Leyte landing. We thought heavy units of the Jap Fleet from Singapore might use Balabac Strait or Palawan Passage enroute to Leyte.

3. Estimated damage inflicted on the enemy is as follows:

DACE	1 Kongo Class BB	sunk(EU)	29,300	tons
	1 Large AK	sunk(EC)	7,500	"
	1 Large AP	damaged(EC)	7,500	"
	1 Large AO	damaged(EC)	10,000	"
DARTER	1 Atago Class CA	sunk(EC)	9,850	"
	1 Atago Class CA	damaged(EC)	9,850	"
	1 Teiyo Class AO	damaged(EC)	9,850	"
	1 Eiyo Class AO	damaged(EC)	8,674	"

Total sunk	46,650 tons
Total damaged	45,874 tons
Grand total	92,524 tons

A considered opinion that the DACE BB target sank is submitted. The DARTER C.O. in 9 patrols has never heard anything like the violent breaking up noises and violent explosions which followed our attacks. In addition, it is possible that DARTER sank one heavy cruiser in addition to the two cruisers mentioned above. (See DARTER Patrol Report).

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(C) REMARKS

1. This area is an excellent one for a coordinated patrol since shipping must move in restricted lanes.

2. "Wolfpacking" can be very effective against major combatant units: on the night of 21 October, three high speed (22 knot) heavy ships, (now thought to be cruisers) headed north through "Dangerous Ground", were contacted by DARTER at midnight west of Balabac Strait. Although outspeeded and losing ground steadily, DARTER managed to maintain radar contact for over five hours, sending 10 contact reports to DACE who was in a fair position to intercept. Even the exact zigzag plan was sent. Unfortunately the Japs know more about the "Dangerous Ground" than we do, and they changed base course to west beyond reach of the DACE just before dawn, apparently to avoid unknown dangers to the north.

DACE-DARTER were holding a megaphone conference on night of 22 October when a major task force was picked up on radar. With superior speed (BBs were in the force) DACE-DARTER took up positions ahead; DARTER was stationed ahead of port column, DACE ahead of stbd. column; so that with DARTER attacking first, DACE was certain to get a shot, no matter which way they zigged. The two dawn attacks, 20 minutes apart, were terrifically effective.

3. This Task group made first contact reports (as far as is known) on the large northbound Jap task force enroute from the Singapore Area to interfere with the Leyte Operation. In addition, these two submarines whittled down, by the following, the force which eventually arrived off Leyte:

One Battleship (BU)
Two Heavy Cruisers (CA)
Two Destroyers (escorting crippled cruiser)

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(C) REMARKS, Cont'd

4. The cooperation and aid in planning rendered by the DACE Commanding Officer, Commander B.D. CLAGGETT, USN, were outstanding. In addition this Officer unhesitatingly risked his ship to rescue the entire crew of the DARTER.

D. H. McCLINTOCK.

U.S.S. DARTER (SS227)

..16-3
.erial 022

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. DACE.

Subject: Coordinated Search and Attack Instructions.

Reference: (a) CTF-71 OpOrd. 138-44 and 139-44.
(b) CTG 71.4 Tentative Coordinated Search and Attack Doctrine (serial 0399 of 17 July 1944.)

Enclosure: (A) Supplemental Communication Instructions.

1. Proceed independently to area as ordered by reference (a).

2. Upon arrival in area about 9 Oct., 1944 rendezvous at 115-45E, 7-45N. two hours after sunset. DARTER will be at this rendezvous each night beginning 9 October until rendezvous is effected.

3. On receipt of information concerning passage of enemy shipping through our area, C.O. DARTER will specify the search plan to be used. If practicable, a search line will be formed at a position to insure enemy contact two hours after dark. This should minimize effectivness of air cover.

4. In forming the search line, the point of origin of the line will be the position of the DARTER; and the direction of the line will be the true bearing from that ship. Distance will normally be 20 miles. Speed of advance normal to line, on surface, will normally be 10 knots. If submerged, speed of advance will be 2.5 knots. If line is stationary, remain within 5 miles of assigned station if on surface; remain on station if submerged.

5. Doctrine for attack is as follows: Use reference (b) as a guide. Submarine "A" making first contact, report same, together with probable

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side of her attack. If "A" and "B" are on same side at initial contact, boat making first contact attack from far side, if practicable. "A" will normally attack first, without signal. Should second submarine "B" find herself in position to attack, she may do so whether or not "A" has attacked; "B" will, however, announce her intention to do so if attacking first. She will normally choose the side opposite to that announced by "A". Sub making first attack will normally finish off cripples; after which she will attempt to regain contact and attack on original side. Attack at every opportunity bearing in mind that the purpose of these instructions is to give both boats maximum opportunity to attack, not to restrict either.

6. Whether patrol is to be surfaced or submerged will be signalled; and this according to weather and intensity of air search.

7. A daily rendezvous will be made two hours after sunset. Position of first rendezvous is designated above. Future rendezvous will be as signalled visually. If rendezvous not made, return to same point on succeeding nights until rendezvous effected.

Rendezvous is for exchange of information and orders for next 24 hours. Normally this will be done by blinker.

8. From sunset 20 October operate independently.

9. All times will be How.

/s/ D. H. McCLINTOCK.

U.S.S. DARTER (SS227)

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Supplemental Communication Instructions

1. Communication doctrine will be in accordance with the communication plan of CTF-71.1 OpPlan 1-44, with the following instructions applying while patrolling as a group.

2. Primary voice frequency 2880 Kcs.
Secondary Voice " 2656 Kcs.
Alternate voice " (for emergency, such as jamming, only) 2785 Kcs.

3. When time permits, encode despatches in effective edition of aircraft code, 1270 series. If delay unacceptable, use plain language.

4. Voice radio calls are assigned as follows:

DARTER	DACE
1. Rita	1. Kate
2. Mable	2. Poppy
3. Betty	3. Alfred
4. Elsie	4. Dusty

Do not use same calls on 2 consecutive despatches.

5. If time of execution of a despatch is not given, normally assume it is to be executed on receipt.

6. The following points are given for reporting contacts in plain language. Formally Lat. and Long. will be given if message is encoded. Position of contacts are enemy positions. When reporting a contact state from which side (port or starboard) of enemy you will probably attack. Use bearing of contact from point as first three numerals, then point, then distance in miles.

ENCLOSURE (A)

ENCLOSURE (B)

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Supplemental Communication Instructions, Cont'd

Point	Location
Mike	Eastern most point of area
Option	Northern most point of area
Peter	Southern most point of area
Sugar	Western most point of area

Example: "260 Mike 20" means, "From Mike bearing 260° 20 miles."

7. Use CW if voice contact fails. If voice frequency fails, as a last resort clear message via VIXO Bakers, but use CSP 1247/8, Channel 108 for this.

8. Receipt for all voice messages. Make callup short and wait an interval before repeating a callup. If you want a message authenicated use following authenicators:

DARTER	DACE
Dave	Clag
Ernie	Benny
Dennis	Matt
Ira	Sam
Walt	Gus
Ed	Earl
Don	Phil
Bill	George

Example: DACE wishes to check on DARTER.

"Betty from Poppy - Clag. Answer:
"Poppy from Betty - Dave"

Use authenicators consecutively from list. If submerged and if practicable listen for 3 minutes with antenna raised at 0600; 1100; 1400; and 1700 How on voice frequency.

ENCLOSURE (A)

ENCLOSURE (B)

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Supplemental Communication Instructions, Cont'd

9. Recognition:

(a) Night recognition will normally be by radar. If a radar is trained on one sub, she will train her radar on bearing of first radar and attempt to exchange major war vessel recognition signals.

(b) In emergency use major war vessel recognitions by blinker.

(c) DARTER radar normally sweeps at 6-8 rpm.
DACE " " " " 4-5 rpm.

10. Special voice signals which may be used when diving are as follows:

Dog Dog	- Diving.
Dog Dog Sea Gull	- Diving for plane.
Dog Dog Blitz	- Diving for attack.

11. Use Sugar Dog radar at discretion during daylight. Normally DARTER will use it, unless visibility renders early plane detection by lookouts probable.

ENCLOSURE (A)

ENCLOSURE (B)

FC5-18/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Wx

Serial 0221

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
8 November 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS DARTER (SS227)
Conf. ltr. A16-3 Serial
022 dated 5 November 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) and U.S.S. DACE (SS247). (DARTER 4th Patrol, DACE 5th Patrol).

1. This coordinated attack group comprised U.S.S. DARTER whose commanding officer was group commander and U.S.S. DACE. The group covered Palawan Passage and vicinity for a period of fourteen days. Two coordinated attacks were made and each ship made one independent attack as a result of information furnished by the other. The first coordinated attack was delivered on each of two DD's evidently conducting an anti-submarine search in advance of a heavy enemy task force. Both attacks were unsuccessful due primarily to radical manouvers of the targets. The second was an epic of coordinated attacks. Radar contact was made on a large task force coming up Palawan Passage just after midnight on 23 October. Each submarine took station ahead of a column of enemy ships, submerged before dawn and delivered a periscope attack within fifteen minutes of each other against both columns just at dawn.

2. The DARTER got five hits into an Atago class CA and swung for a stern shot and with gyro angles of 130 to 120 left, fired four torpedoes for three hits in the second cruiser in column, also an Atago, and another hit timed for the third cruiser in column. The DACE got four hits into what was identified as a Kongo class battleship. All evidence points to her sinking.

3. In making a subsequent end around on a crippled Atago limping back to the southwest that night, the DARTER ran hard aground and could not be saved. DACE rescued all officers and men, returning them to Fremantle.

4. This group displayed a marked degree of teamwork, aggressiveness and intelligence. The comments of the group commander are well considered.

5. Communications, both within the pack and with the outside were excellent. The contact reports of the group commander on the morning of 23 October furnished our forces with information of the enemy task force which was invaluable and which contributed in large measure to the success of the second battle of the Philippine Seas.

FC5-13/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON EIGHTEEN Wx

Serial 0221

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
8 November 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report of Coordinated Patrol of U.S.S. DARTER (SS227) and U.S.S. DACE (SS247). (DARTER 4th Patrol, DACE 5th Patrol).

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6. The Squadron Commander heartily congratulates the group commander, and both ships on an outstanding performance which had far reaching results. Both ships are well deserving of a "WELL DONE".

Eliot H. Bryant

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

Capt. Wallace

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/le

Serial 01518 December 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DARTER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 022, dated 5 November 1944.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group Consisting of U.S.S. DARTER and U.S.S. DACE from 10 October 1944 to 6 November 1944, Comments on.

1. The Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of DARTER and DACE, under the direction of Commander D. H. McCLINTOCK, U.S.N., Commanding Officer DARTER, patrolled in the vicinity of PALAWAN PASSAGE from October 9th until the 24th, when DARTER grounded on BOMBAY SHOAL.

2. DACE and DARTER made an attack on a convoy during the night of the 13th of October in the very foul waters inside of N. FURIOUS SHOALS, and succeeded in completing one attack which sank a large AO and damaged a large AP.

3. This group executed one of the most successful coordinated attacks on record during the morning of October 23rd, when DARTER sank one CA and damaged another, and DACE sank a third. It was assumed that this Task Force was unlikely to radically alter base course in the restricted waters of PALAWAN PASSAGE until after dawn, and therefore both submarines would get in attacks prior to dawn if stationed along the enemy track. This assumption proved correct, and the Task Force came right into the arms of the waiting DACE despite the very effective DARTER attack twenty minutes earlier.

4. When DARTER grounded DACE was on hand to assist only one hour and a half after the grounding took place. There was no chance of getting DARTER off, but the feat of saving all of her crew from certain capture by the enemy was of far-reaching importance, and is an example of the type of mutual assistance which is a factor in the high morale of the Submarine Service.

5. The extensive and almost daily use of rendezvous for megaphone conversation is noted. In addition to the time lost, there are two disadvantages of this form of communication: first,

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DARTER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 022, dated 5 November,
1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group Consisting of U.S.S. DARTER and U.S.S. DACE from 10 October 1944 to 6 November 1944, Comments on.

- -

the coverage of the two SJ radars is cut in half by placing them so close together, and second, the area search of the group is seriously reduced by the necessity of interrupting organized search plans to maneuver for rendezvous. The use of SJ communication has proven most satisfactory, and should be used in all but exception cases. When in hot pursuit of a convoy time should never be taken out to effect a rendezvous for purposes of megaphone communication.

6. The Force Commander congratulates the Group Commander, and DARTER and DACE for inflicting the following outstanding damage on the enemy:

SUNK

1 - CA (ATAGO - EC) (DARTER)		12,500 Tons
1 - CA (ATAGO - EC) (DACE)		12,500 Tons
1 - AO (Large - EU) (DACE)		10,000 Tons
1 - AP (Large - EU) (DACE)		7,500 Tons
	Total	42,500 Tons

DAMAGED

1 - CA (ATAGO - EC) (DARTER)		12,500 Tons
1 - AO (TEIYO MARU - EU) (DARTER)		10,000 Tons
	Total	22,500 Tons
	Grand Total	65,000 Tons

R. W. CHRISTIE.

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 12a/pr

Serial 01518 December 12, 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS DARTER Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 022, dated 5 November
1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group Consisting of U.S.S. DARTER and U.S.S. DACE from 10 October 1944 to 6 November 1944, Comments on.

- -

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(3) - Direct	CTG-71.5	(2)
Vice Opnav	(2) - Direct	CTG-71.8	(2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c	(1)	CTG-71.9	(2)
ComlstFlt	(1)	ComSubRon-12	(2)
Com2ndFlt	(1)	DivComsSubRon-12	(1 each)
Com7thFlt	(2)	DivComsSubRon-18	(1 each)
ComSubslstFlt	(30)	DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)	ComSubDiv-162	(1)
CTF-71	(7)	S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)
CTG-71.3	(2)	SubAd, Mare Island.	(2)
CTG-71.4	(2)	S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)

J. B. Miller

J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

[BECUNA]

SS319/A16-3

Serial: (029)

DECLASSIFIED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. BECUNA (SS319),
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,

28 December 1944.

From: Commander Co-ordinated Attack Group Consisting of USS BECUNA, FLASHER, HOE, D.C.M. and PADDLE.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (Official Channels).

SUBJECT: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the patrol of a Co-ordinated Attack Group conducted in the South China Sea, during the period 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944, is forwarded herewith.

H. D. STURR.

SUBJECT: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944.

- -

NARRATIVE

All times are "HOW"

16 December 1944
1635

Received a message from CTF 71, designating the Commanding Officer BICUNA as commander of a co-ordinated attack group to consist of the FLASHER, HOE, and BICUNA. All three ships were at this time stationed in a patrol line off LUZON and MINDORO. Orders were to attack enemy forces that sortied from [redacted] BAY, GUAVINA and MINGO with but little endurance remaining were patrolling approaches to this bay. Their locations were known to me. BICUNA set course 254° T., speed 10 knots and sent a message to FLASHER and HOE to rendezvous at Latitude 13°-54' N., Longitude 116°-00' E. at 0700, 17 December. FLASHER will have to use three engine speed to make rendezvous. The CTG was aware that FLASHER had less than 50,000 gallons remaining.

17 December 1944
0700

Rendezvoused with HOE and passed her patrol instructions by line throwing gun.

0824

Same with FLASHER.

This plan was conceived to intercept any Orange Task Force transiting from [redacted] BAY to LUZON or MINDORO while we were in transit, and to detect any ships departing from the bay after arrival. All ships were to be stationed on an arc of 15 miles radius from HON CHOT Light.

Stormy weather, which lasted during the period of this co-ordinated patrol, had now commenced to make up. Wind from now on was from the north, varying from 20 to 50 knots. Skies were continuously overcast, driving rain squalls alternated with mist, with but brief intervals of fairly clear visibility, seas were from force four to force eight.

SUBJECT: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944.

1100 — Received MINGO's contact report of Orange Task Force, including 2 BB's, leaving KAMRANH BAY at 0800, course 130°, speed 17 knots. It appeared that they would transit DANGEROUS GROUNDS, and perhaps go through BALABAC STRAITS or that they would turn further south, going to SAIGON or SINGAPORE. Decided that chances of our intercepting force by turning south were very poor and continued on course to KAMRANH BAY.

16 December 1944

1656 — Because of heavy weather and strong southerly current reported by coast pilot, when about forty miles from coast directed group to change course to 040° , speed 5 knots.

2100 — Received message from CTF 71 adding PADDLE and DACE to task group. Initial stations were assigned by message as follows: DACE, north of line bearing 090° from HON CHUT Light and west of Longitude 109°-30' E.; PADDLE, same except south of the line. BECUNA, FLASHER, and HOE to patrol along 109°-40' E. I was given authority to change stations as conditions indicated.

19 December 1944

0526 — Changed BECUNA, FLASHER, and HOE's course to 180°, speed to 10 knots.

0805 — Told following ships to take indicated positions: All on Longitude 109°-40' E., HOE, Latitude 11°-27' N.; BECUNA, 11°-47' N.; FLASHER, 12°-07' N. Instructed ships to patrol independently. Current is running south four to five knots. Eight to ten knots through the water is best speed north against heavy seas.

1800 — In response to my request for JOG 2 calls CTF 71 assigned group a block of calls. All ships in pack already had voice calls assigned. I had, however, found it impossible to communicate satisfactorily with some of the ships by voice. On the other hand one ship of the pack, who never answered a CW call came in very easily on voice. the BECUNA was able to hear both CW and voice.

SUBJECT: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944.

1603 — DACE reported that a large escorted convoy had left the bay at 0900, on a northerly course, speed 8 to 10 knots. DACE dived after transmitting this message. FLASHER requested permission to chase the contact. I granted permission. Considering convoy's head start and indefinite course, and state of seas and weather, chances of overhauling looked improbable for FLASHER, impossible for the rest of the group.

1940 — FLASHER reported she was returning to station.

2015 — DACE reported that depth charging by above convoy's escorts and grounding had caused slight damage including noisy stern planes, flooded torpedo tubes, and one sound head. She requested an off shore station. I directed FLASHER and DACE to exchange stations.

21 December 1944

0120 — Granted permission to FLASHER to conduct submerged patrol at Latitude 12°-40' N., Longitude 109°-30' E., today.

0545 — DACE reported radar contact bearing 073, range 15,000 yards from Latitude 12°-10' N., Longitude 109°-36' E., course 320, speed 5 knots. SEADOG commenced closing.

0624 — Asked DACE how many contacts she had, and she replied that contact was a patrol boat and she was retiring.

1230 — FLASHER reported that at 1000, 3 tankers, 1 AK, 1 DD, and 2 escort vessels had passed her assigned patrol station, course 010, speed 8 knots. She asked if she should chase the convoy. Ordered FLASHER to chase until Midnight. Attempted to tell DACE (patrol position Latitude 12°-07' N., Longitude 109°-40' E.) to chase convoy, but could not establish communications with the DACE. Continued calling her at half hour intervals throughout afternoon.

1349 — FLASHER tried to ask DACE if she had contact or any information. Still unable to communicate with DACE. I informed the FLASHER that the DACE was not chasing and told him to stop his search at discretion.

1351 PADDLE informed me that her ETA assigned position was 1000, 22 December.

2115 HOE reported a floating mine at Latitude 10°-37' N., Longitude 109°-23' E.

22 December 1944

0627 PADDLE reported radar contact bearing 227, range 19,000 yards from Latitude 11°-11' N., Longitude 109°-30' E., at 0600. BECUNA began chasing. Told PADDLE and HOE to chase.

0655 PADDLE amplified her report stating that there were 2 contacts, course 060, speed 10 knots.

0714 Received message on FOX schedule that [redacted] had sunk three tankers of 5 ship convoy at 0500 at Latitude 15°-04' N., Longitude 109°-06' E. She said she had one torpedo left and was headed home.

0729 PADDLE reported that contact was one AK and one escort.

0817 PADDLE gave enemy course as 355°. She also reported another escort. PADDLE commenced attack.

0953 HOE reported contact, bearing 200°, range 22,000 yards from Latitude 10°-59' N., Longitude 109°-26' E. HOE is in sight of BECUNA, between BECUNA and contact.

1000 BECUNA made sight and radar contact.

Attack by all three ships failed. Heavy seas and very poor visibility was the major cause of the failures. I do not believe the targets were ever aware that any submarines were in the vicinity. I do not know the details of the HOE and PADDLE attacks.

1316 Sent DACE word that convoy was approaching [redacted] B.M.

1730 — PADDLE reported a radar contact, bearing 190, range 25,000 yards from Latitude 11°-07' N., Longitude 109°-32' E., BLOCK headed toward contact.

1744 — Asked PADDLE for enemy course and speed.

1753 — She replied that her own course was northeast, speed full.

1805 — Asked PADDLE for information.

1812 — Received message from CTF 71 reassigning ships. DACE and BLOCK are only two left in pack. New area is C-3. As all traffic seems to hug coast, assigned DACE station off CAPE VARELLA, BLOCK station off PULAU CAMBIR.

1828 — PADDLE said she had lost contact. Ships were very large and high speed, possibly warships.

1910 — PADDLE said enemy course was 090, speed 18 knots. She abandoned search. Told PADDLE to make contact report, which she did.

1947 — DACE reported she had sighted ships (the earlier convoy) approaching the bay, and had been forced down by air coverage.

23 December 1944

0420 — FLASHER, homeward bound with but one torpedo, reported a 5 ship convoy at Latitude 11°-13' N., Longitude 109°-49' E., at 0400, speed 13 knots. BLOCK began intercepting convoy. Attempted to ask DACE if she had received report.

0536 — Established communication with DACE. Found she had not heard FLASHER's message and transmitted latest information (received from FLASHER at 0515 and checking with first information) to DACE.

BLOCK's unfortunate experience with this convoy is detailed in the BLOCK patrol report. Ships sighted by the BLOCK were one YAMATO battleship, one MOGAMI cruiser and one destroyer.

SUBJECT: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16 December 1944 to 28 December 1944.

0939 BECUNA sent contact report to CTF 71, ComThird Fleet, and CTF 77. Sent same report to DACE.

0954 DACE requested new information. Informed her ships had entered harbor.

24-27 December 1944 Nothing of interest, except that weather moderated somewhat but visibility remained very poor with very frequent hard rain squalls and many hours of mist. During this period BECUNA sighted 10 drifting mines, sinking 7, DACE sighted 3.

27 December 1944 After sighting 3 mines close aboard, BECUNA simultaneously, decided to patrol eastern part of area. Told DACE to go to Longitude 110°-30' E.

28 December 1944 Tried to communicate without success all day at half hour intervals with DACE. I wished to station her on a north and south patrol along Longitude 110°-30' E., at the southern part of our area, while I took the northern part. I hoped to intercept the Orange Task Force which had shelled [illegible]DORO.

2111 Received a message from CTF 71 assigning BECUNA a special mission on her way home, thus ending the Task Group.

REMARKS

Of the various contacts made by this co-ordinated attack group, only one, the FLASHER's of 21 December was successfully developed and attacked. It is readily apparent that all credit for this brilliant success belongs solely to the Commanding Officer of the FLASHER.

Under more favorable weather conditions the approaches by the DACE of 19 December, by the PADDLE, HOE and BECUNA on 22 December, and by the BECUNA of 23 December should have born fruit.

Air coverage off [illegible] BAY is efficient in keeping submarines submerged close to shore.

The origin of the floating mines is unknown. It is suspected with the strong southerly currents existing here, that they might come from as far as [illegible].

FC5-26/A16-3
Serial (026)

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
20 January 1945

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT To
CO USS BECUNA Conf.Ltr.
SS319/A16-3 serial 029
dated 28 December 1944.

From: Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX.
To : Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Report of War Patrol of Co-ordinated Attack Group from 16-28 December 1944 (USS BECUNA, FLASHER and HOE).

1. The Co-ordinated Attack Group consisting of BECUNA, FLASHER and HOE was constituted by order of Commander Task Force 71 after all ships concerned were on patrol station. Commander H. D. Sturr, USN, Commanding Officer, BECUNA, was designated as Group Commander and this group functioned from 16-28 December, with FLASHER departing on 23 December due to having fired all but one torpedo.

2. No coordinated attacks were made, although the plan of search was well conceived. Extraordinarily rough weather during most of the period seriously interferred with fast surface mobility and defeated several contact developments, which otherwise might have been successful. FLASHER made a successful attack on the night of 21 December, sinking three tankers, but at the time she was conducting an independent chase of this previously reported convoy, and no coordinated attack was developed. One important and valuable contact with an enemy Task Force was made and reported by BECUNA on 23 December.

L. J. HOFFMAN.

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 14/hr

Serial 0282

RECEIVED S-C FILES
Room 2055
ROUTE TO 6 MAR 1945
158083

9 February 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BECUNA Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 029, dated
28 December 1944.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
FLEET MAINTENANCE
MAR 6 1945
RECEIVED
NAVY DEPARTMENT

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

264

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group Consisting of U.S.S. BECUNA (SS319), U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), U.S.S. HOE (SS258), U.S.S. DACE (SS247), and U.S.S. PADDLE (SS263) - Comment on.

1. The Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of BECUNA, FLASHER and HOE was ordered to form off KAMRANH BAY on 16 December, 1944, for the primary purpose of reporting and attacking enemy forces which might attempt to interfere with the Allied landings on MINDORO. DACE and PADDLE were ordered to join on 18 December. Commander W. D. STURR, U.S.N., Commanding Officer of BECUNA, was the Group Commander during the period 16 to 28 December.

2. DACE reported the first contact on a large northbound convoy which sortied from KAMRANH BAY the morning of 20 December. FLASHER made an unsuccessful attempt to develop the contact.

FLASHER sighted another northbound convoy the next morning. She was unable to close submerged, but finally regained contact early the following morning, 22 December, and sank three tankers in a brilliantly executed night surface attack.

The same morning PADDLE reported having sighted one tanker with one escort. HOE and BECUNA also soon made contact and started working ahead for a submerged attack. All three submarines made submerged approaches on this target. HOE was the only one to reach a firing position, and her attack was unsuccessful. Heavy seas and poor visibility made all approaches unusually difficult.

That afternoon PADDLE made radar contact in reduced visibility on several large high speed targets heading east. Although never sighted by any of the group, they were assumed to be war ships.

In the early morning of 23 December, FLASHER, homeward bound with only one torpedo, reported radar contact on a northbound convoy heading for KAMRANH BAY. BECUNA made a submerged

FE24-71/A16-3 UNITED STATES NAVY 14/1 r

Serial 0282

9 February 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BECUNA Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 039, dated
28 December 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group Consisting of U.S.S. PEGULA (SS313), U.S.S. FLASHER (SS249), U.S.S. POE (SS258), U.S.S. DACE (SS247), and U.S.S. PADDLE (SS263) - Comment on.

- -

approach at dawn, but was unable to reach an attack position. The convoy, after it had passed by, was observed to be a Task Force containing one BB and one CA with destroyer escorts.

3. Heavy seas and poor visibility, plus plane cover which sometimes prevented surface patrolling and end runs, reduced the effectiveness of this group.

4. A total of thirteen floating mines were sighted by members of the Coordinated Group. They appeared to be moored type mines which had broken loose, probably in the vicinity of HAINAN, and had drifted down the coast with the prevailing southerly current.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the Group Commander, and PEGULA, FLASHER, POE, DACE and PADDLE on their performance of important reconnaissance duties and on the damage inflicted by the individual members of the group.

ELIOT H. BRYANT

Distribution:

Cominch	(3)	Direct	CTG-71.5	(2)	
Vice Cnav	(2)	Direct	CTG-71.8	(2)	
Vice Cnav Op-23c	(1)		CTG-71.9	(2)	
ComlstFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-12	(1 each)	
Com2ndFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-18	(1 each)	
Com7thFlt	(2)		DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)	
ComSubs1stFlt	(30)		S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)	
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)		Comdt. NYD, Puget Sound	(1)	
CTF-71	(7)		SubAd, Pearl Island	(2)	
CTG-71.3	(2)		S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)	
CTG-71.4	(2)				

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

SS247/A16-3 U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Serial 001

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
17 December 1944.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer (Commander Task Unit 71.1.31).

To : The Commander Task Force 71 (Commander Task Group 71.1).

Subject: Special Mission - Report of.

Reference: (a) ComTaskGroup 71.1's OpOrd. No. 167-44 of 30 November 1944.
(b) Annex E to above OpOrd.
(c) Annex F to above OpOrd.
(d) CTG 71.1's despatch 100751 of December 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Two copies of overlay of mine plant.

1. In accordance with instructions given in reference (a), (b), and (c), this vessel laid a field of eleven Mark 12 mines off the coast of FRENCH INDO CHINA between PULAU GAMBIR Island and the mainland in the vicinity of latitude 13°-36' N and longitude 109°-18' E. Enclosure (A) gives the exact location of each mine in the plant.

2. A narrative of the operation is as given below:

It was planned to lay the mines as soon as possible after arrival in the area in accordance with reference (d). This it was hoped would be about 0000 on 16 December, however enemy planes and increasing headwinds and head seas deemed otherwise. By forcing the ship into the seas at three and four engine speeds we managed to arrive seven miles abeam of PULAU GAMBIR Island at about 0230 on the 16th. It had been decided to make our approach from the northeast in order to have the current with us and more sea room in which to make initial approach.

At 0300 the initial phases of the approach were commenced. A strong southerly current of 3 knots was experienced which caused us to break off our first

approach, maneuver radically to the west and northwest at 12 to 13 knots, and come in from further north for the second attempt. We were now at battle stations, flooded down, and on 2 main engines with exhausts submerged. At this time we were beams on the wind and sea and took considerable water over bridge and down the engine induction. The engine induction was closed (suction being taken through the Conning Tower hatch) and tanks were partly blown to give more buoyancy.

By about 0340 we were on our way for the first mine drop point at 2/3 speed and at 04-35 the first mine was dropped. This and succeeding mines were dropped on navigational fixes (seconded by TDC) obtained in the following manner. A section of compass rose was layed out on the chart using the southern point of HON DAT Island as a center. The rose radius was made large enough so that bearings could be plotted accurately to 1/2 degree. An icing glass arm equipped with a range scale was pivoted by thumb tack at the southern point of HON DAT. Radar ranges and bearings were continuously supplied on this reference point enabling the ship's position to be fixed at intervals of about 1/2 minute. As an additional check, range to the neareast land on PULAU GAMBIR Island was used. Due to the strong current which decreased somewhat in strength but became variable in nature as the run continued, it was necessary to maneuver the ship with large rudder angle and course change on occasions, but employing the above system we were enabled to drop the mines accurately without too much trouble. An allowance of 195 feet distance from the bridge to the stern tubes plus an ejection travel of 75 feet was made in dropping mines.

Once the operation started it went off without a hitch. The speed of the ship was 8 knots by pit log plus a 1-1/2 to 3 knot helping current. The average dropping interval was minutes 33 seconds with a maximum interval between mines 9 and 10 of 4 minutes 55 seconds and a minimum interval between mines 1 and 2

of 2 minutes 28 seconds. The mines were dropped about 1,000 yards apart as prescribed. The closest approach to the beach was about 1,100 yards from MUI KE GA Point and believe me that was plenty close enough. The weather was ideal from a visibility point of view--there being light rain squalls, some shore line mist, no moon, overcast sky, but yet enough visibility to see the main points of land clearly. Although there were several lights noted on the shore I am sure we were undetected.

At 04-40-13 the last mine was dropped and we put our stern to the shore line, pumped up, put on 4 main engines and cleared the coast and shallow water. (The mine plant was made in 11 to 12 fathoms of water).

It had originally been planned to run to seaward and transmit our completed mission message but as it was after 0500 before we got even a little distance between us and the beach, we wouldn't have had time to get our message off before daybreak nor would we have cleared the land enough to permit transmitting safely. In addition it was necessary to make a trim dive before dawn and load torpedoes in the tubes aft. In view of the above it was decided to make an all day dive east of PULAU GAMBIR Island and watch for traffic as well as observe our mine field, sending out our message after surfacing in the evening.

Unfortunately the 3 to 4 knot southerly current together with heavy seas and poor visibility prevented our closing the coast as close as we desired and seeing as well as we wished. However at 1758 we heard and felt a loud heavy, distant explosion. Again at 1846 we heard another of the same caliber but not quite as loud as the first one. I believe these were our mines going off, but due to conditions described above we could not see any shipping or results.

SS247/A16-3 U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Serial 001

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
17 December 1944.


SECRET

Subject: Special Mission - Report of.

About midnight we cleared DACE's serial one to Commander Task Force 71 reporting the successful completion of our special mission.

/s/ O. R. COLE, JR.

Copies to:
(2) CTF-71 (plus Encl.(A)).
(1) ComSubPacFor (with patrol report)
(1) Ship's File.



U.S.S. DACE
SIXTH WAR PATROL
MINE PLANT
16 DECEMBER 1944

DESIRED POSIT ⊙ ⊙ ACTUAL POSIT

B.A. CHART 3874

FE24-71/A16-3/
A8-2(1)

UNITED STATES NAVY

90/gr.

FINAL Op-20 FILE
3/21/45
FEB 23 1945

Serial 0085

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Report of Minelaying Operation During Sixth War Patrol of U.S.S. DACE.

Reference: (a) C.O. U.S.S. DACE Secret Ltr. SS247/A16-3 Serial 001 of 17 December 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

ELIOT H. BRYANT.

Copy to:
CNO (ADVANCE COPY by AIRMAIL) ←
COM 7TH FLEET.
C.O. U.S.S. DACE.

DECLASSIFIED S-C FILES
NAVSO 2055
30
8 MAR 1945
A16-1/fe247
158439
3122

DECLASSIFIED 3M

NAVY DEPT (O)
2-11-49

FF12-10(A)/A16-3/S75 SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET nr

Serial 00235

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 July 1945.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of Firing Mark 27 and Mark 28 Torpedoes During the Seventh War Patrol of the U.S.S. DACE (SS247).

Enclosure:
(A) U.S.S. DACE - Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 7 (CO USS DACE Secret ltr, File SS247/A16-3/(001), serial none, dated 10 July 1945).
(B) U.S.S. DACE - Top Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedoes, War Patrol No. 7 (CO USS DACE Top Secret ltr, File SS247/A16-3(0001), serial none, dated 10 July 1945).

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.

2. It is estimated that Mark 28 Attack No. 1, enclosure (A), resulted in a hit in the medium AK previously damaged in Mark 14-3A, Attack No. 1 (see Seventh War Patrol Report).

3. It is also estimated that the Mikura class frigate was damaged by a hit in Mark 27, Attack No. 1, enclosure (B).

4. The Force Commander congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the DACE for this effective use of new weapons. Damage to the enemy has been credited in the endorsement to the Seventh War Patrol report.

5. The security classification of enclosure (B) is changed to Secret in accordance with recent instructions from the Bureau of Ordnance.

G. C. CRAMFORD,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(2)
CNO	(2)
Cincpac	(3)
Comsubspac	(2)
ComsubspacAdComd	(2)
Comsubstrainpac	(2)
Comsubslant	(2)
ComSubs7thFlt (Fwd Echelon)	(2)
ComSubs7thFlt (Rear Echelon)	(2)
All Squadron Commanders	(1)
All Division Commanders	(1)
BuOrd	(2)
BuShips	(2)
C.O., USS DACE (less enclosure)	(1)

for
E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

Cruse BOX # 5042 RG #21149 FILE S74 JACKET # 1 NB

S-E-C-R-E-T

ENCLOSURE (A) to ComSubsPacAd
Secret Ltr. File FF12-10(A)/
A16-3/S75, Serial 00235 dated
24 July 1945.

ENCLOSURE (A)

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR

FC5-24/S75/A16-3

Serial: (0011)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July, 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Secret
Report of Firing Mark 28
Torpedoes, Pat. No. 7.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, Patrol Number 7.

1. Forwarded.

2. The remarks that the Mark 28 torpedo fired on the first attack hit the freighter previously damaged and sinking as the result of a torpedo hit from attack 1A are concurred in. Apparently the breaking up noises on this freighter were sufficiently intense to divert this torpedo.

3. The miss on attack Number 2 was probably caused by firing down the throat only nineteen (19) seconds behind the Mark 14 torpedo. This probably resulted in the Mark 28 being required to reverse course in an unreasonably tight turning circle if a hit were to be made.

F. W. FENNO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO FORTY ONE

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

FB5-241/S75/A16-3
Serial # 003

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Secret
Report of Firing Mark 28
Torpedoes, Patrol No. 7.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO FORTY ONE.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Administration.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, Patrol Number 7.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commanding Officer that the Mark 28 "homed" on the freighter.

J. W. DAVIS,
Acting.

SS247/A16-3/(001)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 July 1945.

S E C R E T

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Secret Report of Firing Mark 28 Torpedoes, Patrol No. SEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

O.R. COLE, JR.

SECRET

(MARK 28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 28 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 7

Time 1324-35 Date 10 June 1945 Lat. 47-25N Long. 149-04.5E

Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 1000fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef 80 miles Sea condition 5

Was it raining? No Injection 40°F

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: Convoy consisting of one (1) Medium AK of about 5000-6000 tons (similar to EIHUKU MARU, page 134, ONI 208-J Rev.), one very samll tanker or Sea Truck of the V-B type, with two (2) MIKURA class frigates for escorts. Contact made by high periscope. Visibility 6-9 miles.

Ship(s)sunk: (1) Medium AK, 5000-6000 tons(similar to EIHUKU MARU).

Ship(s) damaged or probably sunk: None

Damage determined by: Torpedo heard to hit over sound gear and through hull. Time of run checks well. AK was emitting breaking up noises loud enough to hear through hull. Torpedo passed close to the AK at the time it enabled.

Target draft 12' Course 050°T Speed 9 Kts Range 2,300 yards (at firing)

Target turn count Unknown. Target bearing at firing instant unknown

Give any peculiarities noted in target' sound output None noted.

(Note: The above refers to the escort which was the original target. The AK was stopped at a range of about 500-800 yards, bearing approximately 025°T, and emitting loud breaking up noises.)

SECRET

(MARK 28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM) (Cont'd)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 2.5 Kts. Course 173°T Depth 65' Angle 0° (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Any indication of acoustic countermeasures being used? Give details None noted.

Were depth charges being dropped? No

Type attack: Snap setup on an escort to previously hit freighter, using periscope ranges and bearings. On its course to intercept the target, the torpedo passed close aboard the loudly breaking up freighter shortly after they gyro unlocked. It is believed that it homed on and hit the freighter.

FIRING DATA

Tube fired No. 7 Track angle 30°S towards*) (Probably decreasing due to swing Depth Set

Gyro angle 227 Torpedo speeddused in TDC 32 Kts Hit or Miss Hit

Erratic No Time of torpedo run 2'20" Torpedo serial No. 104429

Mark exploder Unknown Overhaul activity S/M Base, Pearl Harbor

Description of sound track of run. How long was torpedo tracked? Not tracked.

Were the bearings constant? Unknown

Was torpedo easy to follow? No. Not picked up

COMMENTS: Prescribed routine for upkeep was followed. Torpedo gave no trouble.

(*Note: Data on this attack is a little confused. It is possible that a port track was used instead of starboard.)

SECRET

(MARK 28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 28 Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 7

Time 0039 Date 19 June 1945 Lat. 50-24N Long. 154-30E

Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 800 fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef 20miles Sea condition 0

Was it raining? No Injection 43°F

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by SJ Radar at 9,600 yards. Visibility 5,000 yards

Ship sunk None

Ship damaged None

Damage determined by None

Target draft 10' Course 030°T Speed 14 Kts Range 2200 yds. (at firing)

Target turn count Unknown Target bearing at firing instant 170°

Give any peculiarities noted in target's sound output None noted.

SECRET

(MARK 28 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)(Cont'd)

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 18 Kts. Course 085°T Depth Surface Angle 0° (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Any indication of acoustic countermeasures being used? Give details. None noted. Target was firing guns.

Were depth charges being dropped? No. Commenced 6 min. after firing

Type Attack Night surface, down the throat shot using SJ radar ranges and T.B.T. bearings.

FIRING DATA

Tube fired No. 7 Track angle 007°-30'P Depth set

Gyro angle 167°-50' Torpedo speed used in TDC 34 Kts. Hit or Miss

Erratic Not known Time of torpedo run Unknown Torpedo # 104431

Mark exploder Unknown Overhaul activity S/M Base, Pear Harbor

Description of sound track on run. How long was torpedo tracked? Not tracked.

Were the bearings constant? Unknown. Believed constant as shot was down the throat.

Was torpedo easy to follow? Not followed.

Give details Unknown

COMMENTS: Prescribed routine for upkeep was followed. Torpedo gave no trouble. It was fired 41 seconds too early due to enemy gunfire. Only 19 seconds had elapsed since the firing of a Mk 14 torpedo down the same track. This probably caused Mk 28 to miss, also dove shortly after firing and depth charges commenced about 6 minutes after firing.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ENCLOSURE (B) to ComSubsPacAd
Secret Ltr. File FF12-10(A)/
A16-3/S75, Serial 00235 dated
24 July 1945.

ENCLOSURE (B)

FC5-24/S75/A16-3 SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-FOUR 11/wf

Serial: (0005)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Top
Secret Report of Firing
Mark 27 Torpedoes, Patrol
No. SEVEN.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247) - Report of Firing MK-27 Torpedoes, War Patrol Number SEVEN.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division TWO FORTY-ONE.

2. There are slight indications that one of the frigate escorts subjected to the first attack was damaged. However, any accurate assessment of damage resulting from MK-27 torpedoes is extremely difficult where there is more than one target, echo ranging and depth charging occurring simultaneously.

3. It is believed that the unit fired on the second attack missed because of excessive target speed.

4. The unit returned from patrol by DACE has been examined by the Special Weapons Section, Navy No. 1504, and was found to be in perfect condition.

F. W. FENNO.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

FB5-241/S75/A16-3 SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO FORTY ONE

Serial # 0005

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
13 July 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS DACE (SS247) Top
Secret Report of Firing
Mark 27 Torpedoes, Patrol
No. SEVEN.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO FORTY ONE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY FOUR.
The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Administration.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Top Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedoes, Patrol Number SEVEN.

1. Forwarded with the following comments:

(a) Possible damage to MIKURA CLASS frigate in the first attack.

(b) Insufficient evidence to assess any damage in the second attack.

J. W. DAVIS,
Acting.

SS247/A16-3/(0001)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
10 July 1945.

TOP SECRET

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (Official Channels).

Subject: U.S.S. DACE (SS247), Top Secret Report of Firing Mark 27 Torpedoes, Patrol No. SEVEN.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

O.R. COLE, JR.

TOP SECRET

(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 27 Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 7

Time 1356-19 Date 10 June 1945 Lat. 47-25N Long. 149-04.5E

Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 1000 fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef 80 miles Sea condition 5

Was it raining? No

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description — Convoy consisting of one Medium AK of about 5000-6000 tons (similar to EIHUKU MARU, page 134, ONI 208-J Rev.), one very small tanker or sea truck of the V-B type, with two MIKURA class frigates for escorts. Contact made by high periscope. Visibility 6 to 9 miles.

Ship sunk — None

Ship possibly damaged — One (1) MIKURA class frigate.

Damage determined by — Three to four last minutes before firing, one escort (which upon look was seen to be headed in our direction) shifted to short scale and apparently was commencing a run. 16 min. and 50 sec. after firing a light explosion was heard over sound and through the hull. This was followed by a rapid series of nineteen light explosions which were not depth charges and which sounded close to the surface. After this pinging was still heard from both escorts, but one grew weak faster than the other. At 1730 a heavy, distant explosion was heard.

Target draft 10'(estimated) Course Unknown Speed Unknown

Range 500 to 1000 yds(est.)(at firing)

TOP SECRET

(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)(Cont'd)

Target turn count Unknown. Target bearing at firing instant Short scale pinging was heard all around the dial but escort believed to be approaching from the port quarter.

Give any peculiarities noted in target's sound output None noted. Screws could not be heard but sound conditions have proven poor, and we were under a good density layer. Short scale pinging was very loud.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 2.2 kts. Course 230°T Depth 300 feet Angle 00 (at firing)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Was target aware of submarine's presence? Yes

Was submarine being depth charged? Not at the moment.

Type Attack: Torpedo was fired when the DB meter read a maximum value and pinging was heard all around the dial. Target had shifted to short scale and had commenced a run on DICE.

Time of firing 1356-19 Tube No. 9

Time of hit 1413-09 Erratic No to best of knowledge.

JP decibel meter indication at firing Maximum

JP decibel meter indication 1 minute after firing Maximum

JP decibel meter indication 2 minutes after firing Maximum

JP Gain 4.2 Filter Band 6,000 cycles

Mark Torpedo 27E Serial No. 636T

Mark Warhead Unknown Serial No. - -

Mark Exploder Unknown Serial No. - -

TOP SECRET

(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM (Cont'd)

Arming distance set Believed to be 200 yards.

Issuing activity S/M Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

COMMENTS:: Upkeep procedure followed the instruction pamphlet exactly. Electrolyte temperature ran about 8oF higher on this torpedo than on those in the racks due to the heating effect of the hydrogen burner. This necessitated watering the battery after the torpedo had been aboard two weeks. This torpedo was subject/to 145 psi pressure prior to firing
ed

TOP SECRET

(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)

U.S.S. DACE (SS247) Mark 27 Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 7

Time 0042 Date 19 June 1945 Lat. 50-23N Long. 154-34E

Sound conditions Poor Depth of water 800 fathoms

Distance to nearest shore or reef 20 miles Sea condition 0

Was it raining? No

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description — One (1) MIKURA class frigate. Contact made by SJ radar. Visibility 5,000 yards.

Ship sunk — None

ship damaged — None

Damage determined by — None

Target draft 10' Course 080°T Speed 14 kts. Range 1,000 yds (at firing)

Target turn count Unknown Target bearing at firing instant unknown, but it was approaching DACE on port quarter

Give any peculiarities noted in target's sound output One hour and three minutes after firing sound heard two distinct "whooshing" sounds which resembled torpedoes being fired.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed 5 kts. Course 050°T Depth 250 feet Angle 10 dive (at firing)

TOP SECRET

(MARK 27 TORPEDO ATTACK FORM)(Cont'd)

FIRE CONTROL & TORPEDO DATA

Was target aware of submarine's presence? Yes

Was submarine being depth charged? No. Severe depth charging commenced 4min and 20 sec. after firing.

Type Attack Torpedo was fired when it was estimated the target was about 1,000 yards away and closing DACE. Sound was not manned until just before the torpedo was fired.

Time of firing 0041-40 Tube No. 9

Time of hit No hit Erratic No

JP decibel meter indication at firing Maximum (Vented Negative)

JP decibel meter indication 1 minute after firing Maximum

JP decibel meter indication 2 minutes after firing Maximum

JP Gain 4.2 Filter Band 3,000 cycles

Mark torpedo 27E Serial No. 385T

Mark warhead Unknown Serial No. - -

Mark exploder Unknown Serial No. - -

Arming distance set Believed to be 200 yards.

Issuing activity Pearl Harbor, T.H.

COMMENTS: Prescribed upkeep was followed.

END OF REEL

AR-76-81

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Subject: Towing U.S.S. FLIER (Continued).

8. Florikan was then headed upwind and stopped. While the messengers of increasing size were being taken aboard the submarine, this ship swung into the trough of the sea parallel to Flier and drifted to leeward of her. When the end of the 6 inch manila line (the last messenger) had been taken aboard the Flier the two ships had drifted apart by an amount almost equal to the length of the line.

9. With both ships stopped the Florikan drifted to leeward faster than the Flier, but the Flier drifted faster in the direction in which the ships were heading.

10. With both ends of the line being held, and with Florikan rudder hard over toward Flier, it was possible to work Florikan upwind directly ahead of Flier. Then while this ship drifted to leeward and the submarine moved ahead the strain on the line eased and the Flier heaved it in. By repeating this procedure several times the end of the tow cable was almost gotten on board the Flier. It was then necessary for Flier to use both capstans in series. Finally the tow cable was gotten aboard and shackled up.

11. This time a 15 fathom shot of 1 inch chain had been substituted for the wire pendant. Again the 1½ inch shackle was considered the weakest point in the tow.

12. As Florikan again went ahead taking a strain on the tow wire, the wire was paid out until, with a speed of 50 R.P.M., at 1400 feet the ships rode the waves as nearly in unison as it was possible to arrange. About 5 hours had been required to again proceed with tow.

13. Before leaving that vicinity, I desire to express my great admiration for the officers and men of the Flier who were engaged in the work on the deck of the Flier. The ship was rolling heavily and occasionally waves swept over the deck but the work continued. One man was seen to be swept overboard but, as they all had on lifejackets and lines, he was quickly hauled back on board. He was not any wetter than he had been before going overboard. Reference to Knights Modern Seamanship indicates that those men accomplished an impossible task.

14. Course was set at 125° T. as the most easterly course (and therefore most comfortable course) that could be steered and yet ensure passing safely to southwestward of Lisianski Reef. Even on that course this ship was rolling her bulwarks under.

15. The gale and very heavy seas continued throughout the day and most of the night. Toward morning (24 January) the wind shifted and decreased and the seas moderated. At daylight speed was increased. Based on 1/6 safety factor rule and considering a 1½ inch shackle as the weakest part, the pull was limited to 20,000 pounds except for occasional surges. This was the criterion

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PACIFIC FLEET

Subject: Towing U.S.S. FLIER (Continued)

used for speed for the remainder of the trip.

16. Strong wind and rather rough seas were encountered on 25 January but were not as bad as on 23 January. After that conditions continually improved. Maximum speed attained was 96 R.P.M. (8.8. knots by Flier pit log). Twice speed was reduced and towline shortened to assist Flier in renewing chafing gear.

17. The U.S.S. PC 602 escorted from Midway to Pearl. On the morning of 23 January she stood by close aboard the Flier for lifeguard duty. At 0245 W on 30 January the U.S.S. DIONNE reported for duty as additional escort. During daylight of that day air coverage was provided.

18. The only material casualties suffered were to the towing machine. The automatic tensioning device failed due to the time lag between the closing of the payout switch and the actual paying out of the wire. The cam roller lever arm dropped over the after side of the cam and prevented the cam returning to its normal position on completion of the surge. A new cam with longer riding surface was made on board.. After the new cam had been installed no further difficulty was had.

George A. Sharp.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT SUBMARINE SQUADRON TEN dn
FC5-10/S25

Serial 50

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
19 FEB 1944

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron Ten.
To : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Forwarded. Although this towing operation conducted by the FLORIKAN is a routine assignment for that type of vessel, it is nevertheless considered that the exceptionally fine seamanship displayed by that Commanding Officer, despite rough seas and adverse conditions, is worthy of special mention.

2. It is recommended that the towing equipment on similar vessels be inspected to assure proper functioning.

Copy to:
CO FLORIKAN.

C. F. ERCK.

U.S.S. FLIER (SS250)
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SS250/A16
Serial 027

5 July 1944

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From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. FLIER.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : Commander Submarine Division ONE EIGHTY TWO.
Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: U.S.S. FLIER, Report of War Patrol Number One.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart, Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE only.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area west of the Island of Luzon, P.I. between the coast and longitude 118°30'E and between the latitudes of 12° and 17°N during the period 21 May to 5 July 1944 is forwarded herewith.

J.D. CROWLEY.

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BY OP-09B9C DATE 5/26/72

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U.S.S. FLIER * Report of First War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE:

Oct. 18, 1943: Commissioned at New London, Conn. and received thirty days training including contract torpedo trials at Newport, R.I., ppior to departure for Pearl Harbor.

Dec. 20 Arrived at Pearl Harbor and received two weeks training in addition to a week for voyage repairs and loading for patrol.

Jan. 12, 1944: Departed on first war patrol with orders to top off fuel at Midway Islands.

Jan. 16 Ran aground on east side of channel while attempting an inbound transit of Midway Island Channel.

Jan. 22 Pulled off reef and departed for Pearl Harbor in tow of U.S.S. FLORIKAN. Received temporary repairs at Navy Yard Pearl Harbor.

Feb. 7 Departed Pearl Harbor for Navy Yard Mare Island.

Feb. 16 Arrived Mare Island, Calif. for repair of damage received from grounding.

May 8 Arrived Pearl Harbor after undergoing repairs at Navy Yard Mare Island, California. Assigned two days voyage repairs and eight days training including participation in a coordinated attack group against an inbound convoy.

(B) NARRATIVE:

May 21, 1944:

1100(W) Underway from Pearl Harbor for patrol in accordance with Task Force 17 operation Order No. 171-44, escorted by U.S.S. P.C. 602.

2000(W) Released escort.

2100(W) Made radar contact with an unidentified vessel bearing 325°T at a range of 26,500 yards. (Ships Contact No. 1) Commenced tracking and closed to investigate. Contact developed into a large merchant type ship with escort and obviously friendly due to location. FLIER had not been notified of probability of making this contact. Sent FLIER Serial one to COMSUBPAC and resumed previous course and speed.

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U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

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May 22
1200(W) Lat. 20-26N Long. 164-04W
Miles Steamed 365 Fuel Consumed 5267 Gals.

May 23
1200(W) Lat. 17-13N Long. 169-16W
Miles Steamed 368 Fuel Consumed 6179 Gals.
1534(W) Arrived Johnston Island to fuel.
1830(W) Departed Johnston Island and set course for patrol area. Commenced daily fire control drills, school of the boat for unqualified men, and several divesddaily for training.

May 24
1200(X) Lat. 18-55.5N Long. 173-12W
Miles Steamed 267 Fuel Consumed 2377 Gals.

May 25
1200(X) Lat. 19-14N Long. 178-10.5W
Miles Steamed 293 Fuel Consumed 3135 Gals.
1859(X) Crossed international date line and omitted May 26 from calander.

May 27
1200(N) Lat. 19-45.5N Long. 176-39E
Miles Steamed 298 Fuel Consumed 3524 Gals.

May 28
1200(N) Lat. 20-13N Long. 171-01.5E
Miles Steamed 321 Fuel Consumed 3540 Gals.

May 29
1200(M) Lat. 20-39.5N Long. 165-40.5E
Miles Steamed 301 Fuel Consumed 3905 Gals.

May 30
1200(L) Lat. 21-15.5N Long. 159-58.5E
Miles Steamed 327 Fuel Consumed 3295 Gals.

May 31
1200(L) Lat. 21-36N Long 154-34.5E
Miles steamed 305 Fuel Consumed 3146 Gals.
1204(L) Sighted plane bearing 176°T at a range of about 10 miles. (Plane Contact No. 1) Dived.
1220(L) Observed plane bearing 001°T at a range of about 10 miles. Plane was not seen again so at 1307(L) surfaced and resumed standard speed.

June 1
1048(L) Sighted plane (Plane Contact No. 2) bearing 275°T at a range of about 10 miles. Dived.
1200(L) Surfaced and resumed base course and speed at Lat. 22-05N Long. 149-40E.
Miles Steamed 276 Fuel Consumed 3430 Gals.

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June 2

0815(L) Changed course to intercept convoy reported by another submarine, and increased to three engine speed.

1100(L) Sighted plane bearing 266°T (Plane Contact No. 3) at a range of about 10 miles. Dived. Plane not again sighted so at 1145(L) surfaced and resumed previous speed.

1200(L) Lat. 22-25N Long. 144-35E
Miles Steamed 312 Fuel Consumed 3849 Gals.

June 3

0400(K) Reached estimated track of convoy and commenced retiring search of area twenty miles on both sides of track.

1200(K) Lat. 22-27.5N Long. 138-07.5E
Miles Steamed 410 Fuel Consumed 6735 Gals.

1308(K) Made trim dive. Surfaced at 1350(K) and sighted smoke bearing 008°T at an estimated range of 30 miles. (Ship Contact No. 2) Change of bearing and range indicated that target was on a southeasterly course, while convoy we were looking for was on north westerly course. The sea was glassy calm and it was believed that a successful periscope approach during daylight was very improbable. For this reason decided to dive and approach target sufficiently to obtain an estimate of course and speed to aid in making an end around after dark.

1539(K) Heard first of a series of 22 distant depth charges. Only smoke of target in sight at this time.

1848(K) Sighted unidentified vessel bearing 222°T believed to be either a submarine or escort craft on northerly course at high speed. (Ship Contact No. 3)

1918(K) Turned away from target to open range in preparation for surfacing. Sighted smoke bearing 210°T. (Ship Contact No. 4) Original target now bearing 109°T. The second contact was believed to be closer so decided to shift targets for the following reasons:

(1) Had a more favorable position on second contact.

(2) Believed original target already under attack because of hearing depth charges from that bearing.

2021(K) Surfaced and commenced working ahead on starboard flank of convoy estimated to be on base course 300°T speed 8. Convoy was clearly in sight in bright moonlight, eight columns of smoke being visible. The location of the southbound convoy, bearing about 130°T distant about 30 miles was frequently illuminated by gunfire. There was one short display of gunfire from our convoy giving the impression they may have been under attack, possibly from the submarine previously sighted this afternoon. No underwater explosions were heard, however, The convoy was tracking on base course 300°T speed 8 kts.

2220(K) With convoy bearing 165°T distant 18,500 yds. they zigged toward FLIER giving a zero angle on the bow. This was hastily determined to be a change of base course, associated with the other attack believed to be in progress, so dived to commence radar approach.

2330(K) It now became apparent that base course had not been altered, and range could not be reduced below 7,600 yds. so decided to surface and try again.

June 4

0053(K) Surfaced with target bearing 247°T at 14,800 yards and commenced end around on starboard flank.

0320(K) Moonset.

0355(K) Dived and commenced radar approach with target bearing 115°T at 18,000 yds.

0447(K) Target in sight at 2,100 yards so ordered periscope depth.

0501(K) Fired three torpedoes at each of second and third Able Kings in column of three passing ahead. Swung periscope to get a set up on column passing astern but the nearest was practically on top of us turning away, while two of the escorts close aboard were turning toward. Ordered deep submergence to evade. The first, second, and fourth torpedoes fired were heard to explode, indicating two hits in first target and one in second. On last look around first target was smoking heavily amidships and second had turned away and apparently stopped.

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U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

0634(K) Received last of 34 depth charges, from four escorts.
0658(K) Heard last of propeller noises form escorts.
0735(K) Made periscope observation and ovserved two heavy columns of smoke bearing 016°T.
0747(K) Went deep to reload forward. Escort staying close to scene of attack so continued working way southward in order to clear scene and surface.
1020(K) Surfaced and commenced heading up for scene of attack, with intentionof trailing to determine course and speed of convoy upon departure from scene.
1052(K) Observed escort heading toward FLIER so opened to southward.
1130(K) Commenced trailing again but at 1200(K) sighted escort who is apparently patrolling the area of the attack, nothing else in sight. Commenced an end around to westward.
1200(K) Lat. 22-49N Long. 136-41.5E
Miles Steamed 376 Fuel Consumed 4079 Gals.
1640(K) Commenced retiring search curve to north eastward.
1657(K) Sent FLIER serial 2 to COMSUBPAC repotting attack.

June 5
0042(K) Sent FLIER serial 3 to COMSUBPAC to clarify serial 2 which was reported garbled.
0617(K) Unable to regain contact with convoy so headed for scene of attack.
1000(K) Passed to the Command of Commander Task Force 71 without signal.
1027(K) Arrived at position of attack and found considerable debris including six life boats, from one of which a package of documents was retrieved, several life rafts, and the wooden pilot house overhead from which was retrieved a Sperry Mk 15 gyro repeater.
1200(K) Lat. 22-38N Long. 136-36E
Miles Steamed 290 Fuel Consumed 4079 Gals.
2028(K) Sent FLIER serial 4 to COMSUBPAC reporting inability to regain contact, and observed results.

June 6
1200(K) Lat. 20-45N Long. 131-50E
Miles Steamed 343 Fuel consumed 3439 Gals.

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U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.
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June 7
1200(K) Lat. 19-49N Long. 125-50E
Miles Steamed 353 Fuel Consumed 3381 Gals.

June 8
0515(I) Dived and commenced submerged transit of Balintang Strait.

1105(I) Sighted type Betty plane over Babuyan Island. (Plane Contact No. 4)

1200(I) Lat. 19-40.5N Long. 121-58.5E
Miles Steamed 236 Fuel Consumed 2533 Gals.

1729(I) Sighted smoke andmasts of ship bearing 302°T at an estimated range of 18,000 yds. (Ship Contact No. 5) Attempted to close but abandoned chase with target bearing 336°T at 1820(I). This ship was on northerly course making approximately 18 knots, apparently unescorted.

2005(I) Surfaced and continued toward station.

June 9
0448(H) Dived with plan of remaining submerged until early afternoon to obtain general idea of air coverage and enemy activity in this area prior to running on surface during daylight.

1200(H) Lat. 19-30N Long. 120-12E
Miles Steamed 115 Fuel Consumed 960 Gals.

1344(H) Surfaced and proceeded toward area at 17 kts.

1452(H) Dived due to evidence of enemy radar shown on SD screen. Signs of enemy radar were constant enough to indicate bearings were being taken on SD transmission.

1916(H) Surfaced.

June 10 Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10 miles west of Calayan Island.

1105(H) Plane Contact No. 5. Sighted two unidentified planes 20 miles west of Calayan Island. Planes steering various courses.

1200(H) Lat. 19-16N Long. 121-05E
Miles Steamed 152 Fuel Consumed 1108 Gals.

June 11 Conducted submerged patrol 7 miles west of Cape Bojeador.

0117(H) Sighted small patrol boat at Lat. 19-01.5N Long. 120-43E. Maneuvered to pass clear.

0820(H) Sighted first of several land planes being operated over beach. Planes were unidentified but appeared to bessimilar to type Zeke. One large commercial type plane seen taking off from air strip along beach at Lat. 18-12N Long. 120-35E.

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U.S.S. FLIER - Report of First War Patrol.

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1200(H) Lat. 18-10N Long. 120-22.5E
Miles Steamed 174 Fuel Consumed 2270 Gals.

June 12 Conducted submerged patrol 10 miles northwest of Cape Bolinao.

1200(H) Lat. 16-26N Long. 119-40E
Miles Steamed 178 Fuel Consumed 2033 Gals.

June 13 Conducted submerged daylight patrol close inshore along west side of Cape Bolinao.

1200(H) Lat. 16-02N Long. 119-37E
Miles Steamed 123 Fuel Consumed 759 Gals.

1305(H) Sighted smoke bearing 015°T and commenced submerged approach. (Ship Contact No. 6) Target was evidently keeping close inshore so attempted to get between target and the beach. The original contact developed into a convoy of about eleven ships and at least six escorts. The sea was glassy calm which made undetected periscope observations very difficult so the approach was made with short and infrequent periscope observations.

1418(H) Lost power on the sternplanes for about three minutes. Power was temporarily regained then lost again. Planes finally began operating normally at 1429(H) though remained a source for worry.

1452(H) Fired four stern tubes at a 9,000-10,000 ton tanker, and immediately swung forward to get a set up for the bow tubes. An Able King was crossing the bow about 50-100 yds. ahead, too close for attack, so shifted to a target in the inboard column about 1200-1300 yds. distant. Heard two timed hits in tanker followed immediately by a very loud explosion. Before getting set up on the new target the periscope was ducked because of a misunderstanding of ordered depth to the diving officer. Continued deep to evade the escorts heard converging from all directions. Power failed on the stern planes again, and we had a few bad moments as we tried to get the angle off the boat by hand in the thick of a heavy depth charge barrage. At least six vessels participated in this attack, and dropped 105 depth charges many of which seemed very well directed but set too shallow.

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1515(H) Heard a loud rumbling type of explosion from the general direction of the target. Sound reported noises similar to a ship breaking up from the direction of the target intermittently between now and 1800.

1800(H) Periscope depth, sighted several columns of smoke bearing 130°T. Commenced reload.

1948(H) Surfaced and proceeded at best speed toward Manila to again intercept convoy.

June 14

0244(H) When approximately 15 miles west of Subic Bay sighted smoke bearing 215°T. Started to close contact and observed air patrol to the east. (Plane Contact No. 7) Slowed to one third speed and turned away from plane until clear, when course and speed to close target were resumed.

0310(H) Forced under by plane coming in on port beam. Attempted to close convoy submerged but was unable to do so. Dawn prevented further surface running inaddition to the presence of a patrol boat which was conducting a supersonic sound search from the east.

0610(H) Lost sound contact with patrol boat.

1150(H) Sighted unidentified aircraft bearing 310°T range two miles, on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 8)

1200(H) Lat. 14-45N Long. 119-35E
Miles Steamed 161 Fuel Consumed 1662 Gals.

1356(H) Sighted light bomber bearing 235°T at a range of 7 miles on a westerly course. (Plane Contact No. 9)

June 15 Conducted submerged daylight patrol 10 miles southwest of Lubang Island proceeding to patrol western entrance to Calavite Pass.

1200(H) Lat. 13-26N Long. 120-12E
Miles Steamed 124 Fuel Consumed 883 Gals.

June 16 Conducted submerged patrol of western approach to Calavite Pass.

1200(H) Lat. 13-20N Long. 120-11E
Miles Steamed 94 Fuel Consumed 877 Gals.

June 17 Made submerged transit of Calavite Pass during morning and patrolled Verde Island Pass.

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1200(H) Lat. 13-32N Long. 120-25E
Miles Steamed 126 Fuel Consumed 754 Gals.

1934(H) Surfaced in Verde Island Passage and made transit of Calavite Pass. Searched northern half of Apo East Pass during night.

June 18 Dove in Calavite Pass and completed transit submerged, proceeding to patrol northern entrance of Verde Island Passage.

1200(H) Lat. 13-42N Long. 120-39E
Miles Steamed 159 Fuel Consumed 1368 Gals.

1600(H) Sighted five medium Able Kings, one small interesland tanker and two escorts (Ship Contact No. 7) bearing 018°T at a range of 12,000 yds., as they emerged from a heavy rain squall. Commenced submerged approach. Targets were hugging the north coast of Verde Island Passage on base course about 110°T speed 7 kts. Was unable to close target while submerged, but estimated they could be overtaken about 2100(H) just west of Verde Island. Lost contact in waning light.

1940(H) Surfaced and commenced chasing convoy.

2043(H) Arrived two miles west of Verde Island without having regained contact. It is judged they must have gone through Maricaban Pass or anchored, as their speed would not have permitted them to pass Verde Island before our arrival. Waited until 2100 off the eastern entrance of Maricaban Pass for them to emerge. By this time our presence in the vicinity apparently became known, as a patrol boat in North Pass was seen signaling to the shore and was tracked by radar to be closing and there were many flashing lights on the beaches. It was decided to clear this vicinity and investigate Maricaban Anchorage where the lookouts thought they had sighted ships during our run down the passage.

2232(H) Closed Maricaban Anchorage and identified silhouettes seen there to be rocks.

2318(H) Abandoned search and proceeded to Calavite Pass.

June 19 Made submerged patrol 10 miles northwest of Cabra Island enroute to patrol northern approaches of Manila in accordance with new area assignment.

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1200(H) Lat. 14-08N Long. 119-51E
Miles Steamed 130 Fuel consumed 1300 Gals.

June 20
1200(H) Patrolled northern approaches to Manila.
Lat. 14-32N Long. 120-01E
Miles Steamed 103 Fuel Consumed 738 Gals.

June 21
1200(H) Patrolled northern approaches to Manila.
Lat. 14-24N Long. 120-03E
Miles Steamed 128 Fuel Consumed 752 Gals.

2138(H) Set course for new patrol area in accordance with dispatch orders.

June 22
0133(H) Sent FLIER serial 1 to CTF 71 reporting attack on tanker and acknowledging orders to change station. Made submerged daylight patrol of APO East Pass enroute to new area.

1200(H) Lat. 12-49N Long. 120-33E
Miles Steamed 138 Fuel Consumed 1503 Gals.

1830(H) Sighted five columns of smoke bearing 210°T at an estimated range of 15 miles. (Ship Contact No. 8) Headed for target to observe change of bearing. The bearing had not changed by 1915(H), visibility through the periscope was negligible due to darkness, and the target was much closer, with several pingers and light screws being audible. It was decided to get off the track and make an attack on the surface where it was believed that a better opportunity existed due to darkness.

2025(H) Surfaced and commenced end around port side of target bearing 325°T at a range of 12,000 yds. Target course 345°T and speed nine knots. Target was keeping about 4 miles off Western shore of Mindora Island.

2300(H) Reached a position 45° on port bow of target group at a range of 11,000 yards so commenced attack.

2323(H) Fired three torpedoes at each of first and second ships in near column. Both vessels were Able Kings, the first being quite large and the second medium sized. Two torpedoes were seen to hit aft on the first target and one seen to hit the second target though two were heard to hit the second ship. Both vessels dropped out of formation and headed for the beach. Turned away from target group after firing and began avoiding escorts while working way around port

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side for another attack. Escorts began intermittant depth charging of attack area.

The two ships heading for the beach appeared as allarge pip and a small one on the PPI at 10,000 yds. The small one then either went out of radar range or sank.

The target group was originally made up of seven to nine ships with at least six escorts. These being about the size of a PC boat and came into radar range at about 6,500 yds.

June 23
0001(H) The target group had changed toaa base course of 290°T. FLIER had now gained a favorable position on port bow so turned to deliver attack.

0023(H) Fired remaining four torpedoes forward at a medium Able King. Two torpedoes were seen to hit in after half of target though three explosions were heard. Turned away to deliver stern tube attack and became involved in evading an escort at 1800 yds. range, broad on each bow. Used full power and ran between them. Target was last seen smoking badly, settling by the stern, and being passed by other ships of the formation. As seen by the radar, this ship did not detach itself from the target group which was quite compact and continued on at nine knots. It is believed that the vessel sank before the last ship of the formation passed clear.

After evading escorts, decided to use four remaining torpedoes aft to finish off cripple of first attack now dead in the water about htree miles from the beach. Encountered considerable difficulty in closing target due to numerous escorts patrolling the area. At one time four of them were in radar range while two different ones could be heard pinging. Until this time had been attempting to work way around to the south of the escorts. It began to look as though more progress could be made by circling to the north so began closing target while working way to the north and east. During this period the site of the second attack was sub-

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sequently occupiad without contacting a cripple, which further confirmed my belief that the target of the second attack had sunk.

0139(H) Sound reported distinct noise of a ship breaking up bearing 070°T which was then the bearing of the only cripple still in sight by radar. It is believed that this noise emanated from the cripple originally lost on the radar after the first attack, and now in process of sinking.

0231(H) Since a clear path through the excorts to the target could not be found it was decided to attempt running between two of them, one being a pinger bearing 000°T and the other a radar contact bearing 090°T at 4,5000yds. Cametto course 040°T while making 15 knots.

0234(H) When the target was 14,000 yds. away and three miles from the beach the pip suddenly disappearedffrom the radar screen. U to this point it had come in very clearly at ranged in excess of 18,000 yards so was presumed to have sunk. Further closed the areas but pip did not reappear at what would have been a range of 11,000 yds.

0248(H) Commenced working way to westward of attack area to clear escorts prior to daylight. There was not sufficient time to overtake convoy which had previously disappeared at a range of 24,000 yards just off Capo Calavite.

Attempted to make dispatch report of contact to aid U.S.S. JACK in gaining attack position, but found there was not sufficient time prior to daylight.

0420(H) Dived and turned back toward attack area with the intention of arriving there late in the afternoon for a daylight inspection.

1200(H) Lat. 13-13.5N Long. 120-17E
Miles Steamed 140 Fuel Consumed 1546 Gals.

1348(H) Heard first of intermittent pinging bearing 019°T. Commenced working way south and east to approach attack area from the south.

1400(H) Sighted smoke bearing 002°T believed to be from an A/S vessel.

1430(H) Contacted antoher pinger bearing 082°T and subsequently sighted smoke on that bearing.

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1447(H) Sighted an unidentified plane bearing 075°T. (Plane Contact No. 10) It had now become apparent that extensive A/S measures were being undertaken in the vicinity of last nights attack. Various pingers were heard from that direction throughout the afternoon as well as smoke from A/S vessels.

1820(H) Sighted destroyer type vessel (Ship Contact No. 9) bearing 025°T headed in direction of FLIER so made stern tubes ready and maneuvered to keep them bearing on target.

1915(H) Target turned away after approaching to 3,400 yards and disappeared in waning light.

1959(H) All clear by a radar search at 40 feet so surfaced and in process made radar contact on target bearing 216°T at 5,800 yards, believed to be same destroyer. Cleared area at best speed and set course for patrol area

2222(H) Sent FLIER serial 2 to CTF 71 reporting attack.

June 24
0207(H) Changed course to return to base

Conducted daylight submerged patrol southwest of Lubang Island.

1200(H) Lat. 13-30N Long. 119-55E
Miles Steamed 144 Fuel Consumed 1843 Gals.

June 25 Conducted daylight surface patrol in Cuyo East Pass and northern part of Sulu Sea. Ran submerged for about three hours during that part of the day where it was felt that air patrols would most likely be encountered.

1200(H) Lat. 9-58N Long. 120-55E
Miles Steamed 221 Fuel Consumed 3682 Gals.

June 26 Conducted submerged patrol during daylight while approaching the pass east of Pearl Bank.

1200(H) Lat. 6-14N Long. 119-53E
Miles Steamed 274 Fuel Consumed 3689 Gals.

June 27
0325(H) Made early morning transit of Sibutu Pass. Noticed interference on SJ radar screen caused by another radar.

0354(H) Made radar contact with another vessel bearing 087°T at 8,000 yards. Had previously been warned that the U.S.S. MINGO was operating in this area so took course to avoid for the following reasons:

1. Radar interference was near the same

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frequency as our own and different from any known enemy frequency.

2. Made actual radar contact at the expected range of a submarine. (Ship Contact No. 10

Conducted daylight surface patrol of Celebes Sea paying particular attention to the portion east of Tarakan.

1200(H) Lat. 3-02N Long. 119-55E
Miles Steamed 258 Fuel Consumed 2890 Gals.

1657(H) Made radar contact with an unidentified plane at fourteen miles range and decreasing so dived to evade. (Plane Contact No. 11)

1852(H) Plane not sighted so surfaced and proceeded to patrol eastern shore of Makassar Strait on surface during darkness and submerged during daylight.

June 28 Continued patrol of Makassar Strait and conducted submerged daylight patrol close inshore.

1200(H) Lat. 00-13.5N Long. 119-28E
Miles Steamed 223 Fuel Consumed 1812 Gals.

June 29 Patrolled eastern side of Makassar Strait and during daylight submerged patrol of that portion close inshore west of Cape William.

1200(H) Lat. 2-44S Long. 118-36E
Miles Steamed 186 Fuel Consumed 1634 Gals.

June 30

0220(H) Noticed radar interference with another radar believed to be in the general vicinity of 210°T which was the course of the FLIER.

0310(H) Made actual radar contact with another vessel bearing 238°T at a range of 7,500 yards. Manned battle stations, stopped and turned to keep stern tubes bearing. Radar operator was certain this was one of our submarines because of similarity of frequency and pulse rate as evident from interference, together with range at which actual contact was made. We had not been informed of likelihood of encountering another submarine, but from subsequent information it is concluded that this contact must have been U.S.S. ROBALO. Range opened rapidly and target was tracked on westerly course at seventeen knots until contact was lost. Resumed course and speed and radar interference worked around to northeastward and faded out astern. (Ship Contact No. 11)

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Conducted daylight surface patrol of the eastern Java Sea while enroute Lombok Strait.

1037(H) Approached sail boat to investigate cargo and determine if there were any native volunteers among the crew. The sea was rather rough and considerable time was consumed in maneuvering to get the sail boat alongside. In appearance it was quite similar to the numerous sailing craft formerly encountered in Madoera Strait and was obviously a native fishing boat. One native signified his willingness to accompany us so took him aboard, gave them some food and departed. This native indicated by sign language that there were no Japanese among the crew of five.

1200(H) Lat. 6-06S Long. 116-49E
Miles Steamed 225 Fuel Consumed 2812 Gals.

1425(H) Made radar contact with an unidentified plane at a range of 20 miles which began to decrease so dived. (Plane Contact No. 12)

1513(H) Plane not sighted so surfaced and resumed previous course and speed.

July 1 Made early morning transit of Lombok Strait and evaded a patrol boat at either end. (Ship Contacts Nol 12 and 13)

Cruised on surface during daylight enroute to base.

1023(H) Sighted and exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BONEFISH. (Ship Contact No. 14)

1200(H) Lat. 11-21S Long. 115-29E
Miles Steamed 240 Fuel Consumed 4540 Gals.

July 2
1200(H) Lat. 17-075S Long. 113-59E
Miles Steamed 380 Fuel Consumed 5291 Gals.

July 3
1200(H) Lat. 22-39S Long 112-39E
Miles Steamed 356 Fuel Consumed 4886 Gals.

July 4
1200(H) Lat. 28-13S Long. 112-43E
Miles Steamed 350 Fuel Consumed 5722 Gals.

July 5
1200(H) Freemantle, W.A.
Miles Steamed 275 Fuel Consumed 3950 Gals.

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(C) Weather.

The weather was uniformly good throughout the patrol with moderate warm breezes and clear days andnights. In the eastern part of the South China Sea there were occasional rain squalls and periods of reduced visibility but not to the extent expected during this season of the southwest monsoon.

(D) Tidal Information.

No unusual currents were encountered.

(E) Navigational Aids.

No lighted aids to navigation were encountered. The radar is invaluable for purposes ofnavigation when in restricted waters were accurate fixes may be obtained by radar tangents and ranges ofland objects.

(F) Ship Contacts.

No:	Time Date	:Lat. : :Long.:	Types	:Initial:Range	:Est.Course: & Speed	:How :Cont.:	Remarks
1.	May 21 2100(W)	20-54N 160-21W	AK	26500	095°T 11 kts	SN-R	Tracked and closed Identified friend
2.	June 3 1350(K)	22-25N 138-48E	Smoke from convoy of about 8 ships	50000	150°T	SD Smoke	Approached and tracked and then broke off to attac No. 4.
3.	June 3 1848(K)	22-25N 138-48E	Unidentified	10000	Northerly course & high speed	P	No action taken - thought to be U.S. Submarine
4.	June 3 1908(K)	22-22N 138-49E	5 AK's 4 Unidentified escorts	40000	320°T 9 kts.	P Smoke	Attacked - Sank one medium AK, damaged one medium AK.
5.	June 8 1729(I)	19-52N 121-50E	Large AK or AAP	30000	000°T 18 kts.	P Smoke	Unable to close due to speed and large angle on the bow.
6.	June 13 1305(H)	15-58N 119-38E	11 AK's and Tankers, at least 6 escorts	30000	175°T 9 kts.	P Smoke	Probably sank tanke similar to Huzisan Maru (9,527 Tons) with two hits. Unable to observe results because of strong A/S measures

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(F) Ship Contacts Continued.

No:	Time Date	Lat. Long.	Types	Initial Range	Est. Course & Speed	How Cont.	Remarks
7.	June 18 1602(H)	13-43N 120-34E	5 AK's 2 escorts unidentified	12000	110°T 7 kts.	P	While in Verde Is Pass. sighted convoy emerging fro rain squall. Unab. to close due to range and large s on the bow. Upon facing at night a tempted to overta but unable to reg contact.
8.	June 22 1830(H)	12-50N 120-40E	9 ships about 10 unidentified escorts	30000	320°T 9 kts.	P Smoke	Attacked - Sank o large AK and two medium AK's.
9.	June 23 1820(H)	13-09N 120-14E	1 DD Similar to Fubuki class with one stack	8000	170°T 24 kts.	P	Made contact at du and manoeuvered to keep stern tubes b ing since we had n torpedoes forward. When range was abo 3000 yds. target c ged away and disap peared in darkness
10.	June 27 0354(H)	04-03N 119-40E	Unidenti- fied believed to be U.S.S. MINGO which we were due to pass.	8000	Unknown broke off contact before obtained.	SN-R	Character of radar interference indic ated this was a U. Submarine, maneuve ed to avoid.
11.	June 30 0310(H)	04-50S 117-35E	Unidentified	7800	Various courses & speeds	SN-R	Character of radar interference indic ed this was a U.S. Submarine. He broke off contact.
12.	July 1 0037(H)	08-19S 115-58.5E	Patrol Craft	8000	Northerly course slow speed	SN	Evaded on the surface. Believe we were undetected.
13.	July 1 0128(H)	08-31S 115-55.5E	Patrol Craft	6900	Southerly course slow speed	SN	Same as 12.
14.	July 1 1031(H)	11-30S 115-32E	Submarine	10000	Northerly course 14 kts.	SD-P	Closed & identifi as U.S.S. BONEFISH exchanged signals.

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(G) Aircraft Contacts.

No:	Time : Date	Lat. : Long.	Types	Initial: Range	Est. Course: & Speed	How : Cont.	Remarks
1.	May 31 1204	21-36N 154-34.8E	Mavis (Jap)	10 Mi.	095°T	SD	Made quick dive t 150 feet.
2.	June 1 1048	22-05N 149-45E	Mavis (Jap)	10 Mi.	090°T	SD	Made quick dive t 150'. Believed to be same patrol as #1.
3.	June 2 1100	22-24N 144-41E	Mavis (Jap)	8 Mi.	Unknown	SD	Made quick dive t 150'. Believed to be same patrol as #1 and #2.
4.	June 8 1105	19-40.5N 122-02E	Betty (Jap)	10 Mi.	Unknown	P	Total of three planes.
5.	June 11 0820	18-17.5N 120-25E	Unknown	10 Mi.	045°T	P	Total of three planes.
6.	June 11 1100	18-12.5N 120-23.5E	Large land plane	12 Mi.	--	P	One plane sighted taking off.
7.	June 14 0310	119-22E 14-50N	Unknown	14000 yards	260°T	SN	Aircraft coverage for convoy we wa approaching.
8.	June14 1150	14-45N 119-35E	Unknown	4000 yards	270°T	P	- - - - - - - -
9.	June 14 1356	14-44N 119-31.3E	Unknown	14000 yards	270°T	P	- - - - - - - -
10.	June 23 1447	13-14.3N 120-16E	Unknown	16000 yards	Various	P	A/S patrol
11.	June 27 1600	01-50N 119-42E	Unknown	28000 yards	Unknown	R	Made quick dive to 150 feet.
12.	June 30 1425	06-17.5S 116-48.5E	Unknown	40000 Yards	Unknown	R	Made quick dive to 150 feet.

(H) Attack Data.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 11
Time: 0501(K) Date: 4 June 1944 Lat. 22-55N Long. 136-44E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Attack made on convoy of 5 AK's with 4 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on horizon. Convoy tracked until nightfall. Approach made on surface and at radar depth using radar ranges and bearing. Final attack made at periscope depth usine periscope bearings.

Ships sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: One medium AK (name unknown) 6000 tons.

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Damage determined by: Heard three timed hits, two hits in the first salvo of three torpedoes fired at the first target and one hit in the second salvo of three torpedoes fired at the second target.
Observed first target stopped and smoking badly and second target stopped.
The following day upon return to the scene of the attack much debris was sighted.

Target draft: 14' Course: 320 Speed: 9 kts. Range: 800 yds.

Own ship data.

Speed 2.6 kts., course 050°, depth 65', angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data.

Type Attack: Radar approach - final attack by periscope.

Tubes fired	1	2	3	4	5	6
Track angle	95P	98P	100P	85P	88P	92P
Gyro angle	350	344	348	000	354	357
Depth set	10'	10'	10'	10'	10'	10'
Power	HP	HP	HP	HP	HP	HP
Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mk. torpedo	23	23	14-3A	14-3A	23	23
Serial No.	41391	41118	26453	40731	41006	52903
Mk. exploder	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4
Serial No.	12724	8461	12737	11600	3127	2498
Actuation set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation actual	Contact	Contact	---	Contact	---	---
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-0	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	12383	12555	2133	3102	1425	13092
Explosives	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.
Firing interval	--	8 sec.	8sec.	40 sec.	8 sec.	8 sec.
Type spread	Divergent Spread			Divergent Spread		
Sea Condition	0	0	0	0	0	0

Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was not aware of the presence of a submarine until the attack was completed and the torpedoes were fired.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 1
Time: 1452(H) Date; 13 June 1944 Lat. 16-00N Long. 119-41.5E

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Attack made on convoy of 11 ships including AK's and tankers with at least 6 escorts. Initial contact made during daylight - sighted smoke on the horizon through the periscope. Approach and attack made at periscope depth using periscope ranges and bearings throughout.

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Ship probably sunk: One tanker (Huzisan Maru) 9527 tons.

Damage determined by: Heard two timed hits followed by a loud explosion. Twenty minutes later another explosion was heard. Sound then reported hearing noises of a ship breaking up for a period of 30 minutes.

Target draft: 16' Course 200° Speed 8 kts. Range: 1450 yds.

Own Ship Data.

Speed 4 kts. Course 090°T Depth 65' Angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Periscope Attack.

Tubes Fired	7	8	9	10
Track angle	095P	095P	096P	098P
Gyro angle	025	023	021	017
Depth set	10'	10'	10'	10'
Power	HP	HP	HP	HP
Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Mk. torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	40663	26139	40828	22327
Mk. exploder	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4
Serial No.	2168	17536	434	8799
Actuation set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation actual	Contact	Contact	---	---
Mk. warhead	16-1	16-0	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	3238	2852	3202	12409
Explosives	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.
Firing Interval	---	5 sec.	5 sec.	10 sec.
Type Spread		Divergent	Spread	
Sea Condition	0	0	0	0

Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was following a radical zig plan with groups apparently zig-zagging independently. Escorts were patrolling stations, echo ranging and listening. Approach was undetected until firing. Strong counter measures were started immediately by at least six escorts.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 3 Patrol No. 1
Time: 2323(H) Date 22 June 1944 Lat. 13-10.5N Long. 120-27.

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Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Convoy of 9 ships with about 10 small escorts. Initial contact made at dusk - sighted smoke on horizon through periscope. Remained submerged while convoy passed close aboard; when convoy had passed well clear, surfaced and made end around run using radar ranges and bearings throughout the approach. TBT bearings were used for the final firing bearings, targets being visible through 7X50 binoculars at about 5,000 yards.

Ships sunk: One large AK (unidentified) 8,000 tons.
One medium AK (unidentified) 6,000 tons.

Damage determined by: Observed two hits on first target and one hit on second target. Heard two hits on first target and two hits on second target. Two vessels were seen by radar to drop out of formation and start heading for the beach. Lost radar contact with one of these at 10,000 yards while the other was clearly in sight at 18,000 yards during subsequent attack on convoy. Upon return to attack cripples only one target was visible at 14,000 yards and sound reported loud noises similar to vessel breaking up in general direction of cripple originally lost at 10,000 yards. While attempting to penetrate screen of escorts the remaining radar target suddenly disappeared from view and did not reappear when the range was closed to what should have been 11,000 yards.

Target draft:	24'	Course 340°	Speed: 8 3/4 kts.	Range:	3100 yds.
	20'	340°	8 3/4 kts.		3100 yds.

Own Ship Data

Speed 5 kts. Course 085°T Depth Surface Angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface radar attack - TBT firing bearings.

Tubes Fired	1	2	3	4	5	6
Track angle	075P	075P	077P	080P	080P	082P
Gyro angle	000	359	000	000	359	001
Depth Set	12'	12'	12'	12'	12'	12'
Power	HP	HP	HP	HP	HP	HP
Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss	Hit	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mk. torpedo	23	14-3A	23	23	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	49219	36385	41442	41530	25891	26569

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Mk. esploder	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4
Serial No.	11593	8764	11590	439	2345	2301
Actuation set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation actual	Contact	Contact	---	Contact	Contact	---
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-0	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	9390	12559	11974	9646	3135	3105
Explosives	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.
Firing Interval	---	8 sec.	8sec.	15 sec.	8 sec.	8 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent Spread			Divergent Spread		
Sea Condition	1	1	1	1	1	1

Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Convoy was unaware of the presence of a submarine until the actual hits but were following a regular zig zag plan 20° either side of the base course.
An impulse pressure of 300 lbs. was used.

U.S.S. FLIER Torpedo Attack No. 4 Patrol No. 1
Time: 0023(H) Date: 23 June 1944 Lat. 13-13N Long. 120-00.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Same convoy as in Attack No. 3. As second end around approach was being made the convoy was required to change base course in our direction for navigational reasons. Radar contact was maintained throughout the period between Attack No. 3 and Attack No. 4. Radar ranges and bearings were used throughout the attack - TBT bearings were used as final firing bearings.

Ship Sunk: One medium AK (unidentified) 6,000 tons.

Damage determined by: Bridge personnel observed two hits though three were heard. Ship began smoking badly and was settling by the stern as other vessels of the formation passed around it. This target did not emerge from the target group as seen by the radar and it is believed to have sunk before last ship of formation had passed.

Target draft: 20' Course 295°T Speed; 8 3/4 kts. Range: 3000 yd

Own Ship Data

Speed 9 kts. course 035°T Depth Surface Angle 0°

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface Radar Attack - TBT firing bearings.

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Tubes fired	1	2	3	4
Track angle	80P	80P	82P	83P
Gyro angle	000	359	000	358
Depth Set	12'	12'	12'	12'
Power	HP	HP	HP	HP
Hit	Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Mk. torpedo	23	14-3A	23	14-3A
Serial No.	41556	26567	41618	40328
Mk. exploder	6-4	6-4	6-4	6-4
Serial No.	8800	8762	17840	2599
Actuation set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation actual	Contact	Contact	Contact	---
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-0	16-0
Serial No.	2363	12563	12042	10929
Explosives	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.	Tpx.
Firing Interval	---	8 sec.	8 sec.	8 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent Spread			
Sea condition	1	1	1	1

Overhaul Activity: Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Remarks: Although the convoy was aware of the presence of a submarine as a result of the first attack, this attack was made undetected. Two escorts passed about 1800 yds. on either beam shortly after firing, but did not see us.

(I) Mines. None.

(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics.

Convoys in the Manila area are large and heavily escorted with both destroyers and PC boat types being employed as escorts. They use echo ranging both day and night quite ineffectively and there were no indications of radar being used.

Routine patrols around the Manila area are negligible, however after the attack of June 23rd the area was strongly patrolled by a hunter-killer group consisting of a plane, a destroyer, and several smaller A/S vessels.

A speed of 90 rpm was used at 300 feet to evade A/S attack and seemed to leave most of the depth charges astern.

(K) Major defects and Damage.

1. June 2 - Both high pressure air compressor motors were grounded out due to water being blown into them from the bilges by the rapid venting of negative tank, the vent of which leads into the pump room bilges in

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The immediate vicinity of the compressors. Both motors were disassembled and thoroughly cleaned and dried out and returned to satisfactory operating condition. jFurhter trouble was prevented by exercising extreme care in venting negative.

2. June 13 - Power was lost on the stern planes temporarily three times at critical moments. The three speed switch installed by the navy yard during overhaul proved to be the source of the trouble. The resistances introduced when operating the motor at medium and low speeds cause a decrease in voltage below the amount necessary for proper operation. The motor was operated at normal speed the remainder of the patrol. It is recommended that the three speed switch be investigated and possibly the resistances reduced.

3. Considerable difficulty was encountered throughout the patrol in maintaining the proper adjustment of of the starting panels for the low pressure blowers. This was a repetitive failure in the porper operation of the accelerating contactors and will be investigated more thoroughly during the coming refit period.

(L) Radio.

All serials were received. Much interference was experienced, however none was believed to be due to enemy jamming. Transmissions were completed with little difficulty on the 4235 series. Autnenticators were used at all times with prompt acknowledgement.

(M) Radar.

The SJ and SD radar performance was excellent. This is largely attributable to the expert attention given this gear by HOWELL, A.G. RTlc.

Radar interference was noted on the SJ radar four times. In two of these instances friendly submarines were known to be in our vicinity while no enemy forces were known to be near. In the other two instances enemy forces were known to be present, while although a friendly submarine could have been in the vicinity, its presence was not definitely known.

The first of these two instances was at Lat. 13-10N Long. 120-27E on June 22, while we were tracking an enemy convoy with several escorts. However, nothing in their

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actions indicated they were aware of our presence until we attacked the convoy, and then they never definitely located us.

In the second of these instances on June 23 we had been in contact with a destroyer while submerged and just before sunset in Lat. 14-07N Long. 120-14E. We lost contact as darkness set in, and in a radar sweep just before surfacing the only thing noticeable on the screen was radar interference from about 200°T. Immediately upon surfacing made radar contact at 6,000 yds. on this bearing with what is believed to have been the same destroyer. Although he was aware of our presence in the area, it is quite apparent that he did not have a radar contact on us after we surfaced.

A search was made with the AN/APR-1 radar detector between 80 and 1000 megacycles once each hour while on the surface in the vicinity of enemy bases. We were fooled at first by indications on 185, 205, 250, 283, 305 and 310 megacycles, but these were apparently from intermediate frequencies on the SJ, as they disappeared as soon as that radar was turned off. Although considerable time was spent within fifteen miles of Corregidor and the suspected radar on Lubang Island, we were surprised to get absolutely no indications of enemy radar at any time. While enroute to base we encountered a friendly submarine and made a search and were able to pick up their SD on about 118 megacycles.

Very definite interference picked up on the SD radar, and at first attirbuted to enemy radars, was subsequently discovered to be caused by a defect in our own transmitter.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions.

Sound conditions were uniformily good throughout the patrol. The QC/QB gear was much more effective than the JP-1 sound equipment. The JPwas unable to contact anything at a greater range than 3,000 yards.

(O) Density Layers.

In the South China Sea west of the Luzon coast no surface layers were encountered. All gradients

Were negative with a step of from two to ten degrees at some point between 100 and 200ffeet.

The average periscope depth echo range was between 2000 and 3500 yards with a ping range of about 2000 yards. The assured range varied between 1200 and 1800 yards and was usually at a depth of 250 feet.

It was noted that the negative gradient became sharper as the coast was approached increasing to as much as 8 degrees five miles off shore. Conversely the negative gradient became as low as 2 degrees some distance from the coast.

(P) Health, Food and Habitability.

The ship's company enjoyed excellent health throughout the patrol with no days being lost due to sickness.

The food was quite good with the ice cream freezer being a very welcome addition.

In general the habitability was good with the possible exception of the forward torpedo room. This space gets little circulation of air and remains hot and uncomfortable in the tropics even while operating on the surface. It is recommended that an additional cooling unit similar to the one in the conning tower be installed in the forward battery with a booster blower to increase the supply of air to the forward torpedo room.

(Q) Personnel.

A large percentage of both officer and enlisted personnel received their first combat experience during this patrol. Their performance of duty was exceptional and reflected the soundness of the underway training programs conducted at New London and Pearl Harbor.

Extensive use of the available training facilities ashore from the time the crew was first formed until the present has paid dividends. In addition, the extended period from commissioning until this patrol together with a small personnel turnover has resulted in more than the average training for a new boat.

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(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used.

Pearl Harbor to Area	5888 Mi.	57,000 Gals.
In Area	1750 Mi.	14,000 Gals.
Area to Fremantle, W.A.	2914 Mi.	42,000 Gals.

(S) Duration.

Days enroute to Area - 19 days.
Days in Area - 14 days.
Days enroute to Base - 11 days.
Days submerged - 19 days.

(T) Factors of Endurance Remaining.

Torpedoes Number	Fuel Gals.	Provisions Days	Personnel Factor Days
4	1500	30	20

Limiting factor this patrol: Effective expenditure of torpedoes.

(U) The two Manila bound convoys that we encountered were proceeding so to arrive off Corregidor at daylight. There is considerable shipping in this vicinity, and it is considered that several boats could be effectively employed in this area simultaneously. Direct VHF voice radio communication would be of considerable assistance.